

McGRAW-HILL PUBLICATIONS IN SOCIOLOGY
EDWARD BYRON REUTER, CONSULTING EDITOR

INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

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INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

BY

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PREFACE

The aim of this book is to give an introductory but consistent and integrated presentation of sociological theory. The only principle capable of giving synthetic unity to sociological science is the concept of social interaction; the communication of men is the essence of social reality at the same time that it is the source and origin of all that is distinctly human. The book is built around this central concept. The purpose of the book determines its content and organization: it seeks to explain rather than merely to describe the phenomena with which it deals; it emphasizes general processes rather than factual details.

This presentation of sociology makes somewhat greater demands on the ability and application of the beginning student than does a descriptive and discursive discussion of concrete social problems or social phenomena, but the profit is more than correspondingly great. While every effort has been made to present the ideas simply and in the clearest possible form, often with an abundance of concrete illustrative material, there has been no effort to secure simplicity at the price of triviality and superficiality. The book is not more difficult than modern college texts in other fields where some degree of abstract thought is necessary; in view of the inherent complexity of the subject matter and the necessity for some degree of abstract thought if relationships, as well as factual material, are to be understood, we see no reason why it should be less difficult.

The book is so arranged as to meet the needs of either a semester or a year course: the text material alone is adequate to the usual term or semester class; supplemented by the exercises, problems, and readings outlined, it is adequate to the needs of year courses. The supplementary readings are, in general, from materials adapted to the ability and interest of beginning students. Only occasional reference is made to such systematic treatises as House's *The Range of Social Theory* and Eubank's *Concepts of Sociology* which are designed for the use of more advanced students.

The repetition that appears in the various chapters is intentional; its explanation is the fact that the book is designed to serve the needs of beginning students.

The obligations of the authors may not and need not be stated in detail. We have drawn freely from many sources and recognize our indebtedness to a host of writers in the social field. In view of the nature of the book we have not felt it necessary, or indeed appropriate, to attempt to acknowledge the indebtedness in detail. Ideas are the property of those who are able to use them; they bear no copyright. Footnotes appear in the text, therefore, only where we have consciously used the verbal forms of previous writers. Sociologists will be able to identify, without elaborate citations, the sources of much that is contained in the book; the beginning students, whose interests we have chiefly in mind, are best served by directing their attention to ideas rather than to the authorship of particular word forms.

E. B. REUTER.

C. W. HART.

IOWA CITY, IOWA,
April, 1933.

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INTRODUCTION TO SOCIOLOGY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It is the purpose of the present chapter to give in broad outline some preliminary information in regard to the general nature of sociology and to indicate its relations to related fields of study. The popular notions of sociology are numerous and diverse: they vary from vague conceptions of a social philosophy or a culture history at the one extreme to more or less definite ideas of concrete social problems and welfare programs at the other. In consequence of the popular misconceptions, students often enroll for courses in sociology anticipating a body of subject matter quite foreign to the actual content of the scientific discipline. The present chapter is designed to dispel, at least in part, these popular misconceptions. It also seeks to furnish a preliminary orientation and a tentative point of view for those students who elect to enter upon a serious, intensive, and objective study of social reality.

A. THE SOCIAL HERITAGE

The general patterns of human life and human behavior are everywhere much the same. Articulate speech is a human power and every group has developed a language sufficient for its needs. Organized systems of control are universal: every group has its legal regulations, its property conceptions, its moral codes, and its artistic practices. There is no group known to be without an organized sex and family life. All groups of men have conceived of supernatural beings before whom they bow in reverence or in fear. No group is without its body of philosophic doctrine in terms of which external nature is made intelligible and man's

position therein made tolerable. The same fundamental institutions are found among all peoples and in all times; all cultures are built on the same ground pattern.

It is, however, only in form and general content that cultures are alike; they differ widely in detail. All races and peoples, for example, have an educational system designed to insure the solidarity of the group by transmitting the prevailing body of beliefs and practices. But the methods of education may vary from the incidental and informal acquisition of practice and belief in the ordinary routine of daily life to the ritualistic formality of ceremonial initiation or to the systematic *régime* of the modern school. The educational content may vary from purely vocational training at the one extreme to the memorizing of ritual or conjugation at the other. The method and purpose and the aim and content vary with the culture group, but there is no group without a fairly coherent body of educational practice. The facts are similar as regards other institutional forms and practices and in regard to conceptions of life and of behavior appropriate in defined relations. There is similarity, if not identity, in general pattern but there is endless variety in the detail and specific content of human cultures.

The term culture as it is here used, and as it is used generally in history and the social sciences, must not be confused with the evaluative concept of popular discussion and polite literature. In the latter sense it connotes refinement in taste and manner resulting from training and education; it implies superiority, disciplined restraint, and familiarity with the conventions. But in social science culture refers to the mode of life of a people. It is, in Tylor's famous definition, "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."¹ It includes the whole complex of individual activities, the material as well as the immaterial. When we speak of Greek culture, Oriental culture, Eskimo culture we have reference to the totality of attainment characteristic of the particular social order.

The social heritage, as the phrase is used in sociology, is very similar in meaning to the word culture. It connotes the social as distinct from the physical environment. It is the body of achievement, the material and objective facts as well as the

¹ E. B. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*, Vol. I, p. 1.

mental organization resulting from and underlying them, that is socially transmitted. The culture of one generation is the social heritage of the next and succeeding generations.

The existing culture of any group, the social heritage it transmits, is the residuum of a long period of accumulation in the effort to satisfy human need. No part of the social heritage is a gift of nature; it is all the result of human effort. Its basic similarity from group to group is an expression of the common needs of mankind. The curious diversities that appear reflect the differences in material and stimulation.

Culture facts once invented have an independent existence, a natural history of their own. It is possible to trace the evolution of culture and of specific culture facts without reference to their creators or users. Language, for example, is a culture fact invented by man to serve human need. But it is possible to trace the growth and evolution of a language as an independent reality. It undergoes an orderly change in form and structure apart from any intention or awareness of its creators and users. So it is in regard to other culture elements and in regard to the complex as a whole. It has an independent existence, develops according to inherent principles, and must be understood in terms of itself.

It is one part of the task of sociology to define the social heritage as a product of human activity and as an influence in subsequent behavior and relations.

B. THE PERSON

The sociologist is concerned not alone with the social heritage but also with the human personality and its development.

The various discrete units of the population possess a marked similarity by virtue of membership in the same animal species. Each individual unit has, in general, the same bodily structure, the same physical organs, the same complement of reflexes. Each passes through the same stages of physical development; each has the same appetites, capacities, and organic needs. The similarity is such that the human being is never mistaken for any other animal form.

But these biological individuals are not identical. There are gross differences in race, sex, and age, and within each of these major divisions are continuous individual differences in physique,

stature, and other physical traits. The variations are always within the species limitation, but no two individuals are alike in physical form and appearance.

These likenesses and differences are physical in character. Each individual owes the general features that identify him as a human being, as well as the features that distinguish him from every other unit of the population, to the fact of biological heredity and physical growth. The likenesses and differences, their transmission from generation to generation, and their variation from individual to individual are matters of biological and psychological interest and concern. As such they lie outside the field of sociology except in so far as they condition or determine phenomena on the sociological level.

But there are other likenesses and differences that are acquired. At the time of its entrance into the world, the human child is the most helpless and plastic of living organisms. It is capable of certain reflex acts as crying, coughing, and sneezing, and the vegetative processes—respiration, digestion, and the like—function from the beginning. The newborn child makes a limited number of random and uncoordinated movements in response to external and internal stimulation. The most characteristic fact about these early movements is their plasticity; they are capable of indefinite modification and varied combinations. Out of the limited repertoire of physiological responses had from birth, a reaction system is gradually built up. The reflex and spontaneous responses are gradually coordinated and integrated into habit systems in accordance with the environmental demands. As the child develops, his environment expands: he learns the language and acquires the tradition of the group of which, in a physical sense, he is a part.

The body of habits that may be formed is limited of course by the nature of the organism, by its degree of plasticity and capability of modification under stimulation. But the behavior patterns themselves are determined by the stimuli to which the organism responds: the child forms habits in accord with the environmental patterns. He has, for example, the capacity for articulate speech—this is an anatomical trait of the biological form—but the particular language and the language habits the child acquires are determined by the group into which he is born. The same thing is true in other respects; his organized body of behavior conforms to group patterns.

In the group life the child plays various rôles, thereby forming new response combinations and reconditioning earlier-formed habit patterns. In the developmental process he comes to a conception of himself as separate from others and to a conception of his place in the group life. In the earlier social contacts he is a different child in each situation. He has a different status and plays a different rôle in each group of which he is a part. Consequently he has a different conception of himself and is, in reality, a different child in each group. But gradually, as a result of his adjustment to the expanding environment, the various selves of the child fuse and he becomes an integrated personality.

To understand this human personality as defined by the individual's *milieu* and the social heritage, and the subsequent behavior of the person in determining the heritage itself, is a major sociological objective.

C. THE SOCIAL PROCESS

The person and the culture are mutually created and interdependent. The individual comes into the world an animal devoid of any distinctive human trait; in the course of development he acquires a human nature. The characteristics of that acquired nature depend upon the culture complex by which he is conditioned and in which he presently comes to participate. But, conversely, this culture complex is the cumulative result of man's effort to satisfy his animal and human needs.

It is the fundamental task of the science of sociology to analyze the processes by means of which human nature is formed and culture developed.

By the term process we should understand the sequence of occurrences by means of which transition is made from one condition to another. When we speak, for example, of a manufacturing process we have reference to the series of actions or steps in transforming the raw material into the fabricated article. A natural process is the way in which phenomena regularly recur in nature. The process of decomposition, for example, is the series of changes a chemical compound undergoes as it disintegrates into its component elements. A social process is always a natural process. It is the sequence of steps by which transition is made from one social condition to another.

This concept of process underlies all fundamental science. The natural sciences are in their fundamental character nothing other

than a search for and a description of the natural processes. The biological sciences undertake an analysis of the life processes; psychology, the conscious processes; and sociology, the social processes. The goal of each natural science, including sociology, is the formulation of scientific laws—that is, generalized descriptive statements of natural processes that define the way in which events regularly occur.

D. SOCIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE

The general problem that sociology sets for itself is a description of the social process. It seeks to discover the mechanisms of social interaction that account for the development of personality and the changes in culture. Emphasis may be placed upon either aspect of the problem.

With a minimum of attention to social and institutional organization, we may study personality and trace its development through contact and communication. This may be done genetically through a study of the contacts and experiences, the life history, of persons and groups. On the other hand, assuming the acting human personalities, we may study the practices and beliefs, folkways and *mores*, standards and customs, ritual and ceremonial, in short the whole body of social fact as expressed in the practices and rules of behavior and in the institutional norms and organization. This, again, may be done genetically by tracing their origin, development, function, and organization in a single group or, comparatively, by a parallel examination of many groups. Or it may be done analytically by examination of the nature and organization of the customary norms as they spontaneously recur, function, and change in the social life of the group.

Whether the immediate point of view be the person or the body of culture fact, and whether the method of approach be analytical or genetic, the fundamental object of attention is always the abstract social process, the mechanism of interaction that determines both personality development and culture organization.

The ultimate aim of sociology, like that of all science, is practical. Immediately, it seeks to understand the fundamental mechanisms of social reality. This may be done only when the problems of research are formulated independently and without utilitarian bias. But the desire to understand is always motivated

by the wish to control. Sociology seeks to understand in order that ultimately there may be a social organization that will make possible a higher type of human nature that will, in turn, produce a superior type of social organization. But the science is practical only in this ultimate sense that all truth is assumed to be of utilitarian value.

In a sense this is the problem and the goal of all the social disciplines; they are all seeking to understand social reality. The nature and scope of sociology may be clarified and made specific by distinguishing it from other fields of study.

E. SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY

A most important and frequently confused distinction is that between history and the literary arts on the one hand and the social sciences on the other. The two may be easily and simply distinguished. They differ in method, purpose, and point of view.

History deals with unique events. It seeks to reconstruct the past in all its variety and individuality; it endeavors to give a realistic picture of concrete reality. Its purpose and function are to give an understanding of past events in the sense of an appreciation. All of its data have definite loci in time and place: each event has a name and a date. It is, in method and purpose and spirit, more closely allied to literature than it is to science.

Sociology, on the other hand, has no interest in phenomena that do not recur. It does not seek to give a realistic picture of social reality. It seeks uniformities in behavior as the basis of generalization and prediction. It is interested in the recurring elements whose endless recombinations make the unique events that history describes. It seeks to understand by discovering the causal relations that obtain between the elements whose varied combinations produce the unique gross phenomena that furnish the object matter of common observation and historical account.

The now popular history of social life and institutions is in no sense to be confused with sociology. It emphasizes an aspect of the life of peoples somewhat or completely neglected by the historians of an earlier generation. As history, it is doubtless superior to the earlier pattern: it gives a more complete and accurate picture of the reality. But just as the older political history is not the science of law, and just as economic history is

not economics so the so-called social history is not sociology. It has a distinct purpose and function.

There is of course a close relation and a degree of mutual dependence between the social sciences and the historic disciplines. The sociologist relies upon the students of history for such historical material as he may have occasion to use. The historian, on the other hand, in so far as he aspires to be more than a chronicler, is dependent upon sociology, as he is upon economics and political science, for the principles of human behavior and social organization that alone make it possible for him to find the meaning and order in the phenomena he studies.

F. SOCIOLOGY AND THE GENERAL SCIENCES

It is possible to point differences and show relationships between the scientific disciplines in different ways. There are similarities and differences in subject matter as well as in methods, problems, and points of view. There are numerous relationships of an historic order resulting from the course of development. Individual scientists sometimes work and make contributions in more than one field, thus establishing a sort of personal relationship between the disciplines themselves. Discovery in one field often stimulates development in another where the new methods or findings are or seem to be applicable. And various other more or less accidental and superficial likenesses and differences may be pointed out.

But any fundamental differentiation must of necessity run in terms of processes. All sciences are, in the final analysis, merely systematic efforts to discover and define natural processes. The relations of the sciences are in consequence determined by the relations existing between the processes of nature. In any unitary view of the universe, these processes are, in varying degrees of immediacy, interrelated and interdependent. Consequently the sciences that describe them are more or less interrelated and mutually dependent. The generality of any science, whether it would class as a general or a special science, is determined by the generality of the processes it describes.

A few illustrations will make the essential relationships clear.

Geographic and climatic conditions are important preconditions of social life. They determine in part the location, distribution, and movement of peoples. Various regions of the earth are ill adapted to human habitation. Some are practically

uninhabited because of extremes of temperature; others are sparsely populated because of excessive rainfall, scarcity of rainfall, unproductive soil, broken terrain, and various other discouraging features of the natural environment. Other natural features—moderate climate, fertile soil, abundant resources, and the like—attract people at the same time that they make possible the existence of a dense population.

The geographic conditions and the natural resources are basic to the mode of life: hunting, fishing, agriculture, and other forms. They determine in general the characteristics of the culture area. The density of the population and the mode of life of the people determine the division of labor and the degree and kind of cooperation. Thus geographic factors, operating chiefly through their determining effect upon population density, condition the form of the social organization and thus determine the number and type of human contacts. Topography, conditioned of course by the location of natural resources, is instrumental in determining trade routes, consequently in determining areas of contact and isolation. The presence of a long unbroken coast line has been an important factor in the cultural backwardness of the African peoples.

All these and related facts of the physical environment are questions of human geography and are subjected to minute and critical examination by a specialized group of scholars. The sociologist is engaged in the study of human interaction in its effect in developing personality types and culture forms. In so far as the geographic facts make for an increase or limitation of contacts they have sociological interest and significance. But their analysis and study are not sociology. They are not in the field of social interaction; they are rather a precondition to interaction. Many other facts limit human contacts or operate to increase them and hence give rise to phenomena on the sociological level. Language differences, for example, are as effective in limiting communication as is physical distance. The biological differences of race and sex and the sentimental barriers of religion and nationality also limit contact and condition communication. From the point of view of the sociologist these are all conditioning factors, but they are external to the problems he studies. The external physical environment has great significance in creating and conditioning the phenomena that sociology studies, but its investigation lies outside the sociologist's field of study.

The central problem of biological science is a description and proximate explanation of the life process. It is concerned with the origin and evolution of the various plant and animal forms. It deals with the problem of species continuity in inheritance through discrete units; with variation, the struggle for existence, and the conditions of survival; with species change in adaptation to environmental conditions; with mutational change and the establishment of new forms; and with the various subsidiary life processes. Its ultimate task is an explanation of life through an understanding of the mechanisms by means of which it works. The data are drawn from all living forms. Human beings have a biological aspect; as a form of organism they fall within the orbit of biological concern. The organic facts and processes manifested in human beings are legitimate and important object material for biological study. The studies of heredity and human genetics as such are strictly biological inquiries. The reproductive processes, birth and death rates, disease and defect, organic variation, climatic adaptation, race and sex and individual differences, and many other phenomena of human life are biological or present a biological aspect. With its attention on life processes biology is interested in these phenomena as they appear in man and elsewhere.

These and other facts, essentially biological, condition phenomena that hold the attention of sociological students. The type of social organization possible is determined by the type of biological material. Culture and civilization are in no sense biological, but they are possible for man and impossible for other animal forms because of differences in biological structure. Personality is a social phenomenon but the type of personality and the extent of personal development are set, within broad limits, by the biological nature of the human organism.

In a more concrete and specific way, biological facts and processes define certain problems on the sociological plane. Sex, for example, is a physical and biological fact and, as such, falls within the group of biological problems. But the fact of sex is made the basis for differential treatment. There arises in consequence a rich variety of cultural and personality differences that are in no sense biological and totally outside the possibility of biological understanding. The differential treatment accorded the sexes and its cultural consequences are sociological data. They would have no existence except for the biological fact but

are themselves on a totally different plane of reality. Race, physical defect, mental deficiency, neural organization, and various other biologically determined facts give rise to phenomena essentially sociological.

In a similar way the facts and conditions of social life give rise to problems on the biological plane. The segregation and isolation of individuals because of occupation, belief, race, defect, and the like and the consequent results on personality types and culture organization are sociological problems. But the social facts give rise to close inbreeding, and its effects, if any, are matters of biological attention and research. Slavery is a form of social and industrial organization that, as such, has no biological interest. The same is true of commerce and international trade. But these lead to the contact and amalgamation of divergent racial groups and set problems that are biological.

The biological and sociological problems and processes are thus distinct but intimately related. The sociological problems that arise from the biological data cannot be explained in biological terms or investigated by biological means. Nor can the biological problems arising in consequence of social conditions be profitably pursued by the sociological technique of investigation. Biology and sociology study different orders of reality that are independent but intimately related.

The fundamental distinction between psychology and sociology, like that between the other general sciences, is that which exists between the processes they study. Psychology undertakes to isolate and define the processes of conscious life, to explain the mental nature of the individual. The conscious processes are always individual processes. The point of view of psychology is, therefore, the individual; the problem is that of individual reaction. The interest, moreover, is in the more elementary conscious phenomena—instinct, emotion, ideation, and the like—since these are the only ones common to all individuals. To the end of explaining conscious processes, psychology isolates the individual from his social environment and treats the individual as a distinct entity. The particular effort may be to determine the form and content of the conscious processes, to determine the organic processes that accompany them, or to determine the individual behavior reactions to given stimuli. The method may be that of introspective analysis or that of observation and experimentation. The findings in any case are always psychical

or physical facts connected with the individual as a biological organism.

Sociology undertakes to isolate and define the processes of social interaction that create the human person as distinct from the biological individual. The problem is to explain personality, social behavior, and the evolution of social organization. The point of view is that of the group.

G. SOCIOLOGY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Human behavior in the social world is the phenomenon to be explained by the social sciences. In consequence, the position is sometimes taken that there are no social sciences but only a social science. But generally it is acknowledged that there is a series of social sciences, and most beginning students have at least a general idea as to the subject matter of each. But that a delimitation of the various fields, in a way satisfactory to the authorities in each, is difficult is manifest in the variety of treatment accorded the problem by different writers.

Differentiation may be made in several ways, each of which has value for specific purposes. The division of the social studies in the curricula of educational institutions is arbitrary, accidental, expedient, or mechanical, hence not worthy of attention. It is easy to make distinction in historic terms by pointing out how each arose, with the appearance of distinctive problems and points of view, from an earlier and less differentiated body of subject matter. Attempt is sometimes made to point distinctions and show relationships in terms of the body of doctrine characteristic of each. Certain writers emphasize distinctive points of view while others would make problems, scientific or practical, the fundamental criterion. Other distinctions are possible and, for specific purposes, valid and useful.

Political science approaches human reality from the point of view of the political process. It is fundamentally concerned to define the political process as such. It describes the origin and evolution of states, the organization and administration of the governmental machinery by means of which control is exercised in human groups.

Now the processes of political control do not exist in a social vacuum: they are at every point conditioned by the concomitant operation of economic, ethical, and other processes underlying human reality. There is a fundamental interdependence among

the processes. In so far as attention is directed to the institution of government, there are intimate relations with the economic, family, and other contemporaneous institutions and with the totality of the social organization as analyzed by sociology. Political science is immediately and intimately related to the human-nature side of sociology—the part sometimes designated social psychology. From the sociological point of view the organization and functioning of the political institutions is one important element in the determination of the human nature which sociology studies. The political process is one manifestation of the general social process.

The relationship of economics and sociology must be understood in a similar way. Economics, as a science, undertakes to define and describe the process by virtue of which price is fixed and goods exchanged. Incident to and a consequence of the economic process are the economic institutions and organization of society. The economic process itself is, of course, a pure abstraction—one manifestation of the social process in general. As such its expression is conditioned by the other natural processes. The economic institutions, through which the process itself must be studied, are conditioned by the other contemporaneous institutions as government, education, and family. Economics is therefore related to sociology on both the personal-ity side and the cultural side. An understanding of economic institutions and their functioning involves an understanding of human personalities and the related culture institutions that are object matter for sociological study. On the other hand, human nature itself as well as the social organization in general is, in part, the result and expression of the past and present organization of the economic life.

H. SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL TECHNOLOGY

The relation of science to the practical arts is usually indirect. In some instances scientific doctrine may be utilized immediately to practical purposes. In such cases there may exist an applied science, that is, an organization of the laws and principles of a theoretical discipline to the solution of some group of problems of concrete reality. Navigation is essentially an applied science of astronomy. The discoveries of chemistry are in some cases of immediate utilitarian value and there is in consequence an applied science of industrial chemistry.

But such application of theoretical science is unusual. Each science arrives at its laws and principles through the analytical isolation of certain processes. The generalizations arrived at are abstractly stated and valid in the realm of abstraction only. There are few problems of concrete reality that may be solved by the exclusive use of the principles of any one science; the concrete problems of reality are rarely the expression of any one set of processes alone, they involve processes studied by different sciences. Medicine, for example, is not an applied chemistry nor an applied biology. It is, therefore, not an applied science but an independent organization and integration of chemical and biological data.

The solution of practical problems requires data organized in relation to the concrete social situation in which it is necessary to act. Now the data of the theoretical sciences are organized from an entirely different point of view, that of the discovery of truth. Before the findings are practical they must be reorganized from the other angle. Moreover, the solution of practical problems requires the use of data from different sources. Consequently, there are few applied sciences in any accurate use of the term. The mobilization of data from different scientific sources and their independent organization and orientation toward the problems of daily experience are the function not of science or of applied science but of technology.

One or two concrete illustrations will make clear the relation between social science and social technology.

Public finance, often conceived as a problem of applied economics, involves decisions in regard to various questions involving data that economic science does not supply. Taxation, whether or not so designed, is a method of redistributing income, hence it involves social and ethical questions that economic theory cannot answer. It also involves the processes and functions of government studied by political science. It also involves questions investigated by psychology and sociology. Clearly, then, any competent consideration of tax policy will utilize the pertinent data from ethics, psychology, political science, sociology, and other disciplines as well as those from economics. Truly, an economist may study public finance, but in so far as he does so as an economist rather than as a social technologist his practical proposals will be limited, biased, and unworkable.

Crime is a problem of social life but hardly a problem of science. In its study, use is made of data from sociology, economics, law, psychiatry, psychology, biology, and other sources. Data from the various sources are organized from a special point of view and focused upon the complex body of reality. In the concrete problem are involved facts of mentality, personality, economic and social status, administration of justice, prejudice, tradition, custom, and so on through the whole range of social forces acting to determine human behavior in individual situations. This calls for a technological, rather than a scientific, organization and point of view.

These cases are illustrative merely. Social problems are bits of concrete reality unified on the basis of the immediate situation in which action is necessary. They are not scientific problems: their solution is a problem of technology, only indirectly of science. Sociology studies human personality as it manifests itself in all the different social situations and as it determines and is determined by these situations. In this way it arrives at the general principles of personality and human behavior. This information is necessary in the solution of any practical problem of the social life. Sociology thus contributes data and principles indispensable in dealing successfully with practical problems but it is not itself a technological discipline.

I. SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL PRACTICE

The practical arts rest directly upon technologies, indirectly upon the fundamental sciences. The sciences furnish the principles, the technology the practical organization, the arts apply the technological rules to concrete situations. A single illustration will suffice. Education is an organization of certain principles of psychology and sociology; school teaching is an art based directly upon the technology of education which, in turn, rests upon the abstract sciences. The essential distinction between the sciences and the arts was clearly and simply stated by John Stuart Mill:

These two ideas differ from one another as the understanding differs from the will, or as the indicative mood in grammar differs from the imperative. The one deals in facts, the other in precepts. Science is a collection of *truths*; art is a body of *rules*, or directions for conduct. The language of science is, This is, or, This is not; This does, or does not, happen.

The language of art is, Do this; Avoid that. Science takes cognizance of a *phenomenon*, and endeavors to discover its *law*; art proposes to itself an *end*, and looks out for *means* to effect it.¹

J. THE SOCIOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW

A point of view is a position from which reality is observed and interpreted. In a purely physical sense it signifies a point in space. A person may observe a physical object, say a building, but the things and relations he sees and reports will be very different from the things and relations seen and reported by a second observer who views it from the opposite side. Two persons may examine the same book but if one is interested in its subject matter and the other in its format and manufacture their reports may have nothing in common.

The social sciences all deal with man in his social relations. But they approach the concrete reality interested in finding answers to very different questions. The economist, with his attention on market price and distribution, sees the totality, if he sees it at all, in relation to that process. The political scientist, interested in the processes of formal control, sees the totality of human behavior from that angle. The ethicist sees it from the point of view of moral sanction. And so for each of the disciplines that find their problems in human behavior.

The sociological point of reference is the human group. The attention is on the general processes of human interaction as manifested in all phases of collective life. The interest is on just those things—human nature and the social organization—that are, for the most part, and properly, assumed data for the other social sciences. The sociologist interprets human reality from the point of view of the inclusive processes of associated life.

K. METHOD AND RESEARCH TECHNIQUES

In scientific literature the term *method* is very loosely used. It is commonly made to include both the methods of reasoning and the specific aids to observation. The fundamental logical processes by means of which evidence leads to conclusion are always the main method and are common to all the sciences.

¹ J. S. Mill, *Essays on Some Unsettled Questions of Political Economy*, Essay V, p. 124.

The necessary steps in the process are observation, classification, and inference.

It follows from what was said above in regard to point of view that each social science separates the data and processes that it is concerned to analyze from the complex reality of sense experience. Science proceeds on a plane of abstraction. It is interested in formulating generalizations of general validity; it is not interested in giving a realistic picture. The first step in scientific method, therefore, is the preliminary analysis of the gross phenomena to separate the processes and problems that are to be studied in isolation.

In approaching a concrete research problem the investigator sets up the most reasonable hypothesis he is able to formulate. This is always tentative and subject to modification and restatement on the discovery of relations that contradict or fall outside the statement as formulated. The procedure of scientific research is the attempt to verify the hypothesis advanced. To this end the scientific student makes use of whatever means or devices are applicable to the problem in hand.

There are various technical devices which may be useful in procuring evidence or as aids to inference. They are always subsidiary and auxiliary to the fundamental logical methods. The microscope is an aid to observation and measurement of certain phenomena that otherwise could not be observed and measured or could not be so well observed or so accurately measured. The telescope falls in the same class: it is auxiliary to the processes of mathematical reasoning on which the astronomer relies. The so-called laboratory method is a technique of isolation, of manipulation apart from conditioning reality, that observation and inference may be more exact and certain. These and other devices are to aid the fundamental logical processes; they are in no sense substitutes for them. They are very numerous and differ from one science to another and even from problem to problem within the same science.

Several auxiliary procedures are used and found useful by students of social and sociological phenomena. It is quite usual to find in the literature enthusiastic statements concerning the superiority of one procedure in comparison with others. The advocates of a certain technique frequently assume a patronizing attitude toward, or even profess a profound contempt for, other procedures which they dismiss as lacking in scientific value.

Such statements are frequently interesting as expressions of personal bias but are not otherwise valuable. No device has value in itself; it is useful only in so far as it contributes to the discovery of significant truth. In general the special techniques apply to different material or problems or to different steps in research procedure. When applied to the same matter, each, so far as it has validity as a means of discovery, will supplement and corroborate the others.

All science in a way is an extension and a refinement and correction of common sense. The common-sense procedure is generalization from data which come to hand. Its limitations lie in the fact that the data coming within the observation of the person are very limited, they are highly selected because of the restricted contacts of the observer, and they are restricted to the obvious, and generally superficial, aspects of reality. Inference on the basis of common-sense observation has the additional disadvantage of indefinite bias. A fact reported is always an interpretation. The untrained person does not see the reality he observes; he sees it in relation to his belief and previous experience, in terms of the traditional conceptions and conventional standards to which he is habituated.

The so-called historical method is a refinement of common-sense procedure and has certain obvious advantages. Instead of depending upon personal and chance observation it employs the data furnished by the historian. This gives an immensely larger body of observation, and it gives a body of data that the historians have made elaborate efforts to verify as to accuracy. And in the better use of such materials they are viewed in the light of independently developed principles rather than in terms of the prepossessions of folklore and common sense. The procedure always labors under the disadvantage of dealing with the superficial: history records happenings, the aspects of reality that are observed and recorded. The data may show trends, movements, and the like, but they throw little or no light on the question of scientific importance—the mechanisms that underlie and account for the phenomenal appearances that are observed and recorded.

The survey is an extension rather than a refinement of the common-sense procedure. In practice it has been chiefly the collection of a large body of factual data in regard to easily observed phenomena. The enumeration procedure of the federal

census is the survey in its most extensive form. Often the procedure is invalidated by the fact that the data are collected to serve as evidence in support of some reform campaign. The survey is in its nature preliminary. It may serve to locate a problem to be stated and defined for scientific study by other means. So far not much success has resulted from the effort to develop the survey as a valid research tool. It lends itself admirably to investigation; it seems to have limited value in scientific research.

The statistical technique has come into great vogue in America in recent years. It is a semimechanical device that permits the use of calculating machines and the statement of results in quantitative form. It makes a strong appeal to certain types of mind.

The technique, while it has limited value in scientific sociology at the present time, must not be neglected. A quantitative statement is generally to be preferred when it can be used. It tends to minimize the individual bias of investigators, it makes easy the verification by other investigators, it makes easily evident the margin of error, and it replaces vague descriptive words with precise mathematical formulae. It is apparently admirably suited to the study of certain types of problems though not, apparently, to others. There are many phenomena that do not at present lend themselves to quantitative study. Suitable means of measurement may presently be found for these problems and situations, but at present many resist this form of approach and it may be that some will continue to do so. Just as the technique has small use in the organic and inorganic realms—in the science of geology, for example, it has no use at all—it may prove to have only a limited value in social science.

The technique is of great value where applicable and when competently used. At present its chief use in sociology appears to be as a means of delimiting and stating problems that must be scientifically studied by other means. The effort to secure exact measurements in social phenomena should be extended where possible but should not militate against the use of productive non-quantitative efforts to arrive at truth. The statistical device is not essential to reputable science and it is not necessarily superior to other procedure. It is one among various valid means of discovering truth.

The method of case analysis must not be confused with the so-called case-work method of the social worker. The latter is

the collection of certain data in regard to the person or the family with which the practitioner must deal in a practical way. Its purpose is to determine the care or treatment that will be most likely to produce the results desired. In case study as a scientific method the aim is the discovery of underlying mechanisms that will make possible classification and hence the discovery of uniformities. It is a special application of the monographic method of the social anthropologists.

L. THE PLAN OF THE VOLUME

The present volume is designed as an elementary but systematic introduction to sociology as a science. The introductory chapters define human nature in terms of original nature, the person, and the social forces. The following group of chapters approaches the problem from the point of view of the group and its social heritage. Then follows a treatment of social contact and the forms of social interaction. This is followed by chapters on the forms and mechanisms of social control. The volume closes with a discussion of collective behavior.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the interest that led you to enroll for a course in sociology. What did you anticipate would be the nature of the subject matter? Do you see that the nature of the course, as you understand it from the reading of the chapter, will be of any value in your understanding of personal and social problems? How will an understanding of general principles aid in understanding concrete problems?
2. "Sociology is whatever is taught under that name." In what sense is this true? In what sense is it a mere quibble?
3. Compare and contrast some two peoples, as the Chinese and the Americans or the French and the English, by the ways in which the social heritages of the two are alike and the ways in which they differ.
4. What is the dictionary definition of culture? Does the usage in the text differ from that recorded in the dictionary you use? If so, in what respects?
5. Define the term *person*. In what respects are all persons alike? In what respects do they differ?
6. Turn to the dictionary for a definition of personality. In what way, if at all, does the present usage differ from the definition you find?
7. Enumerate a number of specific characteristics of persons that you consider to be biological traits. Make a second list of traits that you think are culturally acquired.
8. Enumerate the steps in some manufacturing process, such as the making of a button, a coat, or a basket.

9. Give the sequence steps in a political process—say a trial by jury or an act of legislation. Is political science as you know it interested in political processes or in the history and forms of government?

10. Trace the steps in an economic process of your own selection.

11. Give the steps in some natural process, such as the course of typhoid fever, measles, or other disease. Is the process of the disease you have followed an abstraction? Does any specific case exactly follow the sequence as you have outlined it?

12. What is a scientific law? Give an illustration and show that your illustration meets the requirements of your definition.

13. Take some generalization of physics, as the law of gravitation, and give an accurate statement of the law. Show that it is not true for any phenomenon in the known universe.

14. State the general problem of sociology in your own words and explain the ways in which each aspect of the general problem may be studied.

15. In what sense is science practical? In what sense is the purpose of sociology practical?

16. Distinguish between history and natural history; history and natural science. What are the characteristic objectives that distinguish the study of history from the study of sociology.

17. Distinguish between the historical method and the method of science in dealing with (a) earthquakes, (b) wheat, (c) dogs, (d) migrations, (e) war, (f) disease.

18. Each generation must write its own history of the past. Explain this statement and give illustrations in its proof or disproof.

19. Any fundamental differentiation among the sciences must be made in terms of the processes they seek to define. Explain and illustrate this in the case of two sciences, as physics and chemistry or geology and geography.

20. Explain in what sense blindness or feeble-mindedness is a biological problem. Is it a practical problem? A sociological problem?

21. Is psychology as a science interested in the person or in the individual? Explain. How do you distinguish between "the individual" and "the person"?

22. Enumerate the chief social sciences. In what sense do they constitute a single body of science?

23. Distinguish between two of the disciplines you enumerated above in terms of (a) origin, (b) body of doctrine, (c) points of view, and (d) problems.

24. Define pure and applied science. Give examples of each and show in what sense they are "pure" or "applied."

25. Show in what sense engineering, agriculture, education, medicine, or other discipline with which you may be somewhat familiar is a technology rather than an applied science.

26. To what scientific disciplines would it be necessary to turn for information in order to formulate an immigration policy?

27. "Social problems are bits of concrete reality; they are not scientific problems." Explain and illustrate.

28. State and illustrate the difference between an art and a science. What is the gist of Mill's distinction?

29. Distinguish clearly between sociology and social work.
30. Are our methods of dealing with personal behavior and group life usually those of science or those of an art? What change, if any, in our methods is desirable, and why?
31. What is meant by a point of view? State the sociological point of view.
32. State and illustrate the differences between scientific methods and scientific techniques.
33. What is an hypothesis? What is the value of an hypothesis in dealing with a social problem?
34. What do you understand by common sense? In what way is science a refinement of common sense? In what way is the refinement made?
35. Show in what sense the survey is a common-sense method. What value has the survey for science? What is its value in a reform program?
36. What problem can you name that might be advantageously studied by the historical method? By the case-study method?
37. In scientific research should one attend more critically to instances that seem to contradict or to those that seem to support one's hypothesis? Why? What application of your conclusion is desirable in your study of the materials of this course?

Exercises and Problems

1. Examine a current issue of several of the following magazines and journals and characterize each briefly. Tell which are the more attractive to you, and in what respects they are attractive:

The American Journal of Sociology
Social Forces
Sociology and Social Research
Sociological Review
The Survey
The Family
The Scientific Monthly
Publications of the American Sociological Society
Journal of Educational Sociology
The Journal of Social Psychology
The Journal of Abnormal Social Psychology
The Journal of Social Administration
The Journal of Social Hygiene

2. Turn to the table of contents of your text and, by relating the general outline of the course revealed there and the materials you have studied in this first chapter, make a list of questions that you think the subsequent study may help you to answer.

3. Examine carefully a current number of *The American Journal of Sociology* or of *Social Forces* with the purpose of discovering what problems sociologists are interested in and working on at the present time. Include in your analysis, of course, the book reviews and abstracts contained in these journals.

4. Assess carefully your own stock of ideas and sentiments and set down on paper, in sentence form, ten or a dozen that you think you hold more or less uncritically and that are likely to bias your study of personal and group relationships.

5. Are social data more complex than the phenomena in other fields? What are reasons given for the common assertion? Are any or all of these reasons valid? See R. Bain, "The Concept of Complexity," *Social Forces*, 8(1929), 222-231; 369-378.

6. "Sociology, like other natural sciences, aims at prediction and control based on an investigation of the nature of man and society, and nature means here, as elsewhere in science, just those aspects of life that are determined and predictable." (R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 339.) Comment at some length on this statement.

7. Bring together the formal definitions of sociology as given in half a dozen or more general books on sociology. In how far is there essential agreement among them? In how far is there irreconcilable conflict? Formulate the one, two, or more conceptions necessary to include them all.

8. Give examples of scientific discoveries in one field stimulating scientific development in others.

9. From a utilitarian standpoint and from any other standpoints that occur to you, indicate what you consider to be the importance of science.

10. "We have undertaken in this treatise to give a clear picture of American society." Does this set a scientific or a historical task? Explain and defend your position at some length.

11. "Sociology may therefore be defined as the science which attempts to describe the origin, growth, structure, and functioning of group life by the operation of geographical, biological, psychological, and cultural forces operating in interpenetration through a process of evolution." (J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *An Introduction to Sociology*, p. xxii.) On the basis of this definition indicate the type of concrete reality you would expect to find discussed in a general book on sociology. What is your present reaction to this idea of "sociology as a synthesis of specialized disciplines"?

12. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. The Social Heritage. W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 1-7.
- b. The Accumulation of the Social Heritage. R. E. Turner, *America in Civilization*, pp. 101-110.
- c. The Person Defined. E. W. Burgess, "The Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28(1922-1923), 665-673. Reprinted, in part, in K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 409-413.
- d. The Social Process. A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 201-206.
- e. Common Sense. T. V. Smith, "Common Sense," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- f. Science as Method. E. C. Lindeman, *Social Discovery*, pp. 3-29.
- g. The Problem of Sociology. E. B. Reuter, "The Problem of Sociology," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 13(1928), 1-14.

- h. Historical and Sociological Facts. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 6-12.
 - i. Science and Art. E. W. Burgess, "The Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work," *Social Forces*, 1(1923), 366-370.
 - j. The Pitfalls of Bias. F. H. Hankins, *Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 1-13.
13. Topics for written themes:
- a. Common Biases in Popular Thought
 - b. The Evolution of a Word
 - c. The Philosophy of History
 - d. History as a Form of Polite Literature
 - e. Science and Religion
 - f. Sociology and Philosophy
 - g. The Philosophy of Science
 - h. Sociology and Ethics
 - i. Anthropology and Sociology
 - j. The Scope of Sociology
 - k. Definitions of Sociology
 - l. Conceptions of the Social Process
 - m. Conceptions of the "Person"
 - n. The Scientific Method of Charles Darwin
 - o. The Method of Louis Pasteur
 - p. The Monographic and Comparative Methods
 - q. The Relative Importance of the Sciences

Supplementary Readings

1. Adams, E. W.: "The Nature of Historical Repetition," *History*, 12(1928), 289-298.
2. Barnes, H. E.: *Sociology and Political Theory*, Chap. II, "The Relation of Sociology to Political Science," pp. 14-25.
3. Blumer, H.: "Science without Concepts," *American Journal of Sociology*, 36(1930-1931), 515-533.
4. Burgess, E. W.: "Interdependence of Sociology and Social Work," *Social Forces*, 1(1923), 366-370.
5. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. I, "The Scope and Method of Sociology," pp. 3-17.
6. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, "Introduction," pp. xv-xxxvi; Chap. I, "Nature and Field of the Social Sciences," pp. 5-26.
7. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "The Sociological Movement," pp. 811-820; Chap. XXII, "Sociology, Its Fields and Methods," pp. 823-829.
8. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. I, "The Study of the Group," pp. 1-38. Especially, "Bearing of Psychology of Society upon Other Sciences," pp. 21-28.
9. Eubank, E. E.: "The Vocabulary of Sociology," *Social Forces*, 9(1931), 305-320.
10. Giddings, F. H.: *Civilization and Society*, Chap. XXIX, "Sociology as the Study of Human Society and Human Behavior," pp. 385-404.

11. Gillin, J. L., and F. W. Blackmar: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. II, "Definition and Scope of Sociology," pp. 15-35; Chap. III, "Purpose, Problems, and Methods," pp. 37-54.
12. Hagerty, J. E.: *The Training of Social Workers*, Chap. II, "Scope of Social Work," pp. 22-30.
13. Hankins, F. H.: *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chap. I, "Introduction and Background," pp. 1-42.
14. Hayes, E. C.: *Sociology* (2d ed.). Chap. I, "The Science of Society," pp. 3-20; Chap. II, "The Point of View," pp. 21-36.
15. House, F. N.: "General Methodology," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 21(1927), 165-173.
16. Lindeman, E. C.: *Social Discovery*, Part I, "A Brief Review of the Methods Employed in Social Discovery," pp. 3-108; "Observation and the Participant Observer," pp. 177-200.
17. Lundberg, G. A.: *Social Research*, Chap. IV, "The Principal Methods of Social Research," pp. 76-95.
18. MacIver, R. M.: "Theoretical Trends in American Sociology," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 25(1930), 25-35.
19. Odum, H. W.: *Man's Quest for Social Guidance*, Chap. III, "The Spirit and Method of Science," pp. 31-44.
20. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. I, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," pp. 1-57.
21. Reinhardt, J. M., and G. R. Davies: *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, Chap. I, "Sociology: Development and Method," pp. 3-36.
22. Reuter, E. B.: "The Relation of Biology and Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32(1926-1927), 705-718.
23. Reuter, E. B.: "The Problem of Sociology," *Sociology and Social Research*, 13(1928), 119-132.
24. Shaw, C. R.: "Case Study Method," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 21(1927), 149-157.
25. Smith, T. V.: "Common Sense," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
26. Spykman, N. J.: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Book I, Chap. I, "The Concept of Society," pp. 26-34; Book I, Chap. II, "Sociology," pp. 35-44.
27. Sutherland, E. H.: "The Biological and Sociological Processes," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 58-65. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 70-78.
28. Thomas, W. I., and Dorothy Swaine Thomas: *The Child in America*, Chap. XII, "The Sociological Approach," pp. 505-552.
29. Wallis, W. D., and M. M. Willey: *Readings in Sociology*, Chap. I, "The Cultural Approach to Sociology," pp. 3-43.
30. Ward, L. F.: *Pure Sociology*, Chap. II, "Establishment of the Science," pp. 8-14; Chap. III, "The Subject-matter of Sociology," pp. 15-44.
31. Znaniecki, F.: "The Object Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32(1927), 529-584.

CHAPTER II

THE HUMAN ANIMAL

The introductory chapter brought out the fact that sociology as a science is concerned with human behavior in social situations. It has a twofold task: the explanation of human personality in so far as this is a product of social life and the explanation of social organization in so far as this is a consequence of human effort and association. Like all science, it is in the final analysis a method and a point of view for the study of a limited portion of reality. And, like every science, it implies the existence of a natural process that may be subjected to analysis and description.

The interest of all science is in uniformities, in similarities rather than in differences, in the common rather than in the unique. The chemist makes his analysis in terms of elements, not in terms of composite substances; the former are uniform in their behavior, the latter may not behave consistently. It is only in terms of behavior that is uniform and consistent that it is possible to state laws that are valid in all circumstances. The students of social life are likewise interested to discover uniformities that will make possible prediction, generalization, and the formulation of law. To that end, they attempt to analyze the complex and superficially confusing phenomena of social life into the elements and groups of elements which behave in the same way, in given conditions—units that are elementary in the sense that their behavior is uniform.

As a science, then, sociology is concerned to describe and explain the social processes. By this phrase should be understood the sequences of steps involved in the evolution of culture forms and in the development of human personalities. Considered in regard to consequences in personality, these processes are the series of steps by means of which each individual, whether born into the group or entering it as an immigrant from another culture complex, is so modified in mental attitude and overt behavior as to be able to cooperate in the group activity and participate in its culture life. Considered from the side of the

social organization, they may be defined as the series of steps by means of which changes are effected in the social organization to bring it into closer conformity with human need and desire.

As a requisite preliminary to this analysis of the social uniformities and processes, it is necessary to understand something of the nature of the human animal that is gradually made into a human and social being. He is not born human in any except a biological sense; he achieves the status of a personality as a result of participation in a social group. In the present chapter attention is given to the original characteristics and potentialities of the human animal that make possible the human and social person. The biological nature of the human animal is a part of the physical basis of social life.

A. THE BIOLOGICAL INDIVIDUAL

The raw material of the social process on the personality side is the biological individual as furnished by the purely organic processes. At birth this individual is already possessed of certain definite characteristics that will continuously limit the course of his personal development and that may, to a limited extent, direct it. These characteristics determined by heredity and the processes of embryonic development are for the sociologist given material; the original datum, or complex of data, is the nature of the newborn infant. The detailed analysis of the original nature of man is not, therefore, a concern of the sociologist. It is a matter of research interest to the biologist, the physiological psychologist, and others who undertake to analyze the physical facts that underlie social life.

But the social student must understand something of the facts of original nature, since they touch at many points the social and cultural phenomena which he seeks to explain. The original nature of man is the physical basis of his social life. Certain of the original reflexes remain unchanged, as the patellar reflex, and function throughout the life of the organism; others, through a process of conditioning, become social responses. The instinctive tendencies form the basis of many habit responses. The original capacities are the source and origin of the abilities. The fact that man's original nature is what it is is the thing that makes possible the social and cultural development that differentiates him from the other animal forms.

It is necessary, therefore, that the social student know enough of the biological and physical basis of life to understand its relation to social phenomena and social processes and to be able to distinguish problems that lie in his own field from those that lie elsewhere. He must understand the relation of original nature to social and cultural phenomena though he does not study the former as such.

The consideration of biological heredity in relation to the processes of personality development and culture evolution is often needlessly confused by unrealized differences in the use of terms. Few concepts have undergone more critical examination and redefinition by competent scholarship than this concept of heredity since 1850, as inquiry into the mechanisms of biological transmission has been put upon an adequate research basis. In consequence its present meaning is quite clear and undisputed among careful students.

Biological inheritance refers, when accurately used, to transmission through the ovum and spermatozoon, the female and the male cells that unite at conception. Whatever the new individual receives from his ancestral stock is determined by the composition of the chromosomes that make up the nuclei of these two reproductive cells. When these nuclei have united, that is, when the act of fertilization is complete, the biological equipment of the individual is irrevocably established. There is no later contact with the parental reproductive cells, hence no possibility of additions to the original equipment; the inheritance determination is complete. Any changes effected in his nature thereafter result from processes of interaction with the environment. This inheritance contained in the potentialities of the combined reproductive cells from which the individual springs is what is referred to as original nature.

If this definition be understood and accepted as a basis for study and discussion, it will appear immediately that the nature of the infant at birth is not his original nature but his original nature as modified by a significant prenatal experience of approximately nine months' duration. The earlier view of inheritance assumed that whatever traits the child possessed at birth were the result, exclusively, of his biological heredity. But it is now generally understood that much of the nature of the child at birth is a result of his prenatal environment. During the embryonic period many things may have happened to condition

both the form and the rate of development of the purely biological heritage. The embryo may, for example, have been undernourished, injured, or infected with disease germs, and it has, no doubt, through position and movement in the womb, begun to develop habits such as handedness. The classes of traits that may be acquired during the prenatal stage of development include malformations and deformities due to injury; infections such as syphilis, fevers, tuberculosis, and other blood and skin diseases that are received from the mother's blood stream or at parturition; toxic conditions due to chemical poisons in the mother's blood stream; toxic conditions within the metabolism of the child; and defective development due to abnormal or defective or deficient hormones developed in the ductless glands of the mother.¹

This conception of original nature avoids an easy but fallacious theory of original nature often found in current discussion of personal and group phenomena. In the social as well as in the popular literature there is a common assumption, often an explicit statement, of the persistence in men even through adulthood of a kind of savage nature that is identified as original. Thus man's coming to participate in the social patterns of civilized life is referred to as the acquisition of a "thin veneer." These habit forms of civilized culture life are assumed not to be natural to him; they are thought of as artificial, as something imposed upon and concealing an unchanged original nature. His natural behavior is thought of as savage behavior. Fundamentally, or "underneath" the veneer of civilization, it is said, is still the original savage, an original nature held in leash by the arbitrary and often irksome requirements of associated life. But the foregoing definition makes it clear that original nature is the nature of the individual at the moment of his origin; as such it exists for only a moment in time and then is modified, irrevocably modified, through contact with environment.

The processes of modification through interaction with environmental elements begin immediately and continue until death. At any point in the life cycle of the individual, therefore, his behavior, given the total series of situations in which he has participated and the responses he has made to these situations, is just as natural as his first infantile act. The fact is that the individual's nature is irrevocably changed by each process of

¹ L. L. Bernard, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 99-100.

reaction to stimulation. In a sense, original nature bears the same relation to adult nature as the seed bears to the tree. It is just as impossible for the developed human being, as an individual, to lapse into his original nature as for the grown tree suddenly to transform itself into the seed. To be sure, the tree produces seeds substantially like that from which it sprang; similarly, as will be pointed out later, each newborn infant today is in all essential respects just as savage as were, at birth, its parents or primitive ancestors fifty centuries ago. But this is a different matter.

B. THE BIOLOGICAL AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROCESSES

The biological process is the sequence of steps leading to the production of the individual organism and determining its innate characteristics. The union of the sperm cell and the ovum brings together elements from previously independent lines. In each of the combining cells many hundreds of characters are potentially present. In the development of the fertilized cell these seem to segregate presently to recombine in chance combinations but in a perfectly definite way and always to the production of a unique organism.

But the original, hereditary equipment of each biologically normal individual is essentially like that of every other of the same species. Each inherits the same physical structure, the same characters and combinations of characters. Each generation is like each preceding one. Among human beings no new traits have been added and none has been lost in a period of perhaps twenty thousand years. The individual variation occurs within rather narrow limits and arises in consequence of the fact that each character in inheritance is determined by the combined influence of many elements, each of which is itself a variable.

New forms occasionally appear. As a result of causes not as yet fully understood, an individual may be possessed of a certain trait or combination of traits new to the species from which it sprang, or certain traits may be absent that characterize the species. In any case it may mark the beginning of a new line.

These mutants may or may not be fitted to survive and reproduce in the given environment. If the new characters put the individual at a disadvantage in the struggle for existence or survival, the individual will be eliminated and the line become

extinct. If the new character gives the individual an advantage in the natural struggle, the individual will survive and reproduce its kind. In this case the new form may presently displace the species from which the mutant was an offshoot, or it may live alongside of the parent species or interbreed with it. The new traits may be neither of advantage nor of disadvantage. In this case the mutant may survive and reproduce and form a distinct strain in the population. The mutants may or may not cross with and modify the parent stock.

The ways in which species continuity is maintained through transmission and inheritance and the way in which racial modifications are effected are an important part of the biological process. Their definition is a problem of genetic biology. What the student of sociology needs to recognize at this point is that the biological process is always an individual process, a matter of mutational change in individual organisms and of the selective survival of those forms best fitted to survive in the given environment. It is always selective. The fact of survival in the competitive struggle is the evidence of fitness.

The cultural process stands in sharp contrast to the biological one just sketched. It is a matter of the modification of the native traits in the contacts and experiences of group life and of the accumulation of a body of culture fact through invention and discovery. It is cumulative rather than selective. The accumulation includes both artifacts and behavior patterns, additions to the culture complex and to behavior. The new generally is an addition to the old rather than a substitute that displaces the old. The invention of a new word enriches the vocabulary, adds an additional item without displacing one previously in use; the invention of the automobile gave a new means of transportation; it did not entirely displace the railroads or the horse-drawn vehicles. A culture fact is invented, used, and gradually spreads through the communicating group. In this process of adoption and diffusion it undergoes by accident or design still farther modification. The products and content of the social process are forms of culture and types of persons created by and perpetuating them.

The two processes are thus sharply contrasted in mechanism and medium as well as in method, content, and product. These fundamental differences between the two processes may be clarified and emphasized by a diagrammatic statement:

THE BIOLOGICAL AND THE SOCIOLOGICAL PROCESSES

Processes	Method	Medium	Mechanism	Content	Product
The biological process.	Selection	The germ plasm	The chromosomes	Integrated structures	Types of individuals
The culture process.	Accumulation	Communication	Imitation and other psychological processes	Patterns of activity	Types of persons

C. THE ELEMENTS OF ORIGINAL NATURE

Man, as an animal, comes into life equipped with certain characters that, on the one hand, mark him as a member of the human species and, on the other, differentiate him from all other members of that species. Just what this heritage contains of a definite and specific character is a matter that has not as yet, in all cases, been definitely determined. Obviously a part of it consists of such definite physiological traits as sex, color, stature, head form, and facial feature. That traits of this kind have a bearing upon personal and group experience will be made evident in a later section; here it need merely be pointed out that in general their significance lies in the fact that they may be treated as classificatory or individualizing marks and thus be made the object of prejudicial attitudes.

The part of the biological heritage that falls outside these relatively simple and definite bodily characters is not well understood. A survey of the available data and competent opinion as to the content of this part of man's animal heritage, however, reveals four important elements: reflexes, instincts, emotions, and intelligence. These represent the elaboration and differentiation of the single cell from which all life, as well as the life of the individual organism, had its origin. They are a biological endowment that has been fashioned in the process of organic evolution and they function, in response to the environmental stimuli, to adjust the organism to the environment. The sum of these original elements and their functioning together, in varying combinations and degrees, in response to the stimuli of the environment may be treated as the proximate hereditary basis of human and group behavior.

The unlearned behavior tendencies are variously described as reflexes, instincts, and inborn capacities according to the degree of definiteness and invariability with which response follows upon the presentation of the appropriate stimulus. The reflex is a definite and uniform response, usually not involving the entire organism, to a specific type of stimulation. The patellar reflex, the eye wink, the cough, the various vegetative processes of the organism, and other part activities belong to this category. The instinctive response involves the whole organism and is made to more generalized stimuli. The migratory behavior of certain mammals, birds, and fishes is commonly classed as instinctive. In human beings there is apparently no body of behavior tendencies that may be classed as instincts. Men do have, of course, certain appetites that are common to all men and that function in much the same way in all but these are not in the nature of the animal instincts. Rather than instincts man does have a variety of vague original or instinctive tendencies that predispose him to respond to certain situations without, however, determining the specific nature of the response that is made. He has also, as a part of his native endowment, certain predispositions and capacities that are extremely indefinite in source of stimulation and form of response, highly variable from individual to individual, and indefinitely modifiable through training and experience. These unlearned behavior tendencies "range with respect to the nature of the responses from such as are single, simple, definite, uniform within the individual, and only slightly variable amongst individuals to responses that are highly compound, complex, vague, and variable within one individual's life and amongst individuals."¹ Their significance lies in the fact that they may initiate a process of learning and so of human control. It is because an object or a situation calls out a response, positive or negative, that habits are formed.

The tendency to overt activity appropriate to a given situation is normally accompanied by more or less of emotional disturbance which persists, in general, as long as the impulse is denied realization in activity. In some cases the emotional state is the most obvious and characteristic part of the experience; the impulse to run in time of danger or to strike when thwarted appears most definitely and dramatically as fear and anger—that is, as emotional states rather than as overt behavior tendencies. In the

¹ E. L. Thorndike, *The Original Nature of Man*, Vol. I, pp. 5-6.

same way hate, love, awe, and other conscious emotional states that accompany the inhibition of activity may be and often are the most prominent elements in the total situation.

It is unnecessary here to go into the exact nature of the emotions. We are here interested in them only as a part of man's original equipment. As such they are, presumably, or in the past have been, in some part at least, biologically serviceable. In any event the human organism is made to react in emotional ways. Danger, for example, gives rise to a feeling of tension and a focusing of attention accompanied by an accelerated heart beat, blanched face, muscular trembling, and other familiar external signs. These result presumably from organic changes. In a state of fear there are increased arterial pressure, quickened pulse, cessation of digestive processes, increased secretion of sugar and adrenalin, and other physiological readjustments. The emotion is the conscious state that accompanies this preparation of the organism for violent activity.

Whatever the utilitarian value of the emotional reactions in the process of biological development and in the simpler conditions of existence, many of them are without adaptive value in the present state of culture and some interfere seriously with the establishment of rational relations among men. Their function in the present order appears to be as a stimulus to activity and as a bond of unity and basis of solidarity among the members of the group as they come to be defined as sentiments through contact and interaction.

The final major element in original nature is that of intelligence. This is the capacity to see relations and to adapt the means available to the ends desired. It varies in degree from the capacity of the animals to learn by experience to the ability of the mature man to reason in purely abstract terms. The animal and the child learn by trial and error, a restless and unplanned fumbling with the environmental situation until a satisfying adjustment is reached. The procedure of the intelligent man is different only in that he manipulates the elements of the problem imaginatively, comes to an understanding of relations abstractly and without the overt trial-and-error activity of the animal and the child. Intelligence is purely instrumental; the mind is the organ of control.

These elements of original nature—the reflexes, emotions, instincts, animal intelligence—are a part of the physiological

equipment furnished by the biological inheritance. They vary somewhat among the different animal forms and among the individual members of a species, but their nature and content, whatever they may be, determine the possibilities and define the limitations of the species and of its individual members. They are products of organic evolution and function in the adjustment of animal forms to the type of environment in which the species was evolved. In the case of man, they fit him, though very inadequately, for animal existence; they also provide a basis for human life though they do not directly fit him for it.

It is necessary to recognize certain other facts about original nature that make possible the complexity of culture and social organization and at the same time set the limits beyond which it may not develop. These are the degree of plasticity, variability, and stability of man's organic equipment.

D. THE PLASTICITY OF ORIGINAL NATURE

In the lower animals, especially the simple forms that live in a uniform environment, the reflexes and instincts are adequate to care for the whole business of individual and racial life. The instincts are fixed, definite, and unmodifiable; as inherited, integrated structures they are adequate to the needs of life. The bees, ants, and other insects apparently have no capacity to learn. There is no margin of variation in the instinctive responses. Among the higher animal forms that live in a more complex environment the instinctive equipment still cares for most of the situations of the individual life. There is little to learn and, because of the relatively fixed and unmodifiable nature of the instincts, not much that can be learned. Most of the animals do learn by experience but the range of learning is restricted within very narrow limits. It is of course possible in some cases so to train an animal that the stimulus which normally brings out a racial response may be inhibited or responded to in a different way. It is also true that much that has passed as instinctive behavior in animals is in part at least acquired habit patterns. The song of birds, for example, seems to be in part, as far as the content of the songs goes, a learned pattern. The common English sparrow, for example, if reared among canaries, learns their behavior and song rather than the behavior and chirp characteristic of the sparrow family. In so far as there is plasticity there is some learning or possibility of learning. In the lower

forms of life the degree of plasticity of original nature is very slight; it increases with rise in the evolutionary scale and with the complexity of environment. There is apparently no plasticity in the lower organisms; there is an almost complete plasticity in the higher.

The human infant is perhaps the most plastic of living organisms. There are few reflex responses not subject to modification through experience; there are no fixed instincts. There are certain capacities, predispositions and potentialities, but no predetermined line of development. The infant, for example, is born with a mechanism that gives it the capacity to speak but it has no language and no special tendency toward any particular language. In spontaneous and reflex response to stimuli the child produces all the possible sounds; through selection according to available patterns random vocalization becomes a controlled form of purposeful speech. The child has a capacity for color differentiation but it must learn through experience to differentiate colors. It has certain organic needs and appetites, as hunger and thirst, but it acquires the habits of satisfying them with certain types of food and activity rather than with others. It is this plasticity of the organism that makes possible the conditioning and directing of activities by the culture complex into which the child is born.

Even in a purely physical sense, the human baby is unfinished at birth. The senses of touch and taste seem to be somewhat established at birth: the prick of a pin will cause crying and the flavors of food appear to be recognized at a very early date. But the newborn babe is practically deaf. The membranes are swollen and the tube carrying air to the middle ear is closed; hearing is not well established until some days or weeks after birth. The sense of sight is decidedly defective. The eyes are too short properly to focus the rays of light and the infant's vision is blurred. The muscles in control of the eyes are weak and uncertain and, in consequence, the infant's eyes are crossed. The sense of smell is so defective and slow in development that it is many months before the infant becomes conscious of odors. The infant has no teeth. Three or four months must elapse before it can hold up its head; five or six months, before it can sit up; a year and often more, before it can learn to walk.

Added to the fact of immaturity at birth, in reality a part and consequence of that immaturity, is the long period of infancy and

childhood. By the time the baby is a year old it may say a few disconnected words but it is another year before it can master a simple sentence. Some do not learn to talk before they are three or four years old and there are cases of mentally normal adults who did not speak before the age of five or six years. The unfinished condition at birth and the long period of childhood are what make possible the shaping of the person, the formation of habits that will make the child anything within the range of human capacity. The original plasticity is the thing that makes possible the development of human reason.

E. THE VARIABILITY OF ORIGINAL NATURE

A second biological fact of original nature that has great importance for personal development and social organization is that of variability. This characteristic of original nature takes three forms of sociological interest: variability from individual to individual, from race to race, and between the sexes. The differences in each case are wide and important. But the individual differences in original nature within each sex and race are, at least from certain points of view, of greater significance than the typical differences between the sexes or between the races, considered as units.

Race differences, when the term race is accurately used, are facts of original nature. Marks of race are long-inherited general likenesses which have come to be distinctive of a group. The human races owe their origin to the fact of divergent organic evolution, to biological mutation and selective adaptation to divergent habitats. This is simply a special case of a general biological fact. From causes not at present well understood, all plant and animal forms, at irregular and infrequent intervals, produce individuals that differ in more or less important traits from the ancestral type. These new traits are hereditary. In most cases the new forms are ill fitted to survive and are eliminated without leaving descendants to perpetuate the new characters. Occasionally, however, the new forms are as well fitted to survive as is the ancestral type; in some cases the mutant form is superior, from the point of view of survival, to the parent form. In cases where the mutations are not selectively disadvantageous and the mutants are more or less completely segregated they may interbreed and form a new strain or species subdivision.

The various human races had their origin in just such mutational variations from some earlier racial forms. The way in which this came about is well understood, though the time at which it took place antedates, for the most part, all historic record. It is necessary only to visualize a group separating, because of population increase beyond the means of life or because of other historic circumstance, and the segments remaining apart. In a very few generations the separate segments will in certain respects diverge: each will show in exaggerated form the differences that distinguished the founders of the separate groups. But environmental selection also operates to differentiate the two groups and to increase the uniformity within each. Because of the individual differences within a group, the death rate acts selectively and the group presently comes to be composed of those individuals whose characters best fit them to survive in the given conditions. A highly pigmented skin is a valuable protective device in the tropics and in other regions of intense light and leads, through a constantly higher death rate of the lighter-skinned individuals, to an increase in the percentage of dark-skinned individuals in these regions. A group migrating into another climatic area would be modified in a different direction. Environmental selection thus operates, in a long series of generations, to establish a degree of uniformity among the members of groups in a given climatic area and, to the extent that environmental conditions differ, to make the groups distinct. Ultimately, through mutation and adaptation, the groups are recognized as separate races or biological strains. Many of the biological characters, as the nasal index, the cephalic index, and the character of the hair, are zoonomically indifferent and do not serve as bases for selection.

The physical differences among the human races are, however, relatively slight. The variations in stature, weight, proportion of the body parts, length of life, and other biological characters are within a narrow range. The differences, moreover, even the more striking ones, are merely matters of degree. Differences in skin color, for example, are simply matters of degree: the black Africans and the blond Europeans differ only in the amount of coloring matter in the skin.

The original mental differences among the human races are also small and quantitative. There are no qualitative differences in the sense that some race or races have mental capacities that

others lack. Each of the racial groups seems to be endowed in about equal degree with the ability to perceive, to remember, to form abstract conceptions, and to inhibit impulses: these main mental characteristics of human beings appear to be alike in all the races of men. In the elementary mental functions racial differences, if they exist at all, are so slight as to be insignificant. The traits most easily subject to exact measurement—perception, attention, feeling, and memory—show slight if any consistent variation from race to race. While the fundamental mental traits are the same in all races, there are, perhaps, some slight differences in hereditary reactions to stimuli. But such differences are not great and it may not even be asserted with confidence that they exist at all. There are individuals of all degrees of mental ability in each of the races. There may or may not be consistent differences in the percentage of the natively superior individuals produced by various racial groups.

Both the physical and the mental differences discovered to exist among the races are slight and, from the biological point of view, relatively unimportant. None seems to have any native trait or deficiency that would prevent a cultural advance comparable with that of any other. As such, therefore, the matter of race and differences among races are not matters of sociological interest and concern. But the fact of racial difference, especially the differences in physical appearance, impede sympathy and make difficult a harmonious adjustment of social relations when different races occupy the same territory or are otherwise in contact. When members of different racial groups are in contact, the racial marks are made the basis of differential treatment, of social and cultural exclusion. The individuals and groups, excluded because of race and divergent appearance, fraternize with others similarly excluded, develop distinctive mental, social, and cultural traits, and are, in consequence, object matter of sociological importance. It is the body of phenomena that arises in consequence of race facts rather than the biological facts themselves that fall within the orbit of sociological investigation.

Sex is the oldest and the most fundamental of the biological divisions of the human species. As a biological fact it is not of interest to the sociologist. But sex differences have both primary and secondary consequences that lie in the sociological field.

The original differences are not unlike those to be observed elsewhere in the animal world. The sexes are marked by certain

physical differences that adapt each to a specialized rôle in the reproductive process, and there are accompanying or resulting differences in metabolism. Women are shorter in stature and lighter in weight than men; they have less physical strength but greater endurance; and their resistance to shocks, as shown by hospital experience, is greater than that of men; they are less subject to psychopathic states; and they are longer lived. Physiological maturity comes at a somewhat earlier age in girls than in boys. The differences in metabolism and sex function predispose women to a sedentary and men to an active form of life. Consequently, they determine, at least in some part, a natural division of labor and perhaps account in some part for the relative degrees of vocational success.

There appear also to be certain original differences in the psychological character of the sexes. As to the extent of these differences, opinion varies from the assertion that men and women are different physiological species to the position that there are few or no psychological differences that are of biological origin. In intellectual capacity there is a virtual equality between the sexes. The so-called intelligence tests seem to show that girls of school age are slightly superior to boys in most of the things measured by the tests. But boys are more often impatient of the school work in anticipation of later activities, and their rating may be due to a lack of interest or other conditioning factor. Some laboratory experiments seem to show that girls have better memories and are more rapid in associative thinking while boys have greater ingenuity, but habits of thought here again furnish an uncontrolled factor. In the elementary functions of perception, attention, and memory, which are most easily and accurately measured in laboratory experiments, the differences are slight or negligible. Any differences that exist are quantitative rather than qualitative. Of the two sexes, girls appear to be somewhat less aggressive, but here again the differences in experience and training are by no means negligible factors and are wholly uncontrolled. It is generally asserted that women are more suggestible than men, but the fact has never been demonstrated nor has any difference that is asserted to exist been shown to be original.

Whatever may be the direct expression of original sex differences in social life, the secondary effects, in Western society at least, are of far greater importance. The artificial differences

produced by civilization include the vast mass of observed divergences in behavior. The fact of sex has been made the occasion for the exclusion of women from the more stimulating of human activities: men have appropriated to themselves the occupations of hunting, fighting, governing, gambling, business, scientific pursuits, and the literary arts—that is, the activities that assume the pattern of greatest human interest. The exclusion of women from the vocations of men may be direct and frank, as is generally the case in primitive society where the conditions of life are hard and the *mores* inflexible, or it may take various disguises of which chivalry is the most notable in the upper classes of Western society. But regardless of the form, women are debarred from numerous activities and human contacts by taboo or pathos and consequently they lack in richness of personality and mental development. Thus the biological fact of sex gives rise to phenomena on the level of personality and social organization—that is, on the sociological plane.

Original variability includes not only race and sex differences but also those differences that exist among individuals of the same race and sex. No two individuals are alike. There is no biological equality; rather there are indefinite degrees of superiority and inferiority in all respects. There is variation among individuals in all directions and in all characters. Children differ in the age of walking, talking, and other activities; they differ in accuracy, in ease of work, and other respects; some are quick and some are slow in responses. Apparently no two are identical in any character; even identical twins show sufficient variation so that it is always possible to identify them. No individual has ever been found who was in all particulars an average man.

Every individual, of course, has the essential characteristics of a common humanity as well as a group of individual peculiarities. Superficial observation shows a wide variability in physical characters: each has a body, head, limbs, internal organs, and the like, but in each of these respects there are absolute and relative differences. In height men vary from three to eight feet, in weight from 50 to 500 pounds. There is variability in proportion as well as in parts: the six-foot man may have a shorter body than the man whose height is five and one-half feet. It is the difference in proportion of parts rather than in absolute size that enables us to distinguish one individual from another: individuality depends more on the degree of harmony and unity of

qualities than on the degree in which any one quality is possessed as compared with possession by the average person. The pulse beat varies from 40 to 400. Some individuals are strong, some weak; some are healthy, some sickly. There are differences in the elements of which bone and muscle are composed; the combination of these elements into organs of different size gives rise to still greater differences in physiological processes, temperaments, movements, sensations, thoughts, emotions, and actions.

But human individual variations are not confined to the physical characteristics. There are equally great or greater differences in intellectual power: in mental ability individuals vary from idiocy at the one extreme to talent and genius at the other. Between these extremes is every degree of capacity and incapacity: some are highly endowed and talented, others are feeble-minded or psychopathic. Man is the most variable of all animal species. Human individuality and personality owe something directly to this fact.

F. THE STABILITY OF ORIGINAL NATURE

The third biological factor of special significance for sociology and the study of social life is that of organic stability. The human race seems to have reached the period of biological maturity; there is no reason to anticipate further evolutionary change. The essential characters of man as an organism seem to be fairly well defined.

The early history of every biological form seems to be characterized by organic instability and frequent and rapid change in form. Mutations seem to occur with relatively greater frequency and often in important characters. These variations give a basis for evolutionary change: they result in individual organisms of unequal fitness to live and prosper in the environmental conditions. The death rate is, in consequence, highly selective and the form undergoes a relatively rapid series of changes until it is eliminated in the struggle to survive or until it is adapted to the life conditions. As the age of the species increases, there is a decline in the frequency of mutation, its adaptation to the environmental conditions becomes more complete, and its characters more uniform from individual to individual. Presently, in what may be called the maturity of the species, there is a practical cessation of mutational change and the

selective action of the environment also favors uniformity and stability of type.

As a biological organism, man's evolution is apparently at an end. The main features of the human animal were evolved and fixed in periods that antedate recorded events by at least three or four hundred generations. In the preceding periods appeared a dozen or more quite radically different types of human or semihuman forms; and the period of the formation of the modern races was prolific of diverging types. But at present the characters appear to be fairly permanent and fixed: there has been no consequential change since the appearance of the modern races, perhaps twenty thousand years ago. The size of the human brain has not increased since the period of the Cro-Magnon race, and the whole body of evidence points to the conclusion that there has been no change in the base lines of human mental capacity since this race inhabited the caves of Europe. Whatever it may have been in the preceding eras, the biological nature of man has remained essentially the same since the appearance of modern man. Certainly there has been no essential change in original nature within the historic period. Should a new and biologically superior type appear, there is little reason to believe that it would be permitted to live and ultimately displace the present types. If a super-race ever appears and dominates the earth, it will come as a biological offshoot from some other form of life, not as a mutational variation of some present-day race, and it will establish itself only after the present races have disappeared or at least approached extinction.

There is, of course, the possibility of minor changes in the human type through the amalgamation of the living races or through the decrease or destruction of some and the increase of others. But such differential increase would bring no traits not already present. There is also a possibility of various types of minor changes through natural or controlled selection. By such means the age of life might be somewhat increased, the health considerably improved, the stature increased or reduced, and numerous other modifications, within the range of variation, brought about. But this would involve no change in type; it would merely change the percentage of individuals conforming closely to certain norms.

The characters acquired by individuals as a result of use and experience are not biologically transmitted; hence there is no

possibility or danger of change by this means. No matter how refined the man may become, no matter how educated and skilled he may be, and no matter for how many generations the education and training may continue, each new generation starts with the same capacities that children have had since the race began. The acquisitions of men may not be biologically transmitted to their descendants.

The future evolution of man, as his evolution during the past twenty millenniums, will lie in the adaptation of the environment to the needs of the organism, not in the adaptation of the organism to the environment. It has been and will be a cultural rather than an organic evolution.

G. THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF SOCIAL LIFE

The facts of original nature that have been described are the basis of social development and culture differentiation. They are not in themselves social phenomena; they are physical and biological facts the form and nature of which have been determined and fixed in the course of organic evolution. As such they determine the direction and set the limits to cultural and social development. Physically constituted as they are, human beings may not live in the water as do the fishes or in the air as do the birds; they can live only within a very narrow range of temperature, of humidity, and of atmospheric pressure. Their culture development can proceed only in the direction set by such conditions, and it may go only as far as the organic facts permit. The dog and other animals can never develop a culture: they have not the hands or other organs with which to manipulate objects, and they lack the power of articulate speech without which there can be no abstract thought or communication of ideas. In a similar way human culture development is definitely limited by the ability of the human intelligence to create and by the inability of the human being to live in an indefinitely complex environment.

The immediate organic needs are both individual and racial. On the simplest level the individual must have food and shelter in order to survive and there must be sex association and care of offspring in order that the race be perpetuated. These imperative needs set the basic patterns of all culture and social life just as they constitute the sole activity of the lower organisms; men

are everywhere concerned to preserve their individual lives and to propagate their kind. The simplicity and immediate character of these needs as well as their universality and imperative nature account for the fact that all forms of human culture and social organization are basically the same. They must conform to the life needs and capacities of the human animal. Family and group life, economic and industrial activity, government and group controls, religious and magical practices all are devices evolved in the struggle to preserve individual life and to perpetuate the race.

The biological differences among individuals and their variability and plasticity give some degree of variation in human needs and make it possible for them to reach satisfaction in somewhat divergent ways. They must have food but not a particular kind of food; they must have protection from the elements and from their enemies but they demand no particular form of shelter or government; they must have sex association and social life but no particular form of family or communal organization. In consequence men have hit upon different ways of life, in part by chance and in part through adjustment to unlike environmental conditions. But everywhere and in all times the culture and social organization rest upon and are limited by the physical needs and capacities of the human animal.

H. ORIGINAL NATURE AND SOCIAL REALITY

The original nature and capacity of the human animal, as discussed in the preceding pages, have profound implications for social life and behavior inasmuch as they set the limits and determine the direction of human and social behavior. The original nature of man offers no explanation of the social facts themselves. When we know the biological nature of men we know them as animals: the organic needs and appetites and the other items of the original equipment give an understanding of why people behave like animals; they give barely a clew as to why they behave like human beings. Social phenomena are not explainable in terms of original nature.

Of all the animals man is distinguished by the feeble character of his unlearned action patterns; unlike the other animals he must learn almost everything. The physiological appetites and other unlearned behavior tendencies do, of course, have far-

reaching social consequences but they are of a general rather than of a specific nature: hunger, as already explained, is the ultimate origin and basis for the various life-sustaining pursuits of man, and sex is the ultimate basis of family and the affectional life with their profound influences on personality and behavior. But the ultimate physiological basis is far removed from the complicated habit systems and culture patterns that develop in the course of individual and racial experience. It gives the ultimate motivation of human activity and the general direction that the activity must take, but it provides no explanation or basis for understanding individual behavior or social forms. Personality and social organization can be understood only in terms of communication, in terms of contact, interaction, and human experience.

The relative independence of the two realms of reality—the facts of original nature and the facts of personal life, social phenomena, and culture reality—is evident in the world of common-sense observation. The distinction between different peoples gives an illustration in point; the main differences are differences in culture and social life. The original nature of the French, English, Americans, Chinese, Eskimos, Germans, and all the other peoples is, in all essential respects, the same. But these same peoples differ widely in manner of life, language, religious belief, family organization, and the other aspects of culture and of personal and social organization. Quite obviously, an understanding of this divergence may not be had by any attempt to refer it back to the “instincts” or other aspects of original nature, though the fact that each group has the capacity for articulate speech, sex appetites, and other original characteristics accounts for the fact that each has developed a language, a family life, and other culture forms. The original nature of the European peoples has changed in no way in the past two thousand years. There has been no alteration in the structure of the mind. The brain capacity is the same now as it was when our ancestors were naked savages in the European forests; our appetites and physical needs are the same now as then. The change during the period of European history has been a change in culture and social organization, not a change in original nature. The advance or decadence of culture and the development and change in human relations are not dependent upon changes in original nature and they may not be understood in biological terms.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. Define natural process in general terms and describe the steps in some simple natural process that occurs to you.
2. "Unless there is a natural process to be described, there can be no science." Explain.
3. Define social process in general terms and describe a simple social process. In terms of what units does the analysis of the social process run?
4. Why is it necessary that the student of sociology know something of the original nature of man? Define original nature.
5. In what five ways may the nature of the individual be environmentally changed before birth?
6. In what sense is civilized behavior a "superstructure" erected upon original nature as a foundation?
7. It is sometimes said that great crises like war call out man's original nature. In what sense is this true? What part would "acquired nature" play under such circumstances? Think through these questions carefully.
8. Distinguish clearly and sharply between the sociological and the cultural processes.
9. What elements of original nature are of concern to the student of social reality?
10. What is meant by (a) plasticity, (b) variability, and (c) stability of man's original nature? What is the importance of each of these general characteristics for sociology?
11. What is the importance of using the term *heredity* exactly—that is, as meaning the "appearance in the offspring of characters whose differential causes are found in the germ cells"?
12. The biological origin of man runs back to the very origin of life itself. Each stage of life has left its impress on human structure. Explain and illustrate.
13. What are the differences between reflex and instinct? Instinct and capacity?
14. What is an emotion? What is its relation to the behavior of the person?
15. What is meant by intelligence? What other meanings are given to this term in popular speech?
16. Explain the statement in the text: "Intelligence is purely instrumental; the mind is an organ of control."
17. "The plasticity of the child signifies that it is constantly subject to influence whether for good or ill." Explain.
18. Give an example known to you of an animal learning by experience. Can you find an example of the same type of learning among human beings? Can you think of types of human learning that do not appear among animals?
19. Explain and illustrate the "conditioned response."
20. What is the significance of "multiple response" and "multiple causation"?
21. "If we could find the right method of education—excluding feeble-minded children—we would find that all children could accomplish equal work." (A. Adler, *Mental Hygiene Bulletin*, 5(1927), No. 8.) Do you agree?

22. Describe the process of natural selection.
23. What is the most plausible theory of the origin of races?
24. Is the Negro or the European better colored for survival in North Europe? In Central Africa? In the United States?
25. Do you agree that the physical differences among the human races are slight? Defend your position.
26. Race differences, being differences in statistical averages of heterogeneous groups, are biologically unimportant. Discuss.
27. Define race as (a) a biological problem, (b) a social or political problem, and (c) a sociological problem.
28. What explanations can you give of the differences in achievement of the races?
29. What explanations can you give of the differences between the sexes in achievement?
30. What explanations can you give of the differences in achievement among individuals?
31. Give examples of extreme kinds of variation in people you have known. Discuss the differential treatment accorded them because of the peculiarity.
32. Give examples of persons (a) miserable because of their differences from other people, (b) interesting because of their peculiarities, (c) useless because of their peculiarities, (d) socially influential because of some peculiarity.
33. What is the doctrine of use inheritance? Why is it now generally held to be untenable?
34. What degree of change may be brought about in man by means of eugenic selection?
35. How would an improvement in man's biological quality—an increase in average intelligence, for example—affect his cultural evolution? Is such improvement necessary?
36. Explain how original nature directs and limits the cultural and social development.
37. Original nature offers no explanation of social reality. Explain.
38. "Each race judges others according to the qualities in which it excels and therefore necessarily considers itself superior to others." Comment.
39. Take two divergent groups such as the Eskimos and the Chinese and tabulate specific ways in which they differ in (a) original nature facts and (b) social and culture facts.
40. "Judy O'Grady and the Colonel's Lady are sisters under their skins." Explain Kipling's meaning.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.
2. In terms of what has been said in this chapter concerning the plasticity, variability, and stability of original nature, state and criticize certain com-

mon beliefs concerning the influence of heredity upon personal and group development.

3. By and large, women are less efficient than men. Is this relative inefficiency due to innate differences or to social conditions? Would identical education of boys and girls eliminate the disabilities of women? How do you know?

4. Discuss in some detail the different treatment accorded present-day boys and girls during infancy and early childhood and estimate the effects of some of these differences in treatment upon the differentiated adult sex types.

5. Make a list of twenty or twenty-five persons that you consider to be the superior persons in American life, past or present. Opposite each name list the characteristics, such as intelligence, erudition, and imagination, in which each is superior to other Americans. Which of the qualities are common to each of the men in the group? On the basis of this can you define a superior person as "one who is strong, pious, erudite, etc."? Then what do you mean, if anything, when you speak of a superior person?

6. Write up a case of a person known to you whose life experience has been considerably affected by some individualizing peculiarity or peculiarities. If you wish, make your study autobiographical.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. The Inherited and Acquired Equipment of Man. L. L. Bernard, *Social Psychology*, pp. 90-105.
- b. The Sociological and the Biological Processes. E. H. Sutherland, "The Biological and Sociological Processes" in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 70-78.
- c. The Relation and Relative Importance of Original Nature and Environment. H. S. Jennings, *Prometheus*.
- d. The Use of the Instinct Concept. E. Faris, *American Journal of Sociology*, 27(1921), 184-196.
- e. The Mythology of Instincts. J. Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 149-168.
- f. The Role of Emotion in Daily Life. J. B. Watson, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*, pp. 245-248.
- g. Intelligence. G. Wallas, *The Great Society*, pp. 32-56.
- h. Education and Training. J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 14-19.
- i. Individual Differences. R. E. Turner, *America in Civilization*, pp. 90-92.
- j. The Myth of Superiority. H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, pp. 129-144.
- k. Race and Culture. E. B. Reuter, "Civilization and the Mixture of Races," *Race Mixture*, pp. 3-23.

8. Topics for written themes:

- a. Man's Place in Nature
- b. The Physical Basis of Social Life
- c. The Instinct Controversy
- d. Instincts *versus* Prepotent Reflexes
- e. The Meaning of Heredity

- f. The Modifiability of Bird Songs
- g. Learning by Experience among Animals
- h. Education and Training of Animals
- i. Custom and Sex Differences
- j. The Place of Emotion in Daily Life
- k. The Place of Intelligence in Daily Life
- l. The Characteristics of the Superior Person
- m. Race Differences in Physique
- n. Differences in Racial Mentality
- o. Mental Difference in the Sexes
- p. Secondary Effects of Sex Differences
- q. Individual Differences—the Average Man
- r. The Frequency of Mutations
- s. The End of Man's Evolution
- t. The Limits of Eugenic Improvement
- u. Race and Culture Differences in the Past One Thousand Years

Supplementary Readings

1. Allport, F. H.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. III, "Fundamental Activities—Inherited and Learned," pp. 42–82.
2. Bernard, L. L.: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. XV, "Race, Nationality, Class," pp. 224–245.
3. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. V, "Race and Culture," pp. 89–104.
4. Child, C. M.: "Biological Foundations of Social Integration," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 22(1928), 26–42.
5. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Introduction to Sociology*, "Variability of the Sexes," pp. 346–347.
6. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XV, "The Natural Man and His Social Conditioning," pp. 585–613.
7. Dewey, J.: *Democracy and Education*, Chap. I, "Education as a Necessity of Life," pp. 1–11.
8. Dewey, J.: *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part I, Sec. IV, "Custom and Habit," pp. 58–74; Part I, Sec. V, "Custom and Morality," pp. 75–83; Part II, Sec. II, "Plasticity of Impulse," pp. 95–105.
9. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. II, "Group Life and Organic Evolution," pp. 40–68. Consult especially the section on "Organic Evolution and the Nature of the Individual," pp. 43–50; 74–82.
10. Faris, E.: "The Nature of Human Nature," in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 21–37.
11. Faris, E.: "Current Trends in Social Psychology," in T. V. Smith and W. K. Wright (editors), *Essays in Philosophy*, pp. 119–133.
12. Faris, E.: "Are Instincts Data or Hypotheses?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 27(1921–1922), 184–196.
13. Goldenweiser, A. A.: "Race and Culture in the Modern World," *Social Forces*, 3(1924), 127–136.
14. Hankins, F. H.: "Organic Plasticity versus Organic Response," *Social Forces*, 6(1928), 331–344.

15. Hankins, F. H.: *Introduction to Study of Society*, Chaps. VI, VII, "The Biological Factors in Social Life," pp. 218-266, 268-317.
16. Hollingworth, L. S.: "Variability as Related to Sex Differences in Achievement," *American Journal of Sociology*, 19(1913-1914), 510-529.
17. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. X, "The Original Nature of Man," pp. 121-136.
18. Jennings, H. S.: *Prometheus*, Chap. II, "The Biological Background," pp. 5-64; Chap. III, "The Advancement of Man," pp. 65-86.
19. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. I, "Human Nature," pp. 1-33.
20. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. V, "Original Nature of Man," pp. 102-124.
21. Miller, H. A.: *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. XII, "The Myth of Superiority," pp. 129-144.
22. Ogburn, W. F.: *Social Change*, Part I, "The Social Heritage and the Original Nature of Man," pp. 3-51.
23. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. II, "Human Nature," pp. 64-149.
24. Reinhardt, J. M., and G. R. Davies: *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, Chap. III, "The Bio-Psychic Basis of Human Behavior," pp. 75-89; Chap. XI, "Heredity and Variation," pp. 289-310.
25. Thomson, J. A.: *Darwinism and Human Life*, Chap. III, "The Struggle for Existence," pp. 69-94.
26. Turner, R. E.: *America in Civilization*, Chap. IV, "Man and His Original Nature," pp. 65-95.
27. Watson, J. B.: *Psychology—From the Standpoint of the Behaviorist*, "The Relative Efficiency of the Two Sexes," pp. 401-405.
28. Wissler, C.: *Man and Culture*, "Explanations for Racial Differences in Terms of Culture," pp. 296-301.
29. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. IX, "Individual Differences and Social Behavior," pp. 175-199.
30. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. VI, "Original Nature, Individual Differences, and Intelligence," pp. 121-143.

CHAPTER III

THE PERSON

The preceding chapter defined the original, animal, nature of man and indicated its implications for culture development and personal organization. By virtue of his position in the scale of organic evolution, the human individual is possessed of a series of characteristic traits and capacities; original nature is this complex of native traits and potentialities conceived abstractly. The human individual is the organism possessed of this original nature. The individual, when the word is used as a scientific rather than as a literary term, is always to be understood as a biopsychological concept.

The most significant fact about the original nature of man is the relative absence of a fixed and predetermined course of development. In each individual are focalized certain lines of influence that come from near and remote ancestral sources. This inheritance is purely physical—capacities for development resident in the neural structures. The infant has no innate ideas and no mental background; there are few fixed reflexes to dictate the course of development. He is immature, helpless, dependent: only a few of the functions of complete development are present at birth. Without attention, care, and protection he would live at most but a few hours after birth. Even if he could reach maturity without the aid of other human beings, he would lack the essentials of human nature that come to him not by biological inheritance but by virtue of association with others. He would be a human animal but he would not be a human being: he would lack every trait of human as distinct from animal nature.

The child comes at birth into a complex and highly organized social order. He no sooner enters the world than he is acted upon by the forces of the environment. His needs are more or less systematically cared for, with the result that habit formation begins within the first few days of life. His hunger is satisfied at regular intervals and the organism adjusts itself to this perio-

dicity. In a similar way he forms habits of sleep, of requiring the light, the dark, the nurse's arms, the mother's lullaby, and other stimuli according as he is conditioned by the environment. In respect to a very considerable number of situations, habit responses are formed which may remain more or less permanent behavior tendencies. Through a process of social selection among the random and meaningless noises and the association of particular sounds with specific objects in the external world he acquires the beginnings of a language. The spontaneous activity of the growing child is, in some cases, encouraged by attention and applause; in other cases it is repressed, inadvertently through lack of appreciation or attention or purposely by direction or punishment. His behavior tendencies are thus fixed by the responses that his activity elicits from his social environment; his behavior becomes selective rather than spontaneous and random: he acquires the habitual behavior that corresponds with the standards and patterns of the group. A detailed analysis of the social patterns to which the child is socially conditioned is the subject of later study and discussion.

The end result of the two factors—the original plasticity of the child and the molding effects of the social group—is the human person. This is the object matter of present attention.

A. THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE PERSON

The facts of original nature and of human nature that have been emphasized are somewhat confusing, for the reason that they do not exist separately or apart from each other. They can be isolated only by a process of conceptual, scientific abstraction. The concrete and tangible thing is the human being who is a product of both factors inextricably interwoven and mutually conditioned. The man himself, as any act that he may perform, is the result of a peculiar original physical and mental equipment that has had a unique development. If the original traits had been different, neither the man nor his acts would be what they are; if his life experience had been different, both the man and his behavior would be different. Any change in either factor would have given a different product.

The actual human being is unquestionably a distinct unit. He is something different from the elements that produced him just as a building is something different from either the materials or the thought and labor that produced it. It would not be possible

to separate the building and say that this is labor and that is material. But it is possible to emphasize different aspects of the structure—the material of the walls, the plan of room arrangement, the exterior finish, and other facts. In a similar way it is not possible completely to separate the man and say that such and such characteristics and behavior are the expression of his original nature and that other behavior and characteristics are acquired. Such separation would mean the destruction of the person, the product of the interacting factors. Nevertheless, certain traits of concrete human beings are exclusively or predominantly the result of the hereditary biological forces while others are exclusively or mainly the result of the culture heritage. This fact is recognized in the discriminating use of the terms individual and person.

In the use of the term individual the emphasis falls upon the traits and characteristics that are in major part biologically determined. The various mental tests, for example, are efforts to compare the relative mentality of individuals on the assumption, in general, that mental capacity is a trait of original nature and that it continues to exist unchanged by education and personal experience. The idea of the individual thus emphasizes those aspects of the concrete human being that are original and relatively unchanged by experience. The individual is a biological product.

This original nature in its relation to human and social welfare is the special object of attention in social biology. The effort there is to define the characteristics of original nature that are of special significance for human life and to examine into the manner in which they influence phenomena on the social level. On the purely practical plane, eugenics is the proposal to utilize scientific findings to control man's racial destiny by selective changes in his original nature equipment. It is, itself, a program, not a scientific discipline.

The term person is used when reference is had to the qualities and attributes that are results of social life, when it is intended to stress the human rather than the original nature. Language, for example, is an attribute of the person, not of the individual; it is an organized body of habit responses resulting from social experience. When attention is upon the social contacts and membership and participation in social groups, the personal rather than the individual traits are emphasized, and person is the

proper term. The person is a social product, an individual with status in the group. Park's definition has become a classic in the field:

The person is an individual who has status. We come into the world as individuals. We acquire status and become persons. Status means position in society. The individual inevitably has some status in every social group of which he is a member. In a given group the status of every member is determined by his relation to every other member of that group. Every smaller group, likewise, has a status in some larger group of which it is a part and this is determined by its relation to all the other members of the larger group.¹

The sharp distinction here drawn between original and acquired nature is sometimes completely misunderstood and grossly abused. The unitary nature of the concrete human being is violated; he is assumed to be made up of a social heritage superimposed somehow on a more fundamental biological heritage and therefore separable, as to behavior, into what is original and what is acquired. On the basis of such initial faulty premise, the importance of one heritage or the other is minimized, the two contrasted or set in opposition, or behavior understood as the resultant of coincident tendencies of independent origin.

As previously pointed out, certain traits of original nature do persist unchanged and function throughout the life of the organism in more or less complete independence of social life and personal experience. This is true of the vegetative processes and other reflex acts necessary to the physiological maintenance of the individual organism. The structural bases of certain appetites and instinctive tendencies remain unchanged by environmental experiences and determine, in the large, the basic patterns of human interest. Temperament is in large measure or entirely a matter of original equipment; it seems to be determined by glandular and metabolic processes that function independently of and are uncontrolled by the social organization in which the individual is immersed. The native mental capacity of the individual may be determined in the biological structure and may remain unchanged by education and experience.

¹ R. E. Park, "Sociology and the Social Sciences," *American Journal of Sociology*, 27(1921), 181. Reprinted by permission of the Editorial Staff of the *American Journal of Sociology*, Chicago.

Such basic facts of the biological organism are important, and a recognition of them is necessary to any adequate understanding of human personality and social organization. But they themselves do not furnish a basis for understanding social life and human behavior. The whole instinct psychology, for example, rests upon the assumption that the social and cultural life of man is an expression of an equipment of biologically determined instincts that remain essentially unchanged by experience. The popular eugenic doctrines assert that personal behavior and achievement are determined exclusively or almost exclusively by fixed and inherited native traits. There has been a common assumption among the psychometrists that social accomplishments and intellectual achievements are determined by, and are an expression of, an innate and fixed capacity. In the strictly social realm, Lombroso's theory of crime involves a separation of the person into distinct parts: the criminal is born a criminal and innately, irresistibly impelled to his illegal behavior. Many other writers have conceived of behavior as determined exclusively or in major part by physical and mental factors: the child was not understood as a unity but as an aggregation some parts of which controlled the behavior of the whole.

Any and all explanation of human behavior and social phenomena in terms of individual and biological facts and data are manifestly inadequate. In the opposed position there is more or less complete denial either of the existence of the biological facts or of their significance. The extreme position substitutes acquired traits or environment in some form for original nature as an explanation of behavior. Crime, poverty, integrity, social conformity, personal achievement, and the like are conceived to be socially rather than biologically determined, to be phenomena of acquired rather than of original nature. Tarde's theory of crime stands at the logical extreme from that of Lombroso: it is to the effect that criminals are not born but made; crime, like all social phenomena, finds a complete explanation in the principle of imitation. The euthenists are at the opposite pole from the eugenists. Social reformers in general have tended to deny, ignore, or minimize the strictly individual or racial factors that are stressed by the biological determinists. This social determinism, like the biological determinism, does violence to the concrete unity of the human being. Denial of the determining

rôle of original nature in favor of environmental factors, just like the emphasis on original to the exclusion of social influences, implies their separation and relative functional independence.

The sociological position is that the person is a concrete, indivisible unity. He is a product and not a sum. There are no original and acquired tendencies existing separately and struggling to control his behavior responses any more than the behavior of water is a resultant of the opposed or cooperating tendencies of the hydrogen and oxygen in its composition. Water is a compound, not a mixture. It behaves as a unit. Its characteristics and behavior are unique and are not determined by either the oxygen or the hydrogen. In like manner the human being is an entity. The individual is an abstraction.

B. SOCIAL STATUS

It has been emphasized that all human animals have essentially the same original nature—the same physical organization, mental capacities, and developmental tendencies. At the same time no two are identical; there is a continuous variation in traits and in the combination of traits. It is this fact of variability that makes each an individual; all references to individuality stress the native biological aspects of the human being. The cause and explanation of the uniqueness of the individual lie in the organic hereditary processes. These terms—original nature, individual, and individuality—refer to and emphasize the native likenesses and differences produced by the organic processes.

In the realm of social reality the corresponding terms are human nature, the person, and personality. Human nature, being the product of face-to-face contacts and association, is essentially the same among all peoples and in all times, since these primary relations among men are everywhere basically the same. But since no two human beings are identical in original nature and no two have an identical sequence of life experiences, the personality differences are more pronounced than the individual ones. There is less difference between individuals than there is between persons; men are more unlike than babies; human differences are greater than animal differences.

In the complex of factors resulting in the differences between persons, social status is the most important item. By social status is meant the position in the social group—that is, the relation of the person to the other members of the society.

Position is always relative; status always implies a group. It may be a small and intimate group or the large impersonal society. The relations of the father and the child are reciprocal and give to each a position in the family group. But each has relations with other persons in and out of the family; each holds membership in various groups—business, religious, political, educational, play, and numerous others. It is the totality of these relations that defines the status and position of the person.

The actual social status of a person is determined by a wide range of facts and conditions. Park and Burgess list physical traits, temperament, character, social expression, prestige, and the individual's conception of his rôle as the personal characteristics which determine efficiency and social status. They go on to say that "The significance of these traits consists in the way in which they enter into the rôle of the individual in his social *milieu*. Chief among these may be considered the individual's conception of the part which he plays among his fellows."¹ In another connection Burgess has said that "Certain traits of the individual—as his physique, mentality, and temperament—definitely affect his social standing. Primarily, however, his position in the group will be determined by personal relations such as his group participation, his character, his personal behavior pattern, and his social type."²

The specific factors significant in the determination of status are numerous and complex. For present purposes they are grouped into four classes: original nature and physical characters, external and accidental conditions, personal traits, and social attitudes. This grouping is for convenience in discussion; the classes are not intended as independent and mutually exclusive categories.

Differences in the original or physical nature are among the most obvious factors operating to determine the status of the individual. The race to which a man belongs determines to a very large extent the position he will occupy in a given society. The fact of sex operates in a similar way: men and women, apart from all other natural or artificial differences, are destined each to a different status in the social order. The particular status

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 71.

² E. W. Burgess, "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28(1923), 665-666. Mr. Burgess here gives a somewhat detailed outline for the study of individual and personal traits.

differs with time and place, but always and everywhere sex is a factor in its determination. Age is a third biological factor of major importance. In his seven ages of man Shakespeare gives a literary characterization of the status and rôle of the individual male from infancy to senility. Physical traits—physique, physiognomy, and the like—are highly significant items in deciding a man's work, recreation, and standing in the group. Victor Hugo's *The Man Who Laughs* is an elaborate picture of the effect of deformity in defining a man's rôle and efficiency in the social world. Deaf-mutism, blindness, and other physical defects and deformities immediately and directly, and within rather narrow limits, determine the individual's place in the society. The level of mental ability is important among the original factors affecting individual status in the group and the society. Superior intelligence, on the whole, contributes to social recognition and high position, while low intelligence and mental abnormalities operate, on the whole, toward an inferior status and a restricted rôle. Finally, temperament operates to determine the individual's activities, interests, and associates and hence to fix his status in the immediate group and in the larger social organization.

The second important group of factors that determine social status inheres in conditions and values external to the individual. These are related only incidentally, if at all, to his personal worth. The social and economic class into which the child is born and to which the family belongs decides in very large measure his position and importance in society. By accident of birth, he is a member of the nobility, the economic aristocracy, the *élite*, the *bourgeois*, the peasantry, the proletariat, or other class or caste division, and his status is determined or sharply conditioned by that fact. The immediate family of which he is a member narrows still further the range of probable status: he is a Smith, a Jones, or a Brown, and his status is in terms of the prestige and honorific position of the family name. The education of the person, a function for the most part of the social class and economic competence of his family, decides his vocation and associates and places him in relation to his fellows. His church affiliation, political allegiance, and other traditional alinements determine the groups in which a man holds membership and are important, therefore, in locating him in society. Nationality and language, like race and sex, automatically classify the person and, within limits, define his status within a foreign group.

A complex group of personal traits and characteristics operates, independently as well as in conjunction with individual characteristics and social values, more closely to define individual position. These personal traits are in the main a result of the external social conditions in which the person has been reared. Dress is largely a function of economic status. Bodily gesture, facial expression, manner of speech, and the like are reflections of nationality or of social class—matters acquired as parts of the social code and ritual. They function, however, as independent factors in determining the individual's status especially within the local and personal groups. Selfishness, vanity, jealousy, impulsiveness, emotionalism, ill temper, and the like are socially conditioned personal traits but are, nevertheless, factors that help to define the person and the rôle he plays. Character, an integrated set of habits and consistent behavior patterns, is often an important factor among the personal traits. In the secondary relations of modern life, appearance and manner are often of first importance; social status depends in part upon "front," the conventional signs associated with wealth and refinement.

A final set of factors important in the determination of status may be grouped under the caption social attitudes. These fall into two subgroups: the individual's self-consciousness—that is, the person's conception of himself and of his rôle in the society—and the attitudes of others of his immediate group and of the larger society toward him.

Now the individual's conception of himself is determined fundamentally by his status in the group. What he thinks of himself depends upon his relations to other people—upon the groups to which he belongs or desires to belong and his position and importance in these groups. If he is a member of the group in a real and fundamental way, he shares the attitudes, aspirations, and conceptions of the group. His attitude toward himself is simply one expression of the group attitude. If the person's conception of himself does not correspond with his status in the group, he is not in reality a member of it; he is without status, an isolated person. It is only in case of the insane person that there is a conception of self entirely divorced from status and from the conception of others.

Cooley's description of what he calls "the looking-glass self" shows the process by which the person's conception of himself is

determined by the attitudes of other members of his primary group toward him:

In a very large and interesting class of cases the social reference takes the form of a somewhat definite imagination of how one's self—that is, any idea he appropriates—appears in a particular mind, and the kind of self-feeling one has is determined by the attitude toward this attributed to that other mind. A social self of this sort might be called the reflected or looking-glass self:

*Each to each a looking-glass
Reflects the other that doth pass.*

As we see our face, figure, and dress in the glass, and are interested in them because they are ours, and pleased or otherwise with them according as they do or do not answer to what we should like them to be; so in imagination we perceive in another's mind some thought of our appearance, manners, aims, deeds, character, friends, and so on, and are variously affected by it.

A self-idea of this sort seems to have three principal elements: the imagination of our appearance to the other person; the imagination of his judgment of that appearance, and some sort of self-feeling, such as pride or mortification. The comparison with a looking-glass hardly suggests the second element, the imagined judgment, which is quite essential. The thing that moves us to pride or shame is not the mere mechanical reflection of ourselves, but an imputed sentiment, the imagined effect of this reflection upon another's mind. This is evident from the fact that the character and weight of that other, in whose mind we see ourselves, makes all the difference with our feeling. We are ashamed to seem evasive in the presence of a straightforward man, cowardly in the presence of a brave one, gross in the eyes of a refined one, and so on. We always imagine, and in imagining share, the judgments of the other mind. A man will boast to one person of an action—say some sharp transaction in trade—which he would be ashamed to own to another.¹

There are, to be sure, some additional elements involved. The individual's conception of himself is in part a deposit from past experience; it is in part due to status in other, possibly imaginary, groups. The religious mystic, for example, may have prestige and acquire status by the very fact of other-worldliness. A person's manner and overt behavior may, of course, have little or no relation to his conception of himself. Experiences of

¹ C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 183-185. Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

people and things come to be embodied in ideas of what may be expected of them; they are signs of behavior to which adjustment is made in the form of reciprocal behavior. The individual may control his overt behavior in order to control his human environment. Humility, as frequently in the southern Negro, may be a technique of control rather than a mental attitude.

While the individual's conception of himself is determined by his status, the conception thus formed is, in turn, an important factor in determining status. The child's conception of himself is first defined in the family and other intimate local groups. This conception is carried over, more or less completely, to other groups. Poise and self-confidence, as timidity and uncertainty, determine behavior and initial status in new situations and groups. In the home the dependent status of the child may generate a lack of confidence that determines a subordinate rôle in other groups, or the child may reverse the home situation and assume a masterful and domineering attitude in groups of smaller children. In either case the conception of himself as a part of the total situation determines the rôle assumed and so the status.

Mention has already been made of the influence of race, sex, wealth, religion, church membership, and other incidental and external facts in defining a person's position in the society. They do so because the group has a defined body of reactions toward the facts upon which the position depends. The position of the person is due directly to the possession of the external signs that mark a status. But indirectly it is due to the prevailing body of social attitudes toward these facts: the characteristics upon which status depends have no intrinsic importance; they get their significance because of the general attitude toward them. It is these attitudes toward the marks of status that give the man the status. But the attitudes toward the external marks are perpetuated and retain their significance because of the general attitudes toward the persons bearing them. Status is a matter of prevailing social definition. The attitudes of others operate directly to determine the rôle of the person and indirectly, and more fundamentally and insidiously, by determining the conception of his rôle held by the person himself.

It is perhaps evident without extended discussion that competition is the fundamental process through which the individual finds his place and rôle in the social order. Selection is made and status determined on the basis of the original and acquired dif-

ferences and in terms of the prevailing social attitudes. The personal differences are, in the main, an expression of inequalities in economic, educational, and other opportunities basic to personal development, and the attitudes in terms of which differences are evaluated are, in the main, traditional and unenlightened. The impersonal forces of competition and selection operate against this background to fix the individual's place in the social order.

Individual status is a complex of interrelationships. Each person is conscious of inferiority in some respects and of superiority in others. He may be inferior in one group, as the family or the school, but superior in another, as the pool room or the fraternity. A gain in status is a thing for which each strives and a loss of status is a thing against which each person struggles. A large part of otherwise meaningless human activity is directed toward maintaining appearances. A great percentage of Americans are said to put conspicuous luxury before comfort or even necessity: they go hungry in order to be well dressed; they buy a car and suffer for medical treatment. The emphasis is placed upon the things that bring recognition. The so-called inferiority complex is an organization of attitudes clustered about deficiencies in some trait or group of traits considered important by the group to which the person belongs or to which he would belong. Compensation is a form of the individual struggle for status. The physically inferior student who cannot compete in sports may get recognition by superior scholarship; the mentally dull student may compensate for classroom deficiencies and failure by athletic and social activity. The scholarship of the Jew is in part an effort to achieve self-respect in the presence of discrimination and social exclusion. Much of juvenile and adolescent delinquency is an effort to achieve recognition or prevent loss of status because of deficiency in other lines.

C. PERSONALITY

It is now evident perhaps that the human personality is not something vague and esoteric and that it is not necessary to look beyond the experience of the person to understand what it is. In the sociological usage, personality is simply the state of being a person. It may be defined as the unity resulting from the blending of the native and acquired traits in the individual life expe-

rience and social participation. It signifies all that is original and individual to a man as well as all that he has acquired by education, experience, and human contact. It includes all those qualities, physical, intellectual, emotional, and moral, which define the man.

In popular usage the term personality is commonly employed as a literary and evaluative rather than as a descriptive and scientific concept. With this usage we have nothing to do.

The scientific usage is not entirely consistent. The term is often arbitrarily defined and employed to connote the particular and limited aspect of the totality that comes within the field of interest of a particular science. It is of course entirely legitimate to give a special definition to a term in common use and to employ it in accordance with the specific definition. This practice in regard to the term personality makes it necessary here to clarify the sociological as distinct from the special and limited uses.

The physiologist and the biologist often look upon personality as the organic unity resulting from the hereditary nature of the individual. In one of these conceptions personalities are determined directly and exclusively by the functioning of the endocrine glands. There are said to be five pure personality types corresponding to the domination of the organism by one or another of the glands and a great variety of hyphenates resulting from the combinations and variations in the relative activity and control among the glands.¹

To the psychologist, personality quite generally means the mental unity resulting from the peculiar original equipment as organized in social experience. One writer without stating what it is says that "personality is the result of progressive mental organization."² In listing the "factors of personality" another psychologist gives physique, temperament, instincts, and intelligence, each of which is said to differ from one individual to another.³

In the sociological sense the concept always connotes unity: the personality is a product of the inborn energies and the socially determined interests, a product of the biological endowment and the culture heritage. It is an organization and an integration of the total life processes and experiences. But the unity must be

¹ L. Berman, *The Glands Regulating Personality*.

² H. C. Warren, *Human Psychology*.

³ R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*.

understood as a somewhat loose and changing aggregate. At any point in his life the human person is the result of all the things that have come within the experience of the organism. The constant responses to an ever changing environment result in continual changes in the content of the organization. Each personality is a unique unity, but this unity is somewhat different from day to day.

What was said above in regard to the determination of social status may be applied to the concept of personality. It is conditioned by the physique, mentality, temperament, and other biological and individual facts; it is modified by the habit patterns, the life philosophy, and other social traits; it is influenced by group and class and family connections; and it is in part determined by the type and degree of participation in the social order. The man's personality is both a cause and an effect of his status in the group.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SELF

It follows immediately from the fact that personality is largely determined by the contacts and experiences of group life that it is a complex and many-sided construct. There are as many aspects of the person as he has patterns of behavior. The significance of this statement is appreciated only upon noting the beginning and nature of personality development.

The idea of self, as distinct from all other things, is so familiar that its existence is commonly taken for granted. But the conception is one of slow growth through long years of experience. The child at first has no idea of self; in the stream of experience he does not distinguish between himself and the remainder of the universe. The first dim awareness of self as distinct from others comes when there is conflict with his environment, when there is restraint upon and interference with his activity. He discovers himself in the process of discovering others and in the same way and at the same time. He becomes aware of himself simultaneously with his awareness of things not himself.

As the child develops, his awareness of the distinction grows and clarifies. But his idea of himself is always in terms of others and of his part and theirs in a mutual social situation. He recognizes things that minister to or frustrate his desires. He understands himself in terms of his activities and relations;

he understands others by participating in or reproducing their activities, by setting off his own actions, thoughts, and ideas from theirs. Without companions he would never develop more than a crude and rudimentary idea of self. The idea of self, as well as the individual's conception of himself, is social in origin, in development, and in content.

In the home and family life the child has a definite rôle and status. He has a conception of himself in terms of his relationships to the other members of the family group. He understands the situation in the sense that he has formed a set of habits that fit him into its routine. He is timid and subdued or bold and persistent according as his parents and elders are harsh or lenient. Whether he is generous or selfish, cheerful or unhappy, orderly or destructive, independent, meddlesome, honest, sociable, and so on depends upon the group patterns and his habituation to them. Within the home he develops a type of self that is in accord with the situation.

In his play with other children, the child enters another world and forms a new set of relationships. He has a different status, plays a new rôle, and comes to have a modified conception of himself. He is, in reality, a different person. There is, to be sure, a transfer from the one situation to the other. His initial adjustment is controlled at least in some part by his body of memories and habit patterns. With children older and larger than himself, he tends on the whole to assume a subordinate position and a dependent rôle as in the family group. He may transfer, more or less completely, the idea of himself as a child and an inferior from the one group to the other. With younger children he tends to assume a superior or protective position and attitude; he reenacts the home patterns but with a reversal of status. There he is protected, here he protects. His behavior toward the younger children is in large measure a reinstatement of the treatment he has received from his elders: the child who is repressed and abused in the home may reenact the home patterns by being a bully among the younger children.

The school life presents another type of situation involving new adjustments and relationships and a consequent different conception of himself. He participates in a new set of activities and plays a rôle unlike that in the home or in the play group. He accommodates himself to the school routine, finds new interests, learns to control his spontaneous tendencies, accepts new responsi-

bilities, and makes a wide variety of other adjustments. He acquires a status and plays a part in the group and this gives him a new conception of himself.

So it is with every situation of which the child is a part. As his circle of acquaintance grows and his body of experiences enlarges, his self expands. In each group he has a somewhat different status and each gives him an opportunity to play a different part and makes it necessary that he do so. In each he develops a self corresponding to his part in the relationship. He is a different person in each group and situation. He is not the same child at home that he is at school, he is still another boy on the playground and, indeed, in every different play group. His behavior is always reciprocal: he is not the same with his father as he is with his mother, not the same with his playmates as with his tutors. The child is typically and normally a divided personality. He is as many different children as there are groups of which he is a part. He changes from one personality to another with change from one group and set of relationships to another.

The growth of the child's personality is not restricted wholly to actual groups and experiences. He participates, vicariously, in historical and fictional situations encountered in the stories he reads and in the pictures and dramas he sees. He takes the part of the characters, becomes an active participant in the story, and thereby greatly expands his range of experience and sympathy. His understanding and appreciation become broad and deep in proportion to the range of his contacts and the completeness of his participation.

As the child matures, his different selves become integrated into one consistent personality. The memory of one self carries over to other situations and the behavior in one is modified by that in the other. His behavior becomes more or less the same in all situations. The man, as contrasted to the child, is more or less the same person regardless of the immediate group. The different selves of the child become the different facets and phases of the adult personality. When these different selves of the child fail to integrate or when they become separated in the adult, the result is the divided or dual or multiple personality presently to be discussed. Here the memory of one self does not carry over to the others, and behavior in the different situations is unrelated. Stevenson's story of *Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde* is a classic literary example of a divided personality.

The normal adult personality may and usually does have many aspects. Its richness is determined by the range of contact and experience before the final integration and determines the range of sympathy and appreciation. Very commonly the range of contact and experience of the girl is more restricted and selected than that of the boy, and the results are apparent in the final personality products. Depth of personality, as distinct from richness and breadth, is determined by the intensity rather than by the variety of contacts.

E. TYPES OF PERSONALITY

Each member of society is a unique personality. No two are alike in original nature; no two are alike in life experiences. Even the so-called identical twins differ in observable and measurable physical ways as well as in life experiences; in personality they are far from identical. The concrete life experiences of children in the same home and family are widely unlike. The personalities built up as a product of these variable factors are infinite in their range of detailed differences. Each human personality is unique.

But the scientist is concerned with the constant and the general. Like the artist, he seeks to abstract the universal from the particular and to understand the concrete in terms of cause and relationship. Order is achieved in the confusing complexity of phenomena, and the concrete reality takes on meaning, as the individual and unique are grouped by points of reference. The unique is meaningless. It becomes understandable only by being generalized, by being brought within an ordered set of relations. A frame of reference reduces the complexity, multiplicity, variability, and uniqueness of concrete phenomena; it makes them comprehensible by bringing them within an ordered system. In the study of personality, the sociologist seeks to discover and define types and thus bring what is otherwise unique and esoteric within the realm of the natural and understandable.

Various classifications are possible depending upon the conception of personality held and upon the purpose and point of view of the classifier. From the moral point of view of approval and disapproval, on the basis of independently accepted criteria, the division is into the good and the bad, the desirable and the undesirable. Another familiar common-sense division, running in terms of deviation from a familiar standard, gives normal and abnormal personalities. A third common-sense classification,

sometimes arrived at after an elaborate show of evidence, is into strong and weak types: traits assumed to be desirable—good physique, high intelligence, an extroverted view of life, conformity to the social conventions, an aggressive rôle in social relations—are said to be positively correlated with each other, and their opposites are, therefore, similarly intercorrelated. The one group of correlated traits gives the strong- and the other the weak-personality types. Psychiatrists use the terms extrovert and introvert to distinguish the active, gossipy, and meddlesome from the thoughtful, sensitive, and retiring. A third group of the so-called average persons is commonly added to care for those who do not fall within the classification. In terms of patterns of personal behavior a usual threefold classification is into objective or direct, the introspective or indirect or imaginative, and the psychopathic or perverse. The Bohemian, the Philistine, and the Creative Man is a classification of personality types stressing the result of the totality of the life processes in the formation of the person.

To the sociologist a personality type is defined by the set of attitudes that determines, and is determined by, the status and rôle of the individual in the group. The definiteness of the type depends upon the definiteness and character of the attitudes and the nature of their integration about a nucleus of significant social traits.

Generally speaking, persons who develop in a distinctive environment become more or less typical of that group. They have the language habits, mental attitudes, traditional beliefs, social mannerisms, and other traits of their *milieu*. They resemble each other more closely than they resemble individuals from other groups. Race and national characteristics are obvious. The members of various professional and occupational groups conform more or less to type. The lawyer, minister, politician, farmer, policeman, bond salesman, administrative official are examples of innumerable social types determined by the nature of their work and associates.

Differences in social status, regardless of the original conditions out of which they arose, give rise to cultural and personality contrasts that accentuate the differences and serve as a justification of them. The native or other peculiarities that initiate the differential status may be wholly or in part replaced by traits originating in the status itself. The members of an aristocratic

and ruling class are in personality type sharply contrasted to the supporting peasantry; the traits of character and personality, the social values and personal virtues, are not the same. The one is characterized by leisure, refinement, and generosity; by simplicity of manner and dignity of bearing; by independence of character and frankness of speech. The traits and virtues of the dependent class are industry, humility, frugality, and obedience. The differences are social in origin and define social and personality types. The plantation gentleman, the poor white, and the Negro slave in the antebellum days of the Old South were sharply contrasted types of personality. The social characteristics of women and men, historically and in the modern world, have been rather sharply distinct. They have had different rôles and positions in society and have developed characteristics that define sex types. Historically, dependence, delicacy, timidity, compliance, good nature, pettiness, and so through a considerable list have been traits of the ideal woman of the leisure classes as contrasted to strength, independence, decision, courage, and other attributes of character supposed to define the masculine ideal. The modern Jew is essentially a personality, rather than a racial or a religious type. The characteristics that are typical of the Jews as a group are manners, habits, and interests determined by the exigencies of life in their long period of segregation and the persistence, even in changed environments, of this set of culture traits. Their social status and the conceptions they have of themselves have varied in strict harmony with changes in the set of historic circumstances to which they have been accommodated.

Centuries of confinement in the Ghetto, social ostracism, ceaseless suffering under the ban of abuse and persecution have been instrumental in producing a characteristic psychic type which manifests itself in his cast of countenance which is considered as particularly "Jewish."

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The "Ghetto face" is not the result of the complexion, nor of stature, nor is it due to the size, prominence, or form of the nose, cheek bones, lips, or chin. It is purely psychic just like the actor's, the soldier's, the minister's face.¹

Within each larger social group is a wide range of personality subtypes. The personality differences between men and women

¹ M. Fishberg, *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment*, pp. 165-166.

are striking, but differences within each sex by nation, caste, and class are even greater. The flapper, the housewife, and society girl; the college boy, Rotarian, and reformer are popular characterizations that correspond in a somewhat rough and superficial way to social types. The contrast between Jew and non-Jew is marked but not so pronounced as that between Jews of the East and those of the West. The French, German, and Russian Jew are distinctive types, and within each national group are various subtypes.

Among the great number of social types that call for careful and exhaustive study it is possible to mention but a few. From the standpoint of economic success, the "pauper" and the "millionaire" are social types created and defined by the conditions of the economic order. The Babbitt is a reprehensible type of blatant business man to whom economic success is the only form of achievement that the culture has to offer and who measures all achievement in monetary terms. The boor is a social type of uncouth and uneducated person, rich or poor, with no appreciation of intellectuality. The "yes man" is a social type created in response to the demand of powerful persons for flattery. The priest, the Protestant minister, the nun, the opportunist, the radical, the conservative, the intellectual, the "realtor," the scholar, the "mortuarian," the college president, the dean of men, the actor, the Bohemian, the philanthropist, the poser, the colonist, the "beach comber," the hobo, the "automobile gypsy," the social worker are others among a long list of popularly recognized American social types. They are in each case to be defined by an analysis of the complex of attitudes that they hold concerning themselves and that others hold toward them. .

The range and variety of personality types are an index of the character and culture of the group. The existence of a type implies an audience that calls it forth and perpetuates it. Each type, like each separate personality, is a product and an inevitable expression of the social situation and the life experiences. Its existence depends upon a supporting set of attitudes and habits in the social group. The type, in other words, is a direct expression of the values of the group. New types come and old types pass with changes in the character and attitudes of the group. The important types are the nuclei about which the culture fabric of a given area is woven.

F. DISORGANIZATION OF THE PERSONALITY

The organization of the personality implies an effective unity of sentiment and habit that will make possible consistent patterns of behavior. Such organization comes as a result of the integration of the various personalities or selves of the child built up from his membership and participation in his various primary groups. This integration comes when responsibility is put upon the child and he is obligated to be the same person in different or all situations. The memory of each situation carries over to the others and behavior becomes more or less the same in all.

Disorganization is the absence, partial or complete, of a working integration of memories that would permit of a wholesome and personally satisfying adjustment to the environment. Between the conceptions and the wishes of the person and the external reality there is a lack of harmony that prevents unobstructed activity. It may represent a failure of the original integration to incorporate various elements of the childhood personalities or it may result from the incorporation of mutually incompatible elements.

All through life but particularly in the earlier years the formation of new habits and the acquisition of new information and ideas go along with the discarding of habits no longer appropriate and of conceptions no longer tenable. The child changes as he grows and comes to have new games, interests, and friends. And the social situation changes so that old ideas and ways must be replaced by new. The change of ideas and habits is normally not a conscious and deliberate process; it goes on unnoticed as a result of the growth and maturity of the person and of changes in the external surroundings. The two changing factors make new habits and conceptions necessary if the person is to remain adjusted to the social world. If the person meets changing situations successfully, the old habits and conceptions are modified or replaced without disorder. But habits, beliefs, and conceptions may be so deeply impressed that there is a strong emotional resistance to change. Because of poor natural equipment, the effect of sickness, unfortunate training, or other cause the old may persist after it has ceased to be appropriate. The person may hold old conceptions and beliefs alongside of, but separate from, the new. His mind may be, as it were, a series of compartments holding mutually contradictory things. His early reli-

gious or social training, for example, may have been of such a nature and so deeply impressed that, though wholly inadequate to the present need, it may remain little or not at all modified. In some cases new situations cannot be met until the old ideas and habits change. The old will not work in the new situation but the old will not give way to the new. As long as this remains the situation, and it may remain so more or less permanently, the person is unadjusted and personally disorganized.

Such disorganization may not be sufficient to prevent all normal behavior; the serviceable habits may be sufficient to carry the person along in spite of the burden. There is no satisfactory type of integration, but the equipment may be sufficient as long as the person has the protection of a favorable environment. But in time of crisis there is failure, or the maladjustment then becomes overt. Marriage, childbirth, the death of a child or other near relative, business defeat, personal injury, loss of occupation, or any major or minor change of life may precipitate some gross psychic disorder.

These so-called functional disorders—psychasthenias, neurasthenias, hysterias, anxiety neuroses—range from a mild inferiority complex at the one extreme to dementia praecox and manic depressive insanity at the other. They arise in periods of crisis and represent an emotional conflict between the conditions of life and the personal conceptions. The individual's inability to resolve the conflict is evidenced by excesses, seclusion, recklessness, hysteria, manias, and other major or minor behavior disturbances. There is of course an organic aspect of functional disorders but this is aside from the present concern.

It remains only to emphasize that mental conflict and personal disorganization are expressions of social relations. The matter receives detailed treatment in a later chapter on conflict.

G. THE DISSOCIATED PERSONALITY

A special type of personality disorganization takes the form of dissociation, of dual or multiple personality. The phenomena vary from the familiar and usual to extreme psychopathic states.

It has been pointed out that the child is typically and normally multiple in personality. He is not responsible and dependable; the kind of child he is varies with time and circumstance. He is a more or less different child in each group of which he is a member and in each situation in which he participates. The memories of

one self and situation do not carry over, or carry over only imperfectly, to other situations. His behavior in one situation may be as unlike his behavior in another as is that of two different children. With the approach of maturity, in the normal case, the various habits and behavior patterns form a more or less unitary organization.

In the normal person there are, of course, differences of behavior in the presence of different persons and groups. The adult personality has as many phases as there are groups to which the person belongs. But they are merely aspects of a single personality; memory and consciousness of behavior carry over from one situation to another. It is also a commonly known fact that many persons are virtually dual or multiple in personality. The exigencies of life may put a man more or less permanently in two more or less independent worlds. The business and home life, for example, may provide two worlds of experience that have little or nothing at all in common. The man may be and in reality often is a different personality in his office and in his family.

In the process of personality integration there may be conflict between ideas and behavior patterns, with the result that some groups may remain outside the main aggregation; consistent unity is not achieved among the separate selves. There is in such case not a single unified personality but two or more. One may contain all but a single or a few minor memory groups, or the constellation of memories may divide into two more or less equal parts. In any case there is a lack of unity, a dual personality. The same individual lives alternately two separate lives, one or both partly or totally oblivious of the other. According to circumstances, now one and now another personality is released from control and becomes for the time being dominant. The consciousness of behavior when one personality is dominant is not carried over into another situation in which the other personality is dominant.

Dissociation may come subsequent to the initial integration. A body of experiences and memories acquired by the person after the organization of the personality never becomes completely integrated into it. It remains more or less separate and apart, a satellite about, rather than an integral part of, the personality. There may come also conflicts among the divergent phases of the adult personality. In such cases overt disorganization of behav-

ior may be avoided by a splitting off of the personality into separate constellations of habit and sentiment that maintain independent existences. The complex of religious and ethical ideas, for example, unable to harmonize with the complex of ambitions and activities of practical life or with other phases of the personality complex, may split off and continue a separate existence unrelated to the remainder.

The phenomena of dissociation vary widely in character and significance. Hypnotism is an extreme form of temporary dissociation of memories. Some forms of dissociation are so partial and temporary in character as to occasion slight disability. Absent-mindedness, the detachment of abstraction, is a mild form of dissociation. Moods are a more permanent type of partial dissociation. In more pronounced forms there is an absolute cleavage. One mood or character complex of the normal individual is split off and becomes the sole or chief characteristic of the new personality. Dr. Prince's patient, Miss Beauchamp, manifested three independent personalities in addition to the original. In some cases of dissociation the separated parts are isolated from and unknown to each other; in others one self may be aware of the existence of the other while the second may possess the memories of both. In Janet's patient, Madam B., one personality, Leonie, possessed only her own memories; the second personality, Leontine, possessed her own and Leonie's; the third, Leonore, possessed Madam B.'s whole life.¹

H. PERSONALITY CHANGES

If follows immediately from the fact that the social personality is a product of human experience and association that it must undergo modification with changes in contact and social status. It expands through participation and decays through limitation of function and loss of possession. It is a functional and a dynamic rather than a static reality and, in the usual case, old elements are constantly being replaced by new ones. Every meaningful experience widens the sympathetic understanding and alters the person's conception of himself and of his rôle in the social order. His personality expands in richness and sympathy with the increase of significant experience and with participation in

¹ W. S. Taylor, *Readings in Abnormal Psychology and Mental Hygiene*, "Dissociation of Personality," pp. 459-472.

a variety of social situations. It increases in depth and strength as a result of responsibility and intensity of experience. But it is not alone a matter of addition or subtraction of personality elements: every change involves some reorganization of the total complex.

The changes in status and personality may be slow and gradual or they may be sudden and mutational. In broad outlines the adult personality remains stable, the main patterns are firmly fixed, and except as a consequence of major personal crisis, change slowly or not at all. The physical organism, the intellectual qualities, the major habit patterns, and other basic elements are relatively unchanging. In the usual course of events, change may be observed only over relatively long periods of time. But the body of information, the minor interests, occupational habits, and the like undergo more rapid and easy change with changes in life and in types of social participation.

The same factors important in the initial determination of personality and social status operate to their elevation or degradation. The loss of property, a break in health, the decline of mental vigor, the death or alienation of relatives or friends, a criminal record, or the destruction of any thing or relationship associated with the person tends to degrade his social status, change his conception of himself, alter his rôle in the group, and affect his personality. On the other hand, the acquisition of wealth, distinctive achievement, or other fact may raise the person's position in the group, change the part he plays, increase his self-respect and self-confidence, and profoundly alter his personality.

Among the factors significant in personality change is change in environment that brings new contacts, associations, and experiences or allows of escape from the old. A change of residence may bring either gain or loss of status and so of personality organization. The man who is a failure in one situation often succeeds in another; he escapes the people who rank him as a failure and in doing so escapes such a conception of himself. On the other hand, a change of residence may involve a sudden and severe loss in social position. The educated foreigner upon immigration into America is often reduced to the position of a manual worker with a correspondingly great change in personality.

Change of personality comes about most readily of course in children and in the young and relatively immature. It is well

known that a change of family residence often results in the reformation of a previously delinquent child and that sudden and sharp changes in the personality and behavior of socially well-adjusted children sometimes follow upon such change of residence. The young man or woman often undergoes a sudden change of status resulting in profound alteration of personality on leaving the home environment. Often in the family circle the young woman—sometimes also the young man—is treated as a child and her personality development depends upon her escape. The personality of the protected woman is so often lacking in richness and depth because both the range and intensity of her experiences are so narrowly limited. In the protected home environment the boy often has developed a conception of himself and of his importance in the social order that is suddenly and painfully destroyed when he is thrown on his own in a secondary group.

I. THE PERSONALITY OF PEOPLES

It is possible and profitable to extend the use of the term personality to include national and other groups. This use of the term is not mere analogy; it defines an objective reality.

Every human group of any size or permanence is distinguished from others by various more or less important characteristics. The peoples of the world differ in racial composition, culture development, institutional arrangements, and basic elements of social organization. Each has an internal organization, a political position, and a distinctive body of tradition, resulting from its historic experience, that operate to exalt and perpetuate the group. Each has status, place, and importance in the world of groups and plays a distinctive rôle in some larger group and in relation to others. There is a conception of the group by itself—a consensus or integration of personal conceptions—and of others toward it, that operates to determine its status, development, and functioning. Each major group, as a group, has a unity and coherence and a body of consistent attitudes, aspirations, and practices that give it individuality and uniqueness. A people or other well-defined group has a sort of collective personality.

Each national group has a certain ethnic composition, psychological character, political tradition, and other characteristics that give it individuality and a definite and clearly defined status in the family of nations. This position has been achieved and is maintained by competition on the basis of group differences just

as the relation of persons within the group is determined by competition operating on the basis of differences among them. Each nation, moreover, has a conception of itself, expressed in the incoherent body of folk thought and feeling as well as in formulated nationalistic literature. This conception of the place, importance, and rôle of the group in world culture and in the political order is developed and determined in a way closely parallel to that in which the conception of the person in the group is determined by status and rôle.

The characteristics of a personality are in part determined by the nature of the individual, the biological elements acted upon by the environmental processes. But the person is something other than the elements, biological and environmental, that enter into the organization. The group in like manner is conditioned by the character of the units that compose the population. The group personality, in one sense, is a totality of the personalities that compose the population. The presence of numerous superior personalities makes for superiority of the group. The progress, development, and culture of the group are determined in part by the advancement of the personalities within it. But the personality of the group runs in terms of internal organization, political position, historic tradition, group aspirations, and the like.

The relation of group personality and the personality of the members of the group is a reciprocal one. One element in the personality of the group is the degree of active participation of each member in the common interest and welfare of all. If the group organization be such as to restrict the participation of large numbers of the population, such as women or slaves, the fact is reflected and expressed in the group personality itself. As distinct from earlier societies, the members of modern groups are more articulate and active personalities; this fact of proletarian literacy and participation in group concerns is an important element in determining the personality characteristics of the collectivity. On the other hand, the person's conception of himself turns in part upon the groups to which he belongs. He is an Englishman, a Mexican, a Negro, a Jew, or other group member and his conception of himself is conditioned by the status of the group. On the other hand, the personalities of the members of the group are the basis upon which the phenomena of group and social life rest.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. Summarize the content of the preceding chapter and relate it to the thesis of the present chapter.

2. What are the two factors the interaction of which results in the development of personality? What is the rôle of original nature in the development of personality? What is the rôle of the social group?

3. State as clearly and concisely as you can the distinction between the terms *individual* and *person*. In what respects are you an individual and in what respects a person?

4. By reference to a standard unabridged dictionary determine in how far, if at all, the definitions of *person* and *personality* set up in the preceding discussion differ from common usage.

5. "Man is not born human." Explain.

6. Personality is "the sum total of images, ideas, attitudes, and habits of the individual organized in terms of his social participation." (K. Young.) Personality is "the sum and organization of those traits which determine the rôle of the individual in the group." (Park and Burgess.) Compare these two definitions with each other and with the definition as given in the text.

7. What are the errors in the popular conception of the civilized human being as a savage with a veneer of culture?

8. Define temperament. Is temperament a trait of original nature or is it a culture acquisition? Is the "temperament" popularly assumed to be characteristic of "artistic" people a pose or are they in such a large percentage of cases really psychopathic?

9. What is the present standing of the psychology that assumes man to have an extensive complement of instincts in terms of which it undertakes to explain man's culture and social behavior?

10. Define social status. What are the different types of factor upon which status depends? Illustrate each type.

11. "From the interaction of the community elements and the impulses of the individual develops personality." Discuss this from the point of view of the conception of personality implicit in it.

12. Show how race determines a man's status in the American society. Has race anything to do with the fact that there are no Negroes on the faculty of your college? That there are few or no Negroes in the United States Congress? Could a Negro be elected president of the United States?

13. Give an example of a woman denied recognition (status) because she was a woman; give an example of a woman being accorded undue recognition for work accomplished because she was a woman.

14. What are Shakespeare's "seven ages of man"? Does this classification seem valid to you?

15. Give an example of a person known to you whose status depends upon family wealth or family name. How far do your own status and sense of importance depend upon some such accident of birth or circumstance?

16. How far does your own "social" status or that of some one you know well depend upon appearance?

17. In how far is your opinion of yourself determined by what Professor Cooley called "the looking-glass self"?

18. In what respects and relationships may one feel himself superior and in what respects and relationships inferior?

19. Give a concrete case known to you where a sense of inferiority determined the rôle of the person.

20. Give a case known to you of "overcompensation" for some deficiency.

21. Under what circumstances is self-confidence developed?

22. Describe the development of the self.

23. Can you give a case of a child known to you who is meek and subdued in his own home but a bully among the smaller children?

24. What is the sociological justification, if any, for teaching music, art, and the like in the lower grades of the schools?

25. What are the place and function of literature in the life of the child?

26. How do you account for the different selves you display in different groups? Are you aware of any conflicts that have arisen in your life because of your failure to integrate these several selves into a consistent unity?

27. It is said that individuals invariably act parts when in the presence of other people, feigning virtues that they do not in reality possess. Would you say that such a statement is correct?

28. What is the importance of the mother in the early stages of personal development? Of brothers and sisters?

29. Have you ever in an argument clung doggedly to an opinion that you had stated after you were convinced that you were wrong? How do you explain such behavior?

30. What is the importance of memory in the integration of the personality?

31. Tennyson makes Ulysses say, "I am part of all that I have met." Discuss this in terms of personality development.

32. Do you think it is usual for a person to adjust himself to two or more conflicting groups by developing a kind of split personality, as far as possible keeping the two selves apart, and otherwise avoiding or ignoring the dilemma? Is such a solution more easy for the introvert or for the extrovert? What are the dangers of such a solution?

33. What do you understand to be the difference between the normal personality with its several variant phases and the abnormal divided or dissociated personality?

34. If each human personality is unique, how is it possible to speak of types of personality?

35. How does an integrated personality become disorganized?

36. In what sense do peoples, as distinguished from individuals, have personality?

37. Give a case of a change in personality with the acquisition or loss of wealth or other change in formal status.

38. Give an illustration of a "failure" in the village making good in the city.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. "Calling a child a name not only reflects the parent's interpretation of the child but sets the frame of the child's behavior." Discuss this with citation of cases known to you personally or from your reading.

3. Make a list of personality types that might profitably be made the object of sociological research. Under each tabulate some of the more obvious characteristics of the type. Indicate what determines the characteristics.

4. List some types of personality of the present-day world that could not have existed a generation ago. Make a similar list of types of an earlier generation that are no longer with us.

5. "Sudden loss of status or 'collapse of one's social world' is perhaps the greatest catastrophe in the life of the person. Few ever recover." Discuss with concrete illustrations.

6. One often hears concerning a person who has lost his wealth, his position, his wife or child or suffered some other major privation that he "goes all to pieces," "becomes a different person," and the like. Give concrete illustration. What does such behavior reveal as to the relation of possessions to the selfhood of the person? Are you sure?

7. From your experience or readings, illustrate (a) inferiority complexes, (b) persistent daughter-father attachments, (c) persistent son-mother attachments.

8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. The Social Self. C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, pp. 168-210.
- b. The Person and the Individual. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 409-411.
- c. Determination of Personality. E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 114-120; 245-246.
- d. The Idea of an "Expanded" Personality. H. Hart, *The Science of Social Relations*, pp. 92-99.
- e. Disorganization of Personality. E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 386-389.
- f. Compensation. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 359-361; 411-413.
- g. The Multiple Personality. D. H. Kulp, *Educational Sociology*, pp. 191-194.
- h. Types of Personality. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 644-648.

9. Topics for written themes:

- a. The "Old Maid"
- b. Personality Change
- c. The Village Failure Who Made Good in the City
- d. The Collapse of a Personality
- e. A Village Failure
- f. The Biological Conception of Personality
- g. The Psychological Conception of Personality
- h. Mr. A.'s Conception of His Role: A Biography of a Close Acquaintance

- i. Defect and Personality Development: A Case Study
- j. My Status: the Factors Determining it
- k. George Washington Today: An Imaginary Biography
- l. Charles Darwin Today: An Imaginary Biography
- m. My Conception of My Role
- n. Personality as Determined by Class
- o. The Life Organization
- p. The Marginal Man
- q. Caste Differences in Personality

Supplementary Readings

1. Allport, F. H.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. V, "Personality—The Social Man," pp. 99-125.
2. Anderson, J. E.: "The Genesis of Social Reactions in the Young Child," in Mrs. W. F. Dummer (editor), *The Unconscious*, pp. 69-90.
3. Bernard, L. L.: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. XVIII, "The Integration of Personality in the Social Environment," pp. 269-280.
4. Burgess, E. W.: "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28(1922-1923), 665-668, 657-680.
5. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, "The Development of the Person through Association," pp. 417-418.
6. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "Socialization of the Individual," pp. 429-447.
7. Cooley, C. H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. I, "Society and the Individual," pp. 35-50; Chaps. V, VI, "The Social Self," pp. 168-210, 211-263.
8. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Chap. III, "The Remaking of Human Nature," pp. 424-434.
9. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Readings in Sociology*, Book II, Part III, Chap. III, "The Remaking of Human Nature," pp. 537-551.
10. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XVI, "Personality," pp. 616-649.
11. Faris, E.: "The Nature of Human Nature," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 15-29. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 21-37.
12. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. IV, "The Development of Personality," pp. 63-81.
13. Hart, H.: *The Science of Social Relations*, Chap. VIII, "The Expanded Personality," pp. 92-113; Chap. X, "The Dynamics of Personality," pp. 146-169.
14. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XI, "The Individual and the Primary Group," pp. 137-144; Chap. XII, "Habit and Custom," pp. 145-155; Chap. XIII, "The Social Personality," pp. 156-173.
15. House, F. N.: "Development in the Theory of the Social Personality," *Social Forces*, 6(1928), 357-367.
16. Keller, A. G.: *Man's Rough Road*, Chap. II, "Adjustment," pp. 12-24;

- Chap. III, "Custom: The Mores," pp. 25-45; Chap. IV, "The Evolution of the Mores," pp. 46-62.
17. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. I, "Human Nature," pp. 1-33; Chap. XI, "The Nature of Personality," pp. 321-350; Chap. XII, "Traits of Personality," pp. 351-385.
 18. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. VI, "Human Nature," pp. 126-146; Chap. VIII, "Personality," pp. 172-205; Chap. X, "Pathology of Personality," pp. 229-246.
 19. Mead, G. H.: "The Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *Journal of Philosophy*, 19(1922), 157-163. "The Social Self," *Journal of Philosophy*, 10(1913), 374-380.
 20. North, C. C.: *Social Problems and Social Planning*, Chap. I, "Human Needs, Attitudes, Values, Cultures," pp. 3-15.
 21. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. II, "Human Nature," pp. 111-128.
 22. Reuter, E. B.: "The Personality of Mixed Bloods," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 22(1928), 52-59. Also E. W. Burgess, *Personality and the Social Group*, pp. 55-63. Also E. B. Reuter, *Race Mixture*, pp. 205-216.
 23. Sapir, E.: "Speech as a Personality Trait," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32(1926-1927), 892-905.
 24. Thomas, W. I.: "The Problem of Personality in the Urban Environment," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 30-39. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 38-47.
 25. Thomas, W. I.: "The Configurations of Personality," Mrs. W. F. Dummer (editor), *The Unconscious*, pp. 143-177.
 26. Todd, A. J.: *Theories of Social Progress*, Chaps. IV, V, "Self as a Social Product," pp. 31-57; 58-79.
 27. Wirth, L.: "Some Jewish Types of Personality," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 26(1926), 90-96. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 106-112.
 28. Wissler, C.: *Man and Culture*, Chap. XIV, "The Domestication of Man and Its Consequences," pp. 303-312.
 29. Young, K. (editor): *Social Attitudes*. R. E. Park, "Human Nature, Attitudes, and the Mores," pp. 17-44. E. W. Burgess, "Family Tradition and Personality," pp. 188-207.
 30. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. IX, "The Acquired Nature of Man," pp. 193-217.
 31. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. V, "Habit and Social Behavior," pp. 74-93.
 32. Zorbaugh, H. W.: "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms: An Urban Type," E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 98-105.

CHAPTER IV

THE SOCIAL FORCES

Man everywhere seeks to control the forces of nature and to use them to his own ends. He endeavors to bring to pass changes that would make the conditions of his life more tolerable and to prevent happenings that would increase the discomforts of existence. His success, aside from chance and accident, is directly proportional to his comprehension of the natural forces and his understanding of the processes of change.

It is the purpose of science to define the natural processes and thereby furnish the means of control. It does not presume to state what changes should be brought about; it deals with means, not with ends: its function is purely instrumental. Nature can be understood and controlled only in so far as behavior is uniform and predictable. Science operates on the assumption that this is an orderly world, that all events in the universe are the result of efficient cause. It seeks to discover the cause-and-effect relationships and to define the invariable sequence of phenomena. To the extent that science is developed, control is possible; to the extent that people utilize the findings of science, control is actual.

Social science is simply one division of natural science and has the same purpose and function as science in general. Its fundamental assumption is that the laws of cause and effect hold as true in social as they do in physical reality. It seeks to understand human behavior by discovering the cause-and-effect relation. To the extent that social science succeeds in discovering the social laws, it is possible to control human and social behavior and to build societies and develop types of human nature in conformity to man's desires.

It must be remembered, of course, that any analysis of social reality does not give a picture of the existing social order. It is the function of history and literature, not of science, to picture reality. In the actual society the things observed are the inces-

sant activities of complex persons. The social forces, processes, and products are inextricably interwoven and for the most part not subject to direct observation at all. Their separation, enumeration, and description are for the purpose of understanding the social order as a causal system.

Science is the effort to describe and define the processes of nature. Each separate science attempts the analysis of a single process or of a group of related processes. The task of sociology is to analyze and define the social process. We need, therefore, clearly to understand what the term connotes.

A. THE SOCIAL PROCESS

When the scientist speaks of a process, he refers to a sequence of steps of which each is the outgrowth of what precedes and in turn gives rise to that which follows. A process is a group of activities each of which has a meaning in relation to all the others and the whole of which constitutes a transition from one status or condition to another. The process of digestion, for example, includes all the various steps involved in the organism's transformation of food into the various elements of the body tissue. The process of a disease is the sequence of steps through which each case normally or ideally passes. An industrial process is the group of related activities involved in the transformation of a body of raw materials into a fabricated product.

Every natural process involves the reciprocal interaction of diverse elements. Things that are identical have no separate existence and do not interact. Where there is no interaction there is no process. The two essential factors in any natural process, therefore, are diverse elements and mutual interaction. The science of astronomy is concerned to define the behavior of the various planetary and other solar bodies. This involves description of the various bodies and a description of the mutual influence of each upon the others that enforces the order that makes a unity of the whole solar system. The reciprocal interaction is ascribed to attraction, gravity, or other force hypothesized to explain the behavior. The chemical processes involve the various elements and the ways in which they interact. The biological process, vegetable and animal, runs in terms of cells and their interaction.

A social process is a group of related activities involved in the transition from one social condition to another. It involves the

factors essential to the generic idea of process—diverse elements and their interaction. The problem of sociology as a science, and of the social sciences in general, is to isolate these elements and describe their interaction. There are of course hundreds of social processes. The political process involves the complicated sets of activities by means of which government functions and is maintained. But the generalized political process implies a great number of minor concrete processes, such as the legislative process, the election process, the judicial process, and many others. The educational process includes the minor processes of instruction, administration, learning, and various others. So there are various economic, industrial, religious, and other large and small groups of definite and related activities that are classed as processes. They represent change from one status to another.

But all human experiences are related; every human activity has a meaning for every other human activity. Each has something in common with all the others; each is a factor in a process of change. The complex group of human activities that defines a concrete process such as a legislative enactment has elements in common with the administrative, elective, judicial, and other processes of government. The generalized political process, as distinct from the more concrete processes, is defined in terms of the things common to each of the minor processes of government. The economic process is not simply the totality of production, manufacture, finance, exchange, and like specific processes; it is rather that which is fundamental and common to all.

The specific social processes are of course very numerous. Among those of more general nature are association, socialization, opposition, differentiation, cooperation, segregation, control, selection, domination, exploitation, expansion, class struggle, stratification, decadence, and institutionalization. The enumeration might be greatly extended. A detailed list of the more concrete social processes would be as extensive as social life and activity. The social process, as distinct from the concrete social processes, is not the totality of the causally interdependent activities that make up the life of society; it is the common and universal elements that get a varied expression in the concrete activities. An additional illustration should make this entirely clear. Competition is a process. It has many expressions, as the struggle between plants for space and food and light; animals for food and shelter; business men for customers; athletes for a

place on the team; politicians for votes; and so on. But the competitive process, common to each, may be described without reference to any of these. It is a thing independent of any of its expressions.

Each process is the resultant of the integration of diverse elements. It is the expression of the factors or forces operative in the situation. The expression of a limited group of forces operating in relative independence of others is a specific process. The social process is an expression of the social forces. It must be described and understood in terms of these fundamental units, in terms of the elements, factors, or forces in the situation.

B. THE SOCIAL FORCES

In the effort to make intelligible the vast complex of inter-related and mutually conditioned activities of human society the sociologist starts with the assumption of a social process. If no such process exists, there is of course no possibility of a science: all is chaos and meaningless confusion. The problem is to define the process, to trace the invariable sequences, the cause-and-effect relationships that in their totality give society with all of its confused richness of detail. The sociologist is interested therefore to isolate the elements of behavior and describe their interaction.

He starts with the social forces. This term is used in the simple common-sense way. The social forces are the factors involved in the social process; they are the elements that initiate and condition social phenomena, the active factors in social life. The concept has no mystical or metaphysical implications. The social forces are the factors operative in the social process.

In principle there is no difference in this respect among the natural sciences. Physics, chemistry, biology, psychology—all attempt to describe change in terms of process and all make use of forces and elements. The particular processes to be defined are different in the different sciences and the elements in terms of which the analysis proceeds are different, but the principle is everywhere the same.

By elements are meant the units which enter into the composition of a complex reality. Bricks and stones are the elements of a wall; cells are elements of a living body; atoms are elements of a chemical compound. Analysis and description consist in separating a complex thing into its unit parts and showing their

interrelations. What are to be considered as unit parts or elements depends upon the type of analysis that is undertaken. That which is treated as an element from one point of view may be from another point of view a complex thing requiring analysis. Bricks are units in the construction of a wall, while they are highly complex compounds from the point of view of chemical composition; living cells are units to the biologist and in terms of them he explains the life processes, but to the chemist they are highly complex masses reducible to their molecular and atomic structure.

The requirement of a unit of scientific analysis is that it behave consistently. It need not be and perhaps never is an element in the ultimate sense that it may not be reduced by other means to a simpler form. But as long as it exists its behavior is consistent. For purposes of the builder, a brick is a unit: it has characteristics that are definite and permanent; as long as it remains a brick, its behavior may be foretold. In scientific social study the elements of analysis and description need not be ultimate units but they must conform to the requirement of consistent behavior.

C. PHYSICAL AND BIOLOGICAL FACTS AS SOCIAL FORCES

There are various physical and biological facts that operate actively and directly as conditioning factors in the social process. From the sociological point of view they represent external natural forces in practically unmodified form. The operation of these forces is virtually constant: they have not changed appreciably within the historic era. The reflexes, physiological needs, appetites, emotions, aptitudes, and capacities comprising the organic equipment of the human animal are primary forces in individual behavior and have been so from the beginning. The geologic conditions—atmospheric temperature and humidity, degrees of light, altitude, seasonal changes, and others—are basic and determining factors in social organization and human behavior which have operated in an essentially unchanged manner throughout the period of human existence. All these fall, in one way or another, within the realm of forces conditioning personal and social activity.

In an earlier chapter some attention was given to the definition of the biological and other physical facts in so far as they are of concern to the student of the social processes. Discussion at this point would be unnecessary, further than to point out that

they are not themselves social forces, were it not for the general tendency to treat them as such, to use them as data in the explanation of social reality. These facts do have a bearing upon behavior and in a sense become embodied in elements or factors that are social.

The various organic traits and differences that define the human animal are facts antecedent to social life; they are not in any real sense a part of it. The original nature and capacities of the human being as of other animal forms determine the limits of possible achievement and the type of social life within the range of the species. The power of articulate speech, for example, is a biological characteristic of the human animal that makes possible the development of a language. Language, in turn, is necessary to thought and to the communication of ideas; hence it is basic to the whole body of culture fact that distinguishes man from the inarticulate forms. It is not possible to exaggerate the importance of language to human and culture development. This fact, however, does not bring the organic speech capacity within the realm of social phenomena; it is a precondition to the prevailing types of social life but itself remains an organic character of the physiological organism. Again, the sex dichotomy of the human race is a biological fact far reaching in its social consequences. It is, to mention but a single fact, the basis of the family institution which has perhaps played a more important part in human and cultural development than any other invention of man. But sex remains a physiological condition: it is a precondition of the existing social reality but not itself a social fact. Its study lies within the realm of general biology. It concerns the social student only in so far as the sex differences, directly or through being made the basis of differential experience, condition human contacts and association. Even then the social student is concerned with forms of association determined directly or indirectly by sex differences and not with the biological facts themselves. Race differences are biological facts that may have some immediate social consequences; certainly they give rise to a wide variety of cultural and personality phenomena. The influence of race on civilization is a question of interest and importance. Race prejudice and its whole train of attendant phenomena are within the orbit of social study. They arise as a consequence of the biological differences, but this does not bring race as such within the realm of the social.

Racial characters, their origin, nature, and modification, transmission, and the like, are causal factors in the origin of certain types of social reality. But the racial facts remain biological and their study gives no principle for understanding the secondary and tertiary social phenomena.

Biological facts are preconditions of human and social life, but they are not social forces; they are not factors or elements that can be used for the analysis and understanding of social reality.

Much the same relation exists between physical and geographic facts and the phenomena of social life. The facts of the external environment, such as climate, topography, altitude, location, natural resources, are conditions that affect men much as they affect other forms of matter and other types of life. They set the conditions within which the social life and activity take place.

The obvious fact that human existence is conditioned by its physical setting has led frequently to attempts to explain personal and group behavior in these terms. Geological and geographic facts are treated as social forces. Many students have undertaken to explain the course of human history in terms of topography and the surface configuration of the environment, to understand the rise of civilization and the character and content of cultures in terms of temperature and rainfall, and to state individual and personal behavior in terms of diverse factors of the external surroundings. This geographic determinism takes many forms according as the emphasis falls on climatic conditions, natural resources, surface configuration, or other features of the environment and as the purpose is to explain culture forms, historic civilizations, or personal behavior.

Human society does of course rest upon a material base and in one sense it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of the geographic reality. Men live of necessity in regions where the resources of nature are such that it is possible to sustain life and where the extremes of temperature and other destructive forces of nature are not such as to destroy the individual. Population is very unequally distributed over the earth's surface, some regions are densely and others sparsely populated: there are great areas unable to support even a sparse population and others where the severity of natural conditions makes human life almost or quite impossible. Man is directly dependent upon the productiveness of the soil for his food and for the other necessities of life and he is equally dependent upon nature for the

materials from which the material aspects of his culture are fabricated.

The size and density of populations are dependent upon nature—upon rainfall, climatic conditions, and soil productivity. Numbers and density, in turn, are important conditions in the determination of social life and culture development. Numbers make for protection and safety from marauding groups and give the peace and security necessary to possession and accumulation. Numbers make possible a division of labor with its increased productiveness and modicum of leisure. All inventions and discovery upon which culture advance depends are the work of superior men who are relatively rare in any society. The larger the population the greater the likelihood of the appearance of extraordinary men, hence the greater the likelihood of invention, discovery, and the ability of control. Density increases the frequency of contacts and the amount of communication. Various facts basic to culture advance come directly from the size and density of populations which depend, in turn, upon the geographic and physical facts of nature. The presence of mountains, deserts, an unproductive soil, an inhospitable climate, and other such natural facts makes for small and sparse populations with few contacts and with hard conditions of life. Topography exerts an influence on the social and cultural development and status, to mention but a single way, by determining routes of migration and commerce. It is along these natural avenues of travel—river valleys, mountain passes, and the like—that contacts are numerous and the exchange of ideas frequent. The location of the resources essential in a given stage of culture development determines settlements and regions of population density. Various other geographic facts and conditions are vitally important in the life of man and in the growth of culture.

The environmental conditions operate to determine the size and density of populations, their location and contacts, the means by which they live, and various other things important in the life of peoples. They are, however, conditions and not social forces. There is no intention to question their importance. But they only set the conditions of social development; they do not offer an explanation of cultural and social processes themselves. To recognize the importance of the natural facts is not to accept them as factors in the social process. Favorable geographic conditions are conducive to dense populations, and density of

population is conducive to communication; but communication itself cannot be understood or explained in terms of geography or in terms of population density. All attempts to give an environmental interpretation of social reality are,^f in the main, outside the orbit of interest of the sociologist since they avoid the very problems which he seeks to solve. From his point of view they are invariably inadequate.

The interest of the sociologist is limited to those phenomena involving contact and communication among persons or groups. His task is the explanation of behavior in its social aspects—that is, behavior that is occasioned by the immediate or remote presence of other people. Unquestionably, in any situation other factors than the social are operative. The physiological condition of the organism and the character of the physical setting—facts like heat and light and hunger and sex—condition responses to stimuli coming from other persons or groups. By changing the temperature, the color, the amount and distribution of light it has been found possible, without their knowledge, to increase the output of a corps of workers. Everyone has experienced changes in mood, in interest, in power of concentration during periods of hunger, fatigue, or illness. However, two persons theoretically in the same organic condition and in the same physical setting may behave in quite unlike ways. The sociologist, in his study of social forces and their interaction, is concerned with just these differences in so far as they arise in contact and communication. He seeks to discover the social factors that, other things being equal, determine behavior of one kind in one person or group and behavior of other kinds in other persons or groups. These factors are to be located within the phenomena of communication and social interaction rather than in the biology of the communicating individuals or the material universe of which these individuals are a part.

D. SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS AS SOCIAL FORCES

The social institutions and other products of the social process itself are often treated as the social forces that determine behavior and personality and the subsequent course of social organization. These institutions whose nature is determined by the nature of the group life itself are of far more immediate and direct social importance than are the factors inherent in the biological organism and in the physical environment. They bear, however,

essentially the same relation to personality and social life: they are conditions that determine the direction and limit the scope of social interaction, but they are not, in general, elementary factors in the social process itself. The social institutions are made the object of a later detailed discussion; it is necessary at this point to state in general outline only the way in which they function in the social process.

Social life is active and dynamic. As a result of social life there is an ever accumulating body of social products and patterns. Folkways, customs, conventions, and other uniformities in activity, standards, and traditions are undesigned but direct results of group life. These gradually become defined in practice, they are formalized in moral and legal codes, and get a final objectification and structure in the social institutions. Similarity of activities and interests leads to a multiplicity of organizations and associations. Differences in ability and in opportunity find objective and external expression in education and occupation and presently in class and caste.

Once in existence, these and other chance products of human activities become more or less independent realities with a life history of their own. In the social order they function much as the original forces of nature: they define a framework within which subsequent activities are defined and thus define the course and direction of social development. The people who adopt a constitution and frame a code of laws create a structure that limits their freedom by defining the possible scope of their activities. The establishment of universal popular education results in institutional forms and structures that at least define the direction of future growth. For a people to embrace Christianity is for them to make themselves subject to a set of supernatural beliefs and practices that condition and direct the future course of thought and activity. The acceptance of a monogamic form of marriage and family relations gives a framework that controls human behavior quite as rigidly and in much the same manner as it is controlled by the great impersonal forces of nature. Every institutional structure is a thing that becomes, in a way, external to its creators and molds them to its pattern.

The whole body of technological development operates as a powerful factor in personal behavior and social development. The machine industry with its manifold ramifications and necessary subordinate structures defines an industrial society,

with its urban concentration of peoples, its foreign policies, its world-wide commercial relations, that is as impersonal and effective in the control of social life and human activity as are topography and the configuration of the earth's surface.

The importance of these things is not in question. But they are or tend to be impersonal conditions within which social life and personal development go on, they are structures that give direction and define the possible limits of human freedom, they are forces that determine the course of history and the destiny of peoples, but they are not personal and they are not social.

The institutional forms and technic structures do of course tend to become values in and of themselves; they become the objects of human sentiments and behavior tendencies. Men often develop a sentimental reverence for the chains that bind them. The Christian religion, the monogamic family, the price system, private property, representative government, and universal education are among the institutional arrangements of contemporary American society that are objects of sentimental attitudes. In earlier decades, the slavery of Negroes as an economic institutional arrangement was a value toward which people had sentimental attitudes as they have today toward the economic arrangement of employer and worker. These subjective attitudes of the conventionalized members of the social group are determined by life experiences in a society where the given institutional forms and structures prevail. They function as elements in determining and conditioning behavior. The desires, interests, wishes, attitudes, sentiments, opinions, prejudices, convictions, aspirations, and the like are factors in the social process and function as instruments in its expression. But these are resident in persons, not in the institutional order.

E. PERSONS AS SOCIAL FORCES

In concrete social situations the things that are most obvious and interesting and easily observable are the behavior of persons and the environment in which their activity takes place. In the logic of common sense persons are quite obviously the ultimate factors in social life; they are the active elements in the social drama. It is the struggle between them and their combinations in the struggle with other men and combinations of men that are the dramatic elements of the social comedy. Human beings always live in a physical environment and their struggles,

successes, and failures are conditioned by it. The popular mind tends everywhere to personify this external setting, to make it an active factor in human affairs, to see it as cooperating to the achievement of human ends or as perversely and ruthlessly defeating human efforts. Human beings and the environment in which they act are essentially the descriptive units of historical writing; they are the data of imaginative literature and the ultimate basis of popular discussion and understanding.

But for purposes of science neither the persons nor the environments may be taken as elements. Neither conforms to the requirements of a scientific unit; neither is simple in organization or stable in behavior.

No two environments are alike. They are unlike when the term is restricted to the purely external physical and geographic setting and even more unlike when it is made to comprehend the world of men and the products of their activity. The facts of nature, as previously discussed, provide the setting and determine the form of human activity and effort. But these facts and their combinations are not the same in any two places: no two environments are identical. Moreover, the physical environment is not a stable fact: it varies from day to day in temperature, humidity, sunlight, wind velocity, and otherwise, and it is yet more highly variable from season to season and from year to year. If men and their material and immaterial baggage—their beliefs, attitudes, practices, opinions, aspirations, their political organization, economic arrangements, family systems, philosophical doctrines, scientific theories, moral codes, machines, cities, buildings, and other aspects of culture—be brought within the concept of environment, as they of necessity must be in any realistic view, it is obvious that no two environments are more than roughly and remotely comparable. They may and do have characteristics in common but each has its unique elements and combinations of elements. Moreover, this environmental complex is a fluid and changing thing. There are, to be sure, relatively stable facts and conditions that determine its continuity and general outlines, but change is nevertheless continuous. Finally, the environment is always relative to the point of view of the person: it is not the same for any two persons.

Persons are more variable than their environments. Each is a unique product of the social process. They differ continuously in heredity, in physical traits, mental capacities, and temperamental

characters, and they differ far more widely in their personal contacts, significant experiences, and life organizations. No two are alike, hence no two would behave in an identical manner in a given situation. But even a single person is not the same at two different times or in two different situations. He is subject to moods, to periods of depression and elation. His behavior varies with the condition of the bodily organism as it does with conditions of the world external to him. He belongs to or has belonged to different social groups whose interests and standards vary or conflict and he incorporates, and in a manner reconciles, these divergent or conflicting standards. For whatever reason, the person is a highly complex and changing thing the behavior of which is not consistent and not predictable.

The units of science must be uniform and their behavior consistent. The person does not conform to either requirement. The sociologists, therefore, find the ultimate sociological units to be the elements of personal motivation and the values in the environment toward which their activity is directed, not the concrete persons and their environments. The social forces lie in the appetites, attitudes, and wishes of human and social beings. The person and the culture are things to be understood, not the units to be used in explanation.

The refusal of science to treat individuals and persons as elementary is not in such marked contrast to common-sense procedure as it may at first appear. Individuals do have an organic unity and continuity that stabilize their relationships to one another, but a cursory examination of these relationships reveals the fact that they involve, when considered separately, only parts of the total personality. It is possible and usual to like some things about a person and to dislike others. If the things liked are involved in the present relationship, the association is pleasing or at least tolerable; if the things disliked are involved, the relationship is displeasing or irksome. He may be valued positively at one time because he is a competent woodsman and an able guide; he may be valued negatively at another time because he is crude and socially unsophisticated or ill informed concerning literature and other subjects of polite conversation. Furthermore, common sense recognizes the fact that a person changes—that his ideas, sentiments, attitudes; his style of dress; his habits of speech; his manner and bearing; and many other things are unlike their earlier form. If persons in every relation

of life had to be treated as wholes, if every aspect of personality were involved in every contact, associated life would be not only intolerable but impossible. Common sense, like science, in practice recognizes the complex character of persons and avoids treating them as elementary and indivisible units.

F. ATTITUDES AS SOCIAL ELEMENTS

The social forces, as distinct from the multiplicity of external factors that affect behavior and condition culture, are resident in human beings. In final analysis the social forces are subjective behavior tendencies. But they get formulation and objectivity in customs, conventions, and the body of social rules that define the human and the social, and they get expression and further objectivity in the behavior of men in concrete situations. It is possible, therefore, to study the social factors on three different levels of scientific procedure: it is possible to observe behavior as such and to reduce the observations to statistical formulation; it is possible to describe, define, and compare the uniformities and divergencies in the practices, beliefs, sentiments, and aspirations with or without quantitative manipulation of the assembled data; and it is possible to make the social factors themselves the focus of immediate attention, in which case both the concrete behavior of persons and the objective culture facts fall into place as means to fundamental analysis and understanding. The factors with which we are directly and immediately concerned are social in two senses: they are involved as basis and background in all human intercourse, and they are themselves products of human interaction. For purposes of present discussion they may be swept into the concept social attitudes.

The essential similarity in the fundamental needs and wishes of men as well as in their capacity to recognize and satisfy them has given rise to similar culture facts at all places in the world and in all times in human history. Men have everywhere developed the same culture patterns and organized similar institutional forms for the satisfaction of the organic needs and for the regulation of the human wishes. There are, to be sure, wide and marked differences in details: the conditions of life are not everywhere the same, and each group, as a consequence of different materials and unique life experiences, has developed social practices, behavior norms, and institutional arrangements peculiar to itself. These institutions, practices, beliefs, and

aspirations, the sum and coordination of which are the group culture, comprise any and all data that have any meaning, positive or negative, for human activity. The elements of this complex, taken in their distributive aspects, are called values. The value, then, is any object or thing that has a meaning for human activity, any object that human beings seek or avoid. Articles of food and clothing and shelter, institutions as the family and the church, religious beliefs and scientific theories, poetry and art objects are among the things that have meaning for human activity. The value may be simple and material, as in the case of a tool or a foodstuff, or it may be complex and imaginary, as in the case of a religion, myth, or a scientific theory. But in any case it is a thing toward which human activity is directed. The fund of values differs more or less from person to person and from group to group. A particular thing may be an object of desire to the members of one group, an object of aversion to those of another, and to those of a third it may be indifferent—that is, not be a value at all. And within a given group similar differences are to be noted: an object that is indifferent to some persons may be an object of desire to others and an object of aversion to still others. And for the same individual an object may be a matter of indifference at one time and later take on either a positive or a negative meaning. The fund of social values is thus subject to change: things that at one time occupy a place in the behavior scheme of the individual or in the culture complex of the group may pass out, lose their value, and be replaced by values that at another time were mere objects or things. The toys and games and associates of children are in time replaced by activities, standards, and companions that earlier were meaningless. Within a century dueling and slavery have ceased to be positive values in Western society; on the other hand, prize fighting, which had passed out of the *mores*, has, within the present decade, been reintroduced as a moral value into the American culture complex.

Whatever the nature of social values, the members of the group are responsive to them. They are objects of human desire. The appreciation of a social value is an attitude. It is, indeed, the human responsive reaction that converts an indifferent natural object into a value. The attitude is thus the subjective element in the culture complex, the individual counterpart of the social

value. It is the individual tendency to react, either positively or negatively, to a given social value.¹

There are attitudes that are individual and attitudes that are social. The former may be rare or general. Some human tendencies appear to be natural in the sense that they are a deposit of racial experience or arise immediately from human need: they correspond to something stable and uniform in the physical conditions of life. Certain fear and disgust responses appear to be in the nature of organic attitudes. As a result of experience such original responses may become defined as more or less definite behavior tendencies. These are individual attitudes that may be general in the group without, however, being social. They are of sociological interest in so far as they are culturally conditioned or give rise to socially significant behavior. For example, disgust as an individual organic attitude comes within the orbit of social interest only to the extent that it conditions attitudes that are social. Race prejudices are social attitudes and are in the main to be explained in historic and social terms. But if, and to the extent that, the characteristic body odor of one race is organically offensive to persons of a different race, the natural disgust reaction becomes a fact of social consequence since it determines social behavior and attitudes. Physical and temperamental differences do play some part in the determination of attitudes.

But the original nature is in general subject to indefinite modifications through conformity to the social code. The individual is plastic, the behavior norms of the group are relatively fixed. Society provides the code of behavior, a definition of the situation, that is fixed as a result of experience and covers all phases of life. It is from this code, rather than from original nature, that the person gets his values and attitudes. The individual is molded to fit the social framework; it becomes a part of him as he becomes a part of it.

G. ATTITUDES, WISHES, SENTIMENTS, AND OPINIONS

The attitudes are the social forces in terms of which social analysis proceeds; they are the subjective elements involved in social behavior. They are the factors in the process of interaction that determine the individual personality and the character

¹ W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, Vol. I, pp. 21-24.

of group behavior. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the relation of the attitudes to habits, opinions, wishes, and other somewhat related concepts.

The attitudes are tendencies to act. They may be conscious, as an aversion to cats, a prejudice against foreigners, or a fondness for children; they may be unconscious, as the naïve biases that influence the decisions and choices of the man on the street. They may be individual, as the behavior tendencies arising directly from original nature or some unique experience of the person; or they may be social, as when they arise in social experience or are capable of being propagated. They may be latent or active.

Attitudes are to be distinguished from habits which are acquired inner tendencies to act in specific ways. Habits are learned responses that have become in a measure automatic and take care of certain adjustments without conscious attention or emotional disturbance. Walking is an example of a learned activity that becomes so nearly automatic when fully learned as to require, in general, no conscious attention; the pronunciation of familiar words, the series of acts involved in operating an automobile, and the formation of the letters in the act of writing involve other types of muscular coordination that are in major part unconscious and automatically performed. The great majority of the acts performed in the routine business of daily living fall more or less completely into the habit category and involve no emotional tension. Certain other adjustments, which often require a minimum of conscious effort, have emotional accompaniments indicating that they are made with reference to considerations not evident in the immediate situation itself. The term attitude covers

. . . that kind of human activity which is influenced by prior activity and in that sense acquired; which contains within itself a certain ordering or systematization of minor elements of action; which is projective, dynamic in quality, ready for overt manifestation; and which is operative in some subdued subordinate form even when not obviously dominating activity.¹

Opinions are rationalizations of attitudes; they are secondary and derivative. The common American opinion that Negroes

¹ John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, pp. 40-41. Quoted by permission of Henry Holt & Company. Dewey does not differentiate between attitude and disposition and endeavors to bring both into the habit concept.

are mentally inferior is antedated by the historic fact of their servile status and the attitudes characteristic of and appropriate to a master class. The attitudes have become a part of the white culture heritage and appear in the form of opinions that rationalize and justify them. The long history of monogamic marriage in the West and the familiarity of most individuals with it, as well as the social and religious sanctions that surround the practice, determine the emotional and social attitudes. The equally common opinion that it is superior to any other possible family arrangement simply implies the attitude from which it is immediately derived. Political, religious, economic, and social opinions generally are of the same nature: they rationalize and justify the attitudes. They have an interest to the student not because they are true or false but as bases for inferences as to the attitudes that exist and determine the person's behavior.

Attitudes and sentiments are closely related and, in some cases and in some respects, indistinguishable; certain sentiments are in reality generalized attitudes. The sentiments are emotional biases, involving some varying modicum of thought and judgment, toward some value or complex of values. They are generalized definitions of conduct. They have their origin in the behavior norms and moral codes of the group and represent individual and group predilections for the familiar customs and practices. The affection of the mother for the child is an individual attitude—or complex of attitudes—that expresses itself in fondling, protecting, and otherwise manipulating and caring for the loved object. When the relationship is abstracted and generalized into "mother love," it becomes a social sentiment, an evaluation of behavior conceived to be socially desirable. The concrete mother-child relationship, given the concept of mother love, is conceived to embody the virtues of a universal form. The group sentiments are inseparable from the moral customs of the group which they reflect and from which they are derived; the individual sentiments, like the individual attitudes, reflect the sentiments of the group in which the child is reared.

The characteristic sentiments of a group taken together comprise the group's moral code. The moral code is best seen in the body of teaching and tradition found in the schools and churches. Attempts to divorce education from training for social adjustments have invariably failed. The function of the school includes the preparation of the child

for social participation in the community and the state. Hence, the school seeks to impress the social sentiments of square-dealing, honor, patriotism, and sympathy for the less fortunate. It lays emphasis upon the personal virtues and the duties of citizenship. This aspect of education is generally spoken of as character building. The church as a religious institution, even more fundamentally than the school perhaps, regards itself as the protector and conservator of the social sentiments. It affirms the "inherent" rightness of the *mores*, and through its pronouncements and teachings it formulates a moral philosophy and fixes the body of sentiments into an inviolable code of conduct.¹

The concrete wish for specific things or experiences is, of course, familiar to everyone. In one sense the person's conscious life, in so far as it is related to his active experience, is a series of wish manifestations, of ideas of things wanted and of striving to satisfy these wants. As facts of consciousness, wishes take definite, concrete form, as a wish for a new automobile, a town house, a trip to Europe, a new book, an advance in salary, the affection of a certain person, the applause of the profession of which one is a member, a good night's rest, a cool drink—the number is large but by no means unlimited, as the effort to list a thousand or even a hundred separate wishes will show.

In one sense these concrete wishes are the components of attitudes, or, stated conversely, the attitudes are organizations of the concrete wishes. An association of the individual's concrete wishes comes in the course of life experiences and the resulting wish complexes and constellations determine fairly stable behavior tendencies in the presence of values familiar to experience. But the effort to analyze attitudes in terms of a multitude of unrelated and separately determined wishes is essentially the procedure of common sense. It is desirable so to classify the concrete and conscious desires and wishes as to show their relations and expose the more stable and fundamental needs of which they are expressions. Of the various attempts at such treatment mention will be made of two. Professor Small conceived the multiplicity of concrete and shifting desires of persons to arise from more general and stable needs of human beings. By a classification of these conscious desires he arrived at six generalized and abstract needs of human and social life which he designated interests. They are health, wealth, sociability,

¹ E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, p. 273. Quoted by permission of Longmans, Green & Co.

knowledge, beauty, and rightness. As he conceived these, they are not matters of immediate experience but inferences, abstractions derived from the observation of behavior. They are not the immediate motives of behavior but the underlying needs that must achieve a measure of satisfaction if life is to be human and endurable. They are the latent needs of the person, "pressing for satisfaction, whether the persons are conscious of them either generally or specifically or not; they are indicated spheres of activity which persons enter into and occupy in the course of realizing their personality."¹ These interests bear to the desires the relation of substance to attribute or that of a genus to its species. The interests are in a sense categories. The desires are specific and concrete facts of awareness; the interests are generalized categories underlying and explaining the desires.

Following Small, Professor Thomas worked out a fourfold classification which he has used with profit in his studies of personal and group behavior and which has come to be widely accepted and used by other scholars in their studies of personal reality and social life. He used the term wish as Small used the term desire and placed the wishes in four categories which he designated "fundamental wishes." These four fundamental wishes correspond to Small's six interests. These wish categories are new experience, security, recognition, response. All the concrete wishes fall within these four general types which are involved in all personal and group acts as conditioning factors.

The human wishes have a great variety of concrete forms but are capable of the following general classification:

1. The desire for new experience.
2. The desire for security.
3. The desire for response.
4. The desire for recognition.

1. *The Desire for New Experience.*—Men crave excitement, and all experiences are exciting which have in them some resemblance to the pursuit, flight, capture, escape, death which characterized the earlier life of mankind. Behavior is an adaptation to environment, and the nervous system itself is a developmental adaptation. It represents, among other things, a hunting pattern of interest. "Adventure" is what the young boy wants, and stories of adventure. Hunting trips are enticing; they are the survival of natural life. All sports are of the hunting pattern; there is a contest of skill, daring, and cunning. It is

¹ A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, p. 434.

impossible not to admire the nerve of a daring burglar or highwayman. A fight, even a dog fight, will draw a crowd. In gambling or dice throwing you have the thrill of success or the chagrin of defeat. The organism craves stimulation and seeks expansion and shock even through alcohol and drugs. "Sensations" occupy a large part of the space in newspapers. Courtship has in it an element of "pursuit." Novels, theaters, motion pictures, etc., are partly an adaptation to this desire and their popularity is a sign of its elemental force.

2. *The Desire for Security.*—The desire for security is opposed to the desire for new experience. The desire for new experience is, as we have seen, emotionally related to anger, which tends to invite death, and expresses itself in courage, advance, attack, pursuit. The desire for new experience implies, therefore, motion, change, danger, instability, social irresponsibility. The individual dominated by it shows a tendency to disregard prevailing standards and group interests. He may be a social failure on account of his instability, or a social success if he converts his experiences into social values—puts them into the form of a poem, makes of them a contribution to science. The desire for security, on the other hand, is based on fear, which tends to avoid death and expresses itself in timidity, avoidance, and flight. The individual dominated by it is cautious, conservative, and apprehensive, tending also to regular habits, systematic work, and the accumulation of property.

The social types known as "Bohemian" and "Philistine" are determined respectively by the domination of the desire for new experience and the desire for security. The miser represents a case where the means of security has become an end in itself. . . .

3. *The Desire for Responses.*—Up to this point I have described the types of mental impressionability connected with the pursuit of food and the avoidance of death, which are closely connected with the emotions of anger and fear. The desire for response, on the other hand, is primarily related to the instinct of love, and shows itself in the tendency to seek and to give signs of appreciation in connection with other individuals.

There is first of all the devotion of the mother to the child and the response of the child. . . .

This relation is of course useful and necessary, since the child is helpless throughout a period of years and would not live unless the mother were impelled to give it her devotion. This attitude is present in the father of the child also but is weaker, less demonstrative, and called out more gradually.

In addition, the desire for response between the two sexes in connection with mating is very powerful. An ardent courtship is full of assurances and appeals for reassurance. Marriage and a home involve response but with more settled habits, more routine work, less of new experience. Jealousy is an expression of fear that the response is

directed elsewhere. The flirt is one who seeks new experience through the provocation of response from many quarters.

In some natures this wish, both to receive and to give response, is out of proportion to the other wishes, "overdetermined," so to speak, and interferes with a normal organization of life. And the fixation may be on either a child or a member of either sex. . . .

In general the desire for response is the most social of the wishes. It contains both a sexual and a gregarious element. It makes selfish claims, but on the other hand it is the main source of altruism. The devotion to child and family and devotion to causes, principles, and ideals may be the same attitude in different fields of application. It is true that devotion and self-sacrifice may originate from any of the other wishes also—desire for new experience, recognition, or security—or may be connected with all of them at once. Pasteur's devotion to science seems to be mainly the desire for new experience—scientific curiosity—the campaigns of a Napoleon represent recognition (ambition); and the self-sacrifice of such characters as Maria Spiridonova, Florence Nightingale, Jane Addams is a sublimation of response. . . .

4. *The Desire for Recognition.*—This wish is expressed in the general struggle of men for position in their social group, in devices for securing a recognized, enviable, and advantageous social status. Among girls dress is now perhaps the favorite means of securing distinction and showing class. A Bohemian immigrant girl expressed her philosophy in a word: "After all, life is mostly what you wear." Veblen's volume, "Theory of the Leisure Class," points out that the status of men is established partly through the show of wealth made by their wives. Distinction is sought also in connection with skillful and hazardous activities, as in sports, war, and exploration. Playwriters and sculptors consciously strive for public favor and "fame." In the "achievement" of Pasteur and of similar scientific work there is not only the pleasure of the "pursuit" itself, but the pleasure of public recognition. Boasting, bullying, cruelty, tyranny, "the will to power" have in them a sadistic element allied to the emotion of anger and are efforts to compel a recognition of the personality. The frailty of women, their illness, and even feigned illness, is often used as a power device, as well as a device to provoke response. On the other hand, humility, self-sacrifice, saintliness, and martyrdom may lead to distinction. The showy motives connected with the appeal for recognition we define as "vanity"; the creative activities we call "ambition."

The importance of recognition and status for the individual and for society is very great. The individual not only wants them but he needs them for the development of his personality. The lack of them and the fear of never obtaining them are probably the main source of those psychopathic disturbances which the Freudians treat as sexual in origin.

On the other hand society alone is able to confer status on the individual and in seeking to obtain it he makes himself responsible to society and is forced to regulate the expression of his wishes. His dependence on public opinion is perhaps the strongest factor impelling him to conform to the highest demands which society makes upon him. . . .

From the foregoing description it will be seen that wishes of the same general class—those which tend to arise from the same emotional background—may be totally different in moral quality. The moral good or evil of a wish depends on the social meaning or value of the activity which results from it. Thus the vagabond, the adventurer, the spendthrift, the Bohemian are dominated by the desire for new experience, but so are the inventor and the scientist; adventures with women and the tendency to domesticity are both expressions of the desire for response; vain ostentation and creative artistic work both are designed to provoke recognition; avarice and business enterprise are actuated by the desire for security.

Moreover, when a concrete wish of any general class arises, it may be accompanied and qualified by any or all of the other classes of wishes. Thus when Pasteur undertook the quest described above, we do not know what wish was uppermost. Certainly the love of the work was very strong, the ardor of pursuit, the new experience; the anticipation of the recognition of the public, the scientific fame involved in the achievement was surely present; he invited response from his wife and colleagues, and he possibly had the wish also to put his future professional and material life on a secure basis. The immigrant who comes to America may wish to see the new world (new experience), make a fortune (security), have a higher standing on his return (recognition), and induce a certain person to marry him (response).¹

It is necessary to guard against a misconception of the nature and purpose of these wish categories. In the first place, they are to be understood as categories, not as conscious and concrete wishes: the experienced desires are to be treated as expressions of, and to be classified under, these generalized forms. In the second place, it is equally necessary to see that the four categories taken together are to be understood as inclusive: they comprehend all the positive wishes of the person. No concrete wish is ever experienced that does not fall within one or more of the categories. In the third place, the four categories must be understood as mutually exclusive: a satisfaction of one type cannot be substituted for satisfaction of another. The wish for new experience, for example, cannot be satisfied by more security; recognition

¹ W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, pp. 4-5, 12, 17, 18, 31-32, 38-39. Reprinted by permission of Little, Brown & Company.

does not satisfy the need for response; affection is not a substitute for fame. Every person to be a wholesome and adjusted personality must realize more or less adequate satisfaction of each type of wish. This has been termed by some students the fundamental law of the wishes. Finally, the categories are to be understood as universally applicable. They are the fundamental and permanent facts that unconsciously motivate the behavior of all persons.

H. PERSONAL LIFE ORGANIZATION

Every individual is born into a group with a definitely organized social system which conditions or determines his character and personality. The manner of life, the folk customs, social rules, moral codes, religious beliefs, and other elements of the social heritage are prior to the individual. To this body of culture fact he becomes habituated and comes to an understanding and appreciation of it through participation and by inculcation. Deliberate and systematic effort is put forth to make him a member of the group—to equip him with the beliefs, sentiments, and loyalties necessary to full membership.

In so far as the group is small and its standards absolute each member closely resembles every other. The body of lore is small and the practices of life have a high degree of uniformity; behavior is traditional, all contingencies are provided for in the social rules, and all members are fitted into the group patterns. It is possible for each member to possess the entire body of culture fact. There is a minimum of variation and of opportunity for individual initiative. The group organization has provided the channels through which all the wishes must find their satisfaction. In the primitive tribe and the peasant village and, in somewhat lesser degree, in the American village and farming communities conformity is a virtue and individual behavior is uniform and in accord with the ancient pattern. In such case the character and life organization of persons are monotonous; the ideal is that each member of the society exemplify all the group standards and manifest no other characteristics. The attitudes of each person tend to be replicas of the attitudes of every other. There is of course never complete identity, but there is a high degree of similarity from individual to individual.

Differences in character and life organization become marked and important when the group increases in size and its culture

patterns become complex and differentiated. As this becomes the case it becomes increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible for any single person to comprehend within himself the entire content of the heritage. By whatever means, each individual selects, or has selected for him, particular ideas and behavior norms from the group fund of values. The relation, however, is not wholly or even mainly in terms of single, individual, and elementary values and attitudes; it is rather the selection of more or less complete combinations and groups, organizations and complexes of facts. The vocational choice that the person makes or has made for him is a selection from the fund of possible values. It involves for the individual a whole series of related and interdependent attitudes and values that determine or condition place of residence, personal future contacts, mental content, and a great variety of values other than the simple choice of a type of work; he chooses a mode of life and a segment of the culture. As a result he becomes more or less typical of a class or subgroup and by so much divergent from other persons and groups that comprehend different series of culture facts and relationships. The particular organized group attitudes and practices play the predominant rôle in determining subsequent behavior.

Within the individual orbit of experience a limited number of values, as causes and as effects of his attitudes, play a determining rôle. The society provides, as above suggested in regard to vocational types, various models of life organization. Some individuals realize more or less fully these standards; others fail to attain them. The mediocre person, in his life organization, is a more or less faithful replica of the organization of values that characterizes his immediate group or class; he accepts the current values and the prevailing organization of them. The inferior person may be unable to comprehend the values even of the local group and he may fail in his life organization to reach even the level of the local group patterns. The superior person within any group or class is able to rise above the local patterns, to visualize superior patterns. He realizes the meanings involved in the behavior patterns and the limitations they place upon personal development; he learns how to adapt himself to the definitions of society but also learns how to control, by conscious thought, the meanings to personal purposes. He selects consciously and intelligently from the fund of available values,

wherever they may be found to exist, those that will in new organization create the man he wishes to be.

The life organization may be such as either to prevent, or to make indefinitely possible, development after its stabilization. It depends largely upon the content of the organization. A given set of attitudes may be so fixed that the person is unable to receive influence from other classes of data. His whole life, for example, may revolve about a body of supernatural belief that makes it impossible for him to acquire information except as it is in harmony with the beliefs or capable of being interpreted in terms of them. In such cases there is no evolution or improvement possible; he will change only with age and decadence or as a result of a catastrophe that destroys his values at the same time that it destroys his character. Thomas calls this type of life organization that of the Philistine. The person who has no character and no system, who excludes nothing and organizes nothing, he calls the Bohemian. The creative type is the one with settled organized character but capable of change, that in its very nature demands constant growth; the creative man is open to suggestion and influence and selects from the totality of values available those in line with his preconceived development.

I. INTERACTION IN TERMS OF ATTITUDES

On the scientific level sociology and the other social disciplines seek to analyze and understand social reality in terms of process. Types of personality and forms of culture and group organization are conceived as the products of natural processes, as the inevitable result of interacting forces and factors. All social becoming is a natural product of interaction in definitive situations. The task of social science is threefold: the isolation and description of the elements or forces; the definition and description of the typical processes of interaction among them in given situations; the organization of the findings into social laws.

It is obvious that explanation of social reality in biological and geographic terms, while it is useful and necessary preliminary procedure, is rough, partial, and inadequate. These biological and geographic facts provide the setting for social life, define in broad outline its conditions and limitations, but they can give no understanding of the processes of personality and group organization. It is perhaps equally obvious that fundamental social analysis cannot run in terms of men and institu-

tions: these are the things to be understood; they are not given data. Moreover, neither the person nor the institutional order is stable and uniform in behavior from case to case or from time to time. Persons are complex and constantly changing products that differ continuously and indefinitely one from another; environments are historic products and each, in consequence, is unique.

For scientific purposes, as well as for purposes of control and direction, it is necessary to analyze the complex social reality into elementary facts, into elements whose behavior is stable, comparable, and indefinitely repeatable, not erratic and discontinuous, into elements whose behavior may be stated in the form of universally valid generalizations. These elements, the needs and attitudes of men and the objects and values of their cultural habitat, are the final units for social analysis.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. What are the purpose and function of science? What is its relation to control?

2. What do you understand by the term natural process? Give an illustration. What are the essential factors in a natural process? Do you think the conception of a natural process applicable to personal and group behavior?

3. By means of illustrations other than those given in the text, differentiate specific social processes from the general process.

4. What are the requirements of an element?

5. Why may not individuals be taken as the elements involved in group behavior?

6. State again the relation of biological and geographic to social and sociological facts.

7. Do you consider it possible to account for all differences in personal and group behavior in terms of physiological and geographic facts?

8. Where must we look for the social forces as distinct from the conditioning factors antecedent to social life?

9. State the origin of institutions and state, in general terms and by illustration, how, once they are established, they control social life.

10. Why may not persons and their environments be used as elements in social science?

11. Explain and illustrate concretely what you understand by the statement in the text that environment is relative to the point of view of the person.

12. On what three levels may the systematic study of social factors proceed?

13. Define culture in its objective aspects; in its subjective aspects. Give illustrations of objective and subjective elements in the culture of your own society.

14. Define the term *value*. What is the relation of values to the culture of the group? Give concrete examples of positive and negative values.

15. What is the relation of values to human actions? What is their relation to the natural objects? Under what conditions does an indifferent object become a value?

16. Attitudes are social in what two senses?

17. What is your understanding of the term *attitude*? Give numerous examples of attitudes.

18. Distinguish by definition and by example individual, group, and social attitudes.

19. What is the relation of attitudes to (a) wishes, (b) opinions, (c) sentiments?

20. Differentiate habit and attitude in the relations of the Negro and the Southern white man; in the behavior of men and women in routine relations; in other concrete relations.

21. What is temperament and what is its rôle in the determination of attitudes?

22. State and illustrate the relation of opinions and attitudes.

23. State and illustrate the relation of attitudes and sentiments.

24. State and illustrate the relation of attitudes and wishes.

25. Give Small's conception and classification of the human interests.

26. Give Thomas' classification of the wishes. Define each. Give illustrations of the four wishes drawn from your own personal experience.

27. State the four characteristics of the wish categories.

28. State the relation of the individual life organization to the culture complex.

29. What do you understand to be the means by which life organization is achieved?

30. Define each of the personality types restated from Thomas.

31. Give illustrations drawn from your own experience or reading of personal types in which one or another of the four wishes appears to be central.

32. Give similar illustrations of life organization built chiefly about one of the six interests of Small.

33. The human personality is a continually producing factor and a continually produced result of interaction among the elementary attitudes and values. Explain.

Exercises and Problems

1. Prepare an outline analysis of the chapter.

2. Prepare a report on the influence of the geographic environment in America as it has determined the distribution of population, the routes of railroads, the location of centers of culture, and other facts that appear to you as important.

3. Study rather intensively an important character in some novel or play and give an analysis in terms of the organization of the wishes.

4. Art is founded on the desire for recognition. Develop this proposition.

5. List and discuss briefly, but without evaluating, some of the groups,

persons, institutions, and the like that are "social forces" in your home community.

6. Any attitude may be and is a desire to get membership in some sort of organization. Discuss this proposition in relation to some concrete attitude or complex of attitudes, such as race prejudice.

7. Give an illustration from your own life history of some conflict of wishes and attitudes and of the method of its resolution.

8. Distinguish carefully, in general terms and by concrete illustration, between an opinion or doctrine used as a datum and as a value.

9. Take any modern social situation or problem that interests you—a labor war, a race conflict, fundamentalism, the Ku-Klux Klan, the matrimonial situation, the status of women, the Y.M.C.A., the American Legion, or something of your own selection—and attempt to make a fundamental analysis in terms of the attitudes and values involved.

10. Make a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. Social Forces. F. N. House, *The Range of Social Theory*, pp. 185-199.
- b. The Physical Environment and the Life of Man. F. E. Turner, *America in Civilization*, pp. 55-61.
- c. The Interests. A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 425-481.
- d. The Concept of Social Attitudes. E. Faris, "The Concept of Social Attitudes," in K. Young (editor), *Social Attitudes*, pp. 3-15.
- e. The Four Wishes. W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, Chap. I, "The Wishes," pp. 1-40.

Supplementary Readings

1. Balz, A. G. A.: *The Basis of Social Theory*, Chap. II, "Human Nature and Social Forces," pp. 46-76.
2. Bernard, L. L.: "Social Attitudes," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
3. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VI, "The Social Forces," pp. 57-69.
4. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. IV, "Personal Attitudes and Social Values," pp. 72-87.
5. Cohen, M. R.: "Belief," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
6. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Process*, Part VI, "Valuation," pp. 283-348.
7. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. III, "Group Life and Mental Evolution," pp. 111-115.
8. Eubank, E. E.: "Forces Affecting Human Society," *Sociology and Social Research*, 12(1928), 526-534.
9. Faris, E.: "The Concept of Social Attitudes," in K. Young (editor), *Social Attitudes*, pp. 3-15.
10. Faris, E.: "Attitudes and Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 34(1928-1929), 271-281.
11. Faris, E.: "The Subjective Aspect of Culture," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 19(1925), 37-46.
12. House, F. N.: "The Concept 'Social Forces' in American Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 31(1925-1926), pp. 145-172, 347-365, 507-525, 763-799.

13. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XV, "The Theory of Social Forces," pp. 185-199.
14. Kallen, H. M.: "Conformity," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
15. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. VII, "The Analysis of Wishes," pp. 171-203; Chaps. IX and X, "The Nature of Attitudes," pp. 237-268; 269-320; Chap. XI, "The Nature of Personality," pp. 321-350.
16. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. VII, "Wishes and Attitudes," pp. 148-170.
17. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. V, "Folkways and Mores," pp. 88-106.
18. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Chap. XIII, "Social Codes and Social Structures," pp. 248-265.
19. Murphy, G.: "Habit," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
20. North, C. C.: *Social Problems and Social Planning*, Chap. I, "Human Needs, Attitudes, Values, Culture," pp. 3-15.
21. Ogburn, W. F.: "The Great Man versus Social Forces," *Social Forces*, 5(1926), 225-231.
22. Park, R. E.: "Human Nature, Attitudes, and the Mores," in K. Young (editor), *Social Attitudes*, pp. 17-44.
23. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. VII, "Social Forces," pp. 435-497.
24. Rice, Stuart A.: "Social Attitudes and Public Opinion," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 24(1930), 242.
25. Ross, E. A.: *The Principles of Sociology*, Part II, "Social Forces," pp. 41-73.
26. Ross, E. A.: *The Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. IV, "The Original Social Forces," pp. 37-43; Chap. V, "The Derivative Social Forces," pp. 45-51.
27. Sprowls, J. W.: *Social Psychology Interpreted*, Chap. IV, "Social Forces," pp. 74-86.
28. Sumner, W. G.: *Folkways*, Chap. I, "Fundamental Notions of the Folkways and of the Mores," pp. 1-74; Chap. II, "Characteristics of the Mores," pp. 75-118.
29. Sumner, W. G., and A. G. Keller: *The Science of Society*, Vol. I, Chap. I, "Starting-points," pp. 3-43.
30. Thomas, W. I.: *The Unadjusted Girl*, Chap. I, "The Wishes," pp. 1-40; Chap. II, "The Regulation of the Wishes," pp. 41-69.
31. Waller, W.: *The Sociology of Teaching*, Chap. XI, "The Four Wishes in the School," pp. 134-158.
32. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Part III, "External Factors Influencing Social Life," pp. 91-125.
33. Ward, L. F.: *Dynamic Sociology*, "The Social Forces," Vol. I, pp. 468-699.
34. Zorbaugh, H. W.: "The Dweller in Furnished Rooms: An Urban Type," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 83-89. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 98-105.

CHAPTER V

SOCIETY AND THE GROUP

The preceding chapters have had chiefly to do with the development of the human personality and with the individual and personal factors operative in collective life.

It has been pointed out that the human infant comes into the world helpless and unfinished. The physical processes necessary to individual life under favorable conditions function from birth. The infant is also capable of a limited number of reflex actions and of random movements in response to internal and external stimuli. It has certain capacities and limitations by virtue of membership in the human species and its descent from a specific ancestral strain. But at the moment of birth and for sometime thereafter the human infant is the most plastic of living organisms.

At birth this plastic organism enters a highly complex physical and social environment that directs its development and determines its behavior. The spontaneous and random movements of the infant are coordinated into socially predetermined channels. The stimuli to which he may respond are selected and limited. His habit complex is molded by the behavior patterns of the group of which he becomes a part. In the years of his development he acquires a set of beliefs and practices, forms a character, and develops a personality in accord with his original equipment and the conventional standards of the group.

As a person he is characterized by his complement of behavior tendencies. He has certain organic needs and appetites that are expressions of essentially unchanged original nature. He has other needs essentially or exclusively social in their origin and nature. He has, moreover, as a result of his incorporation into the group life, certain attitudes toward these needs and the manner of their satisfaction by himself and by others. This complement of original and derived needs, wishes, and attitudes comprises the human forces in social life.

It is necessary at this point to give a somewhat detailed presentation of the objective culture situation, to look into the nature of the group which makes up the social world into which each individual is born and in which each must find his satisfactions. It is the group which determines the essential parts of his personality.

A. THE UNIVERSALITY OF GROUP LIFE

All human life is group life. Men everywhere live in close association with their fellow men. All primitive peoples today live an associated life and apparently they have always done so. Even in situations where the means of life could be more easily and abundantly obtained by smaller aggregations, if not by solitary efforts, group life is nevertheless the invariable norm. It is of course notorious that the enormous aggregations and local concentration of the Western peoples of the present day are not only economically unnecessary but grossly inefficient. Yet they persist and increase in number and in size. Man is rather highly socialized and there is no evidence that he was ever a solitary animal.

Group life is not even original with man. Many, indeed most, of the organisms below the human level live in groups. These aggregations vary in unity and organization from the loose feeding associations of the plant lice and other low forms to the highly integrated groups of so-called social insects, such as ants and bees. Many different forms of group life have been worked out independently by various species of animals. Solitary life is the exception in the animal world. The immediate ancestors of the modern races of man lived in groups, as is abundantly evident from the articles of their handiwork as well as by the location of their skeletal remains. There can be little doubt that the prehuman ancestors of man lived an associated life.

This group life in its manifold forms is the essence of the social environment. It is the original fact out of which human nature developed and in which each new individual must find the elements that are to make him human. It is one segment of the object matter that the science of sociology undertakes to describe and understand. Its origin is in the effort to satisfy human need. Its nature and function in the life of man, its various forms in diverse situations, its changes in response to changing needs, and its influence in the determining of human nature and personality all fall within the field of sociological study.

The universal incidence of group life among men seems to imply the existence of an inherent and general human need that is satisfied by the fact of association as such. Specific groups and groupings exist in a variety of forms and for a variety of purposes; they may be classified with regard to particular functions or on the basis of various other criteria. There are, for example, various non-social groupings—mere aggregations of individuals—in the human as in the animal world. Other groupings are matters of expediency, protective or otherwise utilitarian in form and purpose—the result of external circumstances rather than of internal need. The function of still other groups seems to be chiefly that of providing an opportunity for human expression or of giving status and recognition. But all this is aside from the present interest, the universal need for and incidence of group life as such.

B. THE BASIS OF GROUP LIFE

Man is so habituated to the presence of his fellows and group life is so universal among men that it has been usual to speak of man as a gregarious animal; students posited a special and specific instinct of gregariousness to account for the observed fact of group existence. But any such instinct seems to be an unnecessary assumption; the facts are adequately and better understood without the aid of this invention. The evidence from feral man, for what little it is worth, lies against the assumption of any such trait of original nature.

The origin and ultimate basis of group life lie in human need, in the complete dependence of the human child. The child is born into a human group and is able to survive only because of the unremitting care he receives. The care and protection are necessary to preserve not only the life of the individual but that of the race as well. The survival value of the group has of course been the biologically controlling factor in its perpetuation. But habit is the mechanism by means of which the biological necessity is met. From birth the child is in the closest possible association with other persons and this continues throughout the most impressionable period of his life. As a result of this close and constant care and association the child becomes so habituated to associates that he is restless in their absence: they have become essential to his comfort and remain so throughout his life. It is the habit of association, arising out of the dependent condition

of the infant and child, that operates to perpetuate the group and associated life after the individual need for care and protection is passed.

Man is weak as compared with many animal species: he has no special means of defense against his enemies nor the speed to escape them. In the natural life—almost the entire history of the race—safety and protection depended upon association and upon collective, if not concerted, attack and defense. Cooperation and mutual aid were necessary in the struggle to survive. And in the subsequent life of man, in the period for which there is some order of historic record, group life has always been necessary or at least advantageous to the individual. Associated life made possible a division of labor that in most cases made easier the securing of food and the necessities of life. It has thus an economic basis: it contributed to the ease of life as well as to its security and to the pleasures that made it tolerable. The group gave strength and security to a relatively weak and defenseless animal, and it made possible the preservation and transmission of discovery—hence the evolution of cultures.

The group life creates a rich variety of human needs and desires that may be satisfied only through the fact of group membership. The desire for status and distinction, the wish for recognition, the need of companionship and sympathy are among the distinctly human products of group life that serve, in turn, to perpetuate and expand it. Arising in the first instance out of physical and biological necessity, group life creates attitudes and values that give it a social and human significance quite apart from its origin and value.

C. THE GROUP AS THE CARRIER OF CULTURE

The relation of the individual persons to the group in the process of culture development is relatively simple. It must, however, be explained in some detail, since an understanding of the relation is a prerequisite to the understanding of a large variety of social phenomena and because the very general misunderstanding of the essential relation has far-reaching practical as well as theoretical consequences.

Culture is the deposit of material and immaterial facts resulting from the activities of men in their efforts to control reality to the satisfaction of their wishes. It is the organized result of the group experience to the present moment. It exists in the

habits, interests, and ideas of the participating members of the group as well as in the practices, rules, material objects, and social organization of the world in which they live. It has in consequence a high degree of inertia: it tends to retain its present content and organization and to be transmitted to future generations in unchanged form. But, as a living thing, it is at the same time in process of change; it is only the dead culture, say that of ancient Egypt or classic Greece, that does not change, and these have influenced and do influence all succeeding civilizations and cultures.

Culture change is the result of new facts and relations being incorporated into the preexisting complex. Such new facts may come from either of two sources: They may be introduced from without, borrowed, as the expression goes, from the cultures of other peoples with whom the members of the group have contacts; or they may be inventions or discoveries native to the culture. From the point of view of a particular group it may be a matter of relative indifference whether the culture fact is an invention or a borrowed element. A new tool or weapon adapted to the needs of the folk will, in general, be used and incorporated into the culture complex quite independent of its origin. The germ theory of disease, for example, functions as effectively in American and English medical practice as it does in the country of its origin. But the enrichment of a culture by invention and by borrowing are basically different processes: one has to do with the origin of culture and the other with its spread.

Origination, when it is more than chance accident, is always the product of a superior mind, it is always a personal achievement. It is a matter of the imaginative picturing of a group of new relations before the relations anywhere have objective existence. No group, as a group, ever created anything. The group provides the conditions conducive to the creative functioning of individual minds. In the things commonly assumed to be of group origin—folk songs, for example—the invention is always personal, though the mental condition incident to group excitement may be a necessary prerequisite to the creation. The illusion that such things are group inventions arises in the fact that the time interval between their invention and their group use is often very brief. The same logical error of thought lies behind the enormous consumption of time and energy in the modern world that goes into board and committee meetings. The human mind everywhere functions most productively in

solitude, although it requires the stimulation and discipline of occasional exchange with other minds. The function of the group in the creative process is to provide the materials with which its capable men work and to use and transmit the product.

The culture may, and for certain types of understanding must, be conceived as a thing apart from its present possessors. Each generation receives it from the preceding one and transmits it to the succeeding generation. The English language, for example, is a culture fact that has objective reality and independent existence. Every word, every form and inflection, to be sure, was an individual invention preserved through use and transmission. But the language itself is independent of any of its users, just as a tool, a bond, a religious dogma, or a scientific theory is independent of its creator and of the man who owns, uses, and bequeaths it to his heirs. The present possessors learned the language by virtue of being born into that language group and pass it to their descendants in the due course of events. The culture fact existed prior to their birth and will persist after their death. The same thing is true of any and all elements of a culture and of the complex as a whole. Any given generation and group are the recipient and carrier of the culture, not its creator. In the course of acquisition, use, and transmission there are of course individual modifications that in the aggregate are important. The Romance languages represent centuries of progressive modifications of the mother tongue.

The possession of a culture is of course a prerequisite to its transmission. It is carried within the communication system. The individual person incorporates into his own life organization the language, beliefs, ideas, and other elements of the culture as he is incorporated into the group. The child acquires the culture of his group and by virtue of that fact becomes a member of the group; until the immigrant shares the heritage and participates in the group life he is a member of the group in a physical sense only. The two things go on at the same time: they are in reality the same thing viewed from two angles; the person is a member of the group just to the extent that he has incorporated into his life organization the culture of the group.

In a complex culture no single person can possess the whole. Some possess more than others. The scholar, for example, has a command of words far beyond the use and understanding of the uneducated person, but no scholar uses all or any considerable

proportion of the total vocabulary of the language. No two persons are in possession of exactly the same elements of the culture. The segment of the culture complex experienced concretely by certain persons and groups of persons of a complex society—say the legal fraternity, the mathematical physicists, or the biblical scholars—is completely foreign to other persons and groups—say the physicians, business men, and farmers. Certain elements of a culture, as the supernatural beliefs, moral sentiments, and ethical ideas, may be widely known or even universal in the group. But in general each person knows and carries a very limited portion of the whole. The particular part in his possession is dependent upon his status, upon his contacts, upon the class and subgroups in which he holds membership.

Groups might properly and with profit be classified from the point of view of the cultural contribution they make to the development of the person. The family and other intimate groups, for example, transmit to him elements of the heritage that are very different in character from those that come to him by virtue of extensive and impersonal association in professional societies and labor unions, and they have a different bearing upon the processes of socialization and personality development. This point receives further consideration in connection with the treatment of social contacts.

D. TYPES OF GROUP RELATIONSHIPS

The fact of group life is a matter of common observation and universal information. It exists in all times and in all places and among all living forms. The understanding of groupings and of groups requires an understanding of the factors and bonds that bring the units together and hold them together; they owe their existence and reality to the relations that obtain between the constituent units. Any real understanding of group life as well as any fundamental classification of groups must of necessity run in terms of the type of interaction and interdependence that obtains among the units.

There may be groups without the existence of any bond of union among the units; they may be in close physical proximity as a result of chance and external factors and have no relation and no influence one upon the other. The miscellaneous collection of discrete objects in a grocery store or on the city dump is of this order: they have no unity except the spacial and temporal

placing of the independent objects. Among living forms there are various groupings of essentially this nature: the units are together in time and place but the aggregate lacks any other unity. Many of the animal associations, as plant lice, are of this order. They are born alive, in large numbers, and almost simultaneously. They have limited powers of locomotion and little occasion to move, since they are born directly upon the food they consume. The individuals spend their lives in close proximity but in complete independence one of the others. There is in consequence an aggregation but no organic unity. The same thing is true of many other simple forms of life. The eggs from which they hatch are deposited directly upon the food on which the young subsist, they hatch simultaneously, and the generation lives in a compact aggregation that gives the appearance of group unity but no interdependence and no unity exist. There are often among higher animal forms and among human beings chance aggregations that at first at least have no more unity than the insect associations. The passengers on board an ocean liner, the inmates of a prison, the members of a college class are together because of chance and external circumstances and there is in the beginning no internal bond of unity.

From the order of association just indicated, where there are no internal bonds of unity and the grouping is an arbitrary or chance product, there are various degrees and types of relations to the opposite extreme of complete fusion and consequent loss of individual and personal identity. The miscellaneous objects, for example, may be assembled according to plan into a building in which each unit has a relation to the whole and, consequently, to every other unit. The presence of other plants and animals of the same or different species may directly or indirectly affect the life and behavior, enforce a unity upon the whole, and define relations among the separate units. The chance aggregation of persons may result in interaction and the consequent growth of organization and interdependent relations.

As long as there is indifference there is an absence of organization and unity. As indifference gives way, individual behavior ceases to be independent, becomes relative and controlled, and some degree of unity and organization exists. The type of relationship that obtains is significant, but whether it be antagonistic and predatory or cooperative and sympathetic there is some order of group life and unity.

The simplest and lowest of all relationships that can exist between living forms is that between the predator and its prey. The relation is temporary, the interests are antagonistic, and the purposes of the two forms are diverse. There is an absence of communication and of cooperation. There is simply the use of one form by the other for the ends of the one and to the destruction of the other. The relation is in general the antithesis of that basic to a social and moral order. The relation of the cat and the mouse, the hawk and the dove, the wolf and the deer are examples in the animal world of predatory relations. This order of relationship has existed and played an important rôle in the relations of men. Much of primitive life and most of barbarian life were essentially predatory, sometimes to the point of using the stranger and enemy as food. In the modern economic order much of human behavior is obviously predatory in form and purpose; the success of one is the destruction of the other.

A slightly different and a somewhat higher type of group relation obtains in what is known as parasitism. This is a common form of relationship in both the plant and the animal world: nearly one-half of the forms in the animal kingdom are parasitic. The relationship is one in which one organism receives the sole advantage and receives it to the detriment of the other. The parasite attaches itself to another form, temporarily, as in the case of the mosquito that ordinarily lives on nectar and plant juices; or occasionally, as in the case of fleas and bedbugs that live elsewhere than on the body of the host; or permanently, as in the case of itch mites that burrow in the skin or parasites that live in the blood, the body tissue, or the alimentary canal and live at the expense of the host without, however, destroying the host or, if so, only by slow degrees. Plant parasites are innumerable: the entire class of fungi derive their nourishment from other organisms; the smut on corn, the rot on potatoes, the mildew on grape vines, and the rust on wheat are examples of plant parasites. The numerous mistletoes that grow on the oak and other trees are familiar parasitic forms in the higher order of plants. Fleas, ticks, leeches, lice, mites, and various other small creatures attach themselves to the bodies of larger animals upon which they feed. Other types, as the tapeworms and liver flukes, live within the body of the host. The analogue of the parasitic relationship is a familiar phenomenon in the human world, and the same words are often used in connection with it, usually, however, with a moral connotation.

Commensalism, which may be regarded as the next upward step from parasitism in group organization, is a form of symbiotic relationship in which two forms are associated but without any known advantage or disadvantage resulting from the intimacy. A commensal is simply "one who eats at the same table." More specifically, it is an organism that lives with another—sometimes on or within the other—and shares the food or lives on the refuse of the host. One of the forms may be more or less dependent upon the other without, however, being either predatory or parasitic. The orchids cling to other plants and live upon them but not at their expense, the association is not positively detrimental to the host. The relationship may be beneficial to one or the other form: the little crab that lives within the shell of the oyster and the sea anemone found in the shell of the hermit crab may benefit by the defense afforded by the shell of the host. There is no antagonism between commensals, neither is there any cooperation. The ends of the organisms are diverse.

A further step gives the relationship known as mutualism, a type of associated life in which the relations of the two forms are reciprocal, in which each form is useful to the other and in some cases each is essential to the life of the other. The association of certain radiolaria and a green alga is mutually beneficial: the little animals give off carbon dioxide which is used by the plant while the plant gives off oxygen which is used by the little animals. The lichen, an association of an alga and a filamentous fungus, is a perfect case of mutualism: the forms are so closely united as to appear to be a single organism. The fungus supplies the attachment and protection and absorbs and holds water necessary to the alga which, in turn, makes carbohydrate some of which is available for the fungus. Under favorable conditions, each can live independently but the symbiotic relationship makes them superior to hardships that neither could survive separately. Certain kinds of bacteria which find their normal habitat in the intestinal tract of man and the higher animals are for the most part harmless mutuals: incidental to the process of getting their own living they cause chemical changes in the food which assist the digestive processes of the animal. The cowbird of the North American prairies gets its food by removing parasites from the backs of cattle; the crocodile bird feeds in the open mouth of the crocodile on particles of decaying matter lodged in the teeth of the crocodile. The association of mutualism is in general a

permanent one and the two forms are in a sense engaged in a corporate activity.

Domestication is a form of mutualism in which the forms are adapted and dependent one upon the other. The relation existing among certain of the ants and the aphids is one of domestication in which each form is organically adapted to the other. Certain elaborate colonies of ants are composed of two species specialized in complementary directions: one species are masters, soldiers, and marauders unable to perform ordinary work and, in some cases, unable even to feed themselves unaided; the slave species performs all the labor of the colony even to feeding the masters under whose protection they thrive exceptionally well. The relation of man to certain types of plants and animals is a familiar form of domestication. Various native grasses and other plants have been modified into wheat, maize, and the other cultivated plant strains. In a similar way man has changed the nature of various animals to produce varieties of cattle, horses, swine, dogs, barnyard fowls, and the like suited to his needs. These domestic plants and animals are dependent upon man for the ability to live, and the relations are harmonious and mutually beneficial. The domestic plants and animals could not survive in the untempered competition of nature and, on the other hand, they are essential to the perpetuation of the present culture life of man.

The various types of group relations just described are in no sense social, though they contain in some cases elements essential to a truly social relationship. They serve a necessary purpose in the life of the organisms and form the basis for the various sorts of aggregations and associations. In some cases considerable aggregations of individuals are together for varying periods without any bonds of group unity; some forms of insect life, as blow-flies, are hatched almost simultaneously from batches of eggs deposited on food suitable for the young which are in aggregations by mere accident of birth. The association of other insects is a purely tropistic or reflex response: they are brought and held together by the warmth or moisture of each other's bodies. The bond of union in the case of the ants and wasps and other so-called social insects is an exchange of food and odors. Herds, packs, flocks, and other temporary or permanent associations appear to be instinctive in origin and nutritive, reproductive, or protective in nature.

E. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SOCIAL

In the associations accurately designated as social, or as societies, are characteristic facts not present in plant colonies or in animal groupings. In the latter collectivities are often relatively permanent association, a high degree of mutual dependence, and in some cases at least a form of cooperation to a common end. But in the human society there is, in addition, communication among the members and a consequent consensus that integrates the activities by defining the group ends.

In the beginning the associations of men were doubtless on the level of animal aggregation in response to food, sex, and protective needs. But the association resulted in the formation of habits and of group ways and customs that were perpetuated because of group continuity. In social life, as distinct from animal groups, behavior is in relation to a body of customs and conventions that exist in the group. Each human group has a social heritage—a body of practices, traditions, sentiments, ideals, standards, techniques—that is the accumulated product of group experience. By means of language, the greatest of the human inventions, the group heritage, is preserved and transmitted. This heritage has objective reality in the form of artifacts and structures and rules of conduct and it exists as well in the sentiments and habits and beliefs of the group members. A person becomes and is a member of the group to the extent that the group heritage forms the content of his mass of apperception. The behavior of the person is controlled immediately by his own sentiments and standards, but indirectly it is controlled by the social rules since they are the ultimate determiners of his sentiments, standards, and behavior patterns.

The existence of the social heritage makes possible communication among the members of a human group. Without it there could be association and interaction but only on the level that exists in the flock and the herd, only on the level of physiological and emotional stimulation and response. Communication is the characteristic feature of the social. It makes possible the transmission from each generation to the next of the accumulated body of practice, belief, knowledge, sentiments, and ideals that result from the associated life of man at the same time that they make the associated life itself a possibility and a reality. But it is the fact of communication, rather than the things communicated, that defines the social.

Society not only continues to exist *by* transmission, *by* communication, but it may fairly be said to exist *in* transmission, *in* communication. There is more than a verbal tie between the words common, community, and communication. Men live in a community in virtue of the things which they have in common; the communication is the way in which they come to possess things in common. What they must have in common in order to form a community or a society are aims, beliefs, aspirations, knowledge—a common understanding. . . . The communication which insures participation in a common understanding is one which secures similar emotional and intellectual dispositions—like ways of responding to expectations and requirements.

Persons do not become a society by living in physical proximity, any more than a man ceases to be socially influenced by being so many feet or miles removed from others. A book or a letter may institute a more intimate association between human beings separated thousands of miles from each other than exists between dwellers under the same roof. Individuals do not even compose a social group because they all work for a common end. The parts of a machine work with a maximum of cooperativeness for a common result, but they do not form a community. If, however, they were all cognizant of the common end and all interested in it so that they regulated their specific activity in view of it, then they would form a community. But this would involve communication. Each would have to know what the other was about and would have to have some way of keeping the other informed as to his own purpose and progress. Consensus demands communication.¹

That which defines the social and distinguishes it from all other relationships among living beings is the fact of communication through which persons share their experiences and build up a culture heritage.

F. TYPES OF GROUP

The term group is used in a generic sense to state the fact of association without implication as to the nature of the relationship obtaining among the associated units. It implies nothing as to the size, form, permanence, or cohesive principle. It is any number of people with such relations between or among them as to make it possible to think of them as a whole. It is a general and colorless term: it may refer to any collectivity from a chance and ephemeral collection of persons on the street or children on the playground to highly organized and relatively enduring organizations, as a primitive tribe, a family, a business

¹ John Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 5-6. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

corporation, or a nation. The number of concrete groups and groupings is indefinitely large, and they vary one from another in size, permanence, and formality; in the nature of the control exercised over the members, the character of the constituent units, and the mode of interacting; in origin, organization, and purpose; and in numerous other ways. The term group comprehends such diverse things as families, nations, crowds, parliaments, castes, sects, clubs, parties, tribes, and many others.

It is possible to classify groups in a wide variety of ways and each may have validity for the specific purpose in hand. Common-sense practice readily distinguishes human from non-human groupings, and further distinctions are made in terms of race, sex, age, occupation, economic status, religious affiliations, political connections, national origins, and on the basis of various other obvious and tangible marks. Such common-sense divisions are of course not mutually exclusive: individuals belong to different groups, and the classification for one purpose commonly cuts across the divisions made for other purposes. Each is based in general upon more or less obvious and superficial marks of identification. The validity of any classification must be determined by its utility for the understanding of a bit of reality under consideration. Obviously the classification arrived at depends upon the criteria used for classificatory purposes. On the basis of sanction Ellwood has differentiated sanctioned and unsanctioned groups; on the basis of intimacy and proximity Cooley proposed the primary and implied the secondary; on the basis of the methods of action Giddings classified groups into private and public; on the basis of the type of control Ross proposed the instinctive, the habitual, the despotic, and the free association groups; in terms of function Spencer discussed domestic, ceremonial, political, ecclesiastical, professional, and industrial; and on similar or different bases other writers have proposed a wide range of other classifications.

It follows from what was said in the section on group relationships and elsewhere that any fundamental and universally valid classification of groupings must run in terms of the type of interaction among the members. But this makes impossible any thoroughgoing and mutually exclusive classification of concrete groups. This fact, the impossibility of a logical classification of the concrete phenomena, cannot be elaborated here but it will recur and will receive attention in connection with the study of

collective behavior. It is possible, also, to classify groups in terms of

. . . the rôle which they play in the organization and life of larger social groups and societies. The internal organization of any given social group will be determined by its external relation to other groups in the society of which it is a part as well as by the relations of individuals within the group to one another.¹

Obviously this is a totally different order of classification but one that has objective validity and utility in group behavior and social organization.

In the present connection it is necessary to distinguish the communal and the social, the community and the society.

G. COMMUNITY AND SOCIETY

Where the interest is on the more or less discrete human units in a defined area, the term population is the appropriate one. If reference be made, for example, to the population of Boston, China, or San Quentin, the emphasis falls upon the people rather than upon the community—that is, the city, the nation, or the prison.

The neighborhood, on the other hand, is a geographical region but one characterized by the special type of relations that exist among the population units. It is usually small and its boundaries are fairly definite. The personal relations that characterize it arise from the fact of proximity: it is a region of primary contacts, the area in which the neighbors live. Neighbors are known to one another by virtue of the fact that they live close together, they meet face to face, they speak with one another, they know one another immediately and personally, they visit in an informal way, they sympathize and assist one another in times of stress, they quarrel, they gossip without malice, and they slander without compunction.

Each neighborhood is a local group of people living in an area sufficiently compact to make relationships intimate and personal. Within this area, which may include a few homes in a village or not many more than two or three blocks in the city, neighbors borrow from each other, know a great deal about each other's affairs, and all come under the social control of sentiment and gossip. Here, acts of kindness are spontaneous, but here, also, sneers, dark looks, and other forms of

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 163-164.

disapproval cut to the quick. This body of neighborly sentiments is the basis of a social order that has no formal social organization. The neighborhood has within it smaller human groupings, as families, play groups, and cliques.¹

The community, likewise, is basically a regional concept: the term always applies to a social group in a given local area; to a commune, a village district, or a farming area; to any social group when the geographic position and distribution are a factor in the understanding of the social relations. The emphasis is upon the unity that exists in a given region by virtue of the prevailing space relations. The unity may not be divorced from its regional base without destroying the utility of the concept.

The boundaries of a community are generally indefinite, often a matter of degree, and there is commonly an absence of definite, formal organization. In the concept of this local and territorial unity there are generally some more or less definite implications both of personal relations and of functional interrelationships. There have been in fact many efforts made to define communities in terms of local interests, activities, and interrelationships of function as well as in terms of personal relations. These efforts in reality amount to enumerating criteria for differentiating among communities rather than to defining the concept itself. The personal relations and the interrelationships of function are incidental, secondary, and derivative. The contacts within the community may be personal and, because of the proximity of the people living within a given area, are often likely to be so. Each person may know the others or know about them; face-to-face contacts are easy and common. But these are characteristics of the neighborhood rather than of the community. They are an incidental result of living in the same area, not an essential characteristic of the community: in the community, contacts need not be personal.

Among the people living in a given area is often a good deal of similarity in interests, activities, and ends. From this fact organization and cooperative activity often develop and the community comes to be pervaded and behavior controlled by common ideas and sentiments. It is usual to speak, for example, of a farming or a college community when the attention is on the region in which the given activities are carried on. But when

¹ C. A. Dawson, and W. E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology*, p. 5. Copyright 1929, Ronald Press Company, quoted by permission.

attempt is made to define community in terms of attitudes and functions, the unit tends to disappear; functions overlap to such an extent that the community boundaries become so indefinite as practically to disappear. The similarity of occupation, and so of interest and work, is a secondary fact: it arises out of the community, it does not create it. In a farming community, for example, the farmers have much in common and functional relations and formal organizations sometimes grow out of the common interests. But in such case the community fades into the functional and interest groups whose territorial base is vague or absent.

If the attention be upon the relationships existing among the human units of a group, rather than upon the units themselves or upon the regional placement of the units, the term society is employed. In this sense society is a highly abstract concept. There could of course be no relations without people and there could, perhaps, be no people without some order of community. It is possible, nevertheless, to consider the interaction of the units and the communication among them and the body of sentiments, ideas, and social structures quite apart from the complex reality of which they are a part.

The term society is also used in a generic sense to refer to the whole constellation of associations that characterize a people. In a population of any considerable size, people are grouped in a great variety of ways and for a great number of purposes and these groupings are in a continual process of change. They include family groups, social clubs, religious associations, business organizations, professional societies, criminal gangs, political parties, and so on through the endless interests that bring people into association and lead them to organize. These various groups oppose, complement, and overlap in numerous and intricate ways: no one of them comprehends the whole range of human interest; each person belongs to many such groups and associations. The term society, occasionally qualified by the adjective "great" or "large," is sometimes used to include this whole range of specific organization and activity.

Society in this sense, the large society, is sometimes practically coextensive with the state, and the terms are sometimes confused. The French nation, for example, is sometimes conceived of as a society. The usage is confusing, since the concepts are by no means identical. The state is an organization for a particular

purpose and corresponds closely to the church and, except for the extent of its power, with other control and interest groups. The large society is not a control group in the same sense of the word; it is merely a generic designation inclusive of associations for all purposes.

But societies, as distinct from society and from the large society, are definite, limited, and concrete social-contact groups. They are specific types of organization of relative permanence and with or without territorial boundary. A society is any organization that enables people to carry on a common life. It is the definite type of interaction among persons, and their adjustment and the coordination of their activities, that makes a society. The concept in this sense always requires the assistance of an adjective to convey the nature of the particular bond that maintains the unity of the group—the Sociological Society, the Mathematical Society, the Ministerial Alliance, the Sophomore Class, the Plumbers Union.

A concrete society may of course coincide with a particular community but it is little more than mere coincidence where such is the case. The person is a member of one community only, except in those cases where a smaller community lies within a larger one, but he may and generally does belong to several societies. The societies exist on other than community bases and are almost invariably independent of local territorial boundaries.

H. GROUP UNITY

Society is something more than an aggregate of individuals and the sum of individuals; it is to be conceived as a real, objective, literal fact. The group is not a subjective synthesis but an objective reality, a fact of common observation and experience.

But the objective nature of the group is a matter that many literal-minded men have found difficult to understand and, unable to grasp the concept, have sometimes denied the existence of the reality, asserting society and the group to be illusions that correspond to nothing real. It is asserted, for example, that there can be no society, no social unity, without the existence of a "social mind" or a "superconsciousness" and that the use of such terms as society and the group implies a belief on the part of the users that society is some sort of large organism. There are, it is claimed, no society and no group; the only realities are individuals and the relations of individuals; society and the group are not objective realities but mental illusions.

This extreme position is logically so untenable and so obviously contrary to fact as to require no discussion. But it does call attention to the fact that the nature of group unity does require explanation. The group is of course an objective fact. The unity of the social group is in essence the same as that of all the unities in the universe: relationship is the only bond of unity anywhere in nature. And relationship is a universal fact of nature. To the extent that relationships are limited, and most relationships are limited, the particular unity has boundaries. This limit of the extent of relationships separates one unity from another. A society, a state, a business corporation is as much a unity as is the solar system. There are of course different types of relationships but all unity lies in organization and the relationship of parts.

Another type of error is also prevalent. Failing to grasp the essential nature of group unity, some students have emphasized particular elements and aspects to the neglect of others and, sometimes, have mistaken the part for the whole. Social unity, according to some, is an awareness on the part of persons of common traits that set them off from others—a common interest to be protected and advanced—and makes them feel themselves to be one. This is of course quite often true; the feeling of unity is a more or less characteristic emotional accompaniment of certain aggregations. But it is incidental, a consequence of a certain type of group unity rather than a thing that defines its nature. In other cases the emphasis is placed upon the fact that in a unity the activities of individual members are regulated and coordinated in a common end; the common, correlated, and mutually conditioned activities are thought to be the essential unity of the society. Society is compared with a machine where unity is secured by a nice adjustment of parts. Hence a social group is said to be a unity because of adjustments, coordinations, and coadaptations between or among the activities of individuals. The reciprocal activity and the reciprocity of parts are thus the essence of group unity. To this again there can be no serious objection if it be not taken as a complete explanation: settled forms of interaction among the members are perhaps necessary to group behavior but the society is more than a machine.

There is, as has been pointed out, a type of unity that is purely physical. The building has a unity that results from the

relation obtaining among the diverse elements entering into its construction. It is something more than the brick and wood and glass and paint of which it is composed and something other than the plans and labor that assembled the elements. A machine, again, is a functional unity; its reality, as a machine, lies not in the wheels and belts and shafts but in the relation, adjustment, and coordination of parts that enable it to perform a specific function. An organic body is a unity arising from the fact of an intimate interchange of energies; the relation is closer among the parts than is the relation of any of the parts with any agent outside. Its unity is physiological. In the plant world there is unity resulting from reproduction and hereditary transmission as well as environmental and biological unity resulting from adaptation of form and structure and from migration and survival in favorable habitats. In the lower forms of life—in colonies of ants and other insects, in flocks of birds, schools of fish, herds of cattle, packs of wolves, and the like—there is a unity of behavior that results from interaction on a physical or physiological level, on the level of tropism, reflex, or instinct.

In human society the unity is based on consensus arrived at through communication.

I. CONSENSUS

Consensus is the fundamental form or aspect of group unity, "the distinctive mark of human society." It is in the nature of an agreement reached in a human group by the resolution of conflict between contending factions or among the members of a single group.

Consensus is to be distinguished from the type of agreement, the uniformities in thought and overt behavior that result from the purposive or incidental exercise or imposition of superior force. Such agreement and conformity may be voluntary or involuntary, the result of conformity to pattern or the acceptance of the edict of a superior force. The slave is, perforce, in agreement with the master; the conquered have no choice but to conform to the patterns defined by their conquerers. There is agreement because of the coercion of superior force; there are also agreement and harmony that come through voluntary conformity. The child in a social environment voluntarily conforms to the prevailing behavior and thought patterns over which he has no control and with which he is not in conflict. The process is

one of accommodation and adjustment to that which is fixed, rigid, and defined.

If group unity be considered merely from a short-time point of view, there is a complete shift of emphasis. The question, then, is one concerning the steps or stages that may be distinguished in the development of a psychological crowd from a chance and miscellaneous aggregation of persons, through the various degrees of excitement and focusing of attention, to the point where there is a working unity of feeling and behavior tendency. This is a matter, however, the analysis of which is deferred to the discussion of collective behavior. MacIver in discussing consensus takes a similar short-time point of view, hence is unable to find it. Policy-defining bodies must reach a decision. He classifies the possible ways as follows but seems to deny reality to the fourth category—which would represent consensus as distinct from formal or arbitrary agreement or decision for practical procedure:

TYPES OF GROUP AGREEMENT¹

Basis	Process	Nature of decision	Treatment of differences
I. Authority....	Acquiescence and assent	Formal unanimity	Suppressed or held in abeyance
II. Compromise..	Give and take	Formal unanimity	Registered in the result but not reconciled
III. Enumeration.	Inconclusive discussion	Majority determination	Registered in the process but not in the result
IV. Integration ..	Conclusive discussion	Real unanimity	Expressed in the process and conserved in the result

¹R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, p. 178.

But consensus is a type of unity that arises out of conflict and exists among men where there is independence in regard to belief and action. The struggle for existence and competition among men inevitably result in some sort of order. But no social order is ever static; change is universal and continuous in every social situation. The change disturbs habits, disorganizes the social structures and arrangements, violates customs and traditions,

upsets status, scandalizes sentiments—in brief, precipitates conflict. Out of the disagreement and disharmony of standards, sentiments, beliefs, and practices there comes presently, as a result of discussion in which all may participate and in the course of which sentiments and opinions undergo modifications and mutations, some degree of group decision and agreement. A new scientific theory, for example, is at once in conflict with prevailing doctrine and it remains so until such time as there is agreement—that is, a consensus of opinion among those competent in the field. The Darwinian theory of evolution precipitated a conflict out of which emerged, after half a century, a theory to the main features of which all biologists subscribe. The status of the prohibition of liquor consumption in the United States, on the other hand, exemplifies, among other things, a social policy or legislative program concerning which no consensus has been reached.

Once a consensus has been arrived at conflict ceases, the matter passes out of the focus of attention, and the decision becomes an unquestioned part of the social heritage of the group. The whole body of social tradition and moral custom in a society represents, in general, the deposit left by past and forgotten conflicts of practice and belief. Democracy, private property, monogamic family, and other traditional sentiments, ideas, and social arrangements were at one time group decisions more or less consciously and rationally arrived at. In the present, however, they tend to be in the nature of presuppositions and axiomatic starting points for popular social thought—a final stage of consensus beyond that of conscious group decision.

The consensus upon which the unity and coherence of the social group rest has three aspects—*esprit de corps*, morale, and collective representation.

In every group unity there is a feeling aspect that is commonly referred to as *esprit de corps*. The person experiences this as a sense of belonging, of identification; he refers to the group as “we” or “us,” speaks of our behavior or possessions, becomes elated, concerned, or depressed as these moods alternate in the control of the group, and in other ways manifests in behavior his participation in the feelings common to and characteristic of the group. The spontaneous enthusiasm of the crowd, the superficial and transitory unity created by the orator and the band, the churning stage of group enterprise, the impatience for

action and for victory, the enthusiasm of the opposing student bodies in an athletic contest, the spirit of fellowship among the members of a fraternal and convivial group are diverse expressions. *Esprit de corps* is the group enthusiasm that often initiates enterprises; it is not the thing that carries them to completion.

Morale represents in general the mature and serious aspect of consensus, the sober persisting organization of group tendencies. In a concrete way it is the determination to win in the group enterprise, whether that enterprise be a game, an election, or a war, and the willingness to endure the hardships, suffer the deprivations, and submit to the organization and discipline that will enable each member of the group to do smoothly and most effectively his part in the collective enterprise. In *esprit de corps* the individual is identified with the group, in morale he is subordinated to it. In morale the objective aim of group action is conscious and more or less clearly defined, at least in its large general aspects, there is unity of aim and purpose, there is organization of behavior relative to the ends to be achieved, there is a preparedness to act as the situation demands, a readiness to act promptly, a fitness to act decisively, and a determination to act persistently. Morale implies patience, willingness to await the strategic time for action, and confidence and assurance in the face of reverses.

- The ideational aspect of consensus is revealed in the collective representations of the group. These are symbols that have a common meaning or, perhaps better, bring similar emotional responses, because they are linked up with and seem to make articulate characteristic experiences of the collective life. They may be grouped under two headings: the concrete and material symbols, as the flag, the cross, emblems, and personages; and immaterial and purely conceptual symbols, as concepts and doctrines and moral ideas. These collective representations, whether material or immaterial, are objects of the deepest human sentiment; the strongest emotions of men are organized about them in a common and characteristic pattern, and, for that reason, they are most effective in arousing *esprit de corps*, group enthusiasm, and controlling emotional behavior generally. But they are significant also as a means of organizing and integrating the thought life of the several members of the group and are, of course, indispensable to communication and social life.

J. CRITERIA OF GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Participation is the requisite as well as the means to membership in a group. There are, however, various degrees of participation which may be stated in terms of different aspects of consensus.

On the simplest and lowest-level group membership is participation in the *esprit de corps* of the group; the person simply feels himself to be identified with the group. While this is the simplest type of participation, it is by no means the weakest of the bonds that tie the person into his group.

The second order of participation is that which comes from an understanding—or at least an appreciation—and use of the collective representations of the group. In so far as the symbols in reality embody the group objectives, they lie deep in the nature of consensus, and to share their meaning and use is to participate in the group life in a more real sense than that of feeling. The person coming into group membership on this level does so by assimilating the collective experience, past as well as present, so that the group situations have for him the same meanings as they have for other and older members, meanings which are represented or suggested by, or contained in, the group symbols. To the extent that he participates in this ideational aspect of consensus, the person defines his place in the group organization, in the network of relationships that mark it as a society.

The third order of group participation lies in contributing to, and being strengthened by, the morale of the group. Membership on this level implies an active and sustaining participation in the collective enterprise. It involves more than implicit feeling and more than appreciation and understanding, although these are both necessary to it. It means an alinement of personal behavior in those aspects relevant to group function.

These aspects of membership in society are to be understood as conceptual distinctions and as tools for abstraction and analysis; they are useful in understanding the behavior of persons in society and of groups as groups. In any concrete situation they are all involved; they appear concomitantly and are mutually interdependent in the relations of any person in society. With this in mind it may be said, in summary, that a person is a member of a society when and to the extent that he participates in the consensus of that society. More specifically, a person is a member of a society when and to the extent that he feels himself to be identi-

fied with it and a part of it; when and to the extent that he shares in the meanings associated with the collective representations; and when and to the extent that he contributes to, and is strengthened by, the morale of the group by fitting his own behavior into the collective endeavor.

K. MEMBERSHIP IN DIFFERENT GROUPS

It remains, finally, to point out that a person normally belongs to many different groups. A particular man, for example, belongs to the white race, he is a member of the state, he is identified with the local community, he is a member of a certain church, belongs to the local chamber of commerce, is a member of a fraternal organization, belongs to a political party and a business men's club and to various other class, professional, and interest groups. A physician, for example, may belong to the local community, the state medical association, the alumni association of his college, a golf club, and so on. In the conditions it is quite obvious, as previously pointed out, that any classification of concrete groups is not a classification of persons. Only in certain aspects of his life and personality does any particular person classify in a particular group.

The interests and aims of group organizations are diverse and often conflicting. The bar association and the chamber of commerce are groups that function to promote the interests of lawyers and business men or to promote higher standards or better service or for whatever may be the purpose. The Masonic order and the Rotary Club cater to still different interests. The aims are diverse but they are not conflicting; the same person may belong to each of the four organizations and find no conflict in their activities and objectives. But this is not always the case; the church and the school, the political party and the citizens' league, the chamber of commerce and the consumers' association represent interests and aims that are not only divergent but that are, or may be, opposed and mutually exclusive.

Membership in multiple groups frequently gives rise to conflict, sometimes serious conflict, within the person. This comes about when there is conflict between the groups to which he belongs. The conflict between the groups brings a conflict of loyalties within the person who holds membership in each of the conflicting groups. A teacher, for example, who is a member of the state and also a member of a university may be forbidden

by law to teach the theory of evolution or to discuss political doctrines critical of existing institutions or tax theory that is conceived to be inimical to the welfare of entrenched interests. At the same time the ethics of his profession as well as his own moral integrity require him to present the established conclusions of science whether such teachings be popular or unpopular. An oppressed group, as the Negroes, may enjoin on its members a program of action forbidden by the state of which they are loyal members.

This matter of divided loyalty and the personal conflict it engenders will be discussed in detail in the chapter on conflict. It is here necessary to note only that they are results of the complexity of social organization, the presence in the society of different standards.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this chapter to the whole subject of study in sociology.
2. What evidence is there that man was never the solitary individualist he is sometimes thought to have been in his very early existence as man? Does this evidence seem convincing?
3. Does the fact that a form of behavior is universal prove that it is biologically inherited? Give examples in proof or illustration of your position.
4. What is the basis of group life?
5. Enumerate a considerable list of needs and desires that arise out of the fact of group life.
6. What is meant by "the group as a carrier of culture"? Where do the culture facts ultimately reside?
7. State the relation of the group and the person in the process of invention and culture change.
8. In what sense may culture be conceived as a thing apart from its present possessors? Give numerous illustrations not mentioned in the text.
9. What determines the part of the culture possessed by any member of the social group?
10. What differences occur to you as to the type of culture elements that come to you through the family and other primary groups and of those that come to you through more impersonal associations?
11. What is the basis of unity among (a) the elements in the construction of a building, (b) the individuals in a hive of bees, (c) the members of a social sorority?
12. Define and illustrate the predatory relationship.
13. What is parasitism? Give illustrations familiar to you from either the plant or the animal world.
14. Seneca speaks of Rome as a huge parasite living "on the spoils of all nations." Discuss.

15. Discuss the relation that exists between the leguminous plants and the bacteria that live on their rootlets.

16. Distinguish commensalism and mutualism.

17. In what sense is man a domesticated animal?

18. What is the meaning of the term *social*, as used in sociology? Distinguish it from *convivial*.

19. Is it an accurate use of words to refer to a group of lower animals as "social" or as a "society"? Defend your position.

20. What do you understand by the term *consensus*?

21. What is the meaning of the term *group*? Are all groups societies? Explain.

22. Show the interrelatedness of social groups in which you hold membership.

23. State and discuss various criteria of group classification.

24. Define the neighborhood and distinguish it from the community.

25. Define the community and distinguish the community and the society. Is a community a society? Is a society a community? Do you say "world society" or "world community"? Why?

26. Distinguish between the so-called great society and the state.

27. State the relation of consensus to conflict.

28. What are the three aspects of consensus? Define and illustrate each, using illustrations other than those of the text.

29. Take some specific society, as a fraternity or other group with which you are acquainted, and see if you can discover the three aspects of organization.

30. Do you know any persons in groups to which you belong whose membership is practically limited to participation in its *esprit de corps*?

31. "Conflicts of conscience are group conflicts." What do you understand by this statement? What is conscience?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. List the major societies on the campus and indicate the bond that maintains coherence in each.

3. List all the groups, formal and informal, of which you are a member. Attempt to arrange these groups in some classification. Discuss the principle of classification you have used. To what extent are you able to make the divisions of your classification mutually exclusive?

4. State and criticize Le Bon's classification of social groups as given in *The Crowd*, pp. 177-182.

5. "One way of measuring the wholesome or the normal life of a person is by the sheer external fact of his membership in the social groups of the community in which his lot is cast." But is it a valid way? Are there other ways? Are you sure that the extrovert is more "wholesome" or "normal" than the introvert?

6. "This group life in its manifold forms is the social environment." Make a somewhat detailed descriptive study of your own social environment in terms of whatever material you have found most suggestive in this chapter.

7. Analyze in writing the consensus of some group to which you belong in terms of the three aspects defined and illustrated in the readings. Be as concrete and detailed as you can.

8. Make a case study to show how participation in the consensus of a group, especially *esprit de corps*, affects one's interpretation of events having a bearing upon that group.

9. Give from your personal experience or from your reading an example of serious subjective problems arising out of multiple group membership.

10. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. Consensus. H. M. Kallen, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- b. The Unity of the Social Group. C. A. Dawson, *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 11(1927), 565.
- c. Social Unity as Interaction. N. S. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 26-32.
- d. The Group. E. Sapir, "Group," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- e. The Person and the Group. J. M. Reinhardt and G. R. Davies, *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, pp. 92-117.
- f. The Neighborhood and the Community. J. M. Williams, *Our Rural Heritage*, pp. 19-24.
- g. The Community. E. C. Lindeman, "Community," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- h. The Nature of Social Unity. C. A. Ellwood, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 79-124.

11. Topics for written themes:

- a. Allport's Conception of the Group
- b. MacIver's Conception of Community
- c. The Boundaries of My Home Community
- d. Gossip as a Neighborhood Characteristic
- e. Plant Communities
- f. Animal Aggregation
- g. *Esprit de Corps* and Morale
- h. Espinas' Conception of Society

Supplementary Readings

1. Allport, F. H.: "'Group' and 'Institution' as Concepts in a Natural Science of Social Phenomena," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 22(1928), 83-99.
2. Alverdes, F.: "Animal Societies," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
3. Bernard, L. L.: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. XXVI, "Primary and Derivative Groups," pp. 411-424.
4. Cooley, C. H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. I, "Society and the Individual," pp. 35-50.
5. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*, Chap. III, "Primary Groups," pp. 23-31.

6. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. I, "The Local Social World," pp. 3-34.
7. Faris, E.: "The Primary Group: Essence and Accident," *American Journal of Sociology*, 38(1932-1933), 41-50.
8. Giddings, F. H.: *Readings in Descriptive and Historical Sociology*, Book I, Chap. III, "Kinds of Societies," pp. 10-64.
9. Ginsberg, M.: "Class Consciousness," "Association," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
10. Goldenweiser, A. A.: "Discussion of Allport's 'The Group Fallacy' in Relation to Social Science," *American Journal of Sociology*, 29(1923-1924), 704-706.
11. Hayes, E. C.: *Sociology*, Chap. XIX, "Kinds of Groups," pp. 463-477.
12. Herring, J. W.: "Apostasy and Heresy," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
13. Hertzler, J. O.: *Social Institutions*. Chap. XI, "Change and Institutions," pp. 179-200.
14. Kallen, H. M.: "Consensus," "Coercion," "Conformity," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
15. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. XV, "Groups and Their Organization," pp. 360-385; Chap. XVI, "Neighborhoods and Communities in Relation to School Problems," pp. 387-407.
16. Lindeman, E. C.: "Community," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
17. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. IV, "Groups," pp. 66-86.
18. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Chap. IX, "The Primary Group and the Great Association," pp. 172-190.
19. Odum, H. W.: *Man's Quest for Social Guidance*, Chap. V, "The Individual and Society," pp. 65-81.
20. Park, R. E.: "Education in Its Relation to the Conflict and Fusion of Cultures: With Special Reference to the Problems of the Immigrant, the Negro, and Missions," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, XIII(1918), 38-63.
21. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. III, "Society and the Group," pp. 161-216.
22. Queen, S. A.: "What is a Community?" *Social Forces*, 1(1922), 375-382.
23. Reinhardt, J. M., and G. R. Davies, *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, Chap. II, "What is Society?" pp. 39-70; Chap. IV, "The Individual and the Group," pp. 92-117.
24. Ross, E. A.: *The Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XL, "Groups," pp. 389-393.
25. Sapir, E.: "Group," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
26. Sapir, E.: "The Unconscious Patterning of Behavior in Society," in Mrs. W. F. Dummer (editor), *The Unconscious*, pp. 114-142.
27. Sumner, W. G., and A. G. Keller: *The Science of Society*, Vol. I, Chap. XV, "Associations," pp. 415-457.
28. Turner, R. E.: *America in Civilization*, Chap. I, "The Individual and Society," pp. 1-20.
29. Waller, W.: *The Sociology of Teaching*, Chap. XIII, "Primary Groups among School Children," pp. 176-187.

30. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Society and the Individual," pp. 131-140; Chap. XIV, "The Group as an Entity," pp. 144-161.
31. Wallis, W. D., and M. M. Willey: *Readings in Sociology*, Chap. VI, "The Group and the Individual," pp. 275-297.
32. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. IV, "Types of Social Groupings," pp. 56-75.
33. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. II, "The Nature of Group Life and Human Culture," pp. 15-31.
34. Znaniecki, F.: "The Analysis of Social Processes," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 26(1923), 37-43.

CHAPTER VI

THE SOCIAL HERITAGE

The previous chapter defined the nature of society and of group unity. The universality of group life finds its genetic explanation in two sets of facts. On the one hand are the helplessness of the human infant and the long period of immaturity which result in individual habituation to life with others; on the other hand is the necessity of common life and cooperation in order to secure individual protection and the means of existence. The bonds of group unity vary from the physical and physiological, through the biological, to a solidarity resulting from a common body of apperceptions and participation in a common life. Society, as distinct from the community and other group forms, emphasizes the interaction of persons rather than that of individuals and the external aspects of the social life. It stresses the central and essential fact of social life—communication—rather than the persons communicating. The emphasis, therefore, in the preceding discussion, was upon the forms and relationships of group life.

In the present chapter the attention is focused upon the content of group life, upon the products of interaction rather than upon its forms.

A. HABIT FORMATION

By original nature the human being has certain definitely fixed activity patterns. There is present a limited number of reflexes that determine characteristic behavior, behavior that is the same in all individuals and in the same individual at all times, in the presence of appropriate stimuli. The patellar reflex, for example, is common to all normal human beings and persists unchanged throughout the life of the organism. It determines a type of uniform behavior in the appropriate situation. Some attention was given to these part reactions in the discussion of original nature and need not be repeated here. The organically deter-

mined activity patterns are little or not at all subject to modification through training and experience. To the extent that the organism is provided with definite reaction patterns, the behavior of the person is predetermined: the native organic equipment immediately and automatically determines responses and provides the complete explanation of the behavior of the organism.

In the lower animal forms a relatively few reflex acts comprise the whole behavior life of the organism. It is equipped to respond in definite ways to given stimuli and is capable of no other type of behavior. Where these organically determined responses involve the entire organism in the performance of an act or series of related acts they are commonly described as instincts. They are, from the point of view of behavior, uniform ways in which the organic needs and appetites get expression. They are to be understood as neural patterns of which definite behavior, in response to appetite, is the expression. The repertoire of instincts in the animals below man is often large; they play the chief rôle in determining behavior that insures the perpetuation of the species. They perform in the higher orders of animals essentially the same functions as are performed in the simpler forms by the reflexes and tropisms. The nest building of the birds, the migration of salmon and other fishes, the sex life of the mammals, the predatory behavior of the cat, and the herding of cattle may be cited as examples of behavior more or less completely predetermined in the neural structure of the organisms. These organically determined behavior patterns have utility in proportion to the uniformity of the environment. The reflexes are fixed and the behavior responses are definite and invariable. The instincts have some degree of plasticity, allow of some variation of behavior and of some degree of learning through experience. They are most definite and unmodifiable in the lower forms that live in a uniform environment; they are less definite and more capable of modification in the higher forms of life that live in complex and changing environments.

The few reflex responses of the human being are relatively unimportant from the point of view of social life. They take care of certain bodily processes but do not enter into the communication system. Furthermore, human beings are not provided with a complement of instinctive behavior patterns, as is the case of the less highly developed forms. The human being

has much the same group of needs and appetites as do the other animal forms but, unlike them, he has no inherited activity patterns that govern his behavior in their satisfaction. There are, to be sure, vague behavior tendencies in this or the other direction—the spontaneous behavior resulting from hunger, for example, is not the same as that resulting from fright, and the excited sex appetite determines behavior unlike either—but there is nothing corresponding to the instinctive behavior of the lower animals. Man's spontaneous tendencies are more generalized than those of other forms, they are less definite in stimulation and in response. What he does have, which the other animals for the most part lack, is an ability to learn: he has capacities rather than instincts: he must acquire through experience the ways of adjusting himself to the external world that other animals have by original nature.

Such reflexes and dispositions as the child has at birth, or comes to possess as a result of developmental tendencies, provide a beginning and an organic basis for the uniformities in human and social behavior. Some of these, as has been pointed out, remain essentially unmodified and uncontrolled throughout life. Others, while making possible certain types of behavior or making behavior easier in certain directions than in others, are indefinitely modifiable as a result of experience.

The spontaneous behavior of the child is conditioned into given channels. He is born into a social world as well as into a physical one where external conditions and group patterns are established and relatively uniform. This environment operates selectively upon the spontaneous and random activity of the child. The activity that gives pleasurable and satisfactory results is repeated and learned; the action patterns that give painful and unsatisfactory results are suppressed and do not form a permanent part of the activity system. The result is, in the individual, a set of behavior patterns or habits. These are simply ways of acting selected from an indefinitely large number of possible ways because, in the child's environment, they give pleasurable and avoid painful results. The child learns to cry in a way that brings results, to sleep at certain times, to speak the language as it is spoken by his companions, and he forms numerous other habits. These habits correspond to the animal instincts in that they come in time to make the appropriate behavior responses automatic. They differ from the animal instincts in that all

through life man is continually acquiring new habits and changing habits previously acquired.

Habits are serviceable to the individual, as instincts are to the animal. They make easy and nearly automatic the performance of many details that otherwise would be distracting. Walking is a habit that is almost automatic, and in the same class are innumerable other details incidental to the business of daily life. Habit thrusts these details below the level of the active consciousness and allows the active attention to be directed to other matters.

The habits themselves are individual ways of acting that are formed in practice, but the habit systems and behavior patterns common to members of the group into which the child is born are, in a way, a part of the heritage; the habits of others decide, in large measure, those that the child will form.

B. FOLK PRACTICES

Out of the habits develop the uniformities in habit which are called customs or folkways. The folkways are simply habits of action common to the members of the group; they are the ways of the folk that are somewhat standardized and have some degree of traditional sanction for their persistence. The time of meals, the number of meals per day, the manner of speech and dress, the hours of work, the kind of food used, the manner of its preparation, forms of etiquette, the size of family, and numerous other facts of daily life are customary practices to which individuals conform in their personal habits. Any routine activity in itself and from the point of view of the individual person is a habit; if it be general among the communicating folk it is a group habit, a folkway. The wearing of a hat and many other matters of dress are habits of individuals but they are customs from the point of view of the group.

Customs are to the group what habits are to the person, and they develop in the community much as habits are acquired by the individual. Their ultimate origin is in the activities of individuals. The person's habits are in large part learned from others; in part habits are a direct copying of the behavior patterns of those about. Each tends to do as others do. The individual's way of acting is determined in part by the group pattern which is prior to him in point of time. In part the folkways are activities of spontaneous origin that are modified in their expression to

conform to group patterns. People who are together easily fall into each other's ways, develop common ways of acting. In the group each person profits by the experience of others; the expedient way of acting is learned by the person from his companions. There is in consequence a high degree of uniformity and similarity between the habits of closely associated persons.

But the habits of men are not all channelized into group patterns; not all habits become general. Each individual in a group will have certain behavior patterns that are peculiar to himself: he has habits of work, reading, speech, manner, and various others that are more or less distinctive. Some persons are conditioned to fear, and consequently habitually avoid, cats or other objects attractive or indifferent to their neighbors. The list of idiosyncrasies is large and gives a degree of habit difference within a group. On the other hand, there are many uniformities in the habits of men that are not properly folkways. They may be common to many individuals without being acquired from others by contact and communication or without being brought into line by social pressure. Uniformities that are the outgrowth of the common needs of men fall within this category.

Persons ordinarily conform to the prevailing customs of their group without protest and without effort. There is always a tendency toward conformity in order to avoid being conspicuous and so becoming an object of ridicule and other forms of persecution. Others conform as an easy means of securing the positive approval of the group. The adoption of the patterns of others is often unconscious, as in the acquisition of the language habits of the persons with whom the child is associated. These customary modes of action have individual and social utility. They make unified group life and action easier than it otherwise would be if, indeed, it would be possible at all without them. They are a guide to the intentions of others, make it possible to interpret and predict behavior, and so to make necessary personal adjustments. The rule of the road—turning to the right in the United States and to the left in England—is in itself indifferent, but the custom and the uniformity of its observance are useful.

The folkways are simply the collective aspect of individual habit patterns. Like habits, they may be persisted in because they are useful or they may persist without having any discoverable utility. In general, by thrusting certain matters below the

level of conscious decision, habit and custom leave persons free to give attention to other matters. They are in this respect as indispensable to social life as is language, and they serve much the same purpose. Customs may and sometimes do become burdensome: they sometimes exact more energy than they conserve, absorb abilities rather than release them.

Within any single group the folkways are more or less consistent with themselves. The work practices, the methods of living, the modes of recreation, and the like are usually well coordinated and harmonize with the behavior patterns resulting from fighting, government, mating practices, family ideals, and supernatural beliefs. All fit in with one another to form a more or less unified and consistent whole. Whatever activity is fundamental in the group life determines the ground pattern in accord with which all other activities tend to range themselves. The group that lives by hunting has a hunting psychosis and in the group practices other things harmonize with this basic activity and with the type of mind that results from it. The peaceful agricultural group has a different set of folk practices—style of dress, type of food, form of family, character of religious practices, and the like—which harmonize with the agricultural activity and type of mind.

But the harmony is seldom perfect and complete. The group culture may contain elements that are false and injurious and incapable of harmonization with other elements in the complex, and a resulting disharmony may last indefinitely. Any change in the manner of life, any new acquisition or discovery or change in life conditions tends to disturb the order, to make old habits unworkable and new adjustments necessary. A long period of readjustment is sometimes necessary before a new and complete harmony is established. But in any group there is always enough of consistency and harmony to give the culture a distinctive character. Without at least some degree of consistency and harmony there would be no group unity and no social or group life.

In the evolution of the folkways there tends to be an ever better and more complete adaptation of means to ends. This Professor Sumner called a "strain of improvement." In any single activity the individual acquires skill through practice and, accidentally or otherwise, he may hit upon improvements. The routine is little examined as long as it works successfully. In

the making of pottery, tools, weapons, and in the arts generally there is gradual and generally undesigned improvement.

The folkways, being ways of satisfying needs, have succeeded more or less well and therefore have produced more or less pleasure or pain. Their quality always consisted in their adaptation to the purpose. If they were imperfectly adapted and unsuccessful, they produced pain, which drove men on to learn better. The folkways are, therefore, (1) subject to a strain of improvement toward better adaptation of means to ends, as long as the adaptation is so imperfect that pain is produced. They are also (2) subject to a strain of consistency with each other, because they all answer their several purposes with less friction and antagonism when they cooperate and support each other.¹

C. SOCIAL RULES

In human social life much of behavior is in response to specific needs which the activity more or less adequately satisfies. With the satisfaction of the need the activity itself ceases, without residual product except in the habit tendencies of the person. Much of the daily business of life is of this nature; it is treated as socially indifferent, there is no effort to regulate and no sufficient social pressure to bring uniformity in behavior. The habits of sleep, work, reading, recreation, speech, dress, and so through a considerable range of activity show a fairly rich variety of individual patterns.

Even in this socially indifferent activity of daily life there is, as we have seen, much uniformity. The general similarity of needs is conducive to similarity in the activities to which they give rise, and the existence of pattern types of satisfaction is a powerful factor in determining individual conformity. The same needs may of course achieve satisfaction in different ways. The organic need for food may be met by one or by many meals a day; it is largely a matter of historic accident which becomes the pattern type, and the custom of separate groups is therefore different. As a matter of convenience the individual conforms to the usual pattern but is not, in general, morally obligated to do so. In general he is conditioned to the group pattern though no evil consequences flow from non-conforming behavior, and variant behavior is tolerated.

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 5-6. Quoted by permission of Ginn & Company.

But there are certain types of individual act that not only satisfy the needs of the performer but also arouse the approval of the group. A feat of strength or skill, an act of heroism, a display of generosity or group loyalty, or other behavior may be the means of meeting a definite situational problem. But the act, because of its appropriateness to the situation, its spectacular nature, its harmony with expectation, or for other reason, may excite group applause. Other types of activity may arouse opposition and disapproval. This may be due to the unusual nature of the act or to other facts or conditions that offend the sensibilities of the group. A display of cowardice in a man, for example, or an act of tyranny or weakness may prove offensive to the group members.

The acts that arouse approval or disapproval may be, in themselves, matters of indifference. The act that meets with approval in one group may be disapproved by another, and, within the same group, an act approved at one time or in one situation may arouse an opposite reaction or remain a matter of indifference at another time or in a different situation. An act of cowardice or selfishness in a man commonly, in American society of the present day, arouses disapproval; the same behavior in a women is commonly treated as indifferent or with amusement or approval. Generosity in the members of a leisure class is applauded while industry and frugality are generally disapproved; in the peasantry exactly the opposite responses are aroused by the same behavior. In general, any strange or unusual behavior arouses emotional opposition while that in conformity with the usual patterns of the group is approved. Until recently at least, smoking by men was in general approved or at least treated as indifferent, it was more or less manly to do so; but smoking by women aroused violent emotional condemnation, it was considered unladylike if, indeed, not positively immoral.

In the enforcement of custom, peoples do not rely alone on the influence of habit and tradition. Every social group undertakes to regulate by formal or informal means the individual behavior that the members, or some influential number of the group, for one reason or another find definitely pleasing or displeasing. In the effort to make more general the types of behavior pleasing to the group and to reduce the frequency of types of behavior displeasing to the group or the ruling classes, a system of rewards and punishments grows up. Certain acts

are encouraged; others are tabooed. In their simple and primitive form these efforts to control and conventionalize behavior are perhaps best exemplified in the home and the school and the church. The ways of acting are defined through ordering and forbidding by the parent, the teacher, and the priest. Questions of propriety, courtesy, temperance, and other matters of personal behavior do not come within the range of acts readily and easily subject to formal control, yet they have their definitions and are generally recognized, understood, and obeyed.

The body of social rules regulating the behavior of the individual members in all or most of the relations of life are, in general, rationalizations of folk practices and come into existence in the presence of conspicuous or divergent behavior. It is only when the custom is violated that the custom itself becomes defined. The formulation of the custom, whether in the form of a social ideal or as a legislative taboo, becomes a thing that operates to control and to increase conformity. The panegyric of the household virtues, attributed to Lemuel, shows a social rule, formulated because of individual variation from the ancient ideal, that has operated for very long periods to influence the position and activity of women in the Western world:

Her price is far above rubies.
The heart of her husband doth safely trust in her,
So that he shall have no need of spoil.
She will do him good and not evil
All the days of her life.
She seeketh wool, and flax,
And worketh willingly with her hands.
She is like the merchants' ships;
She bringeth her food from afar,
She riseth also while it is yet night,
And giveth meat to her household,
And a portion to her maidens.
She considereth a field, and buyeth it:
With the fruit of her hands she planteth a vineyard.
She girdeth her loins with strength,
And strengtheneth her arms.
She perceiveth that her merchandise is good:
Her candle goeth not out by night.
She layeth her hands to the spindle,
And her hands hold the distaff.
She stretcheth out her hand to the poor;

Yea, she reacheth forth her hands to the needy.
She is not afraid of the snow for her household:
For all her household are clothed with scarlet.
She maketh herself coverings of tapestry;
Her clothing is silk and purple.
Her husband is known in the gates,
When he sitteth among the elders of the land,
She maketh fine linen, and selleth it;
And delivereth girdles unto the merchant.
Strength and honour are her clothing;
And she shall rejoice in time to come.
She openeth her mouth with wisdom;
And in her tongue is the law of kindness.
She looketh well to the ways of her household,
And eateth not the bread of idleness.
Her children arise up and call her blessed;
Her husband also, and he praiseth her.
Many daughters have done virtuously,
But thou excellest them all.

.

Give her of the fruit of her hands,
And let her own works praise her in the gates.

The customary rules of behavior are often rigid, tyrannical, burdensome, and difficult to escape. They often enforce conformity irrespective of the benefits or advantages derived. In origin the folk customs are often advantageous or at least indifferent; they were merely the uniform ways of acting in familiar situations. But once established they tend to become obligatory and to persist even when changes of life may make their observance personally inconvenient and socially disadvantageous. This is particularly likely to be the case in small and isolated groups and in primitive and backward societies. In the primitive group it is usual to find almost every act of the individual life regulated by customary rules, often in the minutest details; no freedom is allowed and no spontaneity is possible. In the more advanced societies custom is still a powerful factor not only in matters of dress, deportment, etiquette, and social intercourse but also in politics, religion, and education. Both savage and civilized man, particularly the latter, invent ingenious explanations and justifications for customary modes of behavior—for modes of behavior that are clearly irrational and have no explanation except the custom itself. And the body of rules designed

to enforce and perpetuate this customary behavior is large and makes their observance obligatory.

D. MORAL CUSTOMS

Certain of the group ways come in time to have a moral sanction. Their origin is forgotten and the conviction arises that they are useful and necessary to the welfare of the group. They are thought to have survival value—that is, that the neglect or violation of these ways would lead to the destruction of the group. Not only are the ways of acting uniform but they are looked upon as necessary. In this case, conformity to them is right and non-conformity is definitely wrong. At this stage of their development they are known as moral customs or *mores*; they have become doctrines of group welfare. The customs become *mores* when, to the fact of general observance, there is added this conception of truth. Morality is behavior in conformity with the *mores*.

The moral customs do not in general differ in origin from the other uniformities in group behavior, and, on the other hand, not all the uniformities in group practice pass over into the realm of the moral customs. In the course of time it is seen or comes to be believed that certain types of behavior are conducive to the welfare of the group and that contrary ways of acting are inimical to its welfare. A distinction is thus made in the body of group practices, and certain customs are selected out and exalted as having definite social utility. The transition from folkways to *mores* comes at the point where the attention of the group is directed to the behavior in question and a group decision is registered. The practice in question is declared to be vital to the general good and its observance is made compulsory. The opposite type of behavior becomes, by the same decision, taboo.

The transformation of a folk practice into a moral custom usually follows some variation from, or violation of, the former. The variant behavior arises from either of two sources. As a result of war, commerce, migration, or other fact or crisis in group life, strangers may be introduced into the society and with them behavior practices that are new to the culture and in conflict with established modes of action. Attention is focused on the divergent behavior of the strangers. The strange ways—dress, manner, sex practices, food habits, religious observances, or other peculiarities—are or may be offensive to persons conditioned and

habituated to other ways, or they may prove attractive to certain individuals and a tendency to copy them may develop. The new way may clash with the interests of a powerful faction, endanger the sinecures of influential persons, offend the sensibilities of the group members, or otherwise attract attention and arouse opposition. In any case a conscious decision must be made as to which of the conflicting practices is to be followed by the group. In such conflict the effort of the group is always to reinstate and strengthen the old and the familiar. The one custom is declared to be right—it receives the conscious and formal approval of the group—and the foreign importation is declared contrary to group welfare; it is forbidden and its practice suppressed. It is thereafter an immoral practice and the folkway that was previously more or less indifferent becomes the standard of morality.

In other cases, customs of long standing become progressively less well adapted to the needs of a changing group. In such case there are sporadic violations by individuals of the traditional patterns. Other ways are superior and there is an individual tendency to act in the easier or more effective way. But the divergent behavior calls the attention of the group to the possibility of types of adjustment and modes of acting other than those previously followed and at least tacitly approved. Such conflict leads to the conscious and explicit formulation of the rule of right behavior, of the approved group standards, and to the placing of taboos on the variant behavior. The initial effort of every group in the presence of non-conforming behavior is the endeavor to conserve and reinstate the traditional patterns and to suppress the variations. The Mosaic code is a widely known example of primitive taboos placed upon behavior in conflict with the formally accepted standards.

Not all violations of group standards excite moral indignation to the point of group action. Variant behavior in some lines may be found diverting, be recognized as valuable, and so be tolerated or even encouraged. The same type of behavior in another group may excite an opposite reaction. The decision of one group may declare right and for the welfare of society what another as emphatically declares to be wrong and inimical to the social interest. The practice approved at one time may be disapproved by the same people at another. Human slavery was within the *mores* of the American people only a generation

ago. The social rules are always relative; there is the widest possible divergence from group to group. A form of sex relation, polygyny, is right in one group and wrong in another. The marriage form itself is, of course, a matter of historic accident. Patricide has had the moral sanction of some groups; it has been forbidden by the *mores* of others. Infanticide, which has been within the *mores* of most people and for most of the history of the world, is forbidden by many of the modern peoples. The things regulated by one group are often matters of indifference to those of another.

The particular thing that a group sees fit to bring within the *mores* is not, however, wholly a matter of chance. The relations of the sexes are nearly everywhere subject to group control and sanction. The specific behavior approved varies with time and place and the different groups sanction quite opposite forms of practice. Some groups demand chastity in the unmarried girls and maintain a strict system of chaperonage but permit the greatest of sexual freedom on the part of married women; other groups do not expect chastity before marriage and the girls bestow their favors pretty much where they will but demand and enforce an opposite form of behavior after marriage or betrothal. The forms of marriage approved by different groups vary widely; some enforce monogamy, others permit various forms of polygamy. The forms sanctioned or tabooed differ from time to time as well as from place to place. The relations of the young and old seem everywhere to be within the *mores*, but the rules at one place may require the son to care for the aged parent while at another they may require that he kill the father. In general, the *mores* have to do with the regulating of things thought by peoples to affect the group strength and survival, and the behavior it is thought important to control is much the same from group to group.

The moral customs of a group everywhere come to have the express sanction of the divine powers. The church and organized religion everywhere support the prevailing group standards; it is a guarantor of the *mores*. "When in the Pentateuch a command is capped with the phrase 'I am the Lord thy God,' what is really meant is that such are the *mores*."

The settled folkways rise to higher terms when they come to be regarded as indispensable to the welfare of society. That makes them *mores*; and at length the conviction that they are altogether and exclu-

sively right gets powerful reinforcement from the sanction of ghost fear. Not only do the living believe firmly in their own *mores* but they never doubt that the dead retain every article of faith by which they lived while on earth and are jealously ready to use their grim powers to guarantee its continuance. Conduct counter to the religion-backed *mores* is not merely foolish and contemptible but actually sinful; and, as heretical views or acts are held to be perilous not only to the sinner but to his whole community, everyone in self-defense must unite to suppress them.¹

The individuals in the group are conditioned and habituated to the prevailing standards. Their inclinations are in harmony with the group and religious sanctions. Any act that is rewarded by group approval or otherwise comes presently to be considered meritorious in itself; any act no matter how socially indifferent which meets with punishment or other form of repression comes to be considered reprehensible in itself. The persons habituated to an invariable custom from birth accept it as unreflectively as they accept the uniformities of the physical environment. The standards have become a part of human nature. The conscience of the person is a reflex of the moral standards of the group: it is the consciousness on the part of the individual that his behavior if known would arouse the approval or disapproval of the group. And it is this conscience that is the most powerful factor in a person's behaving in line with the moral standards of his group.

E. CEREMONY AND SOCIAL RITUAL

The folkways and the *mores* of a group are supported, generalized, and perpetuated by convention and the whole body of ceremony and social ritual that grow up and surround the continually recurring contingencies of life. These forms are themselves a part of the social heritage both from the point of view of content and from that of control devices. In the latter sense they receive attention in the later chapters on social control; in the present connection they may be mentioned as parts of the heritage and in their relation to and influence on other aspects of the heritage.

Behavior in social intercourse tends to be conventional, to proceed in accordance with established and accepted patterns. The patterns themselves are of slow growth, agreements gradually arrived at as in the case of language and scientific symbols

¹ A. G. Keller, *Man's Rough Road*, pp. 34-35. Reprinted by permission of Frederick A. Stokes Company, copyright 1932.

which are pure conventions. The habits of thought and behavior that have become generalized and more or less automatic in their operation facilitate social intercourse and make for ease and order in daily life. The advantage of conventions to the individual is fairly obvious: they tell him precisely what is to be done in any set of circumstances, prescribe the course of action, make it unnecessary for him to devise solutions in the affairs of daily life. Once the patterns are built up and their forms fixed they provide the answers to the various problems of life. In doing so they direct future thought and action into the traditional channels, restrain the originality and spontaneity of men, reinforce the moral solidarity of the group.

In matters conceived to be of exceptional importance the patterns of conduct take on a ceremonial form. A ceremony is any formal series of acts or observances, not founded in reason but established by authority. It is a sanctioned pattern of behavior to be learned by observation or precept and repeated on appropriate occasions. The behavior presently becomes habitual and is thereafter repeated automatically and without the exercise of intelligence. The form of behavior toward elders and toward strangers is generally ceremonial. Ancestor worship is a ceremony. Shaking hands in the West and bowing in the East as forms of greeting are simple ceremonials. It is more, however, than a simple conformity to prevailing usage; it is conformity in detail with the ordained and sanctioned definitions.

Ceremony passes over into ritual when the set of words or performances is conceived to have inherent virtue and power to produce results. Rites are magical formulas. They have a virtue to persuade or coerce supernatural powers to do the will of the person performing the rites. An oath is a verbal formula that calls forth action of a supernatural being. Ritual requires not only that certain acts be performed but that they be performed with exactitude as to details. The traditional forms must be scrupulously followed. If the forms are not followed exactly, the performance is futile or worse; it gives no results or, by angering the spirits, it may produce negative results. The answer to a prayer, for example, or to a sacrifice depends upon the form of the prayer or the exactitude of the ceremonies. It is necessary to raise the hand in taking an oath.

Ceremony and ritual have a large place in religion, particularly in primitive religion, and are often thought of as forms of worship

that have become traditional or have been established by sacerdotal prescription. But ritual includes any form of ceremonies observed in so far as it is invariable in form and in so far as it has coercive power. Still more loosely conceived it includes the various forms invented to make an occasion impressive and awe inspiring by seriousness and solemnity. The ceremonies observed by certain secret societies and fraternal orders are ritualistic, as is, also, the recently invented Armistice Day celebration. Even social etiquette may, in this loose sense, be classed as social ritual.

Ceremony gives to social intercourse a fixed pattern. By defining a standard way of acting ceremony and ritual give an abiding sense of order and group unity, a sense of a common life. They are powerful conservative elements in social life; they are forms of drill that make habitual responses mechanical and invariable. They restrict the experience of the individual to routine responses and thereby prevent social change; where ceremony and ritual are most elaborately developed social development is most retarded. Ceremony and ritual are impressive; they are conducive to an attitude of deference to authority and submission to tradition. As such they are often elaborated as instruments of control, consciously manipulated in the interests of prestige. The ceremony and the ritual connected with court procedure, for example, is to give prestige to the law; they are the chief support, and sometimes the only source, of the authority of priest and ruler. But these are matters of control to be discussed in another connection.

F. CULTURAL INSTITUTIONS

Attention has been called to the fact that folk practices grow up in connection with every persisting or recurring situation to which adjustment must be made. In such situations different ways of acting may be possible and, objectively considered, equally satisfactory as means to the end. But within the homogeneous group unit one way is selected from the diverse possible ways and comes to characterize the behavior of all the members in their relations to the particular value. From these uniformities arises a body of social rules defining accepted behavior in concrete situations. The organization of the folk practices and social rules that center about a group of related values, together with the machinery that grows up to control the

practices and administer the rules, is an institution. The social or cultural institutions are the organizations that have grown up to regulate the behavior and standardize the practices in regard to values considered to be essential for group welfare and survival.

Institutions and laws are produced out of mores. An institution consists of a concept (idea, notion, doctrine, interest) and a structure. The structure is a framework, or apparatus, or perhaps only a number of functionaries set to cooperate in prescribed ways at a certain conjuncture. The structure holds the concept and furnishes instrumentalities for bringing it into the world of facts and action in a way to serve the interests of men in society. Institutions are either *crescive* or enacted. They are *crescive* when they take shape in the *mores*, growing by the instinctive efforts by which the *mores* are produced. Then the efforts, through long use, become definite and specific. Property, marriage, and religion are the most primary institutions. They began in folkways. They became customs. They developed into *mores* by the addition of some philosophy of welfare, however crude. Then they were made more definite and specific as regards the rules, the prescribed acts, and the apparatus to be employed. This produced a structure and the institution was complete. Enacted institutions are the products of rational invention and intention. They belong to high civilization. Banks are institutions of credit founded on usages which can be traced back to barbarism. There came a time when, guided by rational reflection on experience, men systematized and regulated the usages which had become current and thus created positive institutions of credit, defined by law and sanctioned by the force of the state.¹

Among the more important institutions generally classed as cultural are the family, the state, the church, the economic arrangements, and the school. The family is the totality and organization of the practices and rules defining practices in regard to sex relations, care of children, rights and duties of man and wife, duties of children toward parents, and various other related things. The school is the organization of the various rules and practices that have grown up about the business of putting the children in possession of the group heritage and of inducing them to conform to and transmit the heritage. The church comprehends all those practices and rules of behavior that have to do with man's relations to the supernatural world. The state is the organized control techniques for maintaining

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 53-54. Quoted by permission of Ginn & Company.

internal order and security from outside powers. The economic institutions are the organized means and rules that have come to regulate the production and distribution of the means of life. There are of course various other minor or subsidiary organizations, as social work, recreation, and public-health activities that are sometimes classed with the social institutions.

Burgess has offered a tentative fourfold classification of institutions in which the basic cultural institutions form the first division:

As studies of individual institutions proceeded, distinctions between different types of institutions began to emerge and gradually their distinctive functions in community life became quite clear. There were, first of all, those basic cultural institutions, like the family, the church, and the school, with the functions of transmitting the heritage of the past and remolding it to meet the present situation. Then there is the great group of economic institutions organized for services of utility rather than sentiment, like industrial and commercial enterprises, labor unions, and real estate boards. Next to be considered are the recreational institutions which satisfy the human desire for entertainment, amusement, and play and which, under conditions of city life, are playing an increasing rôle. Finally, there are the institutions of formal social control, including both governmental and social service agencies, which are dealing, in ways often different but frequently alike, with the problems of society and personality.¹

The major cultural institutions, as a part of the social heritage, are discussed in some detail in the following chapter.

G. THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

The social heritage includes not only the various folk practices, social rules, and institutional structures but also the manner in which they are integrated into a coherent system. We advance, then, to the social organization as a part of the social heritage. By social organization is meant the totality of the social and cultural institutions and their interrelationships together with the body of unorganized activities characteristic of the group. It is the totality of the social groupings which develop from the interaction of persons and from the interaction of persons and groups. The emphasis falls upon the nature and form of the social order rather than upon its content; social

¹E. W. Burgess, "Studies of Institutions," in T. V. Smith and L. D. White (editors), *Chicago: An Experiment in Social Research*, pp. 140-141. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

organization has to do with the forms which social life takes. It is this organization of the parts which gives unity and solidarity to the structure as a whole.

The concrete forms of social organization are of course numerous and widely divergent. They differ from group to group according to the state of culture and, within the same general stage of culture, according to historic experience and manner of life. In a particular group the type of organization will change with changes in the culture and shifts in the general run of attention. But the various concrete forms fall in one or the other of two categories which we designate as the communal and the social, according as the basis of social organization is sacred or secular. The concrete groups of historic experience are, in general, not pure types; both principles of organization are commonly effective in varying degrees.

The communal type of social order is best represented in the small and relatively isolated primitive communities where life is simple and comparatively stable. In such groups the social values and behavior standards are fixed in the *mores* by long tradition and observance. The essential values in such groups tend to be sacred rather than secular and every member conforms to them; there is unanimity in belief and in practice. The simple groups differ widely in the values they hold sacred and in the behavior they consider essential to group welfare but the form of the organization is primary and communal.

When the group expands and there come to be a considerable division of labor and specialization of interest, or when there are outside contacts and some degree of physical and mental mobility, a new or modified type of organization appears. Values become secular or secular values come to exist alongside of the ancient *mores*, contacts become increasingly abstract and secondary and relations increasingly impersonal, and the means of control become ever more formal and mechanical. Gradually the communal is replaced by a social order, or some cataclysmic change, as military subjection by a foreign group or extensive commercial relations, may bring cultural disorganization and an abrupt change in the social order. The basis of the social organization is of course not the same in different societies: in the barbarian stages of social development it was typically military; the socialization of the modern world is basically economic. But in every case it is social rather than communal.

The sentiments basic to the communal order lie deep in the social nature of man and remnants of the order persist or spontaneously reappear in all modern societies in the form designated by Cooley as primary groups.¹ The direct and simple type of social organization arises spontaneously wherever the life activities of a small number of persons bring them into frequent and regular contact, and into association in which the various members come to know each other as persons. In the family as in the kinship and tribal groups it is, if not the entire organization, an integral and dominating aspect of the whole. The control arrangements in the old New England towns, with their church and town meetings and minute regulation of personal behavior, were essentially communal. The peasant village of central Europe and in some degree the village and rural life of America are on the basis of primary organization. This form of association is of course a result of growth and custom, not a rational development, and its power and vitality lie in this fact. It develops spontaneously in all societies and plays a major rôle in the life of most persons. Of all the forms of organization among men it produces the highest degree of solidarity; the members are a unit in all things conceived to affect the status or safety of the group. And it is likewise the least flexible of human organizations; behavior is fixed in tradition and conformity to group expectation is well-nigh complete. The communal organization guarantees unity and it gives a pleasurable sense of security, but it does these things at the expense of individual initiative and social change.

H. THE GROUP CULTURE

The culture of a group is the totality of the social heritages viewed as an organized body of achievement. It includes material inventions and their dependent technologies as well as the institutional organization and the group philosophy arising from and rationalizing this organization. It includes the whole body of fact standing between man and the physical environment. It is not in place here to trace the evolution of culture but it is important to emphasize from this point of view certain facts previously discussed or implied.

It has been pointed out several times in the discussion, particularly in connection with the uniformity of human nature, that

¹ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, p. 23.

all human cultures are basically the same in that all fit into the same general outline. According to the analysis of Mr. Wissler, all the culture facts of any people may be comprehended under nine heads: (1) speech, including language and writing systems; (2) material traits, such as food habits, shelter, transportation and travel, dress, utensils and tools, weapons, and occupations and industries; (3) art, including carving, painting, drawing, music, and the others; (4) mythology and scientific knowledge; (5) religious practices, including ritualistic forms, treatment of the sick, and treatment of the dead; (6) family and the social systems, including marriage forms, methods of reckoning relationships, inheritance, social control, and sports and games; (7) property, including real and personal property, standards of value and exchange, and trade; (8) government, including political forms and judicial and legal procedure; and (9) war.¹

It is claimed that these nine points include all of the culture facts of any people, and they are on the other hand elements in the culture complex of every group. It is not in their general form but in their details that cultures differ and there, of course, there is rich variety. Speech is a culture fact common to all peoples and all times but the particular language forms are numerous and widely different. There is no group without a definitely organized and socially sanctioned form of family life, but the details of the practices as well as the content of the governing social rules and the form of the institutional organization show great variety with change in time and place. There is no people that does not have a body of supernatural beliefs and practices but these, again, differ in details from group to group and from time to time. The same is true with respect to each of the other items: there is uniformity in general pattern with the greatest of variety in content and detail.

It should also be noted that the differences in culture do not represent stages in the sense that one is higher or more evolved than another. There is no given series of steps or stages through which cultures pass in evolutionary fashion. Cultures develop, they do not evolve in any sense comparable or even analogous to the evolution of organic forms. The very common idea that all human groups started as hunters and fishers, presently became herdsmen, passed through an agricultural stage, and finally attained a commercial and manufacturing stage is not in accord

¹ C. Wissler, *Man and Culture*, p. 74.

with the known facts or with the nature of the culture process. It describes with a reasonable degree of accuracy the order of development of some groups but not of all. Not all groups that have reached the commercial stage have taken the steps in this order and in some cases the order has been reversed. The ancient Mexicans were an agricultural people who had never lived in a pastoral economy. Agricultural peoples have in some cases become pastoral and in others they have gone to a hunting mode of life. Two or more types of economy quite commonly exist at the same time: the Africans are agricultural, pastoral, and hunting without regard to culture status, and in American life the pioneers were agriculturists or hunters and trappers indifferently and according to circumstance. The doctrine of culture stages has nothing to recommend it. The steps and the order in which they occur depend upon a number of variable factors peculiar to the people in question.

The cumulative nature of the social heritage needs to be reemphasized in this connection. There are, perhaps, factors that operate to the selective elimination of some culture elements and to favor the survival and spread of others. But characteristically the process is cumulative: facts are continually added to what already exists, and little that once exists is ever lost. Consequently, the number of culture facts standing between man and his physical environment is constantly increasing and becoming ever more complex. Moreover, the rate of accumulation is accelerated as the social heritage expands: every new invention makes possible others dependent upon it.

Every stable culture is the result of a long period of growth and has a high degree of unity and internal consistency. It is not merely the sum total of the inventions and discoveries but the adaptation of these to the preexisting complex and the modification of that complex as a result of the incorporation of the new fact. The basic culture patterns of a people are determined by the mode of life: the organization of a hunting tribe differs markedly from that of a pastoral group and this from that of an agricultural folk. There is a degree of similarity among various hunting groups as there is among peoples who depend upon their flocks and herds and among the various agricultural peoples. But there are, of course, also wide differences depending upon the kind of game and the techniques developed for its capture, upon the animals domesticated and the nature of the grazing

land. Agricultural organization varies with the type of crops and the nature of the geographic environment. But within a single group the other elements of the culture are in general harmony with the basic industry. The form of the family, the status of women, the style of dress, the nature of the art, the character of the religion, and other culture facts are brought into harmony with the economic life and activities. For example, in a warlike group the gods are brutal and predatory; in a settled agricultural society they tend to be fatherly and benevolent. In every case the culture complex tends to become unified and stable and the social organization to become highly integrated and institutionalized. Innovation meets with resistance and the pace of change is slow.

But change does go on even in the most stable and highly organized groups. By accident or discovery or outside contacts new weapons, tools, art objects, techniques, and other facts may be introduced and gradually come into general use because of obvious superiority. An alteration in culture forms may result from changes within the group. An excess of women, resulting from a successful war in which the booty was great or from an unsuccessful expedition in which many men were lost, may bring far-reaching changes in the sex practices and rules of the group. The introduction of firearms or other effective weapons into regions where they were previously unknown may so rapidly destroy the game on which the group depends that it is forced from a hunting to another form of economy. A period of famine may change the food habits or the economic methods of the group. In times of crisis changes in custom take place with least resistance and greatest rapidity. Invention is stimulated, there is more chance for experiment, more disposition to accept what promises to work, more opportunity for the new to be tried. The immaterial elements of a culture change with less ease and the new meets a more stubborn resistance. In the material realm the superiority of a new object or practice may be so obvious as to appeal to the man on the street, the great group of common folk; or the disadvantage of a given way of acting may be clear and the habits and practices readjusted accordingly. It is often possible to see that group success and survival depend upon a change in practice. But in the non-material realm there is generally little possibility of direct proof of the superiority of the one way over the other, and the impera-

tive need for change is often not realized by the mass of the folk. In the matter of beliefs, religious practices, magical procedures, and sentimental relations the good or ill effects of foolishness are not always obvious, and practices survive far beyond their period of usefulness. In such matters there is seldom any check by direct results, the only check that the average man can comprehend. The only check is that of reason. But as the distance between means and ends ceases to be immediate and direct, popular reason becomes inadequate as a guide. Moreover, the sentiments and prejudices dominate reason and the old and false persist in the presence of the new and superior.

I. THE PERSON AND THE SOCIAL HERITAGE

The social heritage described in the foregoing pages is one part of the environment of every child born into the group. The child possesses none of it at birth and is in no way predisposed toward a particular culture complex. The language, technology, social organization, moral standards, and all the other elements are as foreign to him as is the physical environment. They existed before and will continue after him. He has the native plasticity and learning capacity that make possible his adjustment to and participation in practically any form of social life and organization.

By sharing in the social heritage the individual is humanized and becomes a person. Without it the individual would not become a person and would differ scarcely at all from the lower animals. But participation in the culture not only endows the individual with a personality, it determines the kind of a person he will be. His behavior is in accord with the patterns carried in the culture of the group in which the accident of birth placed him. As the patterns vary, he varies. If he is born in a Chinese family in China, he will speak the Chinese language, like the Chinese food, appreciate the Chinese art, worship the Chinese gods, and otherwise participate in that culture complex. These things will be as natural to him as the functioning of his own physiological organism. If he is born into a peasant family in France, he will acquire a radically different body of habits and practices and his life will run in totally different channels. And these will seem to him as natural and right as the other ways seem to the Chinese.

The character of the national culture obtaining in the place of his birth is not the only and perhaps not the most important

element in his social heritage. The type of person he will come to be depends upon the channels through which contact with the national culture is made.

In a complex culture the whole fund of the social heritages is obviously never included within a single life organization. In the simple cultures this was more nearly and generally true. But in the modern world culture is too complex and extensive to permit of its mastery in a single lifetime, and it is too complex and the elements are too contradictory to permit of a single individual's participating in all of its aspects. Modern life has tremendously increased the number of specific human wants as well as the means for their satisfaction. The minute division of labor and specialization of interests with the resultant wide range of vocational and avocational activities have made limited and specialized participation increasingly necessary. It has come about that the average person knows but a single or a few aspects of the culture and his participation in the whole is as he participates in the activities of some local group. To the average person the culture, as far as his life organization is concerned, is that of the local community. The only part that has meaning to him is that which he experiences through participation. To the uneducated person, the world of thought—of science, art, and scholarship—is non-existent. The type of person the man becomes is then not so much dependent upon the particular national culture as upon the parts of that culture to which he is provided access by virtue of his family and its status in the community, the character of the neighborhood, the quality of the schools, the nature of his occupational group, and his casual contacts of a more or less accidental nature.

The individual's acquisition of the social heritage is in part through imitation and accidental learning and in part by inculcation. In the former the initiative is taken by the person, in the latter the initiative lies with the group. The language and the simple arts as well as the body of folklore and current superstitions come to the child without conscious effort; the more formal body of practices and beliefs that the group desires to perpetuate are matters of organized education.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this chapter to the one next preceding.
2. Define tropisms, reflexes, and instincts and give examples of each not found in the text.

3. How does man's original equipment differ from that of the other animals? Considering the diversity of environments in which man lives, explain why instinctive behavior patterns would be of positive biological disutility.

4. Explain the formation of habits in the child.

5. State what is meant by the social heritage and explain the relation of habits to the heritage.

6. What are folkways? Give various examples drawn from your own group experience.

7. How do habits become folkways? Why do some become generalized and others not?

8. Give examples from your own group experience of practices that are burdensome.

9. Explain what is meant by the statement that the folkways are consistent with themselves.

10. What is the relation of group crisis to changes in the folkways?

11. Explain what is meant by a "strain of improvement" in the folkways.

12. What do you understand by the social rules? To what acts do they apply? Give various examples.

13. Explain what you understand by the statement that a custom has no explanation except the custom itself.

14. What is meant by the *mores*? Give various illustrations from your own social heritage.

15. When do folk practices change into moral customs? Explain.

16. Enumerate a number of practices that were at one time useful which are now useless or positively harmful. Why do they persist?

17. Name some practices that were at one time regarded as "good" that are now improper or "bad."

18. "When we assume an absolute standard of morals we are unconsciously accepting our own highest standard and condemning the standards held by people of supposedly lower grades of development. We look upon their methods as defective and therefore not moral in the highest sense of the term." Discuss.

19. It is said that the *mores* are always right and that they are always true. It is also commonly pointed out that every group has its own *mores* and that the *mores* of groups are often sharply at variance with those of other groups. How do you harmonize the statements?

20. Morality is relative to time and place. Explain. Is it always a matter of the *mores*? Do you distinguish between ethical behavior and moral behavior? Between ethical judgment and moral judgment?

21. Explain your conscience.

22. Give illustrations of "definitions of situations."

23. What are some common ways of defining situations?

24. "The process by which the *mores* are developed and established is ritual." Discuss.

25. What is an institution? Do you agree with Sumner that an institution consists of an idea and a structure? Explain.

26. Private property is said to be an institution in our society. Can you bring this under the definition set up in the text?

27. What is Burgess' classification of institutions?
28. Define social organization.
29. What is the function of "primary groups" in a secondary social organization?
30. Distinguish sacred and secular institutions.
31. Give illustrations of material and of immaterial culture facts not mentioned in the text.
32. State Wissler's classification of culture facts.
33. How do you account for the similarity of the general forms of culture among all peoples? How do you account for the differences in content and detail?
34. How do changes in culture come about?
35. Why do habits of thought and sentiment embodied in the folk culture change more slowly than food habits and other practices involving chiefly relations to the material environment?
36. What is the relation of the person and the social heritage? What determines the part of the heritage a particular person possesses?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.
2. Make an analysis of some "primary group" to which you have belonged. Note particularly the type of unity in the group and the means by which group decisions were reached.
3. Give in some detail from your experience or reading an illustration of a change in group custom and its attendant circumstances.
4. "The queue was one of the strong traditions of the empire days—one of the apparent trifles which held China back in her unprogressive civilization." Look up the origin and significance of the queue as a concrete example of custom.
5. Analyze customary morality in relation to a concrete value as murder. Is it wrong to kill or wrong only in case you kill certain people? Is there any absolute standard? Cite examples of variation in standards.
6. Describe the "social ritual" of some intimate concrete group, such as your own family.
7. Select some elements of ceremony or ritual that you observe in some university convocation, church service, or other bit of formal behavior. From the encyclopaedia or elsewhere discover their origin.
8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:
 - a. Definitions of Situations by the Group. W. I. Thomas, quoted in K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 95-97.
 - b. Custom. E. Sapir, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - c. The Evolution of the Mores. A. G. Keller, *Man's Rough Road*, pp. 46-62.
 - d. Folkways. M. R. Davie, *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - e. The Nature of the Social Heritage. J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 504-513.

- f. *Sittlichkeit*. F Tönnies, quoted in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 103-105.
 - g. Convention. C. Mackay, quoted in K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 570-572.
 - h. The Social Heritage. W. F. Ogburn, *Social Change*, pp. 3-7.
9. Topics for written themes:
- a. The Relation of the *Mores* to Consensus
 - b. Social Ritual in Relation to the *Mores*
 - c. Efforts to Regulate Morality by Statute
 - d. Definitions of the Situation
 - e. The Opposition to Social Change
 - f. The Establishment of a Folkway
 - g. The Ideal Woman
 - h. The Ideal Man
 - i. Moral and Ethical Behavior
 - j. The *Mores* and the Law
 - k. Representative Definitions of "Institutions."
 - l. Family Ritual
 - m. The University Convocation: A Ceremony
 - n. Behavior as a Social Value
 - o. The Divine Sanction of the *Mores*

Supplementary Readings

1. Bushee, F. M.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXVIII, "Morality," pp. 465-484.
2. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. III, "Characteristics and Classification of Social Phenomena," pp. 50-70.
3. Chapin, F. S.: *Cultural Change*, Chap. II, "The Accumulation of Culture," pp. 21-52.
4. Davie, M. R.: "Folkways," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
5. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Readings in Sociology*, "Conflict and the Readjustment of Attitudes in the Personality," pp. 552-564; "Group Contacts and Attitudes," pp. 565-574; Book II, Part III, Chap. VI, "Social Controls," pp. 575-589; Book II, Part IV, Chap. II, "The Nature of the Social Heritage," pp. 616-621; Book III, Chap. II, "Processes of Group Control," pp. 730-753.
6. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Part IV, Chap. II, "The Nature of the Social Heritage," pp. 504-513.
7. Dewey, J.: *Human Nature and Conduct*, Part I, Sec. IV, "Custom and Habit," pp. 58-74; Part I, Sec. V, "Custom and Morality," pp. 75-83.
8. Folsom, J. K.: *Culture and Social Progress*, Chap. II, "What is Culture?" pp. 15-35; Chap. III, "How Culture Changes," pp. 36-55.
9. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XVII, "Culture and Social Heritage," pp. 323-342.
10. Hankins, F. H.: *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chap. IX, "The Cultural Factor in Social Life," pp. 376-440; Chap. XIII, "Marriage and the Family," pp. 600-674.

11. Hart, H.: *The Science of Social Relations*, Chap. IX, "Culture: The Social Inheritance of Personality," pp. 124-137.
12. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XII, "Habit and Custom," pp. 145-155.
13. Keller, A. G.: *Man's Rough Road*, Chap. III, "Custom: The Mores," pp. 25-45.
14. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. V, "Folkways and Mores," pp. 88-106.
15. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Chap. XIII, "Social Codes and the Social Structure," pp. 248-265.
16. Malinowski, B.: "Culture," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
17. Ogburn, W. F.: *Social Change*, Part I, "The Social Heritage and the Original Nature of Man," pp. 3-51.
18. Park, R. E.: "Human Nature, Attitudes, and the Mores," in K. Young (editor), *Social Attitudes*, pp. 17-44.
19. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, "Human Nature and Social Life," pp. 98-111.
20. Park, R. E., and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Chap. I, "Immigrant Heritages," pp. 1-24; Chap. II, "Heritages and Human Wishes," pp. 25-42.
21. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XLVI, "Uniformities," pp. 557-563; Chap. XLVII, "Standards," pp. 564-574.
22. Sapir, E.: "Custom," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
23. Steiner, J. F.: "Village Mores in Transition," in K. Young (editor), *Social Attitudes*, pp. 166-187.
24. Turner, R. E.: *America in Civilization*, "The Accumulation of the Social Heritage," pp. 101-110.
25. Wallas, G.: *Our Social Heritage*, Chap. I, "Introduction," pp. 13-23.
26. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XVI, "Language and Custom," pp. 172-180; Chap. XVII, "History, Tradition, and Opinion," pp. 183-194.
27. Wallis, W. D.: "The Analysis of Culture," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 21(1927), 158-164.
28. Wallis, W. D., and M. M. Willey: *Readings in Sociology*, Chap. II, "Culture and Social Change," pp. 49-167; Chap. XI, "The Family," pp. 397-429; Chap. XVII, "The Diffusion of Culture," pp. 576-595; Chap. XVIII, "Widening Horizons," pp. 597-609.
29. Wissler, C.: *Man and Culture*, Chap. III, "The Continuity of Culture," pp. 34-44; Chap. V, "The Universal Pattern," pp. 73-97.
30. Woodhouse, C. G.: "The Status of Women," *American Journal of Sociology*, 36(1930-1931), 1011-1016.
31. Young, K.: "Primitive Social Norms in Present-day Education," *Social Forces*, 5(1927), 572-583; 6(1927), 197-201.

CHAPTER VII

THE SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS

The discussion of the social heritage in the chapter immediately preceding had to do with the common elements of the institutional order. It defined the social organization as the sum and coordination of the various institutions together with the unorganized and non-institutional activities characteristic of the group. The institutions themselves represent the organization and objectification of various human activities directed to the satisfaction of the major universal human needs and of the social rules that have developed, in practice, in the effort to regulate and standardize these activities. The present chapter defines and briefly characterizes typical major social institutions.

A. INSTITUTIONAL COORDINATION AND INTERDEPENDENCE

Social life is essentially a set of relationships. From choice and necessity men live in groups and their efforts to satisfy their wishes bring them into contact and conflict with other men acting to satisfy similar or divergent wishes. Consequently any activity of a person bears a relation to all of his other activities past and future and to the activities, immediate or remote, of other persons. Associated life, therefore, necessitates and enforces modified forms of behavior. Consciously or not, the behavior of each person is conditioned by the acts of others, and his acts are elements in the complex that determines all subsequent behavior. It is the interaction and communication among men, and the complex of relationships by means of which they are enabled to communicate and carry on a collective and corporate existence, that define the social.

The set of relations that has grown up among men is not a rational creation. The social organization in all of its varied phases is the result of trial and error and chance success. It rests upon and is a development from, and a modification of, adjustments that are centuries or ages old. Human culture is the product of a thousand or more centuries of accumulation

through accidental discoveries and individual inventions. During this long period, like a restless animal in a maze, man has struggled to satisfy his needs in cooperation and competition with his fellow men. Like the culture itself, the formal relations among men and groups are in major part products of chance and historic circumstance hardened by usage and perpetuated by custom, tradition, and inertia. They are not creations of rational deliberation; they are products of historic development.

But in spite of the irrational nature of its origin and development, the culture complex is an organic unity and the relations among men are, in a surprisingly high degree, coherent and consistent.

A similar thing is true of the institutional organization within the group. Every major social institution is the present form of a long period of trial and error; none was developed in a rational way. Each is an organization designed to control the practices and relations of men in relation to some basic human or social need, and each developed its present form in the presence of other developing institutions and is, in part, an adjustment to them.

The institutions were not separate in their origin and development. The basic needs of men—the need for food and shelter, for protection and companionship, and for other requirements of a tolerable existence—existed together in the individual and gave unity and consistency to his behavior, and the similarity in the needs of men determined a high degree of similarity in the efforts to satisfy them. The individual need, and the similarity of need, led to individual and cooperative activities and relations that formed the origin and nucleus of institutions. The practices and rules developed together and maintained a degree of internal consistency. The sharp distinction between institutions is a later development.

In their functioning the institutions are intimately related and interdependent. Each is intimately related to every other and the form and functioning of each are the resultant of many and interrelated factors. The family is intimately related to the economic organization and its form, at least, determined by the requirements of the productive system. It is related as well in intimate fashion to the state, the church, and the school. The church and the state are everywhere interdependent and sometimes indistinguishable. The state and the economic

organization are mutually conditioned, and at different times and places each has been the tool of the other. A more or less close interdependence exists among all the institutions of a coordinated social order. Social life, in reality, is a coherent whole and the institutional forms do not exist independent and apart. Indeed, the consistency of the institutions one with another, their complementary characteristics, and their inter-relations give the social coherence that characterizes the stable society.

The social institutions are inventions of men and products of the social process. But once created they become causal factors that mold the lives of men and modify the subsequent course of society. The relations between the social process and the social institutions are reciprocal. The people who develop an industrial system perform a creative act but at the same time make themselves and their successors subject to the processes created. The people who frame a constitution and organize a government pave the road along which subsequent events will take their way. The creation or modification of a school system, a church creed, a family order, or other institutional form introduces an element that will play a part in the social process. Every institutional creation becomes in turn a controlling factor in the lives of men.

In its developed form an institution has a definite structure and operates to perform certain functions and enforce certain practices. The performance of the functions comes to require a body of specialized persons. The efforts of these functionaries in part accounts for the fact that in every institution there is a tendency toward aggrandizement, a struggle for self-perpetuation, and a tendency toward formalism and progressive failure to serve the changing needs of men.

For purposes of examination we discuss the major institutions in isolation from each other.

B. THE FAMILY

Of all the major institutions, the family has received the least intelligent study and is, perhaps, the least understood. The institution in some form comes within the experience of every person. Personal contacts and experience, here as elsewhere, are highly deceptive and lead the uncritical person to assume that he understands the phenomena with which he has some acquaintance. It is very commonly believed, therefore, that

the study of the family can reveal nothing not already within the body of common-sense information of the man on the street. There are, however, other reasons why a study of the institution has been so generally avoided by competent social scientists. It is very close to the sentiments of the people and there is in consequence a militantly intolerant attitude of opposition to any thoroughgoing analysis. Back of this opposition there lies, of course, an unanalyzed fear that the institution will not bear critical examination. The certainty that popular abuse and persecution will be the only reward for discoveries not in support of the sentimental attitudes of the population has turned many competent students into other and less important fields of research.

Astonishing as it may seem, very little is known about the nature and organization of the modern family. Except for a few impressionistic sketches in fiction, no picture of it exists. The biological, psychological, and sociological sciences yield only fragmentary findings from their haphazard and desultory excursions into this new field.

Our ignorance of the life of the present-day family is none the less colossal because of the vast and increasing literature upon sex and marriage and the family. For much of this literature deals with family life of other societies than our own, the best of it with marriage and the family among preliterate peoples, and the remainder of it with the large patriarchal family. . . .

Indeed, the greater part of the increasing annual output of books on marriage and the family is devoted not to any systematic and disinterested description of the modern family but to vivid, always intense, and often embittered indictment of its defects, real or alleged.¹

Nine years ago I gave for the first time a course on the family. There was even then an enormous literature in the field. But among all the volumes upon the family, ethnological, historical, psychological, ethical, social, economic, statistical, radically realist, or radically idealist, there was to be found not a single work that even pretended to study the modern family as behavior or as a social phenomenon. It has been studied as a legal institution, but it has not been studied as a subject of natural science. So far as I know, the description by Professor Thomas of the large family group among the Polish peasants was the first study of the family as a living being rather than as a dead form.²

¹ E. W. Burgess, Foreword to E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, p. vii. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

² E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, 7-8(1928), 3. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of *The Family*.

Care must be exercised not to fall into the common error of confusing marriage and family. The former is a relation of the sexes; the latter is an institution for the care of children. The two things may be and commonly are more or less intimately related, and it may be desirable that such should be the case, but the relationship is neither universal nor necessary. Aside from the fact that sex contacts are a necessary preliminary to the birth of children, there is no necessary relation between the association of the sexes and the natural or the institutional arrangements for the care and rearing of children.

Marriage, in an often quoted statement of Edward Westermarck, is "a relation of one or more men to one or more women which is recognized by custom or law and involves certain rights and duties both in the case of the parties entering the union and in the case of children born into it." Marriage is thus a mating of the sexes of some duration that is formally sanctioned by the community. Accepting this definition, it is at once obvious that there are four and only four possible forms of marriage: monogamy, the union of one man and one woman at a time; polygyny, the union of one man with two or more women simultaneously; polyandry, the union of one woman with two or more men simultaneously; and group marriage, the union of two or more men with two or more women simultaneously. Each of these forms occurs in the world today. In the so-called Christian countries monogamy is the dominant form. Among the non-Christian peoples of the world polygyny is by far the most usual form. Polyandry is third and group marriage the least usual form. Promiscuity exists everywhere in the world but is ruled out by definition: it commonly lacks both permanency and group sanction. The four forms of marriage are in general mutually exclusive for the reason that, by definition, marriage is a socially and legally sanctioned relationship. When a group adopts one it automatically disapproves of others; when a state legalizes the approved form of marriage it forbids and penalizes the alternative forms. The exception lies in the groups which legalize polygyny without making monogamy illegal. In the nature of the case this is more or less necessary, since even in groups where other forms are the accepted standard the marriage relation ordinarily begins as a monogamous one. Second and additional wives or husbands are taken by later marriages. Marriage in the sense of legal or group sanction is an effort on the part of

the group to regularize and channelize the sex life of its members. Except for the legal and social penalties, each form of marriage relation would be found in every society.

The family as a natural grouping exists throughout the animal world wherever the young are born so helpless as to require attention in order to survive. This natural or biological family is primarily a mother-child relationship and lasts only as long as the young require the mother's care. Among human beings the natural family is of exactly this nature. Among men, as among certain of the higher animal forms, both parents commonly cooperate in the care and protection of the young. In this sense the family had its origin in the animal world long before the appearance of the human forms.

The child is the center of the family and its care and protection are the essential function of the association. The family, however, ordinarily has its origin in a prior and different association. The sex impulses have ever led to the union of persons of the opposite sexes for the satisfactions to be had from companionship and intimate relations. The companionate thus formed becomes, in the usual course of events, a real family in which other values and ends become secondary to the maternal functions.

However firmly we may hold to the view that the care of children is the natural or logical basis of the family, we have yet to remember that what is logically first is seldom first in the order of time and may not always be first in the order of importance. A family is founded in time by the marriage of two persons of opposite sexes. Such an association does not necessarily result in children; and, even when it does, the union is generally prolonged beyond the period during which the care of children is essential. Hence it is not unnatural to regard love between persons of opposite sexes, rather than the care of children, as the fundamental basis of the family. This is, indeed, a natural basis; and we see it in animal life, as well as in that of human beings. But it appears, on reflection, that it is normally subordinate to the other basis. There may be intense love between individuals of the same sex or between brother and sister; and this may give rise to associations of a very delightful and valuable kind but not to families. It is the possibility of children to be cared for that differentiates marriage from other associations that are based on personal affection.¹

But the family as a concern of the social student is something other than the biological unit of reproductive life. It is more

¹ J. S. MacKenzie, *Outlines of Social Philosophy*, pp. 80-81. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

than a blood and legally related group of individuals living a more or less common life in close proximity. It is rather a complex of sentiments, attitudes, and ideals that spontaneously develop in, and integrate the members of, an intimate face-to-face group of men, women, and children. Its real unity is not in the contractual arrangements or in the formal obligations legally imposed but in the social interaction among its members.

This study of the patterns of personal relationships in family life led directly to the conception of the family as a unity of interacting persons. By a unity of interacting personalities is meant a living, changing, growing thing. . . . The actual unity of family life has its existence not in any legal conception, nor in any formal contract, but in the interaction of its members. For the family does not depend for its survival on the harmonious relations of its members, nor does it necessarily disintegrate as the result of conflicts between its members. The family lives as long as interaction is taking place and only dies when it ceases. . . .

The family is even more than an interaction of personalities. In this interaction, the family develops a conception of itself. When this conception of familial relations is recognized by the community, the family acquires an institutional character. That is what is meant by the family as a social institution. A family that has no conception of its rôle in the community or of the responsibilities of its individual members would not be an institution, perhaps not even a family. It is just these natural relationships of family life, the obligations and responsibilities spontaneously assumed in family interaction, which the community seeks first through custom and then through law to define, to make contractual, and to enforce. But everywhere, and always, by those who are dealing with problems of family life it is paramount to recognize that the family as a reality exists in the interaction of its members and not in the formalities of the law with its stipulations of rights and duties.¹

The establishment of a family in a fundamental sociological sense is the development of a complex of attitudes and ideals in which all members of the group concur.

A family is more than merely a natural organization. It develops within itself certain attitudes, sentiments, and ideals. That is, it develops a culture of its own beyond the culture of the larger community organization. The members of the family have a common feeling of oneness, a common consciousness of unity as over against other families

¹ E. W. Burgess, "The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, 7(1926), 5. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of *The Family*.

and other cultural groups. Each family has its own universe of discourse wherein certain things have different meanings to the members of the family than to the outsider, due to a difference in past experience. The family is, then, a cultural organization as well as a natural organization for response.¹

Like every other major institution, the family in its external and institutional aspects has had a long history of irregular growth and modification. It is intimately related to the other aspects of the culture of which it is a part. Its form is determined directly by tradition and law and indirectly by the exigencies of the economic order and has varied in response to the conditions of life and in harmony with changes in the related institutions. The form is of course incidental and unimportant so long as it does not operate to retard the growth of human personalities. Its most usual and successful form has been the so-called large family consisting perhaps of 50 to 80 or 100 people or even more. The single or small family system familiar to most Americans is a relatively recent and comparatively rare type of family organization.

Family disorganization is the breakdown, partial or complete, of the complex of family attitudes. There is disorganization whenever there is violation by any of the members of any part of the pattern. In the highly integrated group are sentimental interdependence, cooperative activities, collective ends, a sense of obligation and subordination to the group, and other characteristics that define unity and solidarity. Whenever the personal wishes, ambitions, interests, and the like become dominant; when the person is put before the group, there is a disintegration of family solidarity that, in extreme form, amounts to a dissolution of the family.

Divorce is a legal dissolution and termination of a family group. It is simply a public recognition that the sanctioned relationship has ceased to exist. It is to be understood as a symptom of institutional imperfection. Like other so-called social problems, it is best understood not as an independent reality but as the shadow of a defective institution. The present family instability is at once an evidence that family

¹ E. R. Mowrer, "The Variance between Legal and Natural Causes for Divorce," *Social Forces*, 2(1923), 389. See, also, "The Study of Family Disorganization," *The Family*, 8(1927), 83-87. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of *Social Forces*.

relationships are real and vital and that the institutional framework is inadequate to the present need. In an old and stable society the accepted pattern of family relations is embedded in the whole culture complex, and individual conformity is enforced by the combined weight of uniform custom, long tradition, legal enactment, religious sanction, and economic necessity. In times of social change the group pressures become ineffective, individual initiative emerges, and personal wishes get expression in unchanneled forms of behavior. But the disintegration of an old family framework does not signify the dissolution of the family itself. If, and when, there are cessation of change and the restoration of the old or the establishment of a new cultural equilibrium, the family will emerge in a restored or a new pattern. The unity that we call the family results wherever there is intimate association of men, women, and children and such association will exist as long as the race remains human. It is one of the marks of the human being.

C. THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS

The term *economic institutions* is a convenient designation for the more important, highly standardized, and socially sanctioned concepts and structures which men have developed in the process of satisfying their material needs. A detailed consideration of these institutions and a description of the various mechanisms by means of which tasks are assigned and rewards apportioned are the function of economic science. The sociological interest in the economic institutions is not in the mechanisms of production and distribution but in the relations of men incident to a particular economic order. All human and social life has an economic basis the nature of which determines the formal structure of society. The human being must be possessed of a certain minimum of economic goods in the form of food and shelter in order to maintain his physical existence.

The economic institutions had their origin in the food quest, in the efforts of simple men to satisfy their existence needs. These activities may be very direct, simple, unorganized, a more or less random search for food and shelter much the same as exists throughout the animal world. In early primitivity they did not extend beyond efforts to satisfy the immediate pressing animal needs and involved a minimum of concerted action. Such cooperation as existed was spontaneous and unorganized.

The history of material culture and, incidentally, of modern civilization is an account of the development of this situation through an increasing division of labor, the elaboration of tools, and the progressive organization of individual activity leading to an increase in aggregate productivity.

In unorganized activity each performs all the labor involved and receives the total product of his work. But much of the business of life even in the most simple of situations requires cooperation and concerted effort. Man's group life made collective activity easy; the ways of the folk were group ways. This implies some degree at least of coordinated as well as of reciprocal behavior, some view however vague of common ends and of mutual activity in reaching them. In fighting, particularly, and in the hunting pursuits cooperation was most necessary and men learned to work together, to subordinate immediate impulse to collective purpose. In organized effort there is necessarily some machinery to assign tasks, coordinate efforts, and apportion to each a share in the product of the joint enterprise. In every group a body of customary practices defines the division of tasks, and in regard to the things as vital as the food interests the practices are reinforced and made obligatory and uniform by formal and informal sanctions. The totality and the inter-relationships of these activities, organized and unorganized, involved in the food quest and the material support of the population are the economic institutions of the group. The nature of the activities themselves together with their manner of organization and the nature of the group sanctions determine the nature of the organization.

The economic institutions may be and historically have been organized in many different ways. They may, for example, involve the conception of either forced or free labor, of handicraft or machine production, of private or collective ownership or they may incorporate other basic concepts that determine the form and nature of the organized system itself. The fundamental means of group life may be hunting, cattle raising, predatory activities, commerce, or other activity; the type of group life in turn will determine the activities that will prevail and the rules and sanctions that will enforce system and uniformity. The concepts basic to the present economic order of the industrialized West include the price system. This is in reality a legal and not an economic construct and had its origin in the present sense

in the activities incident to the founding of the institution of the state. In the modern scheme of distribution it gives to the individual exclusive ownership, and control in perpetuity, of the objects that he possesses. It is the basic concept in the scheme of distribution. A second basic concept is that of money prices. This price system lies at the very heart of the present economic order, and the whole present system of exchange rests upon it. Machine production is a third characteristic of the modern economic organization. Finally may be mentioned the concept of business enterprise which, more perhaps than any other, is characteristic and unique in the present economic order. Business is essentially the idea of making money, securing profits, through utilizing or manipulating some element or elements of the productive process.

These basic parts of the modern economic world are of relatively recent development and of relatively local dominance. They are not the basic institutions of the earlier feudal order or of the handicraft system of industry; they are foreign to the organization of the Indian economy and to other important areas of the modern world. They are, however, in process of enormously rapid expansion and promise shortly to dominate and destroy historic and competing systems.

But the present order is not of necessity permanent. The fact that it came into vogue in a world in which it did not previously exist suggests, at least, that it may in time give way to different concepts and structures. Economic institutions are not fixed and final; the present system may not be that prevailing in America a hundred years from now. But an established system resists change for the reason that its concepts are fixed in the minds and habits of men who are for the most part unable to visualize another type of order than that to which they are habituated and who fear the consequences of a change and transition; and because the structures developed in accordance with the concepts have a material form, hence a permanence and rigidity. Moreover, the ruling classes in the society are such in virtue of the system that creates them and they employ the combined power of school, church, and state to resist changes that seem to threaten their status. The legal concept of private property, as has been said, is basic to the whole present economic structure. It is obvious therefore that the whole order could be immediately demoralized and destroyed and a radically different

type of economic organization be ushered in by mere legislative act. This has of course in reality often been done and in some degree is being done in all countries at the present time. The whole economic order of the Old South rested upon slavery and was destroyed by a proclamation that withdrew the legal sanction of slavery. The constitutional amendment declaring unlawful the manufacture and sale of intoxicants destroyed one of the major American economic industries and ushered in a new system. The whole system of taxation is a method of redistributing incomes; it has been used and may be used to put productive industry on a basis other than that of private property and business enterprise. More basically and fundamentally the increase and decrease of population, the exhaustion of natural resources basic to the modern industry, the exploitation of new resources, scientific invention, popular education, and other developments make a system workable or unworkable and determine its continuance or decay.

The economic system determines the relations of men and is of sociological interest, therefore, from the point of view of human personality. The whole order may be studied from that point of view; in any final and fundamental sense it must be examined from that point of view. An economic system based on human slavery, the exploitation by one group of the vital power of the members of another, produces types of personality markedly different from those produced by a system of free labor. The conditions of human life and human relations are basically different under the handicraft and the machine types of industry. The relations of the economic institutions and activities to other types of activities and institutions are also within the range of sociological phenomena. The existence of a slave system with its modifications in government, religion, education, and other social structures is of far-reaching personal and human consequence. Law and government in the modern world function almost exclusively in the interests of private property as an institutional form. The relations of the system to the school and church are almost equally intimate. The types of relationships and of personalities are in some degree functions of the institutional norms. Occupations, for example, determine contacts and social relationships; the social groupings in the modern world are basically occupational and economic groupings. The separate psychologies of the independent farmer, the handicrafts-

man, and the factory worker are somewhat radically different and the differences are determined basically by the contacts and experiences arising out of the occupational status. The character of the work and the degree and nature of personal control have their immediate effects upon the beliefs and attitudes as well as their effects upon contact and communication.

D. THE STATE

The state, in the common political conceptions, is a more or less considerable community of persons which is independent or nearly independent of foreign control and has an organized system of government supported by the sentiments and traditions of the population. The geographic concept of community involves the idea of a definite and permanent occupation of a given territory. The fact of size carries with it the idea of at least some considerable degree of racial and cultural heterogeneity. The organization of a governmental machinery assumes the existence of military power and a class of functionaries and practitioners. A sentimental solidarity that welds the whole into some sort of functional unity implies a body of historic experience. The state was in no sense the beginning of human society: it came late and as a product of conditions existing at a certain point in the development of human culture.

The military state had its origin in the military conquest of one group by another and the subsequent establishment of hierarchical political and economic classes and authorities. It was an arrangement imposed by victorious invaders to guarantee themselves the economic fruits of victory, an arrangement to prevent the revolt of the subjugated peoples or the displacement of the victors by other marauding bands. Or, in some instances, it was a compromise arrangement worked out empirically after prolonged conflict among groups.

The state was an outgrowth, a development and extension in some cases, of an earlier practice. Everywhere the basis of life is economic; an abundant food supply is necessary to large aggregations, and the group generally tends to be as large as the means of life will permit. In a considerable and dense population, possible because of an abundant food supply, a division of labor is possible and cooperative enterprises can be developed. These make possible an increased production and an accumulation of wealth in the form of food stores, tools, implements, household

equipment, and the other baggage of a prosperous life. But all this demands relatively settled and peaceful modes of life; prosperity is based on agriculture. The facts and conditions that lead to the prosperity of a group and define its well-being—a fluvial location and a peaceful and settled agricultural life—are the very things that make it the envy of other and less prosperous folk and the things that make it vulnerable to their attacks. In the history of culture every such people has been surrounded by nomadic groups, outlaw bands, and hill tribes whose means of livelihood is, at least in part, the conquest of unwary and unguarded groups. Early life was openly predatory. Marauding bands made sudden raids upon the crops and stores of the more settled and prosperous folk. Random and spectacular attacks came in time to be replaced by periodic raids sometimes highly organized and timed to follow upon a harvest season. And from these developed the practice of the victorious bands' settling themselves as a permanent incubus upon the conquered group.

In other cases, and subsequently, the state seems to have been an outgrowth of a more evenly balanced warfare. In predatory life the larger group, other things equal, is at an advantage and there is a natural tendency, sometimes a formulated policy, for the group to expand indefinitely. As it approaches the limit of its food supply it extends, or attempts to extend, its territory and increases its numbers by the annexation of contiguous domain and the military conquest and subjugation of neighboring peoples. The large group depends upon the possession and control of abundant natural resources and, in the presence of aggressive neighbors, it may organize for its defense or to increase still more its possessions. In either case, whether an organization for the conquest of other groups or a combination to defend its own domain from outside attack, it is the beginning of a state.

The condition giving rise to militancy is, as we have seen, the protection and enlargement of the food territory, and its essence is leadership. In a very simple society the older men are leaders, on account of their greater experience and longer memories, but the leadership is of a paternal kind and not severe. But when fighting becomes an occupation, the younger, stronger, and more masterful spirits come to the front. Militarism is in its nature absolute and authoritative, and so it happens that the military leaders and their immediate associates tend to dictate

the behavior of the whole group, and they do this not only to secure an efficient organization but, finally, to secure their own personal advantage. Human nature has a kindly side and a selfish side. The kindly side prevails in family and kinship relations, and the selfish is shown toward outsiders. But in the state, as it grows larger through military organization and conquest, not only are outsiders included, but treated as outsiders—as slaves and inferiors—but the number of people becomes so great that the intimate, kinship, face-to-face relations cannot be preserved, and the different elements of the population become as strangers to one another and live in competition.

Now militancy becomes the greatest force for the creation of superiority and subordination—or higher and lower classes. It works on what we call

“The good old rule, the simple plan
That they shall take who have the power,
And they shall keep who can.”

We therefore see in the formation of every state the same conditions which we find so abundantly illustrated in historical Europe.¹

The national state thus had its origin in the expansion of peoples by conquest, subjugation, and consolidation. Its development and continuance rest in part upon the struggle for power and privilege among interest groups and classes within its population, in part upon its ability to establish and maintain an internal condition of peace and order and to protect and enlarge its territory or its opportunities, and in part upon certain more positive governmental services which its organization makes possible.

In the modern world, the state has provided conditions favorable to cultural advance. While its major effort is to insure its own continuance, the state performs services that are for the general welfare of the group. Through its coordinating of activities and relations, it enables men to act as a unit. Its maintenance of internal peace makes possible the accumulation of wealth and the advance in human welfare, and its assumption of other large functions, as the construction of roads and other means of transportation and communication, secures to private persons and groups conveniences and advantages of many sorts. In the maintenance of peace and order it increases the freedom of human action so long as the behavior is not inimical to the institution itself. The industrial, social, scientific, literary, and

¹ W. I. Thomas, *The Origin of Society and the State*, pp. 21-22.

artistic activities have thrived within the state and under its protection.

Changes in historical conditions and circumstances give rise to altered conceptions of the nature and duty of the state. It is possible that in the course of social and cultural advance the state may evolve to a point where it will be more and more an agent of the universal interests and less and less an instrument of the dominant economic class.

E. EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

The basis of all educational institutions and practices lies in the immaturity and plasticity of the human child, which make possible the acquisition of skills, the formation of habits, the learning of techniques, the comprehension of relationships, and other behavior or characteristics of human beings. From the angle of the individual, the universality of some degree of education lies in the fact that the child is born into a highly complex environment in which he must learn to function. Every child must be initiated into the culture of the group; he has none of it at birth and is helpless without it. From the point of view of the group, education, incidental and indirect as well as formal and institutional, is necessary in order to transmit the accumulated culture heritage from one generation to the next. Human beings are the carriers of culture, and education is the instrumentality for its preservation and transmission.

Among the more simple, as among the more culturally advanced, peoples the education of the child is in part indirect and incidental and in part formal and systematized. As in the case of other aspects of the social heritage, the organized and institutionalized forms of training came after, and were an outgrowth of, the indirect and casual methods. In the earlier and simpler societies the child acquired incidentally and without effort the folkways of his group. He acquired the techniques, practices, skills, and other useful information current in the group. By the time of his physical maturity he was in general a competent master of the body of technology and practice characteristic of the culture. He had acquired also the body of folklore, the attitudes toward life, and the explanations and philosophical rationalizations that made the social order and the natural world appear intelligible and hence tolerable to the culture group. For the most part this education of the child went on without any

very deliberate and conscious intention of the elders to teach.

The formal education of the primitive child had a different purpose, that of maintaining the control and dominance of the elders and leaders through inculcating the standards and traditions of the group. It was designed to make men good—that is, to make them conform to the *mores* and to exemplify in their lives those traits of character that the culture held to be noble and right. It impressed the content of the social code: respect for elders, bravery, stoicism, generosity, or whatever behavior traits fell within the group definition. This education was on the whole effective: it produced types of character in conformity with the standards and, as among the American Indians, it often resulted in types of character, marked by dignity, reserve, fearlessness, and the like, that are often considered wholly admirable from other points of view. The method of primitive moral education was in the main that of initiation ceremonies which brought the youth into membership in the adult society. These ceremonies were often elaborate and involved instruction, ordeal, and periods of trial. The complete education of the youth was often a matter of years. The initiation ceremonies served also to transmit much of the mythology and formal lore of the culture group.

A somewhat similar duality exists in the educational procedure of the modern world. There is a need for vocational instruction and for the inculcation of the cultural norms if the person is to be an effective member of the group and the culture complex is to be transmitted to the succeeding generations. The school is the formal institutional organization of the various practices and rules of the group having to do with the giving of vocational information and with the inculcation and transmission of the moral heritage. The two types of education have existed side by side through the centuries but there have of late been shifts in relative emphasis.

In modern as in primitive societies a very great deal of the immediately practical and vocational information is acquired informally and incidentally. The boy on the farm inevitably and without effort comes to have a knowledge of the agricultural activities and processes; by the time of early manhood he is perhaps as competent a unit as his elders. The girl in a similar manner acquires a knowledge of the various household arts and

industries. In the past practically all the knowledge of the industrial techniques and occupational practices has been thus informally picked up. But with the increasing complexity of the social order the old haphazard methods prove increasingly inadequate to the personal and social needs. The industrial and mechanical society is highly artificial and complex, it is not an organic unity so much as it is a mechanical one that was thought out and is controlled and utilized to ends that are not inherent or obvious. A successful adaptation to it requires more than was necessary when life was rural and activities in general direct. Much of modern culture consists of specialized skills and techniques that fit persons for particular and highly limited vocations. The amount of the heritage has greatly increased as civilization has grown more complex. The invention of writing increased the accumulated product at the same time that it created a new means of transmission. The growth of science has of course been the chief cause of the enriched heritage. Also the changes in the home have taken from it most of its educative function. With the increasing complexity of the social order, there has been some tendency for the schools to provide a modicum of information designed to effect a working relation between the person and the industrial environment. This is a somewhat noteworthy educational innovation; formal education has always had a very different objective.

The formal education of the schools, as it was in the early groups, is an elaborate and highly organized mechanism involved in the effort to transmit and insure the perpetuation of the social heritage. Teleologically it is nothing else than a control device, a systematic means for the inculcation of the body of tradition common to the culture group in control of the institution. The object is to make the children accept the standards, dogmas, myths, and traditions of the group. Its task is to disseminate knowledge, and by knowledge is meant the wisdom of the *mores*. When it is an instrument of the church, it is designed to make good men, and good men, from that point of view, are men who support the institution—men who conform to its standards and transmit its traditions. When the school is supported by the state, it is an instrument of the state and its function is to make good citizens—men who are loyal supporters of the institution. Historically, and at the present time, the bulk of formal instruction is directly or indirectly moral—that is,

it presents a body of information and training designed to make good men. It deals with valuational judgments, with matters that lie in the realm of group concepts, stereotypes, in the folkways and *mores*. Its business is the inculcation of these traditional elements that make for conformity to the group standards of welfare. It consists for the most part in giving the children the traditional standpoint on what are considered the important situations of life. It is by nature and design a conservative institution, it is on the side of tradition, its purpose is to teach legends and folkways and drill the students in the *mores* and in the prevailing system of rationalization of the group practices.

The school, like other institutional forces, does not always function as designed. The system is designed to insure the sentimental and emotional solidarity of the group rather than to convey a body of exact information or to teach the techniques of criticism and discovery. The very nature of discovery and invention is disorganizing; they work to the destruction of the old, to the substitution of the new. As a going concern the school tends to become independent of its creators and to develop a different conception of itself and of its functions in the social order. It aspires to intellectual leadership and creative thought and activity—to education in the sense of an understanding of reality. But the tendency is always opposed; the presentation of the new in the schools always arouses violent opposition: it is heresy, treason, or immorality according as the opposition comes from the church, the state, or the people. The bitter opposition to the presentation in the schools of so simple, commonplace, and universally accepted a thing as the theory of organic evolution is a recent case in point. The elementary and secondary schools in America face the most pressure of tradition from the outside against the teaching of the social and biological sciences. In these fields family, church, and state conspire to preserve the traditional definitions and the ancient taboos. Large and powerful groups as well as many individual men do not want the old ways and ideas disturbed; they do not desire to examine old beliefs or to face a possibly disconcerting reality. They want the illusion of fixity and security in a world where such things do not obtain and demand that the school indoctrinate the youth with the ancient wisdom rather than stimulate skeptical and inquiring minds.

When the educational institutions of a people are subject to outside pressures, they function to conserve, rather than to initiate, and show a marked tendency toward formalism. They come increasingly to lack content and in the absence of live content they elaborate form. A content that at one time is a thing of value comes gradually to lose its significance. It is, however, retained and transformed from a means into an end in itself. All such dead things acquire a sacredness of their own and are cherished and defended on their own account. An illustration from the American high-school curriculum will illustrate the general tendency. Latin was at one time a genuine value in education. With the translation of all the lore of the language into the modern European tongues it had much less significance in the educational process. But as a traditional subject in educational routine it was thought to have some inherent value and there was a strong emotional sentiment favoring its retention. Moreover, its teaching was institutionalized and there was a powerful vested interest favoring its retention. The functionaries whose living depends upon the perpetuation of the archaic elements of the institutions are ever their most ardent supporters.

Another tendency of education, when pressure from the outside prevents the institution from being vital, is to make it a means of superficial distinction. Much of American college education has no other purpose than the acquisition of honorific emblems. In such a case sophistication is superior to learning and the more useless the information the greater its power to bestow distinction. For a very long period a knowledge of the classical languages was fixed upon as a symbol of distinction. It was useless and it was unknown to the rabble. In American colleges today music and art have far more honorific value than has economics or the domestic arts.

In the modern world there is an ever increasing need for types of education that will enable men to participate intelligently in the culture complex. Modern civilization is complex, mechanistic, unstable, and its patterns rapidly shifting. If the man is not to be a victim of the leviathan he must understand it. The traditional types of information, valuable doubtless for other purposes, are useless as a means of adjustment: the present order has no deep roots in the past; no other age is comparable. Invention and discovery resulting in rapid communication,

specialized industry, abstract relations, urban life, and other new facts and relations make knowledge and understanding an imperative necessity. Yet society in general is loath to give up the old and allow the school to recognize the nature of existing reality and to reorganize in terms of present-day social, political, and economic reality.

The most significant fact in education is an attitude of mind, a scientific way of thinking. Its object is to teach children to think, to take them out of the daily round of mental habits, to help them to escape the local and the trivial, and to enable them to grasp general truths. In the course of real education the person becomes habituated to the scientific method of thought. He learns to examine preconceptions, to think from fact to inference, and to draw conclusions uncolored by bias. The scientific method of thought is a matter of habit: it takes time to acquire it. But once acquired it rescues the person from the provincial and makes him a citizen of the universe of all time. It frees him from mere social and local bonds and enables him to subordinate phenomena to principles.

F. RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS

Religion in its simplest and purest form is an emotional attitude toward the unknown and the uncontrolled. In some form it appears to be a universal phenomenon among men and will doubtless continue until such time as the universe of reality is completely understood in naturalistic terms. It varies in character from the crude material conceptions of the simple mind to the integrated formulations of mystical sentiments and aspirations of the more intelligent. At the one extreme it is concerned exclusively with the demon world; at the other it is social and personal and uncontaminated with supernatural constructs.

Religion is of course a natural phenomenon that grew out of the nature of man and the conditions of his life. The basic emotions arise spontaneously in every generation and, indeed, in every individual who develops in primary association with religious persons, and its forms and practices and symbols are transmitted as integral parts of the folk heritage. The latter provides a means of adjustment to forces that bear in upon man from every side and that are beyond his present understanding. Fear is the spontaneous reaction to phenomena that do not come within the orbit of the familiar and usual and do not manifest within them-

selves obvious means for their own control. Storms, thunder, wind, explosions, earthquakes, lightning, death, trance, dreams, disease, and many other natural events that are not understood and cannot be controlled in the primitive world are the origin and basis of the simple emotional responses of fear, awe, and terror. Simple peoples living close to nature are continually brought into relations with manifestations of outside power that inspire them with feelings of terror and helplessness. This is the historical and the perennial basis of the religious complex.

The human mind is such that it craves some sort of explanation of phenomena experienced that will give a semblance of order and meaning to the chaos of the phenomena of the natural world. The simple person, operating uncritically, as of necessity he must in the absence of information, interprets the facts of nature that arrest his attention in personal terms—that is, in terms of the only thing he knows immediately and directly: himself. The active parts of the environment are like himself; in his conflict with them he is conscious of them as personal beings or, in a slightly more sophisticated form, as manifestations of the power of personal beings. He recognizes the existence of a power outside himself which is essentially like himself and which is beyond his control. The only power he knows or can comprehend is personal power, and he peoples the natural world with a multiplicity of beings—intangible, invisible, incomprehensible, but none the less real—with passions and behavior and needs such as his own. In terms of these invisible beings which he has created he interprets and understands the phenomena of nature: events of the natural world are seen as the results and expression of the anger or caprice of the invisible powers. However crude and limited such explanation may appear, it is nevertheless an explanation and, as such, provides a philosophical basis for rational action.

From the conception of an invisible world of beings, the idea of differences among them followed as a corollary of a main proposition. Their acts showed some to be friendly and some to be hostile, some benevolent and others malevolent, some capricious and others mischievous. They differed in power as well as in disposition. Presently they came to differ in origin as well as in nature. Some were disembodied spirits, the origin of others was extra-psychic. In his efforts to understand, to make comprehensible and therefore tolerable the world of reality in which he

lived, man created a spirit world that came to stand between him and the reality and greatly multiplied the difficulties of understanding as well as the terrors and dangers of his existence. Toward the demon world that surrounded him man developed a body of practices, often of mass origin, designed to secure their good will and to avoid their wrath. The nature of the practice was in part accident, in part an outcome of the conception that the demons had the same attributes as man himself and could, therefore, be influenced or controlled by the same means—by praise and flattery, prayer and supplication, by promise and sacrifice, by humility and prostration.

To this body of beliefs, attitudes, and practices toward the unseen powers must be added the emotions of crowd excitement. Without this element in its origin it would remain a body of magical formulae with its supporting and resulting body of mythology and philosophical rationalization and its appropriate mental attitudes. But religion is a social phenomenon and behavior toward the demon world was typically crowd behavior. Mass behavior has its own psychological consequences, not the least of which is a highly pleasurable state of emotional intoxication. The practices come to be so organized, perhaps unconsciously but none the less definitely, as to create or reinstate from time to time the emotional states arising from crowd activity itself. The cultus procedure comes in time to be more definitely formulated in practice, and, subsequently, a body of rationalization grows in explanation, support, and justification of the attitudes, emotions, and practices. The religion is then a going concern.

A body of mythology is a more or less characteristic element of the religious complex, though it appears not to be a vital and indispensable element. In the religious sense mythology is essentially a biographical and anecdotal account of the gods and their activities. This, for example, was the nature of the Greek mythology. The existence of concrete, spiritual entities required a territorial reservation for their occupation. Their habitat, especially when the idea of souls and the after life of the souls of men has developed, is always in some place inaccessible to the living members of the social group: it is on the other side of the mountain, across the river Styx, in the regions beneath the earth, or in the clouds above. These regions are in all cases idealized projections of the known reality: they are organized on a similar

pattern and inhabited by the shades of the choicer persons of the earth. The after life of the plains Indians, for example, was visualized as a happy hunting ground where the chiefs and warriors spent eternity in hunting, fighting, gambling, and other pursuits that interested them in the flesh.

The practices toward the unseen powers are not always productive of results and they are often complicated and burdensome. Some individuals are more gifted than others in the arts of persuasion or propitiation. As a result, every group comes presently to have a man or a group of men specially skilled in the ways of the spirit world who act as professional intermediaries between the two worlds. They have a more profound and intimate knowledge of the spirit world and a more ready access to it. They prescribe and perform the various rites and direct the ceremonies necessary to maintain a friendly working relation between the two worlds. These men, because of their close association with the spirit world, take on some of its attributes and come to enjoy a prestige from the nature of their occupation. At this stage religion has taken on a structure that marks the beginning of the church. There is not only a body of beliefs, sentiments, and practices but there is also an organization that integrates, administers, and perpetuates them. The church is simply the institutional organization and integration of the emotional attitudes, the cultus procedures, and the body of belief and dogma.

The church, as distinct from religion, has been an important factor in the history of civilization and in the growth of cultures. The institution has operated to standardize the religious emotions, beliefs, and practices and to spread and perpetuate them. It has, therefore, been a powerful instrument of political control and of social integration. It is a strong bond of social unity through promoting a community of thought and sympathy and of loyalty to the same gods. It deals with divine sanctions and with present and future rewards and punishments. In so far as a people believes in these things they are, of course, realities and exercise a profound influence on behavior. And the appeal of these concepts to the common man is very powerful: they fortify the individual by bringing him into *rapprochement* with eternal and powerful forces. In all times and places, religion has been a haven for the weak, timid, inefficient, and oppressed. The church provides a refuge and an assurance within which the doubts and uncertainties of harassed humanity are resolved. In con-

sequence the church has tended to flourish where it has been most arbitrary and has not flourished where it has been doubtful or vacillating in its precepts. The assumption of a knowledge of absolute truth makes change impossible or at least extremely difficult at the same time that it makes certain the present or future recognition of error. The church has therefore ever been the chief conservator of the *mores* to which it lends a divine sanction. It has generally been on the side of the established order. But this loyalty to the *mores* has in turn everywhere operated to put it in a difficult position when the *mores* or the established order undergo change. The church's support and sanction of slavery throughout most of American history, for example, is representative of the sort of difficulties that result by giving divine sanction to facts of temporal origin. The church has always placed great emphasis on future rewards and punishments, hence has belittled the present life and enjoined submission, humility, and endurance of present ills as a means of future comforts. This doctrine has ever been one of the great props of an aristocratic economic order.

In more advanced groups, as understanding increases and the power of the supernatural declines, the church frequently takes on functions other than those traditionally exercised by it. In the Western world the churches have in major part and in very recent decades abandoned the attempt to explain natural phenomena. In some cases they have frankly and openly discarded the whole belief in the existence of supernatural powers and their interference in the affairs of men. In other cases the older concepts have been given new meaning, and emphasis has been shifted to the cultivation of an ethical idealism. In the present Western world the power and influence of religion and the church are decreasing. With the germ theory of disease and the consequent development of medical science, sickness and the cause of sickness passed out of the domain of the church. In a similar way, other advances in science lessened ecclesiastical authority and undermined traditional religious beliefs. The changes in attitudes and manner of life that have come with the development of modern secondary society have operated to the same effect.

G. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES

Any constant or regularly recurring element in the social life to

may become institutionalized. Such a value becomes the center of a body of practices which, through imitation or because of utility, become more or less uniform and standardized. Customary rules of procedure develop and in time harden into a body of doctrine and dogma that reduces the practices to an inflexible routine. Presently appears a system of administrative machinery, imposed from without or developed from within, and a group of professional functionaries and practitioners. This structure gives definiteness and coherence that in general did not previously exist and, at the same time, it gives stability and inflexibility and a tendency to persist in the established way regardless of subsequent changes in the values themselves. There develops and persists a general attitude toward the organization that is more or less independent of its work and function. The inflexibility resulting from structure, organization, and tradition makes it progressively ill adapted to the human and social needs in a changing world. In such case there is discontent that may express itself in separation and the beginning of a new institutional life cycle.

But the established form may persist through very long periods because there is little change in the complex of values or because the institution adapts itself to the changing order. To the extent that it is large and inflexible it not only resists internal change but it is an obstacle to external change and personal adaptation. It may continue as a revered form and relic. But in any sudden or severe crisis it will undergo radical modification or make way for an efficient organization. The traditional American railway system promptly broke down under the social need of war time and had to be put on an efficiency basis. The standing army of a country is often a serious obstacle to the development of military efficiency in time of need. On the other hand, an institution may persist by being opportunistic and remaining sufficiently flexible to adjust itself to changes in social values and attitudes.

In the present society, medicine ranks as one of the important minor institutions and exemplifies most of the characteristics of institutional behavior. Its origin was in the nursing activities of sympathetic old women, and its development, as an efficient body of practice, has been an elaboration, extension, and refinement of the spontaneous and common-sense procedure. The obvious values are injury, sickness, and suffering and the folk practices were designed to relieve or remove the conditions. A

body of folklore grew up in regard to the practice, and in time a set of rules in regard to treatment and a professional code governing and protecting the rights of the practitioners. At the present time medical practice and the related arts and sciences have achieved a high degree of institutional organization. The hospitals, schools, and associations of practitioners give a structure around and supporting the concept of health and a disease-free people. As far as the concept and techniques are concerned, it has been one of the more progressive institutions. But, to a considerable extent, the personnel has been concerned to maintain its own welfare rather than to promote public health. In this respect the organization exists more or less for its own sake, struggles to maintain its prestige and the status of its practitioners. It has fought vigorously and effectively attempts to socialize medical information and practice and to make the results of science uniformly available to all classes in the general population.

Social work has in recent decades taken on an institutional character. Its origin is in the spontaneous and neighborly assistance extended to persons in distress. In this sense it is as old as community life itself. And in its most efficient form it is still a neighborhood and community enterprise. The basic values are need and suffering, with their inimical effects upon the strength and welfare of the group. In the presence of these values, human attitudes lead spontaneously to efforts designed to help the needy and relieve the suffering. The forms of such assistance tend to take on local standardization and to become obligatory. Charity gets over into the *mores* and throughout the Christian world has a powerful religious sanction.

In the modern industrial and urban centers, with the disappearance of primary group relations and the enormous increase in misery created by the machine industry, the increase of population, and the impersonal economic competition, some systematic method of distributing charity, caring for the grossly unadjusted, and assisting those in distress became necessary. The humanitarian sentiments would not permit the ruthless neglect of the friendless and the poor, and the traditional forms of private charity were unequal to the task of dealing with such conditions in the impersonal, urban situation. Moreover, the conditions were conceived to be a menace to property, moral standards, and public health. Charity organization societies

came into existence, developed a set of standards and an administrative machinery, and assumed control and supervision. Charity was organized and its distribution standardized. The organization, once it developed, created its own personnel, expanded its program of activities, and eventuated in the present institution of social work.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. Illustrate the fact that the activities of one person are related to those of all other persons.
2. Explain the statement in the text that "the set of relations that has grown up among men is not a rational creation."
3. Discuss the interdependent relation of institutions from the point of view of (a) their origin, (b) their functioning.
4. Explain what is meant by the integration of social institutions.
5. What explanation can you offer for the fact that the family institution has been neglected as an object of scientific study?
6. Distinguish sharply between marriage and family.
7. What do you understand by (a) the natural family, (b) the institutional family?
8. What is meant by the family as a "unit of interacting personalities"?
9. Trace some changes in the family that have followed changes in the economic institutions.
10. What are the origin and nature of the economic institutions?
11. Describe the origin and development of our ethical ideas regarding private property.
12. What are the basic concepts in the present economic order of the West? Are they permanent?
13. State clearly the sociological interest in the economic order and in the specific economic institutions.
14. Distinguish between the state and society.
15. What is the sociological interest in the theory of the state?
16. Discuss the conflict of tribal groups and the origin and development of the military state.
17. What is the relation of the state and the military organization?
18. What are the means used by states to perpetuate the established order?
19. In what ways, directly or indirectly, has the state acted in the interests of human welfare?
20. What is the necessity of education from the point of view (a) of the child, (b) of the group?
21. Distinguish between the formal and informal education of the child.
22. Are our schools designed to produce "good" men and women or to produce efficient and intelligent men and women?
23. Explain how an education that teaches children to think is subversive to public education in the historic sense.
24. "Men of great wealth, even though it was acquired by questionable practices, are almost always great advocates of 'law and order' and the 'sacredness of property.'" Comment on this fact.

25. Trace the early steps in the development of religion.

26. Show the relation between the primitive medicine man and the modern minister of religion; between the medicine man and the modern physician.

27. Why was religion more important in primitive than in contemporary society?

28. Is the fundamentalist a primitive or a modern from the standpoint of methods of thinking?

29. Discuss the view that the very earliest as well as the most recent religious theories rest upon the belief in impersonal supernatural power.

30. Discuss the origin and purpose of the church as distinct from religion

31. Discuss the relation between aesthetic and religious evaluations.

32. In what sense are religious values ultimate?

33. State the relation of science and religion.

34. "Every child is born into the religion of nature; its parents make it a Jew, a Christian, or a Magian." (Koran.) Discuss.

35. State the way in which medicine, social work, recreation, or other activity or vocation with which you are familiar tends to be an institution.

36. An institution has been defined as an organization of social rules dealing with a related group of activities and a body of machinery for securing an observance of the rules. Discuss.

37. "Social organization is the sum and coordination of the social units." Discuss.

38. A perfect social organization would permit *every* person to satisfy *each* of his fundamental wishes. Explain.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Trace the development of some institutional structure in your own community from its beginning.

3. Analyze the curriculum of your elementary school to determine what parts of the content are designed to make good men and loyal citizens and what parts have other objectives.

4. Enumerate various minor institutions in your community. Select one from the list and formulate a method for its sociological study.

5. Read a monographic study of some primitive group, as the Vedas, the Todas, or the Andaman Islanders, and make a brief statement of their institutions.

6. Take some minor institution familiar to you, as the Y.M.C.A. or the local social service league, and analyze it into its constituent values.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. The Functions of Government. W. Wilson, *The State*, pp. 41-57.

b. The Concept and Nature of Institutions. W. H. Hamilton, "Institutions," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

c. The Aims of Education. B. Russell, *Education and the Good Life*, pp. 47-83.

d. The Interdependence of Institutions. J. O. Hertzler, *Social*

- e. The Relation of Other Institutions to the State. A. W. Small, *General Sociology*, pp. 233-234.
 - f. The Classification of Economic Institutions. W. L. Thorp, *Economic Institutions*, pp. 11-15.
 - g. The Press as an Institution. W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 274-284.
 - h. The Origin of Marriage. E. Westermarck, *The History of Human Marriage*, pp. 8-24.
 - i. The Persistence of Primitive Social Norms in Present-day Education. K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 293-302.
 - j. Money as a New Institutional Element. W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant*, pp. 164-166.
8. Topics for written themes:
- a. The Primitive Conception of Crime
 - b. The Origin and Development of the Property Concept
 - c. The Primitive Concept of Justice
 - d. Theories of the Origin of Religion
 - e. Theories of the Origin of the State
 - f. The Theory of the Matriarchate
 - g. The Large Family System
 - h. The Companionate System
 - i. The Relation of Religion and Magic
 - j. The Relation of Religion and Art
 - k. Primitive Views of the Soul
 - l. The Relation of Religion and Morality
 - m. Religion and the Church
 - n. Primitive Conceptions of Creation
 - o. The "Other World" of Primitive Thought
 - p. Valhalla
 - q. The Happy Hunting Ground
 - r. Primitive Conceptions of Immortality
 - s. Education: A Modern Fetish
 - t. Efforts to Control Teaching in the American School
 - u. The Necessity of Education
 - v. Cultural Education.

Supplementary Readings

- 1. Ames, E. S.: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chap. III, "The Determining Impulses in Primitive Religion," pp. 33-50.
- 2. Barnes, H. E.: *Sociology and Political Theory*, Chap. III, "Typical Sociological Conceptions of the Nature of the State," pp. 26-43.
- 3. Burgess, E. W.: "Studies of Institutions," in T. V. Smith and L. D. White (editors), *Chicago, an Experiment in Social Science Research*, pp. 139-176.
- 4. Burgess, E. W.: "The Study of the Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities," *The Family*, 7(1926), 3-9.
- 5. Burgess, E. W.: "The Changing American Family," *Religious Education*, 23(1928), 408-415.

6. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "The State," pp. 176-189; Chap. XVIII, "The Family," pp. 252-273; Chap. XXXI, "Religion," pp. 529-549.
7. Case, C. M.: *Outline of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Education and Social Heredity," pp. 268-281; Chap. XV, "Primitive Economic Institutions," pp. 306-325; Chap. XVII, "Foundations of Government and Law," pp. 349-364.
8. Chapin, F. S.: "A New Definition of Social Institutions," *Social Forces*, 6(1928), 375-377.
9. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*. Part V, "Institutions," pp. 313-392.
10. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, Chaps. II, III, "Social Institutions," pp. 38-80; 83-140; Chap. XIV, "The Social Order," pp. 556-580.
11. Dewey, J.: *The Public and Its Problems*, Chap. III, "The Democratic State," pp. 75-109.
12. Faris, E.: "The Origin of Punishment," *International Journal of Ethics*, 25(1914), 54-67.
13. Giddings, F. H.: *Civilization and Society*, Chap. X, "The Beginnings of the Family," pp. 110-119; Chap. XII, "The Nature and Beginnings of Political Society," pp. 140-147.
14. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Part IV, "Man and His Social Organization," pp. 344-453.
15. Hamilton, W. H.: "Institutions," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
16. Holt, A. E.: "Religion," *American Journal of Sociology*, 34(1928-1929), 172-176, 1116-1128.
17. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XVIII, "The Sociology of Religion," pp. 220-243; Chap. XIX, "Religion and Morals," pp. 244-262; Chap. XX, "Culture, Art, and Education," pp. 263-286; Chap. XXI, "Culture and Social Organization," pp. 287-304.
18. Judd, C. H.: *The Psychology of Social Institutions*, Chap. X, "Language, The Fundamental Institution," pp. 187-217.
19. Keller, A. G.: *Man's Rough Road*, Part III, "Religion," pp. 187-317.
20. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Chap. IV, "The Community," pp. 57-77; Chap. VII, "The Family," pp. 109-151.
21. Mowrer, E. R.: *The Family*, Chap. IV, "The Family as a Social Institution," pp. 64-82.
22. Ogburn, W. F.: "The Changing Family," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 23(1929), 124-133.
23. Oppenheimer, F.: *The State*, Chap. I, "Theories of the State," pp. 1-21.
24. Park, R. E.: "Community Organization and the Romantic Temper," *Social Forces*, 3(1925), 673-677.
25. Reuter, E. B., and Jessie R. Runner: *The Family*, Chap. VI, "The Family Institution," pp. 131-162.
26. Russell, B.: *Education and the Good Life*, Chap. II, "The Aims of Education," pp. 47-83.
27. Sprowls, J. W.: *Social Psychology Interpreted*, Chap. VI, "Social Organization," pp. 112-126.

28. Sumner, W. G.: *Folkways*, Chap. X, "The Marriage Institution," pp. 395-416; Chap. XIX, "Education, History," pp. 628-638.
29. Thomas, W. I.: "The Persistence of Primary-group Norms in Present-day Society and Their Influence in Our Educational System," in H. S. Jennings and others, *Suggestions of Modern Science Concerning Education*, pp. 157-197.
30. Thorp, W. L.: *Economic Institutions*, Chap. I, "The Background of the American Economic Order," pp. 1-15.
31. Tozzer, A. M.: *Social Origins and Social Continuities*, Chap. IV, "Marriage and the Family," pp. 127-178.
32. Waller, W.: *The Sociology of Teaching*, Chap. IV, "The School and the Community," pp. 33-47; Chap. XXIV, "A Principal Reason Why Institutions Do Not Function," pp. 441-446.
33. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "The Family," pp. 235-246; Chap. XXII, "Religion," pp. 249-258; Chap. XXIII, "Education," pp. 261-271; Chap. XXV, "Politics and Law," pp. 287-303; Chap. XXVI, "Industrial Organization," pp. 306-320.
34. Westermarck, E.: *The History of Human Marriage*, Chap. I, "The Origin of Marriage," pp. 8-24.

CHAPTER VIII

ISOLATION

The problem of sociology is to analyze and understand human behavior and social life. This sets a twofold task: a description of the human personality, including its origin and development as well as the way in which it functions and is modified in the world of reality; and a description of the social organization which is evolved in response to human need and effort and functions to mold its creators to its own pattern. The two, human personality and social organization, develop together and are mutually and reciprocally modified: human beings are what they are as a consequence of their life and experience in the social order into which they are born, and the social order is made what it is by the persons themselves. For purposes of analysis and understanding, it is necessary to examine the various elements and aspects of the complex social process apart from other elements and aspects which they modify and by which they are in turn modified.

The foregoing chapters have defined in a preliminary way the development of the person and the nature of society. They described the nature of the human animal and the modification of this original material in the interaction of social and cultural life. They also indicated something of the nature of the person as he exists and functions in the group life. The preceding chapters also defined society and indicated something of the nature of the social organization that has resulted from the age-long efforts of men to find more adequate means for the satisfaction of their needs.

It is necessary next to examine in somewhat more detail the process by which human nature is formed and changed and the social organization created and modified. In the interests of simplicity and clarity the discussion of social contact and interaction is prefaced by a consideration of the factors that interrupt the social process. Isolation implies an absence of contact and interaction. The present chapter gives a simple statement of

isolation in its more general and obvious aspects and shows something of its effects on culture organization and personality development.

A. FORMS OF ISOLATION

Isolation is a familiar word of daily intercourse signifying detached position or the act or process of attaining a detached position. It is the state or condition of an object or person that is separated and unconnected with other things or persons, hence free from the influence incident to contact and conjugation. In science the word has several specific meanings not unrelated to the common-sense usage. In chemistry, for example, it refers to the state of an element or compound when it has been separated from all foreign elements and also to the act or method of obtaining the substance in a pure or free state—that is, uncontaminated by foreign matter. Medicine uses the word to describe the complete separation from other persons of the patients afflicted with infectious or contagious diseases and also to designate the place of seclusion, as the isolation hospital, the isolation ward, the isolation camp.

In biology the word has a technical connotation. It is the name applied to one of the four major factors in organic evolution: variation, natural selection, isolation, inheritance. In this usage it connotes the whole range of factors operating in a limited area to maintain the separation of any assemblage of plants or animals and to prevent the incipient varieties and species from crossbreeding with neighboring allied varieties. It signifies the general idea of freedom from crossing with other stock; it is a “general term for all the varied ways in which the radius of possible intercrossing is narrowed.” It includes the idea of biological and ecological separation as well as that of habitual segregation. Biological isolation is essential to divergent evolution. Distinct organic types could not be maintained without the prevention of intergeneration. Isolation is the factor that avoids the leveling effects of free crossing, allows variations or nascent species to become localized, and explains the presence of thousands of local races, varieties, and species.

The forms of biological isolation are numerous and subject to varied classifications. The autonomic include a wide range of conditions within the group, as industrial, migrational, and other endemic conditions as well as sexual antagonism, impregnational

incompatibilities, and other reflexive conditions. The heteronomic include those determined by conditions outside the organic group as geological change leading to separation, transportation to distant positions, and artificial conditions. Another classification of the forms is into the reflexive, environmental, regressive, and intermediate. Still another fourfold classification is into spatial, structural, habitual, and psychic.

As used in sociology, isolation is the absence of social contact. It refers to social rather than to physical separation. Isolation may be defined for sociological purposes as any interruption of or hindrance to free communication. It is an inclusive term for all the varied ways in which communication is restricted. It comprehends the exclusion from as well as the absence of contacts between persons or between groups. It is always a relative term, a matter of degree; social isolation is never complete. Adult care of the human infant through the first decade of life is a prerequisite to its survival, and prolonged human association is prerequisite to the acquisition of speech and the other characteristic human traits. The factors producing isolation may be classified as spacial separation, biological variation, and culture difference. Isolation itself is commonly discussed under divisions corresponding to the factors that produce it.

The physical facts of external nature are everywhere important as determinants of the number and type of human contacts. The simplest form of separation is geographic or spatial. In the sparsely settled areas distances are great and meetings of persons are relatively few. The oceans and other large bodies of water have, through the course of human history, precluded contacts between the inhabitants of different continents and island areas. Within the different divisions, the presence of mountain ranges, desert regions, swamp lands, and other natural features of the geographic environment have operated as effectually as distance separation to prevent the contact and communication of neighboring peoples or to make them infrequent and irregular. The Sahara desert has separated Africa and effectually prevented the migration and contact of the peoples to the north and the south. The Himalaya and Rocky Mountain ranges have operated to the same end in other continents. An essential part of human geography is the detailed consideration of the influence of topography on human and culture development; the location of peoples in relation to others is a significant fact in anthropogeographic

effort to understand racial differences and divergence in culture development. Natural barriers and physical distance are, of course, relative to the stage of culture development. The physical distance separating persons, for example, is a matter of absolute space, a question of miles; but it is also, and perhaps more significantly, a matter of the time required to cover the distances, and this is determined by the stage of transportation development.

The biological differences that prevent human contacts or retard the process of free communication are of equal or greater importance. They are of three main types: individual differences, race differences, and sex differences.

In all societies and at all times the sexes are, more or less and in certain respects, mutually isolated. There are differences in metabolic processes, in physiological functions, and in native interests that stand as ineradicable barriers to free communication and full understanding. Probably there is always present a biological element of sex antagonism that ordinarily operates below the level of conscious awareness. Like all biological differences the facts of sex are overlaid by conventional and traditional differences and are made the basis for occupational and class separations that operate directly to determine the degree and type of exclusion. Hence, while physical and biological sex differences are, in themselves and directly, isolating factors, they also operate indirectly, through conventional and traditional definitions of historic origin, to increase the social and cultural isolation of women.

In a closely similar way, race differences isolate. The various external marks, as pigmentation, facial features, body odor, and other traits, differentiate peoples and operate as barriers to association and communication. Moreover, these biological features are made the basis of social definitions that further narrow the range of contacts. Race feelings, whether of biological or of conventional origin, are powerful isolating factors. Each isolated racial group and provincial men in all racial groups look upon their own type as the only fully human form and tend to fear or despise men of other races. These attitudes limit communication by making difficult meeting and association on a plane of equality and mutual respect.

The individual differences most significant in producing isolation are sense defects, particularly blindness and deafness, that

debar persons from the use of the common mechanisms of communication, the mental defects and deficiencies that limit comprehension, and the superiorities that restrict the number with whom communication is profitable. Sense defects render the standard means of communication less accurate and effective and in some cases impossible of use. The deaf are completely isolated as far as sound communication is concerned as well as from all knowledge and appreciation of sound. The blind are isolated from all contacts and communication by means of facial or other gesture, and they are effectively barred from a knowledge of painting, sculpture, and numerous other elements of the cultural life and from participation in most conventional human activities. Defects in the sense of smell, taste, or feeling operate in similar ways, though in ways that are generally of less social significance, to set the person apart from his fellows. Any physical defect or deficiency sets the person more or less apart. Ill health or any structural defect shuts the sufferer out of many types of human activity and acts as a bar, both directly and indirectly, to contact and association. The mentally deficient and diseased persons, the psychopathic and the feeble-minded may be institutionally isolated. Even if this be not the case, they are still isolated from profitable human contacts. At the opposite extreme from the mentally deficient and divergent are the superior persons of all places and times. The mystic is isolated because of his inability to participate in the daily life of his group and because of the inability of others to follow his mental processes. All creative minds are isolated, lonely, and misunderstood. Their superiority, in some part biologically based but for the most part social, reduces, directly with the degree of superiority, the number with whom communication is worth while. Each person is isolated to the extent that he has experienced uncommunicable thought and to the degree that he is incapable of following the thought of superior minds.

On the cultural level, language differences most immediately and obviously act as barriers to contact and communication. It is always difficult to convey meanings beyond the simple and commonplace, even when there is a common language. The existence of hundreds of languages and thousands of dialects is a condition that separates groups and makes sympathetic relations among them difficult and in some cases impossible. The ability to communicate is dependent upon the ability to understand,

while the inability to understand and communicate is a source of fear among groups and individuals. But differences in manners, customs, and habits of life arouse fears and antagonisms and make relations, in consequence, limited, formal, and distant. Differences in moral practices, supernatural beliefs, institutional forms, and other ways of groups often create hostility or open conflict between the groups or among the group members. Difference in marriage and family practices and organization create emotional barriers to association; the practice of one group, as polygamy, may be repulsive to another group of different marriage folkways and make amicable relations of the groups difficult. Religious differences are everywhere isolating factors; each sect believes itself to be the possessor of the truth and believes that non-believers are wrong and dangerous, hence to be avoided, each refusing to learn or follow the ceremonial routine or worship practices of the other, each going its own way and remaining separate in practices, beliefs, and attitudes. Within the same group the unlike interests, patterns of behavior, types of occupation, and other incidents of daily life, as well as individual and group differences in educational standards, ideals, and objectives act as barriers between and among men. The daily routine and manner of life and the range of interest and information isolate ministers, merchants, mechanics, and other occupational groups one from another. The specialist in any line is by the very fact of his specialization set apart from others.

People who act differently come to think and feel differently; the following of a particular activity pattern leads presently to an approval of it. The practice of monogamy in a group, for example, results presently not only in the acceptance of the pattern but in an emotional approval of it and in an antagonistic attitude toward individuals and groups that do not conform to this usage. Groups with unlike ways do not understand each other; they live in different universes of discourse. The older and younger generations, parents and children, bosses and workmen, masters and slaves, ministers and people, teachers and pupils, aristocracy and peasantry, and other divisions have unlike values and activity routines and unlike views of life and outlook on the world. They commonly do not understand each other and frequently do not want to do so. A full and complete understanding between two persons is perhaps never possible,

and any absence of complete understanding is, to the extent that it exists, an isolating factor.

Men have in some measure removed the barriers that separate them from their fellows. The geographic and spacial barriers steadily diminish in importance with inventions in the realms of communication and transportation. In some measure the barriers between man and the other animals have been removed through domestication which has changed the original nature of certain animals, as the dog, but they remain, for the most part, insurmountable. The isolation of infants, defectives, and other individuals is in part but never completely overcome through perfected means of communication.

B. SOCIAL DISTANCE

The fact of isolation is universal in human relations and, in its more obvious aspects, universally recognized. But it is equally obvious that it is more complete and profound in some cases than in others. The concept of social distance has recently come into vogue in consequence of attempts to state social and sociological facts in statistical terms. It is used in the efforts to measure the degree of isolation of persons and of groups. The concept has been much misunderstood and grossly misused.

Distance is of course a physical concept that describes the relation of objects in space. These relations are determined by definition from established points of reference and in convenient units of measurement. The space intervals between objects are stated in feet, miles, light years, or other arbitrary units. It is desirable in certain cases and for certain purposes to state the degree to which persons are isolated in their cultural and social relations. To this end, various attempts have been made to invent a technique and devise a scale for measuring social relationships.

In the animal realm and in the human social order there is something corresponding roughly to distance and position in the world of physical reality. The very term *social order* implies differences; every organized group is of necessity stratified. The position that the person occupies in relation to his fellows and the position of the group in relation to other groups are described by the term status.

Among such animal groups as the bees and ants there is stratification based upon physical structure and physiological func-

tions. The hive of bees has a queen, a series of drones, and an army of workers; in the ant colony there is a similar and sometimes more elaborate structural differentiation and social organization. In every animal aggregation there are individual differences that go to determine relative status. In the simplest of the human societies there are age groups, sex divisions, privileged classes, and other differences that make organization necessary and possible. The economic classes in modern society are based on ownership of property and control of the means of production and distribution. The political strata are determined by the distribution of power and authority. And there are occupational groupings, educational divisions, families, parties, religious denominations, nationalities, races, and so on through the list. These divisions draw more or less artificial lines and imply distance of a different order from that of physical separations. The groups may be physically near, as a master and his slave or an employer and his employee, yet far removed in social status and in political, economic, educational, and other respects. And these class divisions separate individuals within the same race or class and they separate the individuals of different groups. On the other hand, persons may be far distant physically, as army captains assigned to different posts, but identical as to social status.

There is a third and more fundamental type of relation among human beings: the psychological and sociological nearness or separation of individuals and groups, their convergence or divergence in sympathy and understanding. This is the type of relation that the term social distance is meant to conceptualize.

Geometric space is purely physical, and geometric distance locates objects in physical space. Stratification is mechanical and categorical and locates persons in the social order. From the point of view of sociology each is external and superficial; neither denotes the human person or defines the fundamental social relation. The existence of social classes should not lead the student to the inference that they are basic social facts. Persons who are members of the same group, perform similar functions within the group, and are more or less identical in social position may nevertheless be very distant from one another in more fundamental respects. The master and the slave may be near in understanding and sympathy; two brothers may be far apart.

Both physical distance and class distance are important sociologically to the extent that they condition contact and interaction. But they are conditions of interaction, not the process itself. They are presociological rather than sociological. In so far as stratification separates individuals, it isolates—that is, it interrupts free communication. In so far as it inculcates similarity in habits, manners, interests, beliefs, traditions, and the like among the members of the group, it facilitates contact and communication within the group and retards communication with the members of other groups. Race, sex, education, occupation, and the like are barriers to communication outside the group confines.

Some preliminary effort has been made to develop a tool for measuring social distances, the degree of isolation that obtains among individuals and groups. Some success has attended the effort to measure the relative mental abilities or relative degrees of mental development of individuals and groups. The measurement of economic and other forms of social stratification may be approached with relative ease and objectivity. Some reputable scientific beginnings have been made toward developing a scale and technique for the quantitative study of social attitudes, but the measurement of social distances—the degree of divergence in sympathy and understanding—is still in a stage of preliminary experimentation.

C. ISOLATION AND RACE DIFFERENTIATION

The existence of the various human races, differing as they do in biological character, is an item of importance in the present connection. Races are a product and a cause of isolation.

Isolation in this biological sense has reference to the failure of one part of a plant or animal group to interbreed freely with other parts of the group. In the presence of isolating factors there is a loss of homogeneity of characters among the group members. The separation may be due to any fact or set of conditions, from physical separation to habitual differences. But whatever the isolating factors, when individuals are set off from the mass, biological divergence at once begins and leads in time to race and species distinction. Any original deviation, however slight, in the separated group is fixed by inbreeding and modified in a definite direction by selective adaptation to the peculiar environmental conditions. A new form is inevitable. All the varying species in nature owe their separate existence to

some form of isolation, as do, also, the subspecies and other minor divisions.

As biological entities, the human races have their origin in mutational change from preexisting forms. In the process of reproduction, individuals appear who are marked by characters unlike those that distinguish the parent stock. From the point of view of survival the new characters may be indifferent, or they may be either advantageous or disadvantageous. In case they are not of such positive disutility as to lead to the selective elimination of the forms so marked, the divergent individuals may reproduce by cross-mating with the ancestral stock and their descendants or some of them be similarly distinguished. Further crossbreeding may result in the new traits' being modified and becoming common to the stock.

But the divergent traits of the mutants may lead to a sex avoidance, isolation of the individuals bearing them, and thus result in their inbreeding and the formation of a subrace within the population. There is a general marital avoidance of the deaf by the persons normally endowed in this respect. The result of their sex isolation is a high degree of interassociation and a high percentage of intermarriage unions among the defectives. In so far as the defect is heritable, the offspring will be similarly marked, hence similarly isolated, and find their associates and marital companions among their kind. The process is one tending to the formation of a deaf strain in the population, a subrace or racial variety marked by the distinctive trait that determines the isolation. The marital avoidance of the mentally defective may result in their congregation, association, and intermarriage and thus in the formation of whole groups marked by the same low level of mental ability. In a similar way any other trait that marks individuals and leads to their exclusion from marital relations with others results in their interassociation; the consequent inbreeding tends toward the production of a definite biological type.

In the formation of the major racial types there has been in all cases spacial isolation. The historic process has been the separation of groups and their migration and geographic separation. The close intermarriage within the geographically isolated groups led to the fixation of whatever traits the group possessed that were of survival value, or not of positive biological disutility, in the new habitat.

The separation resulting from race difference leads not only to the perpetuation of distinctive physical traits and characteristics but also to peculiarities in the folkways and cultural characteristics. The isolated group acquires new forms of dress and new food habits, it develops tools and weapons adapted to the conditions of the habitat, the supernatural beliefs and practices undergo change, the language suffers dialectical variation, and in various other ways the traits of the culture become more or less distinctive and in some respects unique.

Those racial and cultural differences acquired by any group as the result of isolation and intermarriage are things that make for their exclusion when they come into contact with other peoples. The differential treatment of Negroes, Jews, Orientals, and representatives of other racially divergent groups is abundantly evident in American life, as, indeed, it is elsewhere.

Biological mutation, therefore, operates in the first instance to isolate the divergent individuals from the usual range of contacts within the group. The divergence causes avoidance or exclusion and withdrawal on the part of the individuals discriminated against. The result is the formation of a more or less distinct biological group. This biological isolation is an essential prerequisite to race differentiation. On the other hand, the fact of race is everywhere made the basis of differential treatment.

D. ISOLATION AND CULTURAL RETARDATION

The effect of isolation, regardless of the conditions that induce it, is to retard the cultural advance of peoples.

Culture development depends upon discovery and invention and the incorporation and assimilation of the new into the existing culture complex. The likelihood of discovery is roughly proportional to the size of the population; the contributions to the social heritage are made by the superior individuals, and the larger the group, other things equal, the larger the number of men capable of making culture contributions. The likelihood of the discovery and acceptance of the new increases with the density of the population, since density increases the ease of communication. In the communicating world, the place of an invention is not a matter of concern; a knowledge of the discovery spreads and it soon becomes the common property of all. Any group therefore profits as greatly from borrowed as from independently produced culture facts. Darwin, for example, was

an Englishman but the Darwinian idea has been as prolific of intellectual advance in Germany and the United States as in England. The germ theory of disease, the basis of modern medicine, was a French discovery but all parts of the communicating world have profited from it equally with the French people. The complexity of the prevailing group culture is a third fact conditioning culture advance. The larger the body of existing culture facts the greater the likelihood of further invention, since every discovery is dependent upon that which has gone before.

Any isolated group must depend upon the genius of its own people for all cultural invention. The smaller the group the less chance there is of the appearance of superior persons in definitive situations, and the less the likelihood either of invention or of its acceptance and preservation by the group. There is, of course, no possibility of an isolated group's maintaining the cultural pace of larger groups and of those in a position to adopt, utilize, and profit by inventions made elsewhere. Isolation is a fact that narrows the range of ideas to which the group has access, hence a condition limiting its cultural development.

Social change in primitive groups goes on with a slowness that seems incredible to Western minds, chiefly for the reason that such groups must depend upon their own inventiveness for advance. But the same stagnation, perhaps in lesser degree, is found in every area of infrequent contact. Everywhere are marked differences between the central and vicinal areas of the same country and between the urban and the rural areas. The differences were particularly striking prior to the present era of quick, easy, and general communication, but even today the new penetrates slowly into the interior. The most retarded group of any size in the United States is the population of the Southern highlands, the lack of outside contact being of course the major causal item in the backwardness of these mountain folk.

But the fact of geographical isolation operates indirectly as well as directly. The isolated people develop a traditional conservatism and an institutional stability that independently resist change. The mental attitudes that prevail in a region of infrequent change are themselves isolating and give rise to other retarding factors in the culture life of the people. Recent legislation in certain backward states designed to prevent the schools from teaching the theory of evolution and other commonplace

biological information is illustrative of the behavior of isolated folk. Separation from the world may be voluntary, as in the case of various sectarian groups that have isolated themselves from the stream of culture in order to perpetuate divergent beliefs and practices. It may be the result of a sentimental complex, as in the case of the Irish, Polish, and other militantly nationalistic groups; it may be the result of exclusion, as in the case of the Negro in America and the Jew in Europe; it may be a language isolation, as in the case of immigrant groups in America. But regardless of the cause or form, group isolation results in retarded culture in proportion to the completeness and duration of the separation.

E. ISOLATION AND INDIVIDUAL RETARDATION

Social contacts are necessary to mental and personal growth as well as to the cultural development of groups. In the absence of contacts the individual fails to develop a human personality, and any interruption of contacts results in personal and mental deterioration. Human nature and personality grow in social life and decay in isolation. Contact with others is necessary to the development of self-consciousness and to human thought.

There are a number of more or less well-authenticated cases of children, lost or deserted at an early age or otherwise deprived of human contacts, who survived in isolation or as members of animal groups and were later recovered and returned to human society. In each such case that has been recorded the individuals, on being returned to human society, were almost or quite lacking in the distinctly human characters. Not only that, but they were in general unable to acquire a human nature. They were without language and without the ability to learn; mental development was arrested on a plane little above imbecility. They lived a vegetative or animal existence, reactions were largely automatic, they were generally unconscious of self, showed an absence of social feeling, and showed also an indifference to human companionship. In some cases they did not walk erect and learned to do so only with difficulty. Such feral men are of course ignorant of all social customs. They do not smile or laugh but produce noises like those of the sheep or wolves or other animals among which they lived. Self-consciousness, personality, the capacity for thought and emotion, and other social and human traits develop only in society.

A somewhat similar thing is true of individuals initiated into a social group and later separated for long periods from human contacts. Such persons undergo a very pronounced mental and cultural deterioration. In isolation they come to rely upon impulse and habit; for the most part they cease to reason or to think. The life histories of shepherds and others long separated from association with their fellow men furnish notable illustrations of deterioration resulting from prolonged isolation of this type. There is an early neglect of the niceties of civilized life: they do not shave, clean their teeth, brush their hair, wash their hands; they become indifferent to appearance. There is no one to see and none to care, and there is a loss of self-respect, since self-respect—a distinctly human trait—depends in large measure upon appearance. The loneliness is at first hard to bear and the person talks aloud to himself. He is constantly haunted by the fear of lunacy. Hermits undergo a variety of forms of mental disintegration; the strange noises, mysterious voices, and other sense hallucinations are often deemed to be supernatural and this interpretation further contributes to the mental divergence. Lighthouse keepers, trappers, prospectors, and other vocationally isolated men manifest the characteristics of persons long isolated from social contacts.

The effects of rural isolation manifest themselves in a number of ways. The fact that farm isolation is in general a hardship is indicated by the disposition of retired farmers to move to the villages, by the testimony of rural folk themselves concerning the social poverty of the farm life, and by the response that rural people make to whatever social facilities may be introduced. It is generally believed and probably true that the rural people, especially the women, are prone to melancholia. Among the men, senile dementia is excessively high among the agriculturists. The rural families are remote from each other and contacts are relatively difficult and infrequent; the single family leads a narrow existence with contacts insufficient to social and personal development. This is particularly true of the women on the farm: they are more isolated than the men, since they see less of the neighbors, have less occasion to go to the villages, and engage less in cooperative work. Because of the more monotonous existence and the empty mental life, they age early and the sensitive are prone to melancholia.

Prison life furnishes a further body of evidence that human nature deteriorates in isolation. The decay is notorious and spectacular in prisons where solitary confinement is practiced: premature death, suicide, madness, and melancholia are excessively high under such *régime*. The prisoners struggle against solitude: the codes of tapping they develop are for companionship as much as for information. The pathetic frequency with which they make pets of mice, rats, spiders, and other vermin that infest their quarters is further illustration of the desire for companionship. The prisoners in solitary confinement become subject to delusions and hallucinations, the memory is weakened, the desire to read declines, the power of mental concentration deteriorates, the capacity to observe becomes less, the emotional capacity declines. In time, when release comes, they cease to care; they have lost the love of home and friends, they shrink from others and return to their cells for shelter. Physically and mentally the prisoner is reduced to a cog in the prison machine.

An affliction operates to the isolation and deterioration of the person. Individuals born with sense defects fail to develop into normal human beings except as elaborate special education is provided to overcome in some part the isolation. Uncared for by special treatment, these persons become a special clinical type in the institutions for the care of defectives; the so-called idiots by sense deprivation are those who have been isolated by blindness, deafness, or other sense defects which prevented social contacts and, hence, mental and personal development.

Any physical affliction operates both directly and indirectly to isolation and deterioration. The cripple cannot take part in the interests and activities of other persons. If the affliction comes after friends and interests are formed, the former friends and companions fall away, and the person himself becomes sensitive and withdraws, shuns people, and shrinks from contacts.

Within the society, because of the defective social organization, numerous individuals are excluded and socially, culturally, intellectually retarded. Illiteracy, in a modern society, excludes an individual from the great majority of the most stimulating of human contacts. Poverty bars him from opportunity of education as well as directly from various contacts. The member of a class is by that fact isolated from contact with individuals of other classes; he has the sentiments and prejudices of the class.

F. ISOLATION AND INDIVIDUALITY

While isolation in an extreme form prevents the human development of individuals and, when it takes place in later years, leads to decay of most of the personal traits that have been developed, certain types of separation are essential to personal development and conducive to intellectual development. Isolation is always a matter of degree. Where contact and communication approach a maximum, as in the family group, the primitive tribe, or the detached village, there are a decline in individuality and an increased uniformity in the character and personality. The superior as well as the incapable divergents are molded to type.

In any society the superior person is of necessity isolated. To the extent that he is gifted he is peculiar, different from mediocre persons, and in consequence misunderstood, neglected, and avoided. Many men of genius are lonely souls craving a sympathy and companionship that cannot be. Creative thought is done apart from the distraction of companionship. Not only so, contacts cannot be. The person withdraws from association to think and to do original work: little if any creative thought is possible in the immediate presence of a group. Moreover, in most cases, the superior man finds ordinary contacts on the whole unprofitable; the man of parts is bored by the chatter of commonplace persons. Zimmerman remarked that, "who lives with wolves must join in their howls," and Wagner expressed a slightly different aspect of the unprofitableness of most contact in the statement, "I always feel it to be a useless and utterly resultless proceeding to converse with anyone." Numerous other men of genius have made similar observations.

Originality is in part a function of individual variation; it is, in general, the natively superior men who see new relations and possible combinations among familiar phenomena and initiate culture change. The superior man is of course dependent upon the culture complex: the information of which he is possessed and the tools with which he works are the products of previous social life. It is on the basis of these that he works; they form the content of his mind and he can never rise greatly superior to them. To the extent that he is limited in education or otherwise isolated from the culture patterns of his time the conditions necessary to his profitable activity are absent. Regardless of

the degree of native superiority, he could not develop and could not work isolated from society. At the same time, it must be recognized that new organization requires long periods of solitude, of freedom from interruption and relief from distraction. Periods of privacy, solitude, isolation give the person opportunity to reflect and to organize and reorganize the materials that come to him from his social contacts. It should be remarked incidentally that the contacts profitable to the superior man are in nearly every case contacts with books or other inanimate things; very rarely indeed are the contacts of daily life anything but interruptions and distractions. The value of solitude is, of course, conditioned by what the person brings to it; the type of experience he has had with men and books determines the materials with which his mind must work in isolation. It is in the isolation of privacy that the person assimilates the new material, recasts the prior content of the mind, and makes original and fruitful combinations.

An idea, an "inspiration," a "hunch," a new conception of relations may come to a man at most unexpected times and with startling suddenness. The source and origin of ideas may be difficult to trace but lie, in every case, in the prior experience of the person. But ideas remain vague and racially useless until such time as they have been organized, verified, and put in a form intelligible to others. The solution of a problem that comes to the mathematician suddenly often requires days or weeks of isolation and labor to demonstrate; the idea that comes without effort and uninvited to the artist may require years to put in artistic or literary form. For this purpose there must be separation and solitude, freedom from interruption and the control of distracting social pressures. A major difference between superiority and mediocrity, as measured in the world of men, lies in the ability and willingness to accept the periods of solitude requisite to any work of human and social value.

The desire for contact is in most persons qualified: man craves solitude quite as truly as he craves companionship. Contact and association rapidly exhaust nervous energy, and companionship, in consequence, soon becomes fatiguing; the person is irritated, rather than soothed, by too much companionship and desires solitude and privacy. The inability of most urban dwellers to secure privacy for any continuous period of time is perhaps the chief explanation of the strain of city life. To other

the lifelong habit of close contact with large numbers makes any degree of solitude unbearable.

Privacy is one form of isolation. It is the voluntary separation from the group with, at the same time, ready access to it. It affords the person an opportunity to select such contacts as are stimulating and to avoid painful and unprofitable association. It frees the person from unselected external contacts and gives him control over his environment. Isolation in this form is necessary to personal integrity and to the maintenance of self-respect. Mature people, "especially sensitive and intelligent ones, feel a peculiar sense of irritation at having their personal affairs publicly displayed." The callous disregard by older persons of the child's need and desire for privacy is one of the great and unnecessary hardships of the child.

Just as a minimum of privacy is essential to the maintenance of self-respect, the demand for privacy increases with education and personal self-respect. In modern times, in certain economic levels of the Western world, the possibility of privacy has increased. But to the poor, particularly the city poor, privacy is a luxury that is rarely or never experienced. The need and demand for privacy and solitude are greatest among mental workers: the thinker is a solitary man; quiet is an essential condition to creative thought. "Man," as Nietzsche has well said, "cannot think in a herd." Graham Wallas has expressed the same thought: "No man is likely to produce creative thoughts, either consciously or subconsciously, if he is constantly interrupted by irregular noises." In association with other people, the continual distraction by conversation is essentially an interruption of the mental processes by irregular noises.

The concept of the stranger may profitably be considered from the point of view of isolation. In the popular usage a stranger is a person in an environment new to him, the man who is among people unknown to him personally. Such a man is more or less isolated from personal contact and intimate association.

But the stranger is isolated in a different and more significant sense. He is outside the social group and free, therefore, from the local taboos and social restrictions. He sees and evaluates the group customs from a foreign point of view, from the standpoint of a different group and culture, and without the sentimental bias of the native. The stranger in a group, in consequence of his different point of view and freedom from the local senti-

ments—that is, his isolation from the group and its heritage—is in a peculiarly fortunate position to see the situation objectively and to initiate social change, and he is also in a position to exploit the group in a manner impossible for the group member. It is a highly significant fact that the stranger has so often been instrumental in catastrophic as well as other historical changes.

In a somewhat more fundamental sense the stranger is any person who has become emancipated from the local traditions and customs of his culture, who rises above the provincial situation and sees its objectivity—that is, in relation to other and different situations. He is outside the *mores* and hence is not biased by them. This form of isolation is essential to scholarship.

The “marginal man” is one who is in a measure outside the group but has not achieved the status of a stranger. He is one who has had forced upon him a degree of isolation but who is unable to rise superior to sentimental attachments or to the concrete situation.

In the contact of cultures are numerous individuals on the borders of both. They belong to both groups at the same time that they are not fully in either. The Christian convert has changed his formal religious affiliation but is bound to the culture group whose religion he has repudiated by many sentimental memories and obligations. He is not sentimentally a part of the new culture group. The mixed-blood populations that have grown up in the various areas of race contact do not belong fully in either culture group but in part to each. The Jew who has left the ghetto but who cannot escape classification as a Jew often finds himself without membership in either the Jewish or the non-Jewish group; he has rejected one group and the other refuses to accept him.

These marginal men represent a peculiar though not uncommon kind of isolation. They comprise a social type or series of social types that are just beginning to be understood as the intermediate status is analyzed in terms of the two concepts, isolation and social contact.

G. SUBTLER FORMS OF ISOLATION

Restriction upon contact and association is often unintentional and sometimes not recognized as such. In such cases the results in human nature and personality are often mistakenly attributed to other facts. Differences in education, language, and religion

are obstacles to free communication but they are not greater, perhaps, than the restrictive regulations governing rank and social position or than the barriers erected by the fact of variation in individual habits and manners of life. A great variety of facts and conditions that erect barriers to contact and association are subtle and incidental. Of particular importance among the less often recognized forms of isolation are estrangement, prestige, prejudice, and pathos.

Pathos is the tendency to see in others characteristics that have their locus in the sentiments of the observer rather than in the object. The emotional attitude often gives rise to behavior that is inimical to the welfare of the loved object. The sentimental attachment of the mother for her child may lead her to give a degree of protection and care and shielding from experience that retards the development of the child; he suffers from the well-meant behavior of the parent. In a larger way the chivalric and romantic attitudes toward women in the Western world have been a major factor in their retarded personality development. The girl in the ordinary American family is more closely guarded than the boy, allowed less freedom, given less responsibility, has less contact and experience, and the results show in the differences in independence, initiative, and general achievement of men and women. One result of the general disposition to protect and shield the object of sentimental attachment is to isolate him from experiences and thereby condition and retard personality and character development.

Timidity, quite apart from the cause or explanation of the fact itself, is a subtle form of isolation. The timid person finds it difficult to meet people, to talk with strangers, to take part in any social activity that makes him the center of attention. The person who is shy and bashful makes a generally poor impression in a strange social group, often in any social group, and the realization of the fact adds to his disinclination to participate actively in group affairs. His sensitiveness may make the fact of public approval and applause almost as painful and unwelcome as public disapproval and censure. As a result he is isolated from the group and group activity in a way that is commonly overlooked and that is scarcely if at all comprehensible to the bold and aggressive person who courts attention and seeks publicity.

Isolation may be the consequence of any trivial circumstance that determines a certain set of mind. The consciousness of

being poorly dressed, of a physical peculiarity that may prove offensive, of a divergent racial or cultural origin, of descent from a disreputable ancestor, or of other facts may cause the person to avoid contacts that he would otherwise make.

The name Archibald seriously handicapped him in his attempt to become an ordinary fellow. It was not that Archibald was an insurmountable obstacle, but Archibald was sensitive of his name. He formed an aversion to his name in the grade school because he was unable to say it plainly. Archibald was always very much abashed when he was forced to tell anyone his name. The dislike for the name grew upon Archibald's oversensitive nature until he began to avoid meeting others for fear that they would call him Archibald, or that he might be forced to tell some stranger his name. He was not a bad sort of a fellow but he found even his few friends made sport of his unfortunate name. . . . When he passed on to the high school he withdrew farther within his shell. . . . He longed to be one of the carefree boys who greeted each other with a friendly, "Hello, Bill,"—but what if some one should shout, "Hello, Archibald," in a crowded corridor. . . . In college he proved himself to be a superior man—and gained national honors in sport. . . . His success would have brought popularity to any ordinary person, but it only made Archibald more unpopular than ever. He was isolated by his very success in sport. His school fellows thought he was conceited and overproud of himself. . . . He couldn't meet people on a friendly footing. . . . He was excluded from the social and fraternal gatherings. . . . He was moody and brooded over the seeming injustices, the ridicule, the exclusion from the fellowship he craved.¹

Prejudice is one of the more important forms of subtle isolation; it operates in numerous ways to limit the contacts and experiences of persons. The Negro in America, the Eta in Japan, the Jew in Russia are notably sufferers from discrimination due to the prejudice of race. But the prejudices of sex, religion, caste, class, and others operate as generally to exclude persons from contact and experience.

H. SEGREGATION AND THE PROCESS OF ISOLATION

In the foregoing discussion the chief emphasis has been upon isolation as a condition or status, upon the fact of exclusion from contact and communication. It remains to consider the process by means of which the condition of isolation is established and maintained.

¹ Excerpt from an autobiographical document.

In part, isolation results quite naturally from the differences in interests and activities of the various members of a complex society. Specialization of the person or the group along any line, whether it be baseball, business, or science, entails a certain exclusiveness of attention and a narrowing of interests and enthusiasms. Among people differently specialized there is often little common ground for contact, whereas persons within the same or related fields find each other mutually accessible and stimulating. There is generally no feeling of hostility or aversion, or even any conscious avoidance in isolation of this sort; yet the fact of separation is real and apparent. The segregating factor is a positive rather than a negative one.

This type of isolation is broken down, when it is, only by the pursuit of some additional interest in which both parties may share. Literature, art, drama, music, current affairs serve this purpose among intellectual folk otherwise isolated from one another; for other people upon a somewhat different plane cards, dancing, sports, automobiles, politics, and like interests lessen the isolation caused by individual specialization.

But isolation is in part an effect of competition and conflict among variant individuals and groups. The values at stake are of many kinds—religious, political, moral, economic, and many others—and those who struggle for certain ends are separated from those who strive for others. Those who seek wealth have little in common with those who seek understanding or beauty; the business man, the scientist, and the artist live in different worlds. And among those who struggle for the same values certain are advantaged and others are disadvantaged; the advantaged and the disadvantaged come together with their kind. The effects of this process are observable in the segregated areas of any cosmopolitan city environment. On the basis of language and nationality are formed the Little Italies, the ghettos, and the various other immigrant colonies; on the basis of race are the Chinatowns and the black belts; on the basis of wealth and income are the gold coasts and the slums; and on the basis of other values are the segregated vice areas, the Bohemias, and the Hobohemias. The segregating factors, the forces that drive groups apart and that bring the members of each group together, are both positive and negative. But in the main they are negative—the aversions, prejudices, hatreds, and enmities—rather than positive. The Negro lives in the black belt less

because he wishes to live near other Negroes than because he is excluded from other residential areas; the Jew lives in the ghetto less from choice than from necessity. The two sets of facts do, of course, interact and reinforce each other, and both persist and tend to broaden and deepen. On the negative side the vicious circle runs: difference, avoidance, exclusion, accentuation of difference, increased avoidance, and so indefinitely.

As a result of the process of segregation, operating on the basis of native and acquired traits, every considerable population is divided into numerous non-communicating groups. The residential areas of a city are broken into racial, economic, linguistic, and other divisions. Occupational groups are often separated geographically, as they are in interests and activities. The criminal, defective, immigrant, artistic, and other groups live lives more or less apart.

I. ISOLATION AND NATIONALITY

Isolation is not wholly a personal phenomenon, as shown in the preceding paragraphs concerning segregation. Groups as such are set apart from one another in the community; contacts among them are limited both in number and in kind, and as a result groups develop differentiated characters. Historically some such process has operated to produce the cultural differentiation of national groups.

In the beginning of any national development distance separation is perhaps most significant. Physical barriers to easy movement of persons and goods secure for the group an isolated existence within a given area. Here it lives through a series of generations, conserving many heritages from its ancient past and developing new ones as it discovers new resources in its environment or new ways of utilizing old ones. The historical and cultural processes, operating thus in separate and circumscribed geographic areas, produce a distinct community of language, folkways, mores, ideals, and ideas. The Balkan region with its crisscross mountain ridges is a congeries of little pocket-valleys within which somewhat peculiar cultures have developed.

Contact and communication also have effects upon the rate and form of national development, but in the present discussion the absence of, or exclusion from, contacts is the fact of interest. Sometimes, as in the case of ancient Greece or of the British Isles, isolation in some respects combines with ease of communication

in others to condition the cultural development of a people.

The two sets of factors, isolation and contact, together with the heritage the migrating group brought with it into its habitat at the beginning of its separate national existence and the critical experience of its independent life, are being given greater and greater weight in explanation of cultural differentiation and development.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this chapter to the preceding discussion.
2. Explain the connotation of the term *isolation* in the biological literature.
3. How is the term isolation defined for sociological purposes?
4. What are the three general types of factors producing social isolation? List as many specific factors under each type as you have experienced or observed.
5. Natural barriers are relative to the stages of culture development. Give numerous illustrations.
6. "Geographical separation is of interest to the sociologist only in so far as it occasions social distance." Explain.
7. Do you agree with the implication of the text that race prejudice is a provincial attitude?
8. Discuss the lack of understanding between capital and labor in terms of isolation.
9. Give examples of isolation resulting from individual differences; from cultural differences.
10. Explain and illustrate what is meant by "universe of discourse."
11. What do you understand the expression "social distance" to mean? What is the relation of social distance to isolation?
12. Can you show by illustration that races are both products and causes of isolation?
13. What is the significance of external and obvious race differences, like skin color, in the isolation of the races?
14. Discuss ex-president Coolidge's provincial use of "choose" in his statement, "I do not choose to run for president in 1928," and the newspaper and popular speculation as to his meaning.
15. How do you explain the survival of distinct cultural traits in the Jews?
16. In what ways are rural people isolated? Enumerate effects of rural isolation not mentioned in the text. To what extent are the so-called rural problems a result of isolation?
17. Helen Keller is a case of isolation through sense defect. In what way was the isolation overcome? How completely was it overcome?
18. How do you account for the deterioration of the person in solitary prison confinement?
19. Give a case known to you of a person deserted by friends as a result of physical affliction.
20. "My deafness forces me to live in exile." (Beethoven.) Explain.

21. "High culture always isolates." Do you agree? Is this isolation a fortunate or an unfortunate circumstance?

22. What are the values of privacy? What are some of the consequences of inadequate provisions for privacy in the home, the dormitory, or elsewhere?

23. In what different senses is "the stranger" isolated? In what sense is the "marginal man" isolated? Would you agree with the statement that the stranger achieves isolation while the marginal man has it thrust upon him?

24. "The doctor therefore gains prestige by the mysteriousness of his silent gravity." Discuss.

25. What do you understand by the "isolation of pathos"? By the "isolation of eminence"?

26. Do you think that the protective and preferential treatment accorded women in the European world has resulted in the isolation of women?

27. Give case illustrations of other subtle forms of isolation.

28. Give an example known to you of isolation due to race or caste prejudice.

29. Those who have antipathies cannot understand those who do not. Explain and illustrate.

30. Trollope wrote of one of his more doubtful characters: "He isn't of our sort. He's too clever, too cosmopolitan—a sort of man whitewashed of all prejudices, who wouldn't mind whether he ate horseflesh or beef and never had an association in his life." Discuss.

31. "How complete was the isolation in which he found himself, when he was almost equally condemned, in London as a bigot, and in Oxford as a latitudinarian." Discuss.

32. Isolation from the concerns of Europe is, or has been, one of the three important foreign policies of the United States. Just what is meant by isolation as here used?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Make a statement of the relation of isolation to the whole social process in both its individual and its collective aspects.

3. Make a list of the more isolated peoples of the world. Show their location on an outline map. Show on the same map the lines of world communication. In how far do you have an explanation of the isolation?

4. On an outline map of the United States trace the lines of travel from East to West of the pioneers and settlers, the railroads, and the airplanes. Superimpose on the map the areas of retarded culture. Discuss, on the basis of your map, cultural retardation and routes of travel as determined by topography.

5. The girl is rarely criticized with the same candor as the boy, because "her feelings would be hurt." Develop in a brief essay the nature and

effects of this common attitude of pathos toward girls in the differentiation of sex types.

6. Simmel, *Sociologie*, pp. 685-691 (quoted in translation by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 322-327), states the sociological characteristics of the stranger. Name these and discuss each in terms of isolation.

7. "This Hanover family is isolated here. They have no friends." Turn to a history of England, if necessary, and explain the isolation of this royal family.

8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. Isolation. M. H. Boehm, "Isolation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - b. The Forms of Isolation. F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 117-123.
 - c. Geographical Isolation. E. Huntington, "Human Progress and the Relief of the Land," in J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 227-235.
 - d. Social Distance. R. E. Park, "The Concept of Social Distance," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 8(1924), 339-344.
 - e. Isolation and Race Differentiation. C. Wissler, "Ethnic Types and Isolation," *Science*, n.s., 23(1906), 147-149.
 - f. Feral Men. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 239-243.
 - g. Isolation and Personal Deterioration. S. Hobhouse and A. F. Brockway, *English Prisons of Today*, pp. 581-585.
 - h. Privacy and Solitude. I. Edman, *Human Traits*, pp. 138-140.
9. Topics for written themes:
- a. A Personal Experience in Isolation
 - b. Individual Divergence and Isolation
 - c. Genius and Solitude
 - d. An Isolated Man
 - e. The Isolation of Prominence
 - f. Isolation in Fiction
 - g. Rural Isolation
 - h. Imaginary Companions
 - i. Biological Consequences of Social Isolation
 - j. The Isolation of Pathos
 - k. Poverty as a Form of Isolation
 - l. The Isolation of Women
 - m. Prejudice and Isolation
 - n. Isolation and Divergent Beliefs

Supplementary Readings

1. Anderson, N.: *The Hobo*, Chap. VI, "The Hobo and the Tramp," pp. 87-95; Chap. VII, "The Home Guard and the Bum," pp. 96-106.
2. Bernard, L. L.: *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. XXXII, "The Influence of Contacts upon Individual and Collective Behavior," pp. 496-516.

3. Blumenthal, A.: *Small-town Stuff*, Part II, "Agencies of Social Control," pp. 101-207; Chap. VI, "How Well the People Know One Another," pp. 101-127.
4. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. VIII, "Isolation," pp. 89-101.
5. Bogardus, E. S.: "Social Distance in the City," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 40-46. Also in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 48-54.
6. Boisen, A.: "The Sense of Isolation in Mental Disorders: Its Religious Significance," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 555-567.
7. Fishberg, M.: *The Jews: A Study of Race and Environment*, Chap. XXI, "Social Disabilities and Their Effects," pp. 438-465.
8. Hawthorne, H. B.: *The Sociology of Rural Life*, Chap. III, "Socialization: Its Interpretation and Meaning," pp. 39-58.
9. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VI, "Isolation," pp. 107-129.
10. McKenzie, R. D.: "Spatial Distance and Community Organization Pattern," *Social Forces*, 5(1927), 623-627.
11. Moffat, Adelene: "The Mountaineers of Middle Tennessee," *Journal of American Folklore*, 4(1891), 314-320.
12. Park, R. E.: "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 1-14.
13. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. IV, "Isolation," pp. 226-273.
14. Parker, H.: "Folklore of the North Carolina Mountaineers," *Journal of American Folklore*, 20(1907), 241-250.
15. Poole, W. C., Jr.: "Distance in Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 99-104.
16. Semple, Ellen Church: *Influences of the Geographic Environment*, Chap. XIII, "Island Peoples," pp. 409-465.
17. Shideler, E. H.: "The Social Distance Margin," *Sociology and Social Research*, 12(1927), 243-252.
18. Thomas, F.: *The Environmental Basis of Society*, Chap. VII, "The Social Importance of Location and Accessibility," pp. 154-189.
19. Waller, W.: *The Sociology of Teaching*, Chap. XVII, "Social Distance; Buffer Phase," pp. 279-290; Chap. XVIII, "The Definition of the Situation," pp. 292-316.
20. Wiese, L. von, and H. Becker: *Systematic Sociology*, Chap. VIII, "Solitariness and Associativeness," pp. 139-151; Chap. IX, "Contacts Among Human Beings," pp. 152-167.
21. Williams, J. M.: *The Expansion of Rural Life*, Chap. III, "Rural Groups in a Period of Isolation," pp. 32-44.
22. Wirth, L.: *The Ghetto*, Chap. II, "The Origin of the Ghetto," pp. 11-27; Chap. XIV, "The Sociological Significance of the Ghetto," pp. 282-291.
23. Zorbaugh, H. W.: *Gold Coast and Slum*, Chap. IV, "The World of Furnished Rooms," pp. 69-86.
24. Zorbaugh, H. W.: "The Natural Areas of the City," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 188-197. Also in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 219-229.

CHAPTER IX

SOCIAL CONTACTS

In the preceding chapter the phenomenon of social isolation was defined and its bearing on personal and social development explained in some detail. The term conceptualizes the relative absence of or exclusion from contact and communication, together with the inducing circumstances and the resulting conditions. A state of isolation may be either a temporary or an enduring status; it may be specific and partial or it may be general and relatively complete. The separation may be voluntary or enforced, or it may begin as one and continue as the other. The state of isolation is occasioned by a wide variety of factors that are roughly segregable into three categories: spatial separation, biological or structural variation, and cultural differences. In form it ranges from timidity, reserve, and other distance-keeping behavior of the person or the group to such sharp and enforced separation as results from sense defect, caste prejudice, or penal regulation. Depending upon the form it takes and the circumstances under which it occurs, isolation may further or retard personal or group development. In some cases it prevents personal growth and group development or results in personal and cultural decay. In other cases it furthers the growth of personality: some degree of privacy and seclusion is necessary to the maintenance of personal integrity and the performance of creative work. The partial separation of a group at certain stages of culture development, by limiting the number of foreign influences, makes possible the integration and growth of distinctive types of social organization.

The present chapter is in reality a continuation of the study begun in the last; it involves a shift of attention and emphasis rather than a change of subject matter. Isolation and contact are opposing aspects of the same reality: each is of necessity excluded by the presence of the other. Both are relative: isolation is never absolute; contacts are never unlimited. The present

chapter deals with contacts and with their nature and their influence on personality development and culture growth. It should be treated as the complement of the chapter on isolation.

A. CONTACT AND INTERACTION

In the current usage the term contact has at least two different connotations: it is used to signify either an event or a relationship. In the one case it refers to a connection between things that is in the nature of an impact, a connection that endures for only an instant in time. This is an event. It is said, for example, that one ball on the billiard table comes into contact with another ball and puts the latter in motion. There is no enduring relation: the objects touch and separate. In another context the term is used with reference to a connection that obtains between independent realities and that endures through a period of time, to a more or less stable and continuous juxtaposition of two realities in space. It expresses a state rather than the momentary fact of meeting. Two adjoining books on the shelf are said to be in contact; the brass points of an electric switch are in contact when the circuit is closed. In a less literal sense persons or groups sufficiently close together to permit of constant communication are said to be in contact. The various divisions and other units of an army in the field may be widely spaced but each is in constant communication, hence in contact, with the general staff. In this sense the term connotes a relationship rather than an event.

The term contact has been given this same duality of reference in the sociological writings; it may refer either to an event or to an enduring relationship. For example, much is said in the sociological literature concerning primary and secondary contacts—terms presently to be defined. By the former is sometimes meant merely the momentary meeting of persons in an intimate way; at other times it has reference to the fact of intimacy as a characteristic or stable condition. Confusion does not always follow from this double reference of the word—the context commonly eliminates ambiguity. Nevertheless it is conducive to clarity and certainty of thought to retain the term contact to designate the more momentary facts, the impacts or events, and use the term relationship or some convenient circumlocution as “life in an area of primary contacts” to describe the more enduring circumstance. The term contact is here used,

therefore, as a colorless term denoting merely the fact that persons and groups come into a stimulating relationship, that, through some immediate or remote sense connection between them, the behavior of one or both of them is conditioned.

Interaction, on the other hand, has reference to what goes on subsequent to and as a result of contact. This linear relation has given rise to the conception of social contact as the first step in interaction. This is in a sense true: there is no social interaction without contact. But this does not express the only or the essential difference. Contact refers to the connection between persons and groups; interaction refers to the mutual modification and reciprocal behavior responses that result. Interaction is initiated by contact but the interaction itself is an independent process. In a sense, contact may be conceived of as the medium of interaction rather than as its primary phase.

A social group is maintained and perpetuated in and through the transmission of its heritage to the immature members of the group and to strangers within it. By various means, intentional and incidental, the child and the alien are gradually brought into conformity with the current standards. They come to share the ideas, beliefs, purposes, sentiments, loyalties, and aspirations current in the society. These immaterial things cannot of course be transferred directly; they cannot be enforced on the child or added to his body of interests. Their acquisition is a matter of growth and of transformation from one to another point of view. And this change comes from a way of acting. The body of thought and sentiment arises in response to environmental stimulation, as an incidental product of participation in activities that lead the person to form certain plans rather than others. Successful activity, even a tolerable existence, in the environmental situation necessitates certain types of behavior and attitudes of mind. Growing out of and accompanying the system of acting is the body of beliefs and feelings and ways of seeing things that receive the approval of the group and, at the same time, identify persons with it. The gradual growth of a disposition to the socially approved modes of seeing, feeling, and acting is the result of interaction and communication in the course of life in the given society and environment.

Without communication with his fellows a human animal would grow to adulthood—were it possible for him to do so—without ideas, beliefs, or sentiments and without a social self or

personality. He would have no sense of propriety and no thought of evaluation of his behavior. These are things that have their origin in and derive their meaning from association and communication, from interaction in a social group. Personality and culture are products of interaction.

But interaction is limited and directed, both in form and in content, by the number, frequency, intensity, and content of the contacts which persons and groups experience.

The sociological study of the phenomena of contact—and of interaction—proceeds from the hypothesis that the social process, the process of control through interaction and communication, is to be understood only as it is viewed in an intimate and detailed way. This involves analysis of human behavior, breaking it up in an attempt to discover the significance of the multitudinous points of connection among persons or, more precisely, among the activities of persons. Inevitably, it does violence to the unity of experience. The analysis of human behavior is a process of atomizing a continuous and highly complex experience into discrete events each of which is but momentary in duration.

B. PHYSICAL CONTACTS

In the preceding paragraphs something was said concerning the physical basis of social contacts. In the present section attention is given to the physical contacts as such, to contacts between the person and his material and non-human environment.

Physical contacts are contacts with things. The social student is not directly concerned to study such contacts except in so far as they determine or condition the reality with which he deals. Other students, notably the geographers, make it their special task to describe the conditioning effects of climate, soil, topography, location, and other such facts upon the behavior of individuals and groups. Nevertheless, the sociologist may not wholly neglect this field of study. It is important that he know the extent of interdependence between the phenomena of physical contact and the social phenomena which he endeavors to understand.

In a sense it is not possible to exaggerate the importance and determining character of the geological and geographic facts of external nature. Life itself, as we know it, is possible only within a narrow range of temperatures, in a restricted range of light, humidity, and atmospheric changes, and only by means of the

chemical composition of the earth's surface. It is only because of a probably unique combination of physical and chemical conditions that life exists at all. Man immediately and directly is dependent upon nature for all the necessities of physical existence, for all the material of his culture, for the patterns of his inventions, and for the forces that he utilizes. But this ultimate dependence of man on nature is not a matter of social import. It is the variations of the physical environment that are significant for social contact and culture development.

The geographic facts of social significance may be classed under topography, climate, and resources. These are conditions that in large measure determine the number, distribution, and movement of peoples and thereby determine social contacts and culture phenomena. In so far as life may be thought of as adaptation of the organism to its habitat, it cannot be the same in arctic and tropic regions, in the desert and the forest, in the river valley and the mountain area. In the less favored regions, the areas of extreme cold, the high altitudes, the desert lands, the conditions of life are hard and the population sparse. In the more favored regions of moderate temperatures, abundant rainfall, and fertile soil the conditions of life are relatively easy and the populations relatively large and comparatively dense. The social significance of mild climatic conditions and abundant available natural resources lies in the fact that they make possible a large population in a restricted area, conditions favorable if not essential to culture development. A population map of any country at any period will show the concentration of peoples in the favored natural areas which are as well the centers of culture. The significance of topography lies in the fact that it determines the routes of migration and travel and thereby determines the points at which peoples meet.

These physical contacts and the geographic conditions that determine them, it may be repeated, are conditions necessary to social life, but they are logically antecedent to it; only in a limited sense are they a part of it.

All human contacts have a purely physical or mechanical aspect; they occur by way of the senses and always involve the environing physical reality in some form. The spoken word involves the organs of speech as well as the organs of hearing and the media for the transmission of the sound waves; the written or printed message requires paper and ink as well as the sense of

sight and the fact of light. Touch, the most basic and primitive of the senses, would have no reality apart from temperature, pressure, and the like. Even the physical proximity of the other, the most simple and elementary of all contacts, has a physical aspect in the sight or other sense by which the presence is known. The material universe is utilized in every sense connection between persons and in every act of communication; in fact, the discovery or invention of new ways of utilizing the elements of this universe has had an important part in every improvement in communication. But the external, mechanical, connection is only the basis of the social contact, not the contact itself. Social contacts are contacts of persons. They invariably have an external and purely physical aspect, but they involve significantly an internal relationship between the persons, they are always characterized by communication. The sound of the voice, the written word, the touch of the hand, and like contacts are in themselves physical and meaningless. Their social character, their reality as social contacts, lies in their symbolic reference, in the meanings which they carry: their significance is in the responses that they stimulate, in the processes that they initiate. A momentary eye-to-eye contact or the inflection of a spoken word may change the course of a human life and, consequently, each aspect of reality touched by the modified personality. A social contact is a meeting of minds, an exchange of influences, to which the physical contact is the means and incidental accompaniment.

C. SOCIAL CONTACTS

The fact that man lives in association with his fellow men makes contacts between and among men inevitable and universal. Human life is social life; the routine business of living involves an endless succession of meetings among men. Some of these are voluntary and welcomed; others are obligatory and irksome. Many are accidental, momentary, formal, superficial, aside from the interest and detached from the organization of the person's activities, of trivial import for personality organization and development. Others are significant and critical; they may have a profound and enduring influence on the person's character and life activities. Some contacts are direct, involve the immediate presence of persons in the exchange of influences, and affect in some degree the life and behavior of each person. Other contacts

are indirect: they may be mutually stimulative, as in the case of the writer and the recipient of a personal letter; or the influences may be individual rather than reciprocal, as in the case of a second-hand oral report or the reading of a published work.

No generally acceptable classification of the diverse and multitudinous human contacts can be made on a common-sense, observational level. The various contacts of men are not discrete and unitary facts that fall into a limited group of mutually exclusive categories. A social contact is a complex of influences: its nature is conditioned, among other ways, by the mental attitude and run of attention of the person. An experience that is meaningful to one person may be meaningless to another. Any scientific and generally valid classification of contacts would of necessity therefore run in abstract terms, in terms of the influence or meaning or type of interaction initiated by the contact rather than in terms of the superficially observable manifestations.

For purposes of the present discussion, it is unnecessary to make any thoroughgoing and logical classification. A simple description of the objective reality in relatively concrete terms is adequate for purposes of elementary study. The interest is in the concrete contacts themselves and in the consequent changes in personality organization. It is possible to approach the study of the concrete phenomena from a variety of points of view. Each approach will determine a special classification, valid for the purpose and from the special point of view. A number of classifications are in current use.

The basic emphasis may fall, as it did in much of the thinking of Sumner, upon group separation and organization. This gives, as a first step in classification, an "in-group" and "out-group" dichotomy. The character and internal organization of groups are conditioned by the fact of their overt or potential conflict with other groups, and, consequently, the contacts of persons are determined within fixed and narrow channels, those with members of the in-group standing in sharp contrast to those with members of out-groups. In a second case the point of departure may be the social heritage. Here the problem divides into questions related to the conservation and transmission of the heritage, on the one hand, and to its modification or loss, on the other. The social contacts in this case divide more or less completely into those of historic continuity and those of mobility.

Professor Cooley, with his thought more or less exclusively on the person, emphasized the dissimilar influence of intimacy and of impersonality in the relations of men. He implied a classification of contacts into the primary and the secondary. Various other basic divisions are possible and many classifications are in use.

It should be repeated here that the categories or classes of contacts derived in this way are mutually exclusive only in the sense that one member of each pair is antithetical to the other member of the same pair. Thus in-groups contacts are distinguished from out-group contacts, primary from secondary, and those of historic continuity from those of mobility. A given contact cannot be both in-group and out-group, although it may be both in-group and primary and, at the same time, a contact of historic continuity. A given contact is usually classifiable either under the first category of all three pairs or under the second category in all. But this is not invariably so. A contact that is primary is usually also an in-group contact and a contact of historical continuity, but a primary contact may, in certain conditions, be an out-group contact and a contact of mobility. A community in which primary contacts predominate is, in general, one in which in-group contacts and contacts of historical continuity also predominate. These facts and their relations will be seen more clearly as the different categories are defined in detail and the characteristics of each type distinguished.

D. GROUP ORGANIZATION AND SOCIAL CONTACTS

The terms in-group and out-group state a commonplace distinction: that between the group of which one is a member and other groups in which one does not hold membership. The use of either term involves the other by implication: reference to the in-group implies that there are other groups excluded from the category; the term out-group could have no reality but for the fact that there is an in-group. The distinction between the in-group and out-group is at bottom a distinction between that which is "mine" and that which is not so conceived. Any use of such pronouns as *my* and *our* implies that which is not mine or does not belong to us. My family, our school, and like expressions imply other families and other schools which are not ours and to which we do not belong.

The in-group out-group distinction varies with the particular set of circumstances. The family of which the individual is a member is an in-group; he thinks of it as "my" family in distinction to "other" families. But he is also a member of many other groups: he thinks of my fraternity, my club, my lodge, my party, my church, and of other similar organizations as separate from and opposed to the organizations in which he does not hold membership. In another connection he thinks of my neighborhood, community, or city as distinct from other groups or regional areas. A still further extension gives rise to the state or nation or other political aggregation as an in-group. In any situation, from the single family unit to the American nation or even occidental civilization, in which the person identifies himself sentimentally with one group in opposition to others, there exists the in-group out-group distinction.

By in-group and out-group contacts are meant those that are typical of the two groups. In-group contacts are those among the insiders, contacts that involve only the members of the same group as between members of the same family, tribe, or clique; out-group contacts are those with outsiders, the contacts that cross group lines as with members of other tribes, factions, or persuasions. The contacts are of course relative to the point of view: that which is an in-group contact in one situation is an out-group contact in another. The relations of the members of a professional organization, as the medical association, are in-group contacts as distinguished from the contacts of the members with lawyers, engineers, or military men. From the point of view of the physician's family, neighborhood, or social club his contacts with other medical men would be out-group contacts. From the point of view of the social club the contacts of the man with his family and other persons not members of the club are out-group contacts. A specific contact is thus either an in-group or an out-group contact according to the point of view and purpose of the contact.

Contacts within the group are characterized by the fact that the persons involved accord each other sympathetic and individual treatment. A degree of mutual understanding and a common body of sentiment are shared by the members of the group. On the basis of what they have in common—interests, knowledge, attitudes, beliefs, and the like—their relations tend to be personal, easy, and informal. This is not to be taken as meaning

that all in-group contacts are friendly. Many of the relations that obtain are colored by personal jealousy, suspicion, and dislike, but over and above the clash of personalities are the facts of common membership in the group organization and the mutual realization of a community of interest.

Out-group contacts are characterized by the fact that the persons involved accord each other prejudicial and categoric treatment. As an outsider the person is classed as belonging to a different group and he is treated not as an individual but as a representative of the out-group. He is in a certain category, a representative of another group, and as such he is treated prejudicially—that is, he is assumed to have the traits of character and personality assumed to define the group that he represents. He is seen not as a person but as a stereotype. The member of another race, as a Negro or a Chinese, is accepted not on the basis of his personal worth and characteristics but as a stranger and in terms of the status of the group to which he belongs. In times of war the most peaceful and inoffensive member of the enemy country is suspected of embodying all the vicious traits attributed to the enemy tribe. But out-group contacts are not always or usually overly hostile. The contacts of Negroes and whites, of men and women, of the mistress and her servants may be free and friendly. Nevertheless, there is always a somewhat formal, cautious, and guarded element in the relationship; an element of danger always inheres in out-group contacts.

Thus a differentiation arises between ourselves, the we-group, or in-group, and everybody else, or the others-groups, out-groups. The insiders in a we-group are in a relation of peace, order, law, government, and industry to each other. Their relation to all outsiders, or others-groups, is one of war and plunder, except so far as agreements have modified it. . . .

The relation of comradeship and peace in the we-group and that of hostility and war towards others-groups are correlative to each other. The exigencies of war with outsiders are what make peace inside, lest internal discord should weaken the we-group for war. These exigencies also make government and law in the in-group, in order to prevent quarrels and enforce discipline.¹

At the beginning of an acquaintanceship one tends to classify the other, to place him in some category about which he has

¹ W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, p. 12. Quoted by permission of Ginn & Company.

already an organized body of sentiment, opinion, and prejudice. The stranger is a professor, a lawyer, a Negro, a Jew, a woman, a student, a laborer, or other categorical type. This is of course an inevitable and universal procedure: it is only through classification, bringing the new into groups of the known and understood, that the new can be made comprehensible; that which is unique and cannot be classified is incomprehensible. But each category into which persons are classified is essentially a body of preconceptions and generalizations, vague or clearly defined, concerning the personality and character of members of the group or class. The result of such classification, in the beginning at least, is that other persons are prejudged. The tentative classification is almost or wholly without consideration of the personal or individual qualities of the person, without consideration of the traits that may set him apart from his group and make the assumptions as to his traits quite inappropriate. A Negro that one meets in the classroom may be a superior person, clean, well mannered, and of irreproachable character. But it may very well be that others will treat him not as these personal qualities would seem to warrant but as one thinks or feels that a Negro should be treated. He is a member of an out-group and, as such, is assumed to have the traits that are assumed to define this particular out-group. As an acquaintanceship progresses the initial categorical treatment is modified; the other comes to be recognized as a person rather than as a representative of a class. The individual and personal qualities become increasingly important in the determination of personal relations. The person is liked or despised in terms of his personal traits rather than in terms of the prestige of his group. But the classification remains; the person is always more or less definitely identified with the group to which he belongs.

In-group contacts are commonly sympathetic; out-group contacts are typically categoric.

Contacts that cross group lines have, characteristically, a solidifying effect upon the in-group. The presence of outsiders compels an unwilling cooperation and solidarity in a divided family or state, just as the presence of other people often stimulates in the person a superficial composure when subjectively he is torn by anger, jealousy, or grief. Such an effect arises out of an attitude of pride, suspicion, hostility, or fear. But out-group contacts are not invariably based on such an attitude and so do

not invariably have such an effect. During the recent World War, staff officers found it necessary to prohibit the fraternization of their men with men of the opposing army during inactive periods along the front in order to prevent loss of morale. The contacts in this case although crossing group lines, presumably during a state of war, were of a somewhat sympathetic kind. Whenever this happens in any group, the result is partial disintegration and acceleration of change. Such cases are not infrequent, nor are they unknown even among primitive groups.

E. CONTACTS OF HISTORICAL CONTINUITY AND MOBILITY

The historic continuity of any group depends upon the transmission of the social heritage from each generation to the one succeeding. The language, customs, beliefs, work techniques, ways of life—each and every element of the culture must be learned by the members of each generation and passed on by them to the generation that follows. There is no other means by which the culture life of a group may be preserved; any failure in the process of transmission interrupts the historic continuity and terminates the distinctive culture of the group. Contacts of historic continuity are those which preserve or tend to preserve the historic unity of the group. Most of the contacts of the old with the young, the incidental and informal as well as the formal teaching, operate to maintain the existing institutions, guard and uphold the group heritage, preserve and transmit unimpaired the characteristic forms and features of the existing culture complex. The contacts of the generations operate as integrating and conserving forces that make for the protection, preservation, and transmission of the social heritage.

All contacts between parents and young children are a means of transmitting the culture of the group. It is from the parents that the children learn the language of the group, its simpler work techniques, its manners of life, its folk practices and moral standards and social customs. Intentionally or incidentally the contacts and relations of the older and younger members of the society operate to the same end. In the home the children acquire the language, customs, and moral standards of the group as well as its body of tradition and folklore. It is all passed on by word of mouth. The elementary schools supplement and extend the informal and incidental instruction of the home. The

literature embodies the knowledge and philosophy of the group and passes it on from past and present to present and future generations.

The unity and continuity of the group are also preserved by a transmission of the heritage from members to initiates. The immigrants into a strange group acquire presently the language, standards, customs, techniques, modes of thought, and other aspects of the culture. The newcomers learn the ways and the sentimental responses and the thought forms of the new group and, in turn, transmit them to their children and associates. The college fraternities, sororities, and other campus organizations, the various churches and religious denominations, the lodges and fraternal societies, and various groups maintain continuity through proselyting and the initiation and indoctrination of new converts.

In this process of transmission there is change: the acquisition of the heritage is seldom complete and perfect, there are modification and growth through imperfect acquisition and through the introduction of new elements. But there is no break with the past. The English language has a continuous history of some hundreds of years. It is, to be sure, a somewhat different medium from that used by Shakespeare or Chaucer and it continues to undergo modification in use and transmission but it is a continuing trait of the group. The same is true of the body of English law, the code of morals, the manner of life, and other culture facts that, as a whole, characterize the English as a historic culture group. The fixity of tradition, custom, and the like as well as its changing nature in transmission are readily apprehended in the history of England, China, or other culture of long standing. The contacts that give this continuum to the existing body of heritages are those of historic continuity. They are "contacts with a fixed past."

Contacts of historic continuity are necessary to any continuous and stable existence; they make for unity and conformity in personal behavior and for cultural and social stability.

In some cases social contacts are with reference to a changing present rather than with reference to a fixed past. Directly or indirectly persons are brought into relations with a contemporary world of ideas, sentiments, values, and practices. From contemporaries—strangers, representatives of other groups, persons of different education and divergent interests and experience—

come new and novel ideas, sentiments, and practices. Elements foreign to the culture of the group are introduced through reading, travel, and other contacts with strange peoples. Independent invention and discovery, as well as the use of those that originate elsewhere, bring the new and the novel within the group heritage. All art and science are additions to the values of the group, while the current fads and fancies and fashions introduce more or less ephemeral modifications. Contacts of this order, contacts of mobility, interrupt the cultural continuity of the group by changing its attitudinal and value content.

The contacts of mobility operate as disorganizing and destructive forces. The introduction and acceptance of new facts, definitions, and methods require the modification or displacement of the old. They are the means of social change. They undermine old habits, beliefs, and institutional structures that are impervious to logical or other frontal attack. In doing so they release the individual from obligatory conformity to ancient usage and induct him into non-communal interest groups that transcend the local and traditional. By breaking down or weakening external controls and subjective inhibitions they increase the physical and mental freedom of the individual man and, by doing so, they increase in turn the mobility of populations and that of culture forms.

Through contacts of historical continuity, the life of society extends backward to prehistoric eras. More potent over group behavior than contemporary discovery and invention is the control exerted by the "dead hand of the past" through the inertia of folkways and *mores*, through the revival of memories and sentiments, and through the persistence of tradition and culture. Contacts of mobility, on the other hand, define the area of the interaction of the members of the group in space. The degree of departure from accepted ideas and modes of behavior and the extent of sympathetic approach to the strange and the novel largely depend upon the rate, the number, and the intensity of the contacts of mobility.¹

F. PERSONAL AND IMPERSONAL CONTACTS

Social contacts may be viewed with reference to the degree of intimacy or impersonality that exists between the parties to them. In this case they are commonly differentiated as personal

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 341. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

and impersonal or by other terms that are intended to carry somewhat the same connotation—primary and secondary, concrete and abstract. The terms are treacherous and much misused.

Primary contacts, as generally used, are those that prevail among the members of primary groups. This latter concept, primary groups, is in general use to designate those intimate, face-to-face aggregations with a more or less distinct feeling of unity such as the family, the neighborhood, and the play group of children. In the use of the concept most of the students follow Cooley and acknowledge their indebtedness to him; his definition of the primary group has tended to become a classic in the field.

There are, however, important differences among the so-called primary groups, consequently in the order of primary relations, that frequently escape attention. The primitive clan or tribe is often an isolated group with few and infrequent contacts with outside groups, and there are many other small and geographically isolated communal groups that live a life apart. These are primary groups by each of the criteria of the usual definition: they are face-to-face groups, they are temporally primary in individual experience, and they have a sense of group unity. But they are primary in a sense quite different from that in which the family, neighborhood, and sorority are primary. In the former case the group incorporates the whole life of the person; it exists as an inclusive organization, has a unity and solidarity that are spontaneous and inherent. In the latter case the group is an organization within the larger society; it includes only a part of the person's interests and only a part of his contacts, and its unity and solidarity are conditioned by its relations to coexisting groups and by the inclusive organization. When the primitive tribe comes into conflict with another tribe, or even when it comes to dwell, without overt conflict, in a region of other tribes, its internal organization undergoes radical change. It stands over against and in opposition to real or potential enemies; it becomes a fighting group—that is, it takes on an internal organization that is determined from without rather than from within. The personal contacts within the group undergo a corresponding change. The primary groups within modern societies are fractional groups whose character is determined in part at least by external factors.

It seems obvious that the term primary group has been made to cover two different kinds of group, the communal and the personal. But there is a yet more serious shortcoming: the term does not refer to any bit of reality. There are few or no groups that are strictly primary. Human groupings vary from those in which personal relations predominate to those in which the personal elements are negligible. It is not possible to make a logical classification of concrete groups on this basis.

The term personal conceptualizes an order of contacts where the persons are known to each other in many aspects of their lives and all their relations tend to be with respect to the entire personalities rather than being limited to a particular aspect or interest. Friends, members of the family circle, neighbors, and close acquaintances are known as persons. Any contact or association is in view of the more or less complete set of circumstances. The neighbor is known as a man of a certain temperament, character, and personality; his parents and home life, his wife and children are known, as are also his interests, mental peculiarities, economic status, church affiliation, political views, private habits, and a multiplicity of other details regarding his life and personality. On the other hand, the neighbor has a similar body of information about and sentimental attitudes toward those with whom he is in contact and association. In the circumstance the relations are personal—that is, relative to the whole nature of the persons involved.

Impersonal—secondary, abstract—relations, on the other hand, are those between aspects of persons or between the functions or interests of persons. They are the contacts characteristic of travel and trade and casual intercourse.

Such contacts may of course be face to face but they are between or among persons known to each other in a single or a few aspects of their lives. Often the present encounter is the only contact of the persons. The person who calls a physician or consults a lawyer has no knowledge of or interest in the private and personal life of the professional man. He is interested not in the man but in his surgical skill, his medical knowledge, or his legal answers. The physician or lawyer, on the other hand, has no interest in the client as such; his interest is in the disease with which the client is afflicted or in the legal problems by which he is confronted. The housewife who visits the grocer has no interest in or knowledge of the grocer as a person; she is concerned only

with the goods he has to sell. On his part, the grocer knows nothing and cares nothing about the personal life and affairs of the customer; he is interested only in getting possession of the customer's money and retaining her trade. The relation is impersonal and abstract, between a single function of the grocer and a single interest of the housewife. In the ideal form this is the character of all trade, business, and professional relations. personalities are subordinated to functions.

In many cases there is, of course, a mixture of primary and secondary relations of men. The physician may be and often is a friend of the family that calls him in a professional capacity; men often turn to their lawyer friends for legal advice; the grocer and his customers may have personal as well as business contacts. But this mixture of personal and impersonal contacts should not confuse the student; the contacts themselves are either personal or impersonal. Either set of relationships may of course lead to the other. The student comes to the professor because of his reputation as a scholar and is accepted as a matter of routine, but the relation that is at first a purely abstract one may initiate personal contacts and association between the two.

The two types of contact, as will be increasingly evident with the study of their nature and effects, are extremely important for the understanding of personal and group behavior.

G. RECENT EXTENSION OF THE AREA OF CONTACTS

One of the most significant aspects of recent cultural development has been the rapid and general shift from life in areas of primary contacts and contacts of historical continuity to life in areas of secondary contacts and contacts of mobility. In earlier and simpler societies the pace of change was slow, and extracommunal contacts were few and infrequent; disorganizing changes were generally widely spaced and commonly concerned, directly, a single or a few aspects of individual life or group organization. There was a high degree of stability and continuity at least in the basic ideas, beliefs, and activity patterns, and something of the same fixity and dependability still persist among the peoples and in the regions not yet disorganized by the scientific culture of the West.

But in the world of European civilization the present is a time of rapid and experimental change in all realms of experience. Communal and primary contacts and relations have declined and

the break with the past, in many aspects of the social heritage, has been abrupt and profound. Contacts of mobility comprise a larger share of human experience than has ever been the case in the history of human society. Ideas circulate with tremendous rapidity over wide areas and succeed one another at brief, if irregular, intervals. Persons and commodities move with ease and swiftness and with slight cost in comfort and convenience. International barriers, both psychological and geographical, are disappearing; inquiry, criticism, and research are specialized and remunerative vocations encouraged by private and public endowment. Life is becoming increasingly urban and the influence of the urban way of life has spread to the hamlet and the farmstead. For a world of separate, independent, and relatively isolated neighborhoods and communities, each characterized by intimate participation in a homogeneous fund of culture heritages, has been substituted the great society, the cosmopolitan world community.

Underlying this development is the extension of communication through the fabrication of a variety of mechanical devices facilitating contact. The steam locomotive made possible the rapid movement of men and goods over long distances within each country; the steamships brought the hitherto distant regions of the world into frequent and easy contact. The telegraph, cable, and telephone enormously increased the contacts of persons close at hand as well as those far distant. Concurrently the growth of the press and the public school brought literacy and a rapid circulation of ideas. Together these inventions and mechanical developments resulted in a tremendous increase in the transportation of commodities and in travel and study that resulted in an extensive and intimate interpenetration of populations and cultures. Still more recently the automobile with its concomitant network of improved highways, the motion picture, the airplane, and the radio have increased the physical and psychological mobility of peoples. The modern world lives in an area of secondary, fractional contacts.

Scarcely a region has remained unaffected by these new means of contact. Everywhere are restlessness and thirst for novelty and excitement; increasing release from customary, sentimental controls and a weakening of the authority of the family, neighborhood, and church; greater standardization of dress, manners, language, and other more or less external forms with greater

freedom and variety in such personal matters as religious belief, moral code, and philosophy. Ends are lost from sight in a quest of means; sentiments, even the basic human ones, are disparaged and disintegrated; consequences fall at such a distance from their acts that they are unseen by the actors and an ethical life is beyond the capacity of the common man; personal irresponsibility increases apace.

H. CONVENTIONAL SELECTION AND THE CONTROL OF CONTACTS

In the effort to increase social stability and to maintain the *status quo*, groups commonly attempt to restrict the contacts of their members. The contacts of children are generally quite carefully supervised and selected in order that they may not be corrupted by vicious associates or by the acquisition of information deemed improper for the immature. In Western society girls and women are particularly guarded and restricted in their contacts and experiences. Novel reading has often been condemned and frequently forbidden as a thing conducive to personal and social disorder. The teaching of evolution was recently forbidden in certain American commonwealths by legislative enactments. A little earlier it was often forbidden to teach school children the shape of the earth. In various schools, if not in all, it is forbidden to teach the facts of American history except as they are romanticised always to appear as creditable if not as just and heroic. The reading and preaching of atheism, socialism, anarchy, and other philosophic and economic doctrines are frequently proscribed. In other ways and in regard to hundreds of other items there is effort to prevent the spread of information—that is, to restrict the range of contacts. These restrictions have usually applied to certain areas of experience, generally to morals, religion, and politics, the things close to the *mores* and considered essential to the stability of the political and ecclesiastical institutions. Changes in the material culture and in the technology of production are not, at least in the present-day world, commonly discouraged; sometimes they are positively fostered by subsidies and rewards.

But contacts are limited in a great variety of ways and by many factors that are only incidentally or not at all so designed. The range and order of contacts are determined in large measure by external or incidental circumstances. The size of the man's

income decides the part of the world to which he has access; without money his contacts are within the neighborhood boundaries. But other facts are quite as restrictive. Etiquette, the moral code, prejudice, class membership, status, and formal education as well as specialized vocational and avocational efforts are important in securing the predominance of one rather than another type of contact. The selection of contacts tends to follow the conventional norms, to yield to fashion, and to become habitual in the person and thus to channelize his tastes, interests, and enthusiasms. The following random excerpt from a popular book on polite manners will suggest the way in which formal etiquette tends to limit, formalize, and channelize contacts as well as show the naïve way in which such folkways are rationalized:

To an old lady or to an invalid a gentleman offers his arm if either of them wants his support. Otherwise a lady no longer leans upon a gentleman in the daytime, unless to cross a very crowded thoroughfare or to be helped over a rough piece of road or under other impeding circumstances. In accompanying a lady anywhere at night, whether down the steps of a house or from one building to another or when walking a distance, a gentleman always offers his arm. The reason is that in her thin high-heeled slippers, and when it is too dark to see her foothold clearly, she is likely to trip.

Even in walking across a ballroom, except at a public ball in the grand march, it is the present fashion for the younger generation to walk side by side, never arm in arm. This, however, is merely an instance where etiquette and the custom of the moment differ. An old-fashioned gentleman still offers his arm, and it is, and long will be, in accordance with etiquette to do so. But etiquette does *not* permit a gentleman to take a lady's arm!¹

Other limitations on the range of contact are conventional and self-imposed. Many persons refuse to read or limit their reading to safe and sane restatements of conventional ideas. Others shut themselves in with their own affairs. Still others restrict their contacts to members of their own social circle and their range of ideas to those that are accepted by that set.

There are portions of the sovereign people who spend most of their spare time and spare money on motoring and comparing motor cars, on bridge whist and post-mortems, on moving pictures and pot boilers, talking always to the same people with minute variations on the same old themes. They really cannot be said to suffer from censorship, or secrecy, the high cost or the difficulty of communication. They suffer from anemia, from lack of appetite and curiosity for the human scene.

¹ Emily Post, *Etiquette*, pp. 29-30.

Theirs is no problem of access to the world outside. Worlds of interest are waiting for them to explore and they do not enter.

They move, as if on leash, within a fixed radius of acquaintances according to the law and the gospel of their social set. Among men the circle of talk in business and at the club and in the smoking car is wider than the set to which they belong. Among women the social set and the circle of talk are frequently almost identical. It is in the social set that ideas derived from reading and lectures and from the circle of talk converge, are sorted out, accepted, rejected, judged, and sanctioned.¹

The circumstances of social organization, with the division of labor and specialized interests, as well as income and educational differences, impose an endless variety of concrete barriers to contact. And to these, as just suggested, are to be added the voluntary barriers raised by sentiment, prejudice, and other subjective factors.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. In what two senses is the term contact used? Give an illustration of each usage.
2. What is the relation of contact (a) to isolation, (b) to interaction?
3. Do contacts come singly, or are large numbers of them associated in any single experience? Illustrate.
4. It is sometimes said that contacts are experienced in characteristic or commonplace "clusters." Can you illustrate from your experience? Of what significance is the point?
5. Can the person exercise any voluntary control over his contacts, discriminating among them, selecting and avoiding? What is the importance of such control, if it is possible? Can you make any suggestions as to the kinds of contacts that should be selected?
6. Discuss some kinds of contact with the physical world. Do such contacts determine the kind of culture the group develops?
7. What changes occur in man's relations to his material environment as he goes from primitivity to civilization?
8. What do you understand by a "natural area"? To what extent is it defined by purely geographical features? What is its importance in understanding the problems of the city?
9. Give some illustrations of "in-groups." Take any one of these and identify the corresponding out-group.
10. Is the out-group always organized?
11. What is likely to be the effect of external opposition and persecution upon a conflict group, like the I.W.W.? How would you deal with such a group?
12. Can you give illustrations from your own experience of ethnocentrism?

¹ W. Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, p. 50. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

13. Relate ethnocentrism to *esprit de corps* and to the social heritage.
14. How many categories can you think of into which you fit people? Try to discover what prejudices you have organized about some of them.
15. Do you recall any person whom you received categorically at first and then gradually came to receive sympathetically, or *vice versa*?
16. To what extent has your experience fallen within an area of contacts of historical continuity?
17. Give an illustration or two of contacts of mobility and of their effects.
18. "Every new period of historical development began with a new period of wandering." Discuss.
19. Are persons more or less mobile now than formerly? Why?
20. Name some types of culture in which there is relatively great resistance to change. How do you account for it? Is it rational or sentimental resistance?
21. Where would an artist or philosopher be likely to find more stimulating contacts, in the village or in the city? Why?
22. How do you explain the greater attention to externals, like dress, manners, and correctness of speech, in the city?
23. "The city is the natural area of the free man." "The city mobilizes the individual man." Explain these statements.
24. Give illustrations of conventional selection of contacts.
25. Are you a member of a social set? If so, can you think of any of its stereotyped sentiments and opinions?
26. To what extent do you think available contacts are avoided on account of (a) lack of time, (b) insufficient income, (c) incuriosity, (d) conventional bias, (e) moral principle?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.
2. Write an autobiographical account of an experience in contacts.
3. Give as exhaustive a list as you can of the new and extended means of contact open to you today but not open to your grandparents. Show briefly in a final paragraph how, by enabling you to communicate over wider areas with much greater speed, they have brought to you a different world.
4. Discuss concretely and in detail some effects of increasing secondary contacts upon family life.
5. Discuss briefly the external *versus* the symbolic character of contacts as presented by F. E. Lumsley, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 130-141.
6. State the classification of contacts given by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 282-287.
7. "Contacts are differentiated into in-group and out-group contacts when they are viewed with reference to the common or disparate membership of the parties involved—that is, with reference to the sympathetic or categoric character of the relationships existing between the persons." Discuss.

8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:
 - a. The Changing Character of Relations to the Land. Ellen Church Semple, *Influences of Geographic Environment*, pp. 51-71.
 - b. Preliminary Notions of Social Contact and the Sociological Concept of Contact. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 280-282.
 - c. The Inorganic and Organic Bases of Contact. F. E. Lumley, *Principles of Sociology*, pp. 131-136.
 - d. Classification of Contacts. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 282-286.
 - e. Sympathetic Contacts *versus* Categorical Contacts. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 294-298.
 - f. "Man's Dependence upon Contacts with the Physical Environment." F. H. Hankins, *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, pp. 171-180.
 - g. Personal and Impersonal Groups. H. E. Barnes and J. Davis, *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 566-569.
 - h. "Natural Areas of the City in Relation to Contact and Segregation." H. W. Zorbaugh, "The Natural Areas of the City," in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 219-229.
 - i. "The We-group and the Others-group." W. G. Sumner, *Folkways*, pp. 12-13.
 - j. Sympathetic Contacts *versus* Categorical Contacts. N. S. Shaler, *The Neighbor*, quoted by R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 294-298.
 - k. Ethnocentrism. E. Faris, "Ethnocentrism," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
9. Topics for written themes:
 - a. An Experience in Categorical Contacts
 - b. Natural Areas and Segregation in My Town
 - c. Ethnocentrism and Social Contact
 - d. Contacts in Relation to Family Life
 - e. A Comparison of the Village and the City with Reference to Predominant Types of Contacts and Consequent Changes in Attitudes and Interests
 - f. My Social Set
 - g. Effects of Recent Extensions in the Area of Contacts
 - h. Selective Effects upon Contacts of Vocational Choices
 - i. A Comparative Study of the Nature and Effects of Conventional Selection upon the Contacts of Males and Females
 - j. Privacy and Contacts in Relation to the Development of a Wholesome Personality.

Supplementary Readings

1. Bernard, L. L.: "Group Contacts and Attitudes," in J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, Part III, Chap. V, pp. 453-462.

2. Bernard, L. L.: *Social Psychology*, Part IV, "The Psycho-social Environment and the Organization of Collective Behavior," pp. 411-581.
3. Burgess, E. W. (editor): *The Urban Community*, Part IV, "Ecology of the City," pp. 167-229.
4. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VI, "Adaptation," pp. 34-41.
5. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "Socialization of the Individual," pp. 429-448; Chap. XXII, "Diffusion of Culture," pp. 449-479.
6. Chicago Commission of Race Relations: *The Negro in Chicago*, Chap. VI, "Racial Contacts," pp. 231-326.
7. Clow, F. R.: "Cooley's Doctrine of Primary Group," *American Journal of Sociology*, 25(1919-1920), 326-347.
8. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Part III, Chap. V, "Group Contacts and Attitudes," pp. 453-462.
9. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Readings in Sociology*, Book II, Part I, Chap. III, "Human Progress and the Relief of the Land," pp. 306-309; Book II, Chap. V, "Group Contacts and Attitudes," pp. 565-574.
10. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. IV, "Primary Group Life: The Forms of Human Association," pp. 117-142.
11. Ellwood, C. A.: *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, Chap. XVI, "The Forms of Association," pp. 341-351.
12. Fairchild, H. P.: *Foundations of Social Life*, Chap. VII, "Groups," pp. 184-208.
13. Groves, E. H.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. IX, "The Basis of Social Experience; Contact," pp. 170-185.
14. Hankins, F. H.: *An Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chap. V, "The Physiographic Factors in Social Life," pp. 171-216.
15. Hayes, E. C.: *Introduction to the Study of Sociology*, Chap. III, "Geographic Causes and Their Social Effects," pp. 29-41.
16. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XI, "The Individual and the Primary Group," pp. 137-144; Chap. XXII, "Contact and Assimilation," pp. 305-321.
17. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. III, "Social Contacts," pp. 60-86.
18. Lippmann, W.: *Public Opinion*, Chap. II, "Censorship and Privacy," pp. 35-45; Chap. III, "Contact and Opportunity," pp. 46-57; Chap. IV, "Time and Attention," pp. 58-63.
19. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VII, "Contact and Interaction," pp. 130-152.
20. Morehouse, E. W.: "Appreciation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
21. Park, R. E.: "The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern and a Moral Order," in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 3-18.
22. Park, R. E.: "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 881-893. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *Personality and the Social Group*, pp. 64-77.
23. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. V, "Social Contacts," pp. 280-331.
24. Sumner, W. G.: *Folkways*, pp. 12-16.

CHAPTER X

SOCIAL INTERACTION

As was pointed out in an earlier chapter, when the scientist speaks in terms of process he implies a sequence of steps of which each is an outgrowth of what precedes and in turn gives rise to that which follows. It is a group of activities each of which has a meaning in relation to all the others and the whole of which constitutes a transition from one status or condition to another.

Every process is the resultant of the interaction of diverse elements and must be described and understood in terms of the fundamental units involved. There are, in consequence, two things to be understood: the elements of the process and the way in which these elements interact.

A somewhat detailed presentation of the social elements was given in an earlier chapter on the social forces. It was there pointed out that the social forces are resident in persons and in the social heritage. They are the attitudes of the person and the system of values comprising the social heritage of the group.

The idea of interaction follows immediately and inevitably once the concept of social forces is understood. Any natural process involves not only the elements but also the ways in which these elements influence one another. The reciprocal influence of the social factors that result in human nature and in human culture is what is meant by social interaction.

A. SOCIETY AS INTERACTION

Social interaction is as wide as human life. The person's membership in society is determined by his responses to the social forces. Social contact initiates interaction; each person is influenced by and responds to the presence of others. The absence of contact and communication is isolation; the individual without social contact is outside society. Society itself exists only in so far as there is interaction. In its final analysis society is interaction; its essence is the set of relations that obtain

between and among the members of the group rather than the members themselves.

Society stated in mechanistic terms reduces to interaction. A person is a member of society so long as he responds to social forces; when interaction ends, he is isolated and detached, he ceases to be a person and becomes a "lost soul." This is the reason that the limits of society are coterminous with the limits of interaction—that is, of the participation of persons in the life of society.¹

Without interaction there might, conceivably, be individual existence of the discrete population units but there would be no society.

A person is a member of a group not because he is physically among the persons who compose it but because he is participating in the consensus of the group, because his activities are, at least in certain aspects, integrated with the activities of others in a common and collective enterprise. The group exists by virtue of communication and interaction.

A community is not a mere geographic expression; the term is not applicable to just any district no matter how its boundaries may be gerrymandered. The relations among the people resident within an area must be such as to constitute those people a society before they may be said to be members of one community—that is, there must be some degree of mutuality, organization, and consensus, some interaction and communication. To determine the boundaries of a given community in a concrete situation it is not possible to accept without examination the boundaries drawn for legal and administrative purposes. These marks of practical convenience are unsatisfactory for purposes of sociological analysis. The whole life of a community, as an incorporated village, may not be understood without including persons outside the legal boundaries who make the village their trading center, who attend its churches, patronize its schools, make it the center of their hedonistic activities, and otherwise participate in its life. But interspersed among the homesteads in and about the village center are certain homes some or all of whose members identify themselves more closely with a neighboring community. To draw the boundaries of a specific community it is necessary to proceed in such a way as to include all those

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 341.

whose energies are exchanged more intimately and extensively with this than with any other community. Interaction thus defines the group in space.

The modern studies of urban life follow the natural areas of the city—that is, the divisions determined by the more or less spontaneous community interests and activities. The boundaries are thus determined by the criterion of interaction. The ordinary divisions such as wards and precincts are more or less artificial and arbitrary unities created by governmental edict for administrative or political purposes. They do not coincide, except by accident, with the natural groupings of the population. Data that are collected and tabulated by the administrative units are commonly of little value unless they are capable of redistribution by natural areas. Statistics of divorce, delinquency, and other types of disorganization take on an entirely new and revealing character when plotted for the natural areas of a city.

Interaction also defines the group in time. This fact was previously explained, in connection with the transmission of the social heritage, and may be passed over briefly here. The conservation of the corporate identity of the society is through the contacts of historical continuity that make possible the transmission of its social heritage. Groups have a kind of immortality, although the individual members are mortal. A nation, a village, a church congregation, a sorority, or a fraternity maintains its corporate identity more or less intact throughout a series of generations. Changes do occur and in time the whole character of the society may be changed, but so long as changes are gradual and cumulative rather than sudden and cataclysmic the identity of the group is not destroyed.

There are three chief factors that favor communication through time; the continued occupation of a given geographic area, the overlapping of generations, and the continuity of the institutional structure.

The continuity of locality is a basic element in the continuing life of a group. The land is in the nature of an underlying material bond that holds the group together in space. It brings the people into physical proximity and, as they become attached by work or residence to certain areas, keeps them in proximity. Each group feels the need of a habitat or a meeting place, not merely as a refuge but as a kind of tangible and material symbol of group identity and purpose. The family has a home, the

sect a church or meeting place, the fraternal order its lodge or grotto or temple, the gang its rendezvous. In the absence of a common habitat, one is projected as an ideal and objective: the Jews have a Zion.

The mobility of the modern world has tended to destroy this historic basis of unity and continuity by divorcing men from the land. The migration of peoples, with their urbanization in distant and often in foreign areas, is a thing new in the experience of men. That it has resulted in some social disintegration is commonly agreed, and, among some students, the personal and social disorganization has occasioned much concern for the future of certain basic institutions or even the stability of the social order itself. Just what effect upon family solidarity and continuity, for example, will follow from the partial substitution of the apartment and the hotel for the single-family house is problematical, but that it has occasioned some considerable present disintegration is a matter of common agreement.

A second consideration conducive, if not essential, to the continuing life of the group is the overlapping of generations. In groups where the membership is recruited by births this condition arises naturally. The family normally comprises individuals of two or three and sometimes four or five generations. The same thing is true of the tribe and other groups genetically maintained. In other continuing groups some provision is commonly made to insure an adequate overlapping of generations. Nearly every legislative body retains historic continuity through a provision that the terms of members shall expire at different dates. The members of the United States Senate hold office for a period of six years but the term of office of one-third of the members expires each even-numbered year. This provision has made of the Senate a continuous body since its beginning. But even in the absence of specific provision that a certain percentage of the membership shall hold over from one session to another, reelection usually operates to the same effect. The members of the United States House of Representatives are elected for a two-year term which expires at a specified time, but because members are very frequently reelected, the House is never an entirely new body. College sororities and fraternities commonly have a national by-law limiting the ratio of new to old members. In the student body of a college or university the proportion of freshmen will seldom exceed one-third of the total.

The faculty of any well-organized university, as of the departments or colleges within the organization, includes young as well as mature scholars, and provision is made for the periodic addition of promising young men. In recent years the United States had defined a national policy in regard to immigration restriction designed to keep the number of immigrants from each foreign country sufficiently small in relation to the total that their assimilation may go on without endangering the historic continuity of the American institutions and culture forms. The gradual replacement of old by new members permits the heritage and body of tradition to be conserved at the same time that it is gradually adjusted to new conditions.

Another condition favoring interaction through time is the continuity of leadership and of the various specialized organs and agencies of group life. Almost every group has provided more or less adequately for a continuing leadership. In older societies, when family units and villages were more nearly self-sufficing and the hold of the state was relatively weak, hereditary leadership was very commonly resorted to as a means of avoiding a period of anarchy, precipitated by conflict among powerful subordinate contenders, after the death of one leader and before the accession of a new. A hereditary kingship is a symbol of group continuity. The office accumulates about itself certain qualities and prerogatives that come to persist independently of the private personality of the immediate incumbent. The kingship reflects and makes visible the immortality of the group and thereby strengthens the vitality of the group itself. With the passing of the tribal order and standards as represented in hereditary leadership, other provisions are made to insure continuity in leadership. The American constitution makes elaborate provision against the possibility of the country being without a chief executive. The continuity of other specialized agencies of the group life guarantees interaction through time. Provision is commonly made to insure the continuity of parliaments and judiciaries independently of the kingship or executive office. The elaborate hierarchies of the priesthoods operate, sometimes purposely sometimes incidentally, to further political and cultural continuity at the same time that they perpetuate the life of the class and the sinecures of the functionaries. Likewise the other specialized agencies gather about them a body of precedent, rule, and sentiment which they attempt to conserve

and generalize in each new generation. The temporal extension of each specialized group within a society is an element in the continuing life of the inclusive group.

B. LEVELS OF INTERACTION

Interaction and association are possible and actual on various levels of stimulation and response. The basis may be physiological, emotional, sentimental, or critical. In a concrete situation, communication is rarely if ever of a single order. Nevertheless it is possible and necessary to distinguish the different types of interaction and possible to indicate groupings where the interaction is predominantly of a given order. Three levels of communication will be considered.

Men, as other animal forms, respond immediately and directly to the presence of their fellows. The stimulation and the responses are essentially organic, sympathetic, and emotional. The type of interaction that goes on between the mother and her baby does not differ widely from that between the animal mother and child. It is largely physiological stimulation and response. The use of words on this simple level, as in the mother's lullaby, is incidental; words are used much as are inarticulate sounds, to express emotion, and they may give rise to emotional responses. It is the tone of voice, not the verbal symbols, that is important; the words may convey the barest minimum of thought or absolutely no element of thought at all; the actual communication might go on almost or quite as well without the use of verbal forms. The verbal communication between lovers may be unnecessary to the purpose in hand: the situation is an emotional one that does not require a language elaborated in the interest of ideas and designed to convey thought. In the behavior typical of unrest, crowds, mobs, social epidemics, and the like, interaction is largely on the level of immediate responses to stimuli.

Beyond the predominantly emotional and physiological types of interaction just mentioned, in which language may be employed but is little necessary, is communication on the level of traditions and sentiments. Here a common language is necessary, as is also a common body of heritage. Interaction is in terms of this common fund of sentiment which the word symbols make active. In the major part of human communication habit and emotion predominate over thought. Language arouses behavior on the

basis of the accepted tradition. The ceremonial procedure of the church service reinstates an emotional state and inhibits divergent responses. The successful political or inspirational speech is often a sonorous flow of words designed to stimulate a sentimental or traditional rather than a critical response. The conventional speech of daily life is commonly, although intellectual elements may enter into it, primarily upon this same level.

The final form of communication to be considered here is that which proceeds on the critical level of general and abstract ideas. It is only in groups concerned to discover facts and relationships among facts, as in a group given to scientific or philosophical inquiry, that interaction is in any considerable degree on the level of ideas. In such groups are a minimum of emotion, sentiment, and tradition and the maximum of critical response and counter responses on the basis of fact.

The distinction between appreciation and comprehending responses in interaction will reemphasize and summate, from a somewhat different point of view, what has just been said concerning levels of interaction. Appreciation is aesthetic and emotional. It consists in feeling or affective responses of pleasure or pain, excitement or calm, desire or aversion caused by the sense image of some sort—features, posture, movements, tone of voice, or mere physical presence, if the appreciated object is a person. Comprehension is rational and deliberate. It consists in ideational responses involving ascertainment of meanings and causes, interpretation, judgment, and understanding of an object, person, or situation. Of course, among human beings these two types of response are always intermixed in concrete acts of communication, but they are present in different degrees and are, in a sense, mutually antagonistic. Emotional responses to emotional cries and gestures among children or adults in periods of great excitement illustrate the predominance of the former. Critical, intellectual responses to abstract language or mathematical formulations in abstract discussion represent the predominance of the latter.

The three levels of interaction correspond to and give the fundamental functional criteria for separating the various types of collectivities to be discussed in subsequent chapters. In the present connection it is necessary to explain somewhat more fully the nature of interaction and communication on the three levels.

C. INTERACTION THROUGH MINOR STIMULATIONS

On the lowest plane of interaction are certain elementary types of stimulation and response common to men and the higher animal forms. The lower animals, and to a limited extent men, interact and mutually influence each other on the basis of body odor and the sense of smell. The importance of this sense and the mutual responses based thereon throughout the animal kingdom are too familiar to require extensive elaboration. It is, perhaps, more than any other mechanism, the basis of the so-called animal societies as well as the means by which they seek food and avoid danger. Among human beings the sense of smell has undergone partial atrophy with the evolutionary development of other senses and capacities; it does not function as a primary means of stimulation and response. But that it is not a negligible factor in conditioning human contacts and association is abundantly attested by the widespread use of deodorants and perfumes among the civilized and partly civilized peoples. Individuals are frequently unaware of the extent to which they respond to stimulation on this organic plane; hence they are unaware of the fundamental determination of certain of their attachments and aversions. It frequently operates, therefore, as a subtle and insidious factor in the conditioning of contacts and association. A native organic response may be, for example, an item of importance in the understanding of racial prejudices.

The universal fear of things new and strange to individual experience has its roots deep in the original nature of man. There is a negative organic reaction to stimuli offensive to the senses. Vile-smelling and foul-tasting objects excite disgust; there is an involuntary shrinking in the presence of ugly and repulsive objects and of diseased and deformed persons; slimy substances are offensive; there is a general human shrinking from blood and bloody things. Similar antipathies may be observed elsewhere in the animal world: the dog is violently excited at the first odor of a camel; cattle and horses run amuck at the odor of blood. . . .

. . . These organic attitudes may be modified, culturally conditioned, and extended into the social field. Disgusts arise fundamentally from the sense of taste and smell in connection with food, but the range of objects becomes extended by association, resemblance, and analogy until disgusts are aroused by purely conventional stimuli that are in a remote way only connected with the senses. A natural aversion to

certain things, in the presence of a habitual code of personal cleanliness acquired in the primary group situation, may be conditioned into an aversion to dirt unknown to the child, the savage, the peasant, and other unspoiled persons. By further extension it may be made to include things displeasing to the mental and moral sentiments of the fit and proper. This cultural extension of organic attitudes is basic to the characteristically negative reactions toward individuals and groups with food habits, moral customs, social beliefs, or other behavior patterns of unfamiliar type. . . .

The antipathies may be and probably are an essential element in the explanation of racial prejudice. Fears, vague or well-defined, appear always to arise in the presence of uncontrolled phenomena and they are always present in racial contacts until time has allowed the opposing groups to become mutually accommodated to a mutually worked-out social order and the individuals of each race habituated to the racial status. The disgusts also play an important rôle. The human animal has the vestiges of a sense of smell that at one time in racial evolution functioned strongly and it is even now stimulated by and reacts to odors and so determines personal prejudices, without the conscious awareness of the person. At the same time the bodies of all men secrete aromatic substances which rather quickly become rancid. The body odor differs from individual to individual and from race to race. That characteristic of the individuals of one race is commonly offensive to individuals of other races: the Japanese and other Orientals profess an extreme dislike for the body odor of white persons; to many white persons the characteristic body odor of the Negro is nauseating; and certain African Negroes have commented upon the disagreeably rancid odor of the white man. The extensive use of aromatic substances for toilet purposes reflects a folk realization that body odors are personally offensive. . . .

But when personal characteristics become familiar they may cease to be offensive: the repulsive reactions may disappear without change in the marks that at first excited them. As the Negro slaves became a regular part of the environment and habitual relations were established, conventional attitudes replaced the original reactions. The body odor, the divergent appearance, and other physical marks of the race ceased to be offensive or even noticed once they were no longer strange. But the fact that for the most part they ceased to be conscious phenomena enhanced rather than lessened their rôle in the social situation. They helped to determine personal relationships and to define status in subtle and little understood ways once they ceased to excite a pronounced negative reaction.¹

¹ E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem*, pp. 141-144. Reprinted by permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

Men and other animals alike react to facial, bodily, and other non-vocal gestures. The major emotional states have characteristic gestural accompaniments which reveal the condition of the aroused person and permit some sort of adjustment on the part of others. Rudimentary ideas also may express themselves more or less adequately in other than language behavior—in the posture and movements of the body, of the face, of the hands, arms, head, and eyes. The simplest, though not the least significant, of these gestures are those of the face. "A man is first known by his countenance" is a folk generalization of wide acceptance. The human countenance in repose has a more or less characteristic posture from which inferences as to the character and personality are drawn. The cast of countenance is thought to show that the person is intelligent or stupid, good-natured or ill-natured, choleric or phlegmatic in temperament, and various other of his traits and characteristics. The popular belief that character and mood may be inferred from facial features or from cast of countenance is probably for the most part fallacious. Interest here, however, is not in the validity of such inferences but merely in the fact that inferences are drawn and made the basis of personal relationships. They do enter into the process of interaction.

But it is in movement, rather than in posture, that the face is revealing. The brows are lifted or drawn down; the forehead is wrinkled vertically or horizontally; the lids are drooped, constricted, or lifted wide apart; the corners of the mouth are drawn upward, downward, or outward; the lips are constricted, pursed, curled, relaxed, or set quivering; the nostrils are dilated or contracted; the jaw is clamped, dropped, or thrust forward; the facial muscles generally are contracted or relaxed; and the whole face blanched or flushed. The face is a constant interplay of such movements, slight in moments of comparative ease, marked and striking in moments of intense activity. Each such movement is a gesture that is revealing in some degree of the inner condition of the man and occasioning and conditioning the responses of his associates.

In spite of the fact that training in the control or suppression of these originally involuntary activities begins in early childhood, they persist always in attenuated form. The child is taught not to laugh at ludicrous people, not to display his anger or fear, not to give overt expression to joy, grief, disappointment, or other

emotional states. But the trained, observant person may detect many incipient movements, subtle and fleeting though they be. The insensitive person—the pedant, the bore—does not observe the emotional gestures even in their grosser manifestations: all the mute gestures of defense, appeal, or repulsion escape his notice. The clairvoyant, on the other hand, is quick to respond to the slightest of them; he, in fact, endeavors to elicit them by carefully posed suggestions and guides his way by means of them.

Obviously it is often difficult to distinguish the expressions manifest in the face from those which are read into it. Certainly errors of inference are a common source of unpleasantness between persons as well as of depression or exhilaration within the person. In any actual situation facial gestures are interpreted in terms of their context, in terms of what is inferred from other behavior, particularly speech.

Posture and movements of other parts of the body are similarly expressive and almost invariably accompany, or are accompanied by, the gestures of the face. A great number of such expressive actions will readily come to mind: the quick intake of the breath, shrugging the shoulders, averting the eyes, bowing or turning away the head, clenching the fists, pointing, beckoning, pulling away, thrusting forward, laughter, weeping, and many others. Many of these acts are characteristic of men in common with certain of the lower animals, with differences in detail only. Like the movements of the face, they are in part original and involuntary. But that they are not wholly so is evidenced by the differences among peoples, as the French and the English, in the use of them. Nor is their significance invariably manifest to others; inferences are made from them, however, and interaction goes on by way of them.

Blushing is an elementary form of interaction on the emotional level that is limited to human beings. The gesture itself is an undesigned expression of emotion which is induced, not by any physical means—that is, not by any sort of action on the body—but by acute self-attention. Not only is it involuntary, the wish to restrain it and the effort to do so often accentuate and accelerate the reaction. It derives its significance in the present connection chiefly from the fact that it reveals the psychological state of the blushing person. It betrays a feeling of shyness, shame, or modesty arising in a situation in which attention is directed to one's own appearance or conduct in relation to the

opinion of others; there is a feeling of inferiority and confusion, of inability to restore the situation to objectivity by shifting attention elsewhere.

D. INARTICULATE VOCAL GESTURE

A new means of contact and interaction appears when the voice and the sense of hearing are utilized. The production and interpretation of sounds make possible a whole new repertory of gestures that reenforce and check those of the face and body and extend greatly the distances over which communication may take place.

The first use of the voice both in the individual and in the race is to produce certain inarticulate grunts and cries. But these gestures soon become differentiated along emotional lines. Among the animals vocal communication is apparently limited to the use of sounds as links of social sympathy. Studies of animal behavior show that the instinctive cries of young animals express the emotional state at the time of utterance and, in many cases, stimulate like emotion and behavior in others. Among the animals various kinds of sounds may be detected: distinctive mating cries, parental calls, and notes of anger and combat, of fear and distress, of alarm and warning. Such differentiation, however, is not intentional on the part of the animal producing the sounds; it is simply an accompaniment or part of the differentiated emotional situation. Its usefulness is limited to the here and now, for it does not appear except in direct association.

The situation is similar among human beings. The infantile cries are early differentiated and developed, and they express various shades of simple feeling. They suggest to adult associates attitudes of annoyance, anger, entreaty, drowsiness, fatigue, distress, fear, pain, hunger, and other feeling states. But here again it is well to guard against the tendency to read adult feeling into infant cries. These infant cries do have significance as revelations of implicit mental and emotional states, but they are always embodied in a complex of gestural and other communicative behavior and, hence, their value is contributory rather than definitive.

Vocal gesture in its more highly developed forms includes subtle variations in tempo, loudness, pitch, vowel quality, and the

like by means of which mood, emphasis, and demonstrative quality of articulate speech are sharpened. Animals and very young children respond only slightly to words as articulate symbols: the sharpness, harshness, or mellow quality of the tone; the intensity, inflection, and pitch of the voice are the chief stimuli. Nor has man in his increasing reliance upon words lost his sensitiveness to the more primitive devices. They provide a rich setting for communication through the medium of language, underlying and surrounding it and conditioning our supposedly impersonal, objective interpretations of it. The importance of speech behavior in human intercourse often makes men oblivious of the importance of the facial and other gestural accompaniments.

The inarticulate human cries, as vocal gestures in general, are peculiarly significant since they are heard and reacted to by the individual producing them as well as by others. It is in this fact that their social importance lies. Bodily posture, facial expression, and other silent gestures are meaningful only to the person who sees them: the angry man does not see his scowl, the angry dog his bared teeth, the frightened child his look of terror. But the spontaneous vocal behavior affects the form producing it as it does others. The random vocal gestures, because of this fact, are incipiently social; not only are they the material out of which language is differentiated but they give the community of mental condition in which sounds acquire meanings. They do not express thought and they do not convey meanings to others. But they are basic to the thought life of man and are preconditions to communication on the level of ideas.

E. LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT COMMUNICATION

On the lower-animal levels interaction is limited to the communication of emotional states. The spontaneous animal cries, like posture and other physical gestures, are not purposive; they are not designed to influence the behavior of others however effective they may be in stimulating sympathetic responses. They serve as a means of collective behavior but there is no communication of ideas of an abstract or descriptive sort.

Interaction that is typically and exclusively human is on the level of articulate speech. Here communication is intentional and by means of symbols. In both respects it is sharply and

completely distinguished from animal gesture. The oral symbols used in human speech are selections, developments, and refinements of the inarticulate vocal gestures previously discussed. The development of the complex symbolic sounds—speech in the true sense—was a long, slow, and difficult accomplishment. There was, without doubt, a long period in human history when communication by the voice-ear route was of a glottal or laryngeal character—that is, on a level comparable with that of the animals.

The modern child acquires a language as a part of his social heritage and for the most part incidentally. He does not need to invent words, nor does he do so. In the incidental routine of daily experience he hears the names of objects as they are presented for his attention and he comes to associate the sound symbol with the object or activity that it accompanies. The word "ball," for example, is associated with the sight and feel and manipulation of the object, the word "milk" with the sight, taste, and satisfaction that go with the word, and so with the various objects and experiences of infant and child life. Incidentally and without effort he comes into possession of the most important of the human inventions.

Human speech makes possible the communication of ideas and the development of thought. The emotional, demonstrative and graphic gestures, whether vocal or non-vocal, do not lend themselves to abstraction, to the communication of general ideas or meaning. Generalizations so simple as "good," "beautiful," "liberty," "truth," "justice," "true," "animal," and the like cannot be conveyed by means of gesture and with difficulty, if at all, by language in its early stages of development. So long as communication is restricted to inarticulate mechanisms, the abstraction of qualities and relationships and the building up of concepts are not possible. Even during the primitive stages of linguistic development, abstraction is sharply limited. Gradually, however, the same order of differentiation that may be observed along emotional lines among animal sounds appears and is carried to greater and greater refinement by the perfection of verbal designations that symbolize experience and thereby make it communicable. As the language itself becomes increasingly expressive it becomes less necessary to resort to grimace and body gestures. Finally language achieves such completeness in the range of its expressiveness that even when removed from all

other communicative aids, as in written and printed discourse, it conveys exactness of meaning.

Accompanying this development in articulation goes a development in abstract ideas. The two things are closely related. Primitive peoples are not only unable to express highly abstract ideas; they do not have such ideas. Even if experienced individually, abstract ideas cannot be held unless named, nor can they be communicated. It is in this sense that "language and thought are inseparable." All thinking is in terms of language; without language there is no thought.

The range of human interaction was greatly extended both spatially and temporally through the invention of writing. Writing makes possible the preservation, the storage, of ideas and their transmission in more accurate form, over long distances, and through long periods of time. Like other human inventions, writing developed from simple beginnings. The first step in the evolution of written symbols was probably the use of pictographs, rough reproductions of the impression to be communicated, somewhat like the line drawings of children. With the reduction of the picture to a few sketchy lines, it ceased to be a reproduction and became a symbol. A kind of rebus writing followed—that is, the written symbol came to be related not exclusively to the object it originally portrayed but to the spoken symbol and thus it became usable in other contexts when this same sound appeared. The final step was the reduction of the reference of written symbols to elementary vowel and consonant sounds, the emergence of an alphabet.

A further highly significant extension of communication was made possible by the invention of printing from movable type. This enabled large numbers of people over wide areas to share in a single act of thought. It gave new meaning to the fact of publicity. By means of printing, ideas lose all connection with their originators and achieve an existence of their own. The importance of the book, the magazine, and the newspaper in the interaction of the present day is scarcely to be exaggerated.

The telegraph, the radio, and other devices of a similar sort are notable not merely as they extend communication in space but as they overcome time, making long-distance interaction more nearly instantaneous, and as they enable increasing numbers distributed over wide areas to share in a single act of speech. These devices are of course of a wholly different order from the

invention of language and writing and printing—they are simply mechanical devices which make these things more widely accessible.

F. IMITATION AND SUGGESTION

In a broad, general sense the mechanisms of social interaction are imitation and suggestion. These are the means by which persons and groups are controlled and the social inheritance perpetuated and transmitted.

Imitation is the more or less conscious and intentional reproduction of copy. It is the mechanism of the learning process. In learning the pronunciation of a word from a foreign language, for example, the pupil endeavors to reproduce the sound as given by the instructor. Such an example involves all of the elements of imitation. The attention is alert and is directed alternately to the copy and to the response. It is always a learning process. In it new mechanisms are built up. The reproduction perhaps never exactly duplicates the copy. Nevertheless, as a result of imitation, the person acquires the habits, sentiments, ideas, and patterns of life common to the group or groups of which he is a member.

Suggestion is the process involved in the release of preestablished mechanisms. Every person has a rich assortment of reflexes, habits, sentiments, beliefs, prejudices, and the like that tend to express themselves in behavior. The person, so to speak, is ready to act. Under the proper stimulation he does act and always acts in accord with the mechanisms already established. The process may be compared with the firing of a gun. If the gun is loaded and ready to fire, a definite performance takes place when the trigger is pressed; if the gun is not loaded or otherwise ready to fire, no behavior follows from a pull on the trigger. The touch on the trigger is the stimulus that sets in operation what the gun is prepared to do. In human suggestion the preestablished habits and tendencies determine the behavior of the person. Unless the mechanisms are established there is no response. In suggestion the activity may or may not follow a copy.

Imitation and suggestion are both mechanisms of social interaction in which an individual or group is controlled by another individual or group. The distinction between the two processes is now clear. The characteristic mark of imitation is the tendency, under the influence of

copies socially presented, to build up mechanisms of habits, sentiments, ideals, and patterns of life. The process of suggestion, as differentiated from imitation in social interaction, is to release under the appropriate social stimuli mechanisms already organized, whether instincts, habits, or sentiments. The other differences between imitation and suggestion grow out of this fundamental distinction. In imitation attention is alert, now on the copy and now on the response. In suggestion the attention is either absorbed in, or distracted from, the stimulus. In imitation the individual is self-conscious; the subject in suggestion is unconscious of his behavior. In imitation the activity tends to reproduce the copy; in suggestion the response may be like or unlike the copy.¹

G. THE GENERAL FORMS OF INTERACTION

Interaction, when it is considered abstractly—that is, apart from those concrete communicative devices which have been under discussion and which are really only its apparatus—breaks up into four major types: the competitive struggle for existence and livelihood, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. Each of these is made the subject of treatment in subsequent chapters.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. In every process there are two basic facts: elements and the interaction of the elements. Give examples from chemical, astronomical, or other non-social processes.

2. "The idea of interaction is not a notion of common sense." Explain.

3. "Society stated in mechanistic terms reduces to interaction." Explain.

4. What is the relation of isolation and social contact to interaction?

5. In what way does interaction define the group in space?

6. Show by a concrete historic example how interaction defines a particular group "in time."

7. What are the three chief factors that favor communication through time? What subsidiary factors can you enumerate? Is each of the three chief factors essential? Give examples.

8. In what concrete ways familiar to you has modern mobility destroyed land as a basis of interaction and group unity?

9. What provision is made to insure the continuity of your state legislature? Of the governing body of your college? Of the local chapter of your fraternity?

10. Explain the organization of a business concern to secure continuity.

11. In what sense does the presidency of the United States, apart from the man who holds the position, give continuity and "interaction through time"? From this point of view which is the more important, the president or the presidency?

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 345-346. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

12. Would the development of a nobility in America be conducive to group continuity? Explain.

13. How does the temporal continuity of a specialized agency, as the church, within a society make for the continuing life of the inclusive group?

14. What are the different levels of interaction?

15. Give illustrations of interaction on the lowest level—that is, through minor stimulations and responses.

16. What is the relation of this order of interaction to the development of moods? Incidentally, what are moods?

17. Does instrumental music, as of the violin or piano, belong to this same level of stimulation or does it convey thought?

18. Does an “inspirational” speech simply arouse emotional responses on the basis of a common fund of sentiments? Does the use of such terms as mother, home, country, and the like help or hinder the communication of ideas?

19. Does the church ceremonial stimulate or inhibit thought? Defend your position.

20. Is there any sentiment or emotion in a conference of scientists or mathematicians, or are stimulation and response purely on a critical basis? Explain.

21. What is the distinction made in the text between appreciation and comprehension? Do you agree with the distinction as made? Does the woman who drives a car appreciate it or comprehend it? What about the mechanic who repairs it? Does the musician appreciate or comprehend music?

22. Explain how odor and the sense of smell are related to certain moral sentiments.

23. Do you agree that “rudimentary ideas” are expressed by non-verbal means? What are rudimentary ideas? If you believe that “ideas” may be so expressed, give a concrete illustration.

24. What are you able to tell about a man’s character by his facial expression? What, in any other respect, are you able to tell?

25. Are women or men more apt in reading the moods of a person from his facial gesture? The southern Negro is very adept in understanding the white man from facial and other minor gestures. How do you explain this fact?

26. Does a person ever blush in isolation? Explain.

27. What fact about vocal gestures gives them a significance that other gestures do not have? Explain.

28. It has been said that a prepossession for communication through the medium of speech blinds us to the significance of other communicative devices. Discuss.

29. Read the following sentence: “This little boy reads well.” How many meanings are you able to get by stressing different words in vocalization and by varying the inflection and the quality of the voice? In what does the meaning of the statement lie?

30. Which of the communicative devices described in the text lead mainly to appreciation and which chiefly to comprehension?

31. Explain the development of language in relation to the ideational processes of childhood.

32. What is the relation of language to mental life?
33. Printed ideas have lost all connection with their origination. Discuss.
34. Differentiate imitation and suggestion. Give illustrations of each. Which of these two mechanisms is chiefly involved in learning?
35. In a statement such as "I followed his suggestion," in what sense is suggestion used?
36. In imitation, does acting follow a copy? In suggestion, does acting follow a copy? Always?
37. "There can be no thought without language." Discuss this statement. Be sure you differentiate thought, emotional feeling, and sentiment.
38. "For men, in distinction from animals, live in a world of ideas as well as in a realm of immediate reality." Discuss.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any upon which you would like more evidence.
2. Make an analysis of your own participation in interaction with special reference to its extension in space and in time.
3. In astronomy the elements that interact are (a) the masses of the heavenly bodies, (b) their position, (c) the direction of their movement, and (d) their velocity. What are the elements whose interaction is studied in some other science such as psychology, physics, or biology?
4. Make a list of twelve to twenty groups arranged in order of increasing importance of critical response.
5. Expand the point made in the text in regard to the peculiar significance of vocal as against non-vocal gesture. Why is it essential that both the forms react to the same gesture? Do you know what you are going to say, or what you are saying, before you hear the words you utter?
6. "Words without thought are dead sounds: thoughts without words are nothing. To think is to speak low; to speak is to think aloud. The word is the thought incarnate." Discuss or comment at length.
7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:
 - a. Communication. E. Sapir, "Communication," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - b. The Relation of the Concept of Interaction to the Study of Sociology. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 36-39, 339-342.
 - c. Imitation. K. Young, "Imitation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - d. The Effects of the Group on Individual Behavior Apart from Direct Interaction. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 261-283.
 - e. The Social Significance of Language. E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 39-54.
 - f. Interaction. E. R. Groves, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 187-193.
 - g. Three Kinds of Non-vocal Gestures. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 190-193.

- h. Sociological Significance of Contacts of Sight. G. Simmel, "Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction"; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 356-361.
 - i. Natural versus Administrative Areas in the Modern City. H. W. Zorbaugh, "The Natural Areas of the City," in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 219-229.
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CHAPTER XI

COMPETITION AND HUMAN ECOLOGY

The foregoing discussion undertook an analysis of social interaction in its general and fundamental aspects. The treatment brought to the front the fact that the elements of the social process are embodied in human beings and in the social institutions and other constructs of human effort and experience. Interaction, therefore, may be treated analytically or descriptively: we may consider the interaction of the elements or that of the persons and culture facts that embody the elements. It is possible to observe and report the interaction between men, between men and the social heritage, and between more or less discrete segments of the social heritage itself. This is the historical standpoint, the description of the contacts and interaction of complex and unique human beings and of equally complex and unique culture products. Such procedure is entirely legitimate and highly profitable. But for purposes of analysis and comprehension, rather than of description and appreciation, it is necessary to penetrate through the gross phenomena of common-sense observation to the general and basic elements that underlie and determine the more or less immediately observed behavior. It is the natural rather than the historic processes that the sociologist seeks to define. Consequently he is interested primarily in the interaction of the basic and universal attitudes and values that get their embodiment and concrete expression in historic phenomena.

The preceding chapter stated in general terms the major forms of interaction and their relationships. In this and the three succeeding chapters the four fundamental forms are subjected to more detailed study. The immediate concern is the process of universal competition and its consequences in the distribution of human beings and culture forms.

A. THE COMPETITIVE PROCESS

Competition has been defined as the elementary, universal, and impersonal form of interaction. It is elementary in the sense that it comes first in time and that all other forms are derived

from it and also in the sense that it underlies and gives reality to these other forms. It is continuous in the sense that it is going on everywhere all the time. Each individual is involved in countless ways of which he is generally unaware in a vast web of competitive relationships. And this lack of awareness on the part of the competing units gives competition its impersonal character. It takes place without social contact—that is, the competitors do not meet or, if they meet, do not identify each other as such; there is no direct communication or sharing of purposes; relations are external. The competitive process is, therefore, not in itself social. It is a subsocial process but one that must be analyzed and understood if the distinctly social forms of interaction are to be understood.

Competition in the human sphere is an interindividual struggle for the goods of life in so far as this struggle remains upon the impersonal level.

In the concrete reality of social life the competitive process is complicated and its expression modified by the coexisting, subordinate, and derivative processes. The forms of interaction do not exist apart from one another; the interaction that is going on in any community at any moment is in part competition and in part conflict, and both conflict and competition are limited by the concurrent processes of accommodation and assimilation. Consequently it is necessary in the study of the competitive process to abstract it from other processes that condition its expression—that is, it is necessary to select from the whole complex of relationships of real life only those that meet the requirements of our definition and to study their nature and effects apart from and without reference to conflict and the other forms of interaction.

It is necessary also to make a second form of conceptual abstraction. The process is a universal one and has as many expressions as there are orders of phenomena in the universe. There is a kind of competition going on among the physical and chemical elements, among the individual plants and the various species of plants in the vegetable world, as well as within and among the various species of animals. The process itself must be conceived apart from and independent of its various concrete expressions.

The results of the competitive process appear in the ecological and in the social order. The competition of plants for nutrient

substances and for the light and moisture necessary to their life and growth results in a definite and orderly distribution in space. Certain plants preempt moist and swampy regions while others predominate in regions of little moisture; some flourish in the shade of larger plants and others only in the upland and exposed areas; the whole complicated but orderly distribution of the various items of the vegetable kingdom is a result of the competition among plants of similar and dissimilar needs for space, food, moisture, and the other necessities of life. Location and distribution in the animal as in the plant world are determined in a competition that puts each in the area where the conditions are most conducive to its survival. The same competitive process determines the ecological organization of human society. The territorial distribution of population is an expression of impersonal competitive factors, and migration of peoples is a means by which some sort of balance is secured between men and the means of life. But competition for the means of life determines the social and class hierarchies as well as the ecological order in human societies. Some details of these processes are given in the sections immediately following.

B. THE BIOLOGICAL STRUGGLE FOR LIFE

Of the various concrete expressions of universal competition the most obvious, perhaps, is that popularly known as the struggle for existence. In some of its forms this struggle has come within the experience of every person. The beasts and birds of prey live by the destruction of other forms. The birds destroy myriads of insects and plant seeds. The herbivorous animals are ever in competition with one another for the limited supply of food and the same struggle exists in the plant world for the limited supply of space, light, and moisture. Every form is in constant struggle for life with the impersonal forces of nature; a severe and ceaseless struggle to survive and reproduce exists everywhere in the natural world.

The origin and basis of this struggle for existence lie in the high rate at which all forms of organic life tend to increase. They all tend to increase without limit and at a rate that would enable the progeny of a single pair to cover the earth in but a few years. The number of offspring may be large or small and the interval between generations may be long or short but in every case increase tends to be in a geometric ratio, a doubling in given

intervals of time. If, for example, an annual plant produces two seeds and these produce two each the following year and so on in succeeding generations there will be in twenty years over a million plants descended from the single source. But there is no known plant that is so unproductive. A moderate rate of increase would be, perhaps, the common field corn cultivated by the American farmers. A single grain will produce in a season an ear bearing upward of five hundred grains. If each of these reproduce at the same rate there would be, at the end of the second season, approximately one-quarter million grains. At the end of the third season the number would be perhaps a hundred twenty-five million, at the end of the fifth season it would exceed thirty trillion, and by the end of the tenth year the number would be a figure inconceivably large. Many forms reproduce in much briefer intervals of time. Some disease bacilli, for example, double in number by cell division, under favorable conditions, in fifteen- or twenty-minute intervals. At this rate a single form would in an hour of time increase to eight or sixteen, in two hours to over a hundred, in three hours to over two thousand, in five hours to over half a million, and by the end of twenty-four hours the number descended from the first form would exceed the number reached by the farmer's corn in a ten-year period. Other forms produce many offspring at a time. Insects lay batches of eggs that often number many hundreds or thousands. Many of the fishes and sea animals are highly prolific. The herring is said to produce some seventy thousand eggs at a time, the cod as many as nine million, and the annual egg production of the oyster is in the millions. But neither short intervals between broods nor large broods are necessary. The slower-breeding forms merely require a little additional time to accomplish the same result. Men, under favorable conditions of unrestricted increase, would double in numbers in from fifteen to twenty years, and in historic times populations have done so in twenty-five-year intervals. At this rate of increase it has been calculated that the progeny of a single pair living at the time of Christ would today be sufficient to cover the entire surface of the earth nine layers deep. Darwin calculated that the progeny of a single pair of elephants, the most slowly increasing of all known forms, would, in seven hundred fifty years, number over nineteen million. There is no exception to the rule that, given favorable conditions, any form would fill the world in a few years.

But the world in which these organisms must live is one of fixed dimensions and limited resources. Within the given space all forms must find a place; all alike are dependent, directly or indirectly, upon nature's resources for the means of life. The fifty million square miles of the earth's surface cannot furnish support or supply space for unlimited numbers.

The result of these opposed facts—the tendency of all living forms to increase without limit in a world that can support but a limited number—is a competition between the forms for the means of life. In that competition the vast majority fail; only a minor fraction of the organisms born are able to live and that fraction does so at the expense of the others. Everywhere in nature there is a ceaseless, desperate, and ruthless struggle to obtain the necessities of continued existence and to escape being made the food of other forms.

This struggle for existence takes three main forms. All organisms wage a ceaseless struggle with fate. Every organism that survives does so in spite of drought, floods, storms, cold, food scarcity, and the numerous other destructive forces of nature. In this form the struggle is continuous and everywhere severe. But every form that is to survive must succeed not only in the struggle with the impersonal forces of nature but in the struggle with other forms: there is a ceaseless struggle between each form and its foes. In one case it is the struggle between those of different species: the birds and beasts of prey live by the capture and destruction of other forms. In another there is a struggle between different forms resulting from the fact that both depend for life upon the same source of food supply. The struggle between cattle and sheep for the same grazing area results in the starvation of the cattle, though the two forms have no active hostility and do not come into actual conflict. Finally, there is a struggle between the members of the same species. Here the struggle may be direct, as when the individuals live by devouring their young or the weaker members of their own species, or it may be indirect, but none the less real, as when they depend upon the same insufficient supply of food.

In the plant communities competition is seen in its most uncontaminated form. The abstraction of the process is there made by nature; the process of competition may there be observed in isolation. The existence in a closed universe of multiplying forms that have no social contact shows competition and its

effects in pure form. It is there a universal, continuous, and wholly impersonal and unconscious process. Wherever two or more plants with similar demands are sufficiently near together that their combined demands exceed the supply of life necessities, they are in competition. The process is purely physical. There is no conscious conflict, and no actual struggle except in the comparatively rare cases where tuberous plants come into physical contact and crowd each other above the surface. In general, there is no competition for room; nearness simply increases the struggle for the means of life. The struggle of the plant is to obtain the physical factors necessary for its life and growth—it is a struggle primarily for light and for moisture, occasionally for humidity, temperature, or air. There is no competition between two plants if the nutrient material, light, and moisture be in excess of the needs of both; it begins as soon as the supply of any necessary factor falls below the combined needs of both. The struggle, properly, is not between the plants but a struggle of each plant with its habitat. Of this habitat other plants may be a part. The reaction of one upon the physical factors about it changes by so much the habitat of the neighboring plants. The roots of one reduce the amount of water available for the other; the foliage of one shades the other. The one plant thus affects the habitat; the changed habitat affects the other plant. The effect is cumulative. The growth of one reduces the amount of light available for the other near or beneath it. Because of its growth it requires more water and nutrient material to support the increased foliage, thereby decreasing the amount available for its competitor. The one prospers as the other loses ground and in the same degree.

In the animal world the competition for the means of life is more properly characterized as a struggle than it is in the case of the sessile forms. It is just as truly and as accurately competition; the same basic facts and the outcome are the same. But the individuals in striving to satisfy their needs often come into a personal conflict that does not occur in the plant world. This sometimes tends to obscure the nature of the fundamental process.

C. BIOLOGICAL ADAPTATIONS

The immediate result in the biological realm of the struggle for existence is adaptation and specialization. Each species of

living form is so adapted as to be able to survive in the existing circumstances; the structure of each is specialized in ways that enable it to survive in the competition for food and in the struggle with enemies.

In the plant world competition results in striking changes. Plants adjust themselves, within the limits of variability, to the conditions produced by their competitors. There is a change in the size, form, structure, and arrangement of parts. When plants are densely crowded, changes in the form and structure of leaf and root are matters of regular occurrence. If the conditions continue, the changes become fixed; the competition produces adaptations which characterize new forms. The desert vegetation, in a continual struggle for moisture, conserves the limited supply of moisture by a modification of foliage into spines. The loss by evaporation is thus reduced to a minimum. Individual plants of the same species growing at different altitudes are often strikingly different. In a paper on plant distribution on the Lake Michigan sand dunes Cowles gives a description of the dogwood and willows when the advancing dune threatens to bury them:

A dune about twenty-five meters in height is advancing with considerable rapidity upon a bulrush swamp. The swamp is more or less continuously surrounded by a marginal fringe of willows and dogwoods. The bulrushes are quickly destroyed, but the dogwoods and willows have thus far been able to remain not only alive but luxuriant. In order to keep above the sand, these plants are obliged to lengthen their stems far more than is ever the case under normal conditions. Already some of the plants have twice or three times their normal stem height. The buried portions of the stems, particularly of the willows, send out roots almost as soon as they are buried. These plants, therefore, become more and more independent of the deeper soil in which they first grew . . .

The conditions become severer each year, because of the necessity for increased stem elongation and also because the plants are constantly rising above the protected position in the lee of the dune.¹

In the animal world biological adaptations to the conditions of existence are numerous and familiar. Every form of life has some specialized ability that enables it to survive.

Everywhere the strong prey upon the weak, the swift upon the slow, the clever upon the stupid; and the weak, the slow, the stupid retaliate

¹ H. C. Cowles, "The Ecological Relations of the Vegetation on the Sand Dunes of Lake Michigan," *Botanical Gazette*, 27(1899), 292-293.

by evolving mechanisms of defense, which more or less adequately repel or render futile the oppressor's attack.¹

Every character of the animal world is the end result of a long evolutionary process that has fitted it to preserve its individual existence and to propagate its kind. The adaptations are as numerous as the living forms, since none is without its enemies or outside the struggle with the destructive forces of the physical environment.

The success and survival of such animals as the deer are due to the speed that enables them to escape the enemy forms that would use them for food. Other animals succeed because of a degree of strength that gives safety from their foes. Still others owe their survival to a protective coloration. The turtle is protected by its external skeleton, the porcupine by its quills, and the skunk by its odor. The wings of the bird, the teeth and claws of the cat, the climbing ability of the monkey are devices that make possible the securing of food and the escape from enemies. Others succeed because of wit, stealth, or cunning. Each form that lives is specially adapted to its particular rôle. Teeth, claws, horns, tusks, speed, strength, sagacity, food habits, protective coloration, group life—all are adaptive specializations resulting from the struggle for survival.

Man is no exception to the biological rule. He is a part of the natural order, and the struggle for existence applies to him as to the plants and the other animal forms. Human beings must succeed in the struggle with the impersonal forces of nature. They are in constant and uncertain struggle with the enemy forms, particularly the germs, parasites, and insects that threaten their destruction directly or threaten it indirectly through the destruction of their food supply. The excessive increase of man, as of other forms, maintains a constant pressure on the means of life and leads to an endless struggle for the possession and control of them. As a result of the age-long struggle to continue human life man, like the other animal forms, is biologically specialized in ways conducive to survival.

D. ECOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION

A second immediate result of the struggle for existence among plants and animals is their distribution in space. Out of the differentiated adaptations has evolved a natural order comprising

¹ G. W. Crile, *Man: An Adaptive Mechanism*, p. 25.

a variety of competing forms holding one another in check. Each plant and animal form practices a somewhat different economy, each makes specialized demands upon the environment, with the result that each, although it is in competition with the others, is dependent upon the others. The forms are, in a sense, complementary and the natural order is at the same time competitive and cooperative.

In the plant world certain species can live in the same environment and close together without competing. There is no competition, for example, between the forest trees and the moss and grass and shrubs that grow in their shade. They do not demand the same nutrient elements. The species are complementary, each contributes to the welfare of the others; the shade of the trees protects the moss from the destructive light of the sun; the grass and smaller vegetation assist in the preservation of the moisture about the roots of the trees. Nor is it possible to speak of competition between the parasite and its host; the mistletoe is not in competition with the oak or the apple tree on which its life depends.

But in the struggle to survive every species of plants not only adapts itself to the existing conditions but, in the long run, finds the habitat where it can thrive. There is not only adaptation but segregation. The vegetation in a given region is not promiscuous. The ponds are surrounded by aquatic vegetation that is not found elsewhere. Special types of swamp plants are found in the bogs from which other forms are excluded. On the uplands the forests thrive. The deserts and semiarid regions have their special types of plant life adapted to the conditions. The variations that determine the distribution of vegetation may be very small indeed. The differences in moisture, light, and temperature on the north and south, or even on the east and west, slopes of a knoll are sufficient to determine differences in the plant life. The segregation of species that results from their competition and their struggle to live and spread is not unlike that maintained by the farmer in the separation of his acres into meadow, wheat, and other fields.

But the monopoly of a region by one order of vegetation is ever being threatened by other forms; attempted invasions are continuous. The borders of a segregated area are ever being encroached upon by the surrounding vegetation. The seeds of neighboring plants find their way into the region, germinate, and

struggle to exist. It is only at the price of great effort that the farmer prevents his cultivated fields from being invaded by the numerous weeds and wild grasses; the artificial segregation is ever in danger from the invaders.

In some cases the present occupants of an area are less well adapted than the invading forms to live in the environment. Except for the efforts of the farmer, the domestic plants would be crowded out by the wild species: they are less well adapted to survive under natural conditions. This displacement of one plant association by another—succession—is a continually recurring phenomenon in nature. In any given place there may be a successional series—that is, one association invading a segregated area and establishing itself to the exclusion of the original occupants only to be invaded and succeeded by a still different species. On the abandoned farms of southern New England the plowed fields are quickly monopolized by associations of annual weeds. But these are soon displaced by perennial grasses. The meadows are presently invaded and replaced by light-requiring shrubs and small trees. Finally the region is invaded by shrubs and trees tolerant of shade, the light-requiring associations are displaced and the hillsides return to their original forested condition. It is an orderly sequence, not a promiscuous occupation. Where there is a burned-over forest in the northern areas of America the region is at once invaded by new vegetation. The first to arrive are the neighboring plants with the lightest seeds, and these monopolize the area. These so-called fireweeds—flesbane and certain goldenrods—prevail for a year or so. But the area is soon invaded by a growth of poplar and white birches which migrate easily and grow rapidly. They soon overtop the fireweeds and shade them out. The region is presently invaded by maple or beech or hemlocks that are tolerant of shade and, when they have time to grow, destroy the poplar and birch that need much light.

The same process is repeated in the animal world. There competition, as we have seen, results in organic modifications that adjust each form to a place in nature where it can survive and reproduce its kind. But it also results in a definite distribution in space that is at least analogous to the ecological order maintained in the vegetable kingdom. The animals that overrun an area have their occupancy disputed by other forms and in some cases the new forms crowd out the former inhabitants. In

America the brown rat has replaced the earlier black forms, the English sparrow has replaced certain native birds, the starling is driving out many other types.

E. COMPETITION, MIGRATION, AND NATURAL SELECTION

As pointed out above, competition not only involves a struggle with the physical conditions inherent in the geographical environment and with other forms of life, distinct species or varieties of plant and animals, but consists also in an interindividual struggle for the goods of life among the members of a given species. When competition of this latter kind is unrestrained, it is invariably the most severe; the severest competitor of man is man. This severity is due in part to the fact that the individuals within a species all need the same goods in order to live and so make the same demands upon the environment, and also to the fact that the struggle for space, food, and other means to individual survival generally merges into the struggle for mates, for progeny, and for position.

Human populations, like those composed of other forms, have always tended to increase to the limits fixed by the available means for supporting human life. The result has always been, for the great mass of humanity, a bitter and continuous struggle for the necessities of life. From this competition two important results have come: the development of new modes of adaptation to the environment, usually through increased specialization and division of labor, and migration to regions not so fully occupied, to regions of relatively open resources.

In the effort to find easier conditions of life, to escape the effects of competition for the means of life, men have become distributed over the entire earth. Sometimes the migrations have been movements of entire groups, as in the wanderings of primitive men and in the tribal movements at the opening of European history. Such movements involved the invasion of lands held by other peoples, and conflicts for the possession of the lands ensued. At the present time, in the form of emigration and immigration, they are commonly individual and family movements. But whether the movement be individual or collective, peaceful or predatory, it is an effort to find more tolerable conditions of life, to escape the impoverishing, competitive effects of excessive numbers.

These migratory movements are commonly selective: the persons who migrate are different in certain respects from those who remain behind. The migrants are most often men; they are typically in the ages of early maturity; they are generally the economically disadvantaged. It may be the more capable, restless, ambitious, or aggressive persons who leave the old for the new environment. It is often asserted and it may be true, though it has never been shown to be true, that in the movement from the Atlantic seaboard to the West, and in the present-day movement from the agricultural to the industrial areas, the better elements of the population migrated while the less efficient remained behind.

In the American situation immigration and competition have acted selectively to change the character of the people. The coming of immigrants in large numbers increased the wealth and property of the older American stocks. With their increase in comfort, leisure, education, and refinement—made possible by the labor of the immigrant groups—came a folkway: late marriage and small family. To maintain the standard of comfort and refinement for themselves and their descendants, they produced few children. The result is that the unassimilated newcomers increase much more rapidly than the Americanized stocks. A continuation of the present tendencies will result, in a relatively few generations, in America's being populated by the descendants of the later immigrant stocks. The early American stock will dwindle and presently disappear. This process is typical of the struggle for existence operating by means of competition in the modern world order.

F. COMPETITION AND SEGREGATION

Another effect of competition, and of the consequent specialization and migration, is the formation of segregated areas and of more or less isolated social classes. Every society, even the most simple, is divided horizontally into several classes or castes on the basis of occupation, income, or other differentiating factor. The members of the different classes, like the residents of different areas, come very little or not at all into contact. Such segregated groups are an outgrowth of the struggle for survival, livelihood, and status by persons unequally endowed and differently circumstanced by birth and education.

In a purely competitive order, such as that posited by the more competent of the classical economists, individuals tend to specialize along those lines in which they have the most natural aptitude, because by so doing they maximize their individual shares in the total fund of goods enjoyed by the group. In a free industrial society there is work for both high and low wage labor; there is abundant work for all the labor of the world, and there is work for all grades of labor and at all rates of pay. It is a gain to every class to exchange with other classes, and there is nothing more foolish than to have high-class workmen doing low-class work or to have workmen doing work that for any reason can be more economically done in some other place. The country will have more employment for labor and have an industrial output of greater value when it produces the commodities which it can produce most advantageously and secures other commodities by trade with countries that can produce those commodities most advantageously.

As a result, in a free situation, areas become specialized. One area specializes in the production of small grains, one in the manufacture of iron and steel, one in shipbuilding, one in commerce and trade, and so on. Competition is the selective force that segregates areas and makes each distinctive in character; each, in a free competitive order, is forced into the occupations for which it is most fitted. Every country has its agricultural and manufacturing areas, its centers of commerce and trade, and its timbered and grazing regions.

Every city is similarly divided into segregated natural areas. Each has its financial and business center, its manufacturing district, its slums, its aristocratic residential sections, its workingmen's home section, and other specialized centers. It is a constellation, a grouping of interests and people, not a mere aggregation of human units. At the central point of the transportation system is the center of congestion, the area of high rents, and the locus of the retail trade. In other areas of low rents and nearness to sources of employment are the slums. The forces of competition operate to put each group and each industry in a definite relation to others, to give an internal organization and a definite pattern. This is what is meant by an ecological order.

. . . The modern city is likely to be the center of a region of very highly specialized production, with a corresponding widely extended trade area. Under these circumstances the main outlines of the

modern city will be determined (1) by local geography and (2) by routes of transportation.

Local geography, modified by railways and other major means of transportation, all connecting, as they invariably do, with the larger industries, furnishes the broad lines of the city plan. But these broad outlines are likely to be overlaid and modified by another and a different distribution of population and of institutions, of which the central retail shopping area is the center. Within this central downtown area itself certain forms of business, the shops, the hotels, theaters, wholesale houses, office buildings, and banks, all tend to fall into definite and characteristic patterns, as if the position of every form of business and building in the area were somehow fixed and determined by its relation to every other.

Out on the periphery of the city, again, industrial and residential suburbs, dormitory towns, and satellite cities seem to find, in some natural and inevitable manner, their predetermined places. Within the area bounded on the one hand by the central business district and on the other by the suburbs, the city tends to take the form of a series of concentric circles. These different regions, located at different relative distances from the center, are characterized by different degrees of mobility of the population.¹

Once these segregations have come to be, however, other factors than the purely competitive enter into the situation, tending both to perpetuate and to disintegrate them. Ancestry, tradition, prejudice, habituation, and the like operate to conserve and accentuate them. The immigrant communities, for example, are perpetuated by newcomers who gravitate to the points where their language is spoken and understood. On the other hand, invention, discovery, new migrations, rivalry, conflict, and education enter as disturbing and mobilizing factors. The more active, ambitious, and venturesome leave the colonies, break the ties of sentiment and culture, and by degrees become absorbed into the general life and population of the city.

Such segregations of population as these take place, first, upon the basis of language and of culture and, second, upon the basis of race. Within these immigrant colonies and racial ghettos, however, other processes of selection inevitably take place which bring about segregation based upon vocational interests, upon intelligence, and personal ambition. The result is that the keener, the more energetic, and the more ambitious very soon emerge from their ghettos and immigrant

¹ R. E. Park, "The Urban Community as a Spatial Pattern and a Moral Order," E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 9-10. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

colonies and move into an area of second immigrant settlement or perhaps into a cosmopolitan area in which the members of several immigrant and racial groups meet and live side by side. More and more, as the ties of race, of language, and of culture are weakened, successful individuals move out and eventually find their places in business and in the professions, among the older population group which has ceased to be identified with any language or racial group. The point is that change of occupation, personal success or failure—changes of economic and social status, in short—tend to be registered in changes of location. The physical or ecological organization of the community, in the long run, responds to and reflects the occupational and the cultural. Social selection and segregation, which create the natural groups, determine at the same time the natural areas of the city.¹

G. THE STRUGGLE FOR STATUS

In human society, except on its most barren levels, the struggle for existence is seldom a brute struggle for the means of life. There are, of course, brute struggle and failure in the case of poverty and famine which destroy people by starvation or by diseases induced by insufficient nourishment. But this is an incident of defective economic and social organization, not a necessary and inevitable consequence of natural forces, as in the lower orders of life. Food and the other necessities of life are abundant in the modern world. When human life is reduced to the brute struggle for existence it is because some are deprived of access to that which others cannot use.

The typical struggle in human society is for livelihood rather than for the means of existence; the human struggle is for economic security and for place and power and status. Economic competition is perhaps its most conspicuous form.

Economic competition is not typically a matter of conscious strife; it is rather an expenditure of energy in the effort to achieve individual ends. The achievement of these ends may exclude the possibility of other men's achieving theirs, as when tradesmen seek the same persons as customers. Economic competition may take the form of cooperation: two or more persons may produce results which benefit others as well as themselves. There is even a form of competitive cooperation in which the incidental results of activity unintentionally react to the benefit

¹ R. E. Park, "The Concept of Position in Sociology," *Publication of The American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 1-14. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of the American Sociological Society.

of others. A case in point is where two competing commercial establishments locate in the same city block; they are in competition for the same buyers but both may benefit owing to the fact that the presence of the two stores may attract more than twice the number of buyers that either would alone.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. What are the characteristics of competition as a type of interaction?
2. What is meant by the statement that competition is interaction without social contact?
3. How many illustrations can you give of processes of competition in which you are participating?
4. What do you understand by "abstracting a process for purposes of study"? What two forms of conceptual abstraction are made?
5. The ecological order is the result of competition. Explain.
6. Discuss competition in plant communities. How does a knowledge of such competition aid your understanding of competition in the human community?
7. Describe the situation that gives rise to the struggle for existence. What are the two opposed facts?
8. Explain the competition of plants.
9. Give illustrations of the three forms of the struggle for existence in which human individuals or groups are involved.
10. Describe biological adaptation in the plant world. Give illustrations not found in the text.
11. Discuss and give additional illustrations of competitive adaptation in the animal world.
12. In what way is man specialized to succeed in the struggle for life?
13. Explain and illustrate the segregation of plants.
14. What is meant by "invasion" and "succession"? Give other illustrations.
15. Can you give any examples showing how competition maintains a balance among plant and animal species?
16. What are the chief results of competition within the human community?
17. Show that migration is both a cause and an effect of competition.
18. What changes in the nature of migration have occurred as group life has developed from primitivity to civilization?
19. Do migrations act selectively? Explain your position.
20. How has American immigration acted selectively to change the racial type?
21. What is the relation of competition to segregation?
22. What is meant by "natural areas" in the urban community? Are "natural areas" the same as "specialized areas"?
23. Describe the city as a series of concentric circles.
24. What factors tend to perpetuate and what to disintegrate the segregated areas within the city?
25. Differentiate the struggle for status from the struggle for survival.

26. To what extent is economic competition impersonal and unconscious? With what proportion of your economic competitors are you in personal contact?

27. "Culture areas and ecological areas seem to coincide." Discuss.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Calculate the rat population through a series of years. Start with a single pair. Assume that they begin to reproduce at the age of three months, that there are six young in each litter, that each pair produces litters at three-month intervals, and that they have a reproductive life of four years.

3. On a base map of your city show the city pattern. Explain each variation from the idealized form of concentric circles.

4. Examine a density map of the United States and explain the population distribution in terms of competition.

5. Show on a map or otherwise the regions producing commercially certain familiar domestic plants, as wheat, corn, rice, and tobacco, and explain in each case the factors determining the distribution.

6. Cooperation is a form or aspect of competition. Attempt a fundamental analysis that will show the relationship.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. Competition. W. H. Hamilton, "Competition," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

b. The Real State of Nature. H. G. Wells, *The Undying Fire*, pp. 81-95.

c. Checks on Natural Fecundity. B. Ibanes, *Mare Nostrum*, pp. 66-68.

d. Conditions of Life and Character in China. E. Huntington, in J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others (editors), *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 326-332.

e. Ecology. R. D. McKenzie, "Human Ecology," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

f. The Pattern of the City. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 209-211.

g. The Natural Areas of the City. H. W. Zorbaugh, in E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 219-229.

h. Personal Competition and Status. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 708-712.

8. Topics for written themes:

a. The Culture Area

b. The Ecological Area

c. Invasion and Succession in the Plant World

d. Competition and Survival in the Animal World

e. Industrial Invasion and Neighborhood Deterioration

f. Immigration and Racial Succession

g. The Selective Nature of Migration

- h. Areas of Deterioration
- i. Regions of Population Concentration
- j. Rates of Population Increase
- k. Checks to Natural Increase
- l. A Critical Review of P. Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid*.

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3. Bernard, L. L.: "Introductory Statement Regarding Human Ecology and Population," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 23(1929), 30-34.
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6. Carpenter, N.: "Urban Growth and 'Transitional Areas,'" *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 24(1929), 254.
7. Carr-Saunders, A. M.: *The Population Problem*, "The Vast Number of Ova," pp. 53-55.
8. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Process*, Chap. XII, "The Competitive Spirit," pp. 125-136.
9. Cowles, H. C.: "Physiographic Ecology of Chicago," *Botanical Gazette*, 31(1901), 145-182. "Vegetative Cycles"; 51(1911), 161-182. "The Ecological Relations of the Vegetation on the Sand Dunes of Lake Michigan"; 27(1895), 361-388.
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11. Dawson, C. A. and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chaps. IV, V, "The Selective Distribution of People and Institutions," pp. 147-189, 192-225; Chap. VII, "Social Interaction in Relation to Ecological and Cultural Factors," pp. 279-312.
12. Duncan, H. G.: "The Concept of Personal Ecology," *Social Forces*, 6(1928), 426-429.
13. Gras, N. S. B.: "The Rise of the Metropolitan Community," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 155-163. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 183-191.
14. Gras, N. S. B.: *An Introduction to Economic History*, Chap. I, "Collective Economy," pp. 3-19; Chap. II, "Cultural Nomadic Economy," pp. 23-42.
15. Hamilton, W. H.: "Competition," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
16. Hankins, F. H.: *An Introduction to the Study of Society*, Chaps. VI, VII, "The Biological Factors in Social Life," pp. 218-266, 268-317.
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18. Holt, A. E.: "The Ecological Approach to the Church," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 72-79.
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20. Lind, A. W.: "Some Ecological Patterns of Community Disorganization in Honolulu," *American Journal of Sociology*, 36(1930-1931), 206-220.
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CHAPTER XII

CONFLICT

The preceding chapter treated competition as a universal and inevitable fact of life and emphasized its fundamental character and impersonal nature. It arises as an immediate and inevitable consequence of the existence of multiplying forms in a closed universe and it is manifest in as many ways as there are orders of phenomena. It may be considered abstractly—that is, apart from and independent of the various concrete expressions—or it may be examined concretely—that is, in relation to the diverse aspects of reality. In any case it remains a subsocial rather than a social process and commonly operates without the awareness of the beings whose fate is determined by it.

It was also pointed out that competition is the process in which the survival and elimination of forms are determined and by which the survivors, whether individuals or groups, are placed within an ecological order. The form and distribution of existing plants and animals are end results of the ceaseless struggle to survive in the environmental conditions. The efflorescence and decadence of political and cultural groups—Egypt, Greece, France in the past and the present, England, America, Japan in the present and the future—are expressions of a competition in which the degrees of success or failure are determined by location, resources, and social organization. The struggle to survive is as severe in the realm of ideas, ideals, beliefs, and practices as it is among organic and social forms; the struggle between religion and rationalism, democracy and monarchy, capitalism and sovietism, and the like will end in the general prevalence of the principle consistent with group survival. The struggle between intelligence and stupidity, as between the practical and the mystical, will end with the dominance of one or the other type of man in the social order. Competition is universal and continuous in every aspect of life and culture and determines in the long run survival and dominance.

In the human world there may come an awareness of the fact that the ends of individual activity are opposed, that the strivings of one group are negated by the activities of another, that the prevalence of one belief prevents the spread of an alternative one. In such case the impersonal forces of competition come to be identified with persons. Competitors are seen as enemies; the success of one is seen and feared as the failure of the other. Struggle becomes conscious and personal and it is planned to injure or destroy the opponent.

. . . Any particular person is normally born into some sort of group, the solidarity and collective feeling of which antedates his own arrival in it. Members of such an "in-group" take for granted, on the whole, their common interests and present, quite spontaneously, a united front to the rest of the world. In so far as the claims they make upon the world conflict with those they find other groups asserting—and the typical first outcome of the contact of group with group is that they do conflict through a wide range—the ensuing process of interaction can be described as one of conflict. The "others" are identified as enemies, and the struggle against them is carried on, for a time at least, with energy and enthusiasm which are reinforced, apparently, by traits deeply rooted in original nature. Under the circumstances in which actual human conflicts take place, however, the means and methods to be used in carrying on the struggle are often circumscribed and defined through the operation of controls already developed in the large social *milieu* within which the particular struggle takes place. The struggle may thus have the form of emulation or rivalry rather than that of war and feud; and in modern times even war is a struggle which is regulated to a certain extent.¹

In the present chapter attention is given to interaction in the form of conflict. Attention is first directed to the nature and characteristics of conflict as a form of social interaction. This is followed by a presentation of the different forms of conflict and an analysis of conflict groups. Finally attention is given to the sociological significance of conflict and to a generalized statement of the conflict process.

A. THE NATURE OF CONFLICT

As long as persons and groups of unlike standards, traditions, and manners of life remain apart their interaction remains on the

¹ F. N. House, "Social Relations and Social Interaction," *American Journal of Sociology*, 31(1926), 624-625. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

impersonal level of competition. If the separation be absolute, as of Europe and the Americas before the end of the fifteenth century, there is of course no competition. Short of an absolute separation there is an inevitable and continuous struggle but one that ordinarily goes on without the competing units' being aware of the clash of interests. There is competition but no necessary conflict between the rug weavers of a primitive group and the factory workers of Europe, between the farmers of New England and those of the Middle West, or between the silk industry and workers of Japan and the cellulose products and factory employees of America.

Conflict is initiated by contact. The transition from competition to conflict comes about chiefly as the result of the interaction and communication of divergent groups. In the contacts of unlike groups there is always tension; there is usually present some element of mutual fear and suspicion; inevitably there is misunderstanding; often there is active mutual hostility. In contact and interaction the competing persons and groups become aware of their opposed and conflicting interests and the competition becomes in a degree personal—that is, the forces and conditions that hinder the achievement of ends are identified with persons who are striving for the same or other objectives. The obstacles to success are seen as other persons; competitors thus become enemies and the struggle of competition is transformed into a conflict of enemies. Conflict is thus always a conscious and personal struggle, a struggle between persons or groups that conceive their interests and welfare to be mutually exclusive. It is always, between men or groups, a ruthless effort to fulfill desires that may be fulfilled only at the expense of other men or groups.

Conflict arouses the active attention of participants and spectators. No other thing within the experience of man stimulates him to the same level of physical exertion and of mental activity; no other racial or personal experience is of such deep and general interest. It arouses the strongest emotions and elicits the deepest sympathies. "Conflict . . . evokes the deepest emotions and strongest passions and enlists the greatest concentration of attention and of effort."¹

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 574.

It follows that conflict is of necessity temporary or at least intermittent in character. The emotional condition incident to personal combats or group struggles cannot be long maintained. The expenditure of bodily and mental effort required for active combat cannot be long continued; it must be followed by relatively long periods of rest and recuperation. Conflicts are in reality periods of violent activity preceded and followed by relative quietude and inactivity.

Conflict determines the status of the individual in the social order as well as that of groups within the larger society: rivalry, war, and other forms of personal struggle determine superiority and subordination of men and groups. The ecological order is molded by the impersonal forces of universal competition, and it is within this natural order that individuals and groups come into contact and struggle for place and power.

Conflicts may be studied with reference to the groups participating, directly or indirectly, as combatants or as spectators; or with reference to the subjective experience of the person.

B. THE CONFLICT OF PERSONS

The most immediate and direct form of conflict is personal combat, a brute struggle on the physical level to destroy or eliminate the competitor or rival. The fighting of animals for the possession of food and mates is a spontaneous and unregulated form of personal conflict. Among human beings also the effort to overcome opponents and rivals spontaneously assumes the same fighting pattern. So deep-seated and universal is this human tendency that there is always a great emotional interest in personal and group combat. Among the ruder classes of men it is an accepted method of settling personal differences. It is significant that all the activities of native human interest—games, hunting, gambling, love-making, law, medicine, business, scientific work—are organized on the same conflict pattern; no activity is of interest except as it falls within this general form. And within the pattern the activities that follow it most directly are the ones of greatest appeal. The relative public interest in football and prize fights as contrasted to golf and tennis is an illustration in point.

The duel probably had its origin in the trial by ordeal of battle, a judicial combat to determine the guilt or innocence of an accused person who denied being guilty of the wrong of which

he was accused. Divested of its judicial function, it was retained by the military groups and aristocratic classes and had an independent history from the latter part of the fifteenth century. The early duels were of a brutal sort in which one was always killed and sometimes both. They presently became less dangerous and at certain places and times precautions were taken to prevent any serious injury. The duel reached a more elaborate stage of development than perhaps any other form of personal combat. It was in part a form of sport and as such limited in its use to the aristocracy and upper classes. It was evolved as a refined and orderly substitute for personal brawls and came to be the conventional and socially sanctioned means for the redress of certain grievances among the upper classes. For conducting this type of personal encounter, very definite rules of procedure were elaborated; the code was not only elaborate but punctiliously observed. The whole procedure was within the *mores* and every member of the group was obligated to redress his grievances according to its forms. Public opinion within the group played a determining rôle: it set the form, defined the procedure and conditions, and enforced the verdict. Refusal to accept the means of settlement as well as any violation of the prescribed procedure was at the cost of ostracism and loss of status within the group.

In the modern community disputes between persons or factions are settled according to norms of procedure worked out in the historic experience of the group, and the procedure is buttressed by a variety of formal and informal sanctions. Public opinion, whether operative by way of gossip or in the explicit and organized formulations of statute law, defines these norms and applies them in every conflict situation.

In the types of frequently recurring disputes that appear serious from the point of view of the inclusive community, provision is made for their resolution by duly and formally organized tribunals or courts. But even in litigation and American court procedure the conflict pattern is retained. As late as 1818 an accused murderer in England was dismissed because the brother of the murdered girl refused the gage of battle. In the modern court a fight is waged but it is conducted in accordance with rules that are exactly stated and impartially enforced. It is another step removed from the spontaneous fight in that it is directed by attorneys specially trained for this type of encounter

and is conducted by verbal rather than by physical means. It is a contest of champions, a somewhat softened form of the early judicial combat of the European peoples.

C. FORMS OF GROUP CONFLICT

Conflicts between groups may be classified in numerous ways. For present purposes they are classified with reference to the form of the conflict and with reference to the groups involved. The former are exemplified by war, feud, commercial rivalry, and litigation; the latter are typified by race, nationality, sex, and sectarian and factional conflicts.

War is the most characteristic and spectacular form of group conflict. It is simply a highly organized form of fight carried on by representatives of nations or of independent groups. The representatives may be either professional fighters or volunteer or drafted amateurs. The non-participating members of the rival groups form the body of spectators whose applause and abuse urge on the active participants after the unpleasant part of the business tends to exceed the romantic and pleasurable features.

War in the first instance grows out of a clash of interests. The initial point may be an effort to steal women or other property of a rival group, to destroy or cripple a competitor group, to replenish the supply of slaves, to gain control of a source of raw materials, or for any other purpose that appears to be to the interests of the military group, the ruling class, or other dominating faction within the society. Since the successful prosecution of major group conflicts commonly requires the moral support of the population and a high degree of unity within the society, the underlying motives are seldom stated in frank and brutal terms; in the modern world, at least, every effort is made to justify the conflict on moral grounds.

There is also a direct—as well as an indirect—cause-and-effect relationship between war and population growth. The numerical increase of a group beyond the immediately available means of life disturbs the man-land ratio and this has often resulted in migration and in the consequent invasion of the supporting areas of other groups. The warfare resulting between the occupying peoples and the invading hordes, by destroying excess numbers, often reestablished a favorable man-land ratio. Where the rival

hordes depended directly upon the bounty of nature, as in a hunting and collecting economy, every man killed in war relieved the pressure on the resources and thereby eased the struggle for the means of life. Primitive warfare has often operated selectively through giving a proportionately higher survival rate among the more mentally alert and physically active of the fighters and through giving a relatively high death rate among the fighters themselves—that is, of the more belligerent and bellicose members of the tribes. In later culture development overpopulation has often been at the base of national conflict, although the direct and inciting causes often seem far removed. The aggressive war policy of the Japanese in the Orient is a case in point. But the wars of culture peoples invariably increase rather than relieve a state of overpopulation, since the destruction of property and resources and the diverting of energy from productive to destructive uses are far out of proportion to the number of people destroyed. The eugenic effects of modern war are negative, or at least not favorably selective, since the persons destroyed are not the pugnacious and ruthless individuals who incite and precipitate the armed conflicts of nations.

In the modern social order wars are enormously destructive of personal and public interests and the intelligent elements of all populations seek to avoid them. But the number of socially intelligent persons even in the more advanced modern societies is small and wars are greatly to the interest of certain groups within every society: the military caste depends upon them for its prestige and status; the prosperity of the munitions manufacturers is dependent upon war and preparation for war; various manufacturing-interest groups look to foreign wars as a means of gaining control of coveted raw material and natural resources. It is relatively easy for the powerful groups to give to selfish interests the appearance of public necessity, and every national aggression, no matter how gross, is made to appear as an act of public defense and protection against a ruthless aggressor. The desired war is thus made to appear necessary and inevitable. In the circumstances it is easy to arouse and stimulate the emotional fighting attitudes of the young and ignorant. Their responses, as pointed out above, spontaneously take the fighting pattern. This is not to say that war is in any real sense an expression of man's original nature. The fighting attitudes of men, like their other attitudes, are a product of their culture tradition; they are a

part of the social heritage rather than an expression of original nature.

The appeal of war to the individual man is better understood as an escape from the responsibilities of commonplace reality. It is often pointed out that war, especially in the highly artificial conditions of civilized life, offers an escape from responsibility and from lowly status. The restrictions of civilized life, the burdens of home and family, the responsibility of earning a livelihood, the monotony of work, and the other inconveniences of social life may be shifted through joining the army. It is also a way of getting recognition denied to the average man; through the simple expedient of donning a uniform he escapes the burdensome cares of independent life and, by the same act, becomes a romantic hero in the eyes of the group.

It should not be assumed that wars have everywhere and always been an unmitigated evil. Throughout most of the history of the race, war has been a chief means of group contact. It has, therefore, played an important part in the development and spread of culture. Aside from the contacts incident to warfare there were, for very long periods, no sociological relationships among groups.

The feud is a type of warfare waged between factions within and subject to an inclusive group. In its primitive form—the blood-vengeance feud—it was a means of avenging the death or injury of a blood relative. In the primitive circumstances it probably had value, as a deterrent to acts of aggression, in that it gave a certainty or a probability that retaliation would follow the infliction of injury. It was an expression of primitive law. But violence in retaliation for injury leads to new retaliatory acts: each death of a relative calls for the death of another member of the enemy group. With the development of political authority the administration of justice is everywhere taken out of private hands. But the primitive patterns tend to persist, or to reappear, in isolated regions and where the central authority is weak or remote. The mountain areas of the southern United States, Sicily, and Corsica are notorious as centers of long-continued family feuds.

Private quarrels in an area of primary relations easily pass into family feuds because of the disposition to hold a relationship group responsible for the acts of its individual members. The original aggression may be trivial, but the quarrel once started

tends to persist and the feud continues long after the original incidents are lost to mind. Moreover, casual conflicts incidental to the conduct of certain enterprises take on the feud pattern. The criminal gangs engaged in illegal business enterprises, with the tacit consent and protection of the local police authorities, as the present-day manufacture and distribution of alcoholic liquors, often have a pronounced feud element; often they are family or race as well as business groups.

Factional strife is a type of intragroup conflict which often, but not invariably, takes the form of feud. Its peculiar character lies in the fact that each faction looks upon the other as selfishly motivated and as threatening the existence of the inclusive group. The antagonism becomes intensely bitter because of this imputation of selfishness and because of the further fact that the enmity is between factions who are nevertheless bound to each other by common membership in the group and cannot escape contact and association with each other apart from complete severance into two groups or complete defeat or annihilation of one or the other faction. This identification of itself, by each faction, with the preservation of the inclusive group dignifies the struggle by giving it the appearance of being an issue more fundamental and far-reaching than the immediate objectives.

D. THE CONFLICT OF VALUES

The conflict of values is a struggle of a different order and on a different plane from either the personal or the group conflict just described. It is an aspect of conflict that is purely objective and impersonal. The incompatibility of certain abstract values must be grasped if the nature of conflict is to be at all adequately understood.

In its simplest observational manifestations conflict is merely a physical struggle between individuals or groups. These external, physical, and personal phenomena, the matching of skill or cunning or brute power, are generally present but they represent a single aspect of conflict. Among human beings struggle also invariably has psychological and sociological aspects. War between nations, for example, in its external aspects, is a body of military facts—a mobilization of men and machines, their transportation and arrangement in battle formation, the maneuvering for position, the advances and retreats, and the various other incidents to a military campaign. But back of these physical

facts is the social and psychological situation, the clash of interests and attitudes that lead the groups to the periodic physical struggles. The wars of nations may be understood only as they are examined in terms of the opposed interests and attitudes of the rival groups. The same statement applies to personal conflicts and to conflicts within the person. They arise out of a clash of attitudes and values.

The values involved may be material or immaterial realities. Men and nations fight for food and lands and markets but they also fight for sentiments, beliefs, and ideals. The disorganization of the peasant immigrant family in an American urban setting is merely an outward expression of divergent ideals and standards. Some degree of actual or potential conflict between the younger and older generations is inevitable in a changing world and among human beings whose personalities are defined in experience.

But above and beyond the physical struggles of individuals and groups and apart from the interests and attitudes that motivate or accompany them is the conflict of values themselves. Many of the ideas and ideals prevailing among men are opposed and mutually exclusive. The ideal of democracy, for example, makes impossible the ideal of aristocracy. Evolution and fundamentalism are contradictory interpretations of reality. There is no resolution of the conflict between such logically incompatible ideas and beliefs. The men or groups who hold them may avoid overt conflict, resolve their differences in verbal formulas or otherwise preserve a semblance of peace, but the impersonal ideals themselves are opposed in their nature and the conflict between them continues without limit. The only resolution of such a conflict is the disappearance of one or the other from the realm of human values.

This conflict assumes its most uncompromising form in the philosophical and scientific worlds. The values there in conflict are abstract and derive their significance from their intellectual rather than from their sentimental reference. The matters in conflict are differentiated from personality; persons are merely representatives of the objective impersonal values. In a scientific controversy the issue is not the destruction of an opponent but the establishment of truth. Such conflicts are fought without concession or compromise. Nothing short of full victory and the complete exposure of error is possible. But they are impersonal, often indeed carried on between personal friends.

Such conflicts for the establishment of impersonal values are well thought of among men. Because of this social reputability, men and groups endeavor to give their selfish struggles the appearance of an impersonal conflict. Wars for the control of markets or raw materials of industry or to collect foreign debts are made to appear as unselfish and self-sacrificing efforts to spread Christianity or civilization or other reputable value into the backward regions of the world or, better, as efforts to defend such values from the attacks of enemies. When this is done, the cause becomes one in which any measures to win may be justified; indeed, it becomes traitorous not to use all means to win the victory.

E. CONFLICT WITHIN THE PERSON

In discussing a conflict of values reference is had to the fact that certain ends of human desire and activity are mutually exclusive. The achievement of one makes impossible the realization of the other. There is of course no conflict in a concrete sense between the values themselves, they are merely the objectives which men strive to attain; they have reality only in so far as they condition human behavior, only in so far as men have attitudes toward them and make them goals to be attained. The conflicting values bring persons and groups of persons into conflict; the concrete struggles are of course always the struggles of men. One group adheres to a given value or set of values, another strives for an opposed value or set of values. If the evolutionary theory of the origin of species and the doctrine of special creation are the opposed values, the modernists are arrayed on one side and the fundamentalists on the other. The concrete struggle is between the adherents of the conflicting doctrines.

In some cases a person is initially so situated that both of two conflicting positions are for him positive values. In spite of the fact that they are mutually exclusive, he cannot relinquish either. In such case the conflict of values becomes subjective; the person is impelled to two opposed and contradictory types of behavior.

Such subjective conflicts are in general due to membership in groups that make contrary demands upon personal behavior. A person may, as an incident of his early primary group experience, belong to a fundamentalist church organization. To it he may be tied by many bonds of sentiment and obligation. He has

accepted its creed as a statement of truth and committed himself publicly to it. His status in his family and in his immediate circle of friends and acquaintances may depend upon his adherence to this religious doctrine. His professional position and livelihood may depend upon his church affiliation and credal profession. But he may also become interested in geology or biology or other science and, through the medium of scientific books and journals, come into contact with the intellectual world. He becomes identified with a somewhat impersonal and widely distributed group of scholars. Sooner or later he comes to realize that the attitudes of the church and the scientific groups are conflicting and irreconcilable. But he is a member of each and so inevitably in conflict with himself. Had he grown up in either group without contact with or membership in the other, the conflict would not have occurred; it is the result of his dual group membership.

Such conflicts of values within the person are in no sense exceptional; they are the usual and normal condition as long as there is intellectual growth. The person has the ideas, beliefs, prejudices, and ideals of the group of which he is a member. As his education proceeds and his contacts and experiences widen there is a process of continued conflict between new knowledge and older beliefs in which the childish, sentimental, partial, and untenable attitudes and beliefs give way to more mature and rational understanding.

The subjective conflicts of the person are not always easily resolved. Many of the attitudes are sentimental and non-rational in origin. This is particularly the case of the whole complex of attitudes associated with family, home, and the primary groups which are fixed in infancy and childhood. They do not yield readily to logic; they are sentimental deposits of haphazard experience, hence do not lie in the intellectual plane. This is quite aside from the fact of unwillingness to give up obsolete but cherished beliefs because it would mean some personal disadvantage—a break with certain friends, a loss of status, a confession of error, or the necessity of revising previously accepted and settled doctrines and interpretations. A person may recognize and admit a prejudice, as toward persons of another race, recognize that it is unintelligent or even silly, despise himself for his provincialism, and yet continue to hold it.

The resolution of subjective conflicts may take any one of several forms. They may find a solution through a rejection of the new and a retention of the old. They may find an opposite solution through the discarding of earlier ideas and standards in favor of the newer and more adequate conceptions. A third possibility lies in the acceptance and retention of both the old and the new. This is possible and usual in either of two ways. The new may be so interpreted as to conceal the conflict. To many persons there appears to be no incongruity in a professional soldier being at the same time a devout Christian.

In some cases conflicts in attitudes and ideas are in their very nature irresolvable. The sentiments, ideas, beliefs, or ideals that are at issue in the struggle are incompatible and mutually exclusive. As between persons and groups supporting the opposed positions there is no resolution short of the destruction or conversion of one party to the struggle. Sectarian groups cannot live at peace with other groups; they are obligated to convert or exterminate the non-believers, and conflict is the prevailing order until the sectarian group undergoes a change of nature.

Within the person these conflicts may take tragic form. Tragedy is, in fact, the personal type of irreconcilable conflict exploited in the great literature of every people. It is the type of conflict that arises within the person as a result of his membership in, and loyalty to, groups representing mutually exclusive ideas and ideals. A man, for example, may be a sincere Christian and at the same time a member of a modern nationalistic group. For the most part and in most conditions he may keep the two things apart, not be keenly aware of the contradiction. But in time of war he is obligated by his one set of loyalties to support the tribal group in its prosecution of the war while, by his Christian professions, he is obligated to oppose war and to refuse to participate in its activities. He must sacrifice either his religion or his nation; he must be a traitor either to his God or to his country. Such conflict is commonly resolved by the person's giving up either his Christianity or his patriotism—with curious frequency the former rather than the latter. But this is simply conclusive evidence that his loyalties were formal instead of real. In case the person is genuinely and equally sincere in both loyalties there is no solution.

F. CONFLICT GROUPS

The existence of groups implies some body of common purpose, belief, or sentiment, some interest that holds the members and makes possible a measure of collective or corporate behavior. Without some bond of unity groups would not form or, being formed, would disintegrate as the members pursued their several ends. Each of the various classes, castes, schools, clubs, gangs, societies, parties, and the like in a complex society represents special beliefs, sentiments, or interests that are held by some members of the society but not by all. By virtue of their existence, they are in some degree separate from and in some measure opposed to other groups; they are in some measure isolated, set apart from other persons and groups. By virtue of their special sentiments and purposes, they are not only separate from but in some measure opposed to other groups and persons who do not share their special beliefs, interpretations, and aspirations. They are, therefore, potentially if not overtly in conflict with others who hold divergent beliefs and pursue conflicting ends.

In some cases existing groups are the defeated factions of former conflicts. Classes, castes, denominations represent in general such defeated factions. Having failed to achieve their ends or to achieve them completely, they have compromised or otherwise changed in character. Their continued existence is based upon a *modus vivendi* which reduces overt conflict to a minimum; they are potentially rather than overtly at war with other groups. They represent an accepted division of labor in the society, an accepted definition of relationships. Such conflict as goes on is kept within well-defined limits and proceeds according to norms fixed in custom or law. Such accommodation groups will be discussed in the following chapter.

Other groups, as gangs, parties, and sects, exist more or less definitely as fighting organizations. Conflict is their normal or chief function. They are more or less continuously in warfare with other groups or with the inclusive social community. This orientation determines more or less completely the form of their internal organization.

The gang is perhaps the most spontaneous of the conflict groups and the simplest in organization. A loosely organized or unorganized play group of boys when it meets with opposition or interference may take on a fighting pattern, a more or less definite

organization about a leader. The pattern and organization may have developed spontaneously in the play and games or it may have been impressed by the well-intentioned interference of the school or playground personnel. Such a group is generally highly localized, often with a definite rendezvous; it has a real though not always a recognized leader; it has a restricted and sometimes a secret membership; often it develops a body of tradition and of custom and ritual; and in other ways it develops a degree of unity, solidarity, and relative permanence. If such a gang comes into conflict with the police, the truant officers, or other representatives of organized society it is classed as a criminal gang with a resultant definitiveness of organization and activity. The gang typically graduates into a local political organization.

The political party or faction is another typical conflict group. Its origin is generally in factional conflict for the control of government in the effort to realize some material or immaterial interest. The professional group growing out of this conflict and continuing as the nucleus of the party—the “party machine”—exists for the purpose of keeping itself in power and adopts its issues and means to that end. It combats other similar groups or compromises and trades with them as appears expedient. The state itself represents a conflict group that has established a relatively permanent tenure. Its existence at every stage from the tribal organization to the modern nation defines an equilibrium among contending parties.

Economic groups are in some cases definitely organized on a conflict basis. Labor unions, as employers' associations, exist for aggression, protection, and bargaining rather than for economic ends. The sect is at war with some aspect of the established order and its organization is determined by that fact. The nationality is a language, cultural, or racial group that has achieved a self-conscious unity in the struggle for status and self-respect.

G. THE SOCIOLOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF CONFLICT

As a form of interaction, conflict is sociologically significant both from the point of view of personality and from that of social organization. It is at the base and origin of all conscious life: both self-consciousness and group consciousness are the result of conflict.

In the life of the person, conflict plays an organizing rôle. The experiences of the person are typically miscellaneous and often quite unselected; generally they are without inherent configuration. The suggestions and stimulations of concrete experience are not only numerous and confused, they are in large measure contradictory. They take on coherence and meaning only in so far as they are brought into relation one with another and related to the apperceptive mass of the person. The order and unity of experience are in the experiencing person, not in the world of environmental stimulations. Every problem in the life of the person is a conflict, a concrete situation where it is necessary to harmonize conflicting tendencies or to choose between discordant facts. Every decision made by the person is a resolution of such a conflict; it represents a choice between opposed impulses, ideas, interests, or types of behavior. Every act of learning involves the conflict of a new fact or experience with the body of previously organized experiential or logical data and its incorporation and assimilation. In and through this ceaseless conflict of stimuli, and the resolution of them through interpretations and decisions, the person makes adjustment to a changing social situation. And in this process his habits of thought and action are organized and his character formed. Without problems and decisions there is no growth in character and life organization; the completely sheltered and protected person remains a child—that is, he fails to develop character.

The recent shift in emphasis in the schools from the older types of formal education to the so-called project method of teaching is a recognition in practice of the significance of conflict and choice in the learning process. A "project" is simply a problem. If it be conceived as such by the student, it enlists his interest and stimulates him to organized, persistent effort. Learning becomes incidental to activity in pursuit of a solution to the problem set. The two methods of teaching are comparable to exercise taken for the sake of health and exercise in the form of games that are interesting in themselves.

Conflict plays a corresponding rôle in group organization. The person's need of the group is for protection and aggression. In the absence of conflict, overt or potential, groups tend to atomize into their discrete units; they reach the maximum of unity and solidarity in overt conflict. The nation achieves its most effective organization in periods of tribal warfare. So well is this

sociological fact understood that rulers and ruling classes have in innumerable cases brought on foreign wars as the simple and effective method of achieving internal unity. In the modern nations a popular fear of foreign aggression is systematically maintained in the interests of group unity and class control. The political party is an inchoate and relatively formless thing except in the period of a campaign. Conflict lies at the basis of all political organization. Governing bodies are merely intermediate groups created in conflict situations to resolve or prevent conflict or to direct it or confine it within established or socially useful limits.

Similarly also the conflict of groups permits or facilitates adjustment to changing situations. The problems that arise between national groups in times of peace are mediated by diplomatic negotiations and result in expedient and mutually unsatisfactory compromises. In time there is built up a cumbersome structure of relationships that becomes increasingly burdensome and obstructive. War is a means—not necessarily the best or the only means—of demolishing this diplomatic structure and permitting the development of a more simple and serviceable one.

H. THE CONFLICT PROCESS

Something of the nature of the conflict process has been implied and assumed in the foregoing sections. It remains only to make the statement explicit.

The first step in the process, the step that marks it off from competition out of which it arises, is the identification of antagonists by persons or groups in competition and the rise of the struggle to the level of awareness. The realization of exclusive ends emerges when the competing units come into contact and communication.

The realization of opposed impulses, interests, or ideas and the identification of opponents may lead immediately and directly to open and bitter conflict. The fighting of animals is the immediate response to a clash of interests; the response of the child or of the simple man to interference with the pursuit of ends is only a bit less direct. But generally in human groups the spontaneous fighting impulses are inhibited. Open hostility is commonly preceded by a more or less prolonged period of sentimental and physical preparation. Opinions justifying each position are formulated and expressed by each party to the controversy, and

personal and group sentiments are enlisted in the struggle. The opposed positions are formulated in impersonal and disinterested terms of the widest possible incidence. The effort is to gain moral and if possible material support by lifting the struggle from the plane of self-interest and making it appear just and right in the eyes of detached onlookers. Ultimately open conflict in some form ensues, the form depending upon a number of factors, such as the relative strength of the antagonists, the issues at stake, and the prevailing norms which both recognize and respect or which neutrals enforce.

The period during which overt conflict continues varies with the circumstances of the struggle but in any case it is relatively brief. Whether personal or group or subjective in character, conflict is intermittent rather than continuous; sooner or later any struggle must cease, at least temporarily.

The final step in the conflict process is its resolution and the initiation of the subsequent process of accommodation. This will be elaborated in the study of accommodation. Here it need only be said that the termination of the conflict may come through the destruction of one or both opponents, through the victory of one and the subjugation of the other, through some compromise or conciliation, or through the intervention or mediation of some third party.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this to the preceding chapter.
2. Differentiate competition and conflict. Illustrate each by a number of examples.
3. "Conflict is initiated by contact." Explain.
4. Tabulate the characteristics of conflict and explain each.
5. What is the effect of conflict and of competition?
6. How do you account for the universal interest in conflict?
7. Would you say that the two sexes are about equally interested in conflict situations?
8. What are some typical forms of conflict?
9. What are the characteristics of the duel as a form of personal conflict? How does it differ from a street fight or other primitive form of personal combat?
10. Compare the duel with litigation, bringing out sharply the likenesses and the differences.
11. Discuss the position that creative thought invariably follows the conflict pattern.
12. "Thought centers at just those points at which we are out of adjustment with our environment." Discuss in relation to the preceding question.

13. State as clearly and comprehensively as you can the relation between war and population growth.

14. Explain how and why governments conceal the predatory purposes in the wars they wage.

15. What men and groups stand to profit by foreign wars?

16. Explain the appeal of war to the common man.

17. "The situations existing in times of peace are precisely the conditions out of which war emerges." Explain.

18. Can war be avoided? Explain your position.

19. What is a feud? What purpose did it serve in the earlier groups?

20. Under what circumstances does the feud survive in modern times?

21. Explain what is meant by the conflict of values.

22. State a conflict of impersonal ideals not mentioned in the text.

23. What do you understand by conflict within the person?

24. What is the relation of conflict within the person to group conflict?

25. Give ways in which conflicts in the person may be resolved. Give examples of each way known to you.

26. Give an example of an irresolvable conflict.

27. What is the nature of tragedy?

28. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ have announced the doctrine that "to support war is to deny the gospel we profess to believe." Do you agree?

29. What are conflict groups?

30. Discuss the gang as a conflict group.

31. In what sense is the political party a conflict group?

32. List and evaluate the various factors occasioning conflicts between races.

33. What is the basis of sex conflict?

34. Can you cite examples of conflicts between parents and children arising out of the wider contacts of the children and the consequent clash of cultures?

35. Explain the function of conflict in the life of the person.

36. Explain the rôle of conflict in group organization.

37. Discuss and illustrate the various devices by means of which a conflict group cozens and disciplines its members.

38. What does tolerance on the part of a group indicate?

39. Outline the conflict process.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Analyze the devices actually used by some conflict group in controlling its own members.

3. Give an account of some subjective experience in conflict, showing in some detail how the conflict was finally resolved.

4. Analyze the conflict between the older and the younger generations. What was the character of this conflict at the beginning of the century when the older generation was the younger generation?

5. Inquire into the personal significance of inner conflict. When such a conflict remains unsettled indefinitely, what happens to the personality?

6. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. The Natural History of Conflict. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 579-582.
- b. The Conflict of Cultures. W. D. Wallis and M. M. Willey, *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 121-122.
- c. Social Conflict. H. D. Lasswell, "Social Conflict," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- d. Feuds. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 323-325.
- e. Conflict and Adjustment in Social Behavior. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, pp. 336-338.
- f. Compromise. H. D. Lasswell, "Compromise," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- g. Mental Conflict. E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 393-414.
- h. Inferiority Conflict. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 359-361.
- i. The Conflict of Impersonal Interests. N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 117-119.

7. Topics for written themes:

- a. A Personal Experience in Conflict and Its Resolution
- b. The Control of Group Members (an analysis of the devices actually used by some conflict group in controlling its members)
- c. The Gang (a review of *The Gang*, by F. M. Thrasher)
- d. Cooperation as a Form of Conflict
- e. The Concept of Conflict
- f. Original Nature and Conflict
- g. A Famous Feud
- h. Mental Conflict and Intellectual Conversion
- i. Race Conflicts
- j. Rivalry and Conflict
- k. Conflict and the Wish for Security
- l. The Definitions of Issues in War
- m. The Conflict Form of Court Procedure

Supplementary Readings

1. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. X, "The Struggle of Groups," pp. 121-139; Chap. XI, "Struggle within the Group," pp. 140-158.
2. Case, C. M.: "Instinctive and Cultural Factors in Group Conflicts," *American Journal of Sociology*, 28(1922-1923), 1-20.
3. Cooley, C. H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. VII, "Hostility," pp. 264-292; Chap. VIII, "Emulation," pp. 293-316.

4. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Process*, Chap. IV, "Conflict and Cooperation," pp. 35-42; Chap. XXII, "Group Conflict and Modern Integration," pp. 241-254; Chap. XXIV, "Class and Race," pp. 268-280.
5. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Introduction to Sociology*, Book II, Chap. IV, "Conflict and the Readjustment of Attitudes in the Personality," pp. 439-449.
6. Davis, J., H. E. Barnes, and others: *Readings in Sociology*, Book II, Chap. IV, "Conflict and Readjustment of Attitudes in the Personality," pp. 552-564.
7. Dawson, C. A. and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. VIII-X, "Conflict," pp. 315-355; 360-392; 395-433.
8. Detweiler, F. G.: "The Rise of Modern Race Antagonisms," *American Journal of Sociology*, 37(1931-1932), 738-747.
9. Frazier, E. F.: "Certain Aspects of Conflict in the Negro Family," *Social Forces*, 10(1931), 76-84.
10. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XII, "Forms of Social Experience: Conflict," pp. 223-238; Chap. XIII, "Forms of Social Experience: Cooperation," pp. 241-257.
11. Hart, H.: *The Science of Social Relations*, Chap. XI, "Social Conflict," pp. 177-195; Chap. XVI, "Mental Conflicts and the Failure Complex," pp. 349-371; Chap. XIX, "Conflicts between Racial and Cultural Groups," pp. 460-492; Chap. XXI, "Industrial Conflict," pp. 536-554.
12. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XXIII, "Conflict and Disorganization," pp. 322-337; Chap. XXVII, "The Social Struggle," pp. 389-407.
13. Hummel, B. L.: "Intercommunity Conflict," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 24(1930), 34-40.
14. Lasswell, H. D.: "Feuds," "Conflict, Social," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
15. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VIII, "Competition and Conflict," pp. 153-174; Chap. XII, "Cooperation," pp. 242-264.
16. Miller, H. A.: *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. XIV, "The Class Conflict," pp. 159-167; Chap. XV, "The Paradox of Americanization," pp. 168-180.
17. Newell, J. I.: "The Chinese Family: An Arena of Conflicting Cultures," *Social Forces*, 9(1931), 564-571.
18. Park, R. E.: "Education in Its Relation to Conflict and Fusion of Cultures: With Special Reference to the Problems of the Immigrant, the Negro, and Missions," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 13(1918), 38-63.
19. Park, R. E.: "Personality and Culture Conflict," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 25(1931), 95-110.
20. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. IX, "Conflict," pp. 574-648.
21. Price, M. T.: "The Concept 'Culture Conflict,'" *Social Forces*, 9(1930), 164-167.
22. Prince, M.: *The Unconscious*, Chap. XVI, "General Phenomena Resulting from Emotional Conflicts," pp. 488-528.

23. Queen, S. A.: "A Study of Conflict Situations," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 24(1930), 56-64.
24. Reinhardt, J. M., and G. R. Davies: *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, Chap. V, "The Rôle of Struggle," pp. 121-148; Chap. VI, "Cooperation," pp. 150-170; Chap. VII, "Conflict and Competition," pp. 173-202; Chap. VIII, "Major Fields of Conflict," pp. 205-249.
25. Ross, E. A.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. II, "Suggestibility," pp. 11-41; Chap. III, "The Crowd," pp. 43-61; Chap. IV, "Mob Mind," pp. 63-82; Chap. XVII, "Interference and Conflict," pp. 296-306; Chap. XXII, "Public Opinion," pp. 346-354.
26. Sprowls, J. W.: *Social Psychology Interpreted*, Chap. VIII, "The Conflict of Cultures," pp. 142-157; Chap. IX, "The Conflict of Groups," pp. 159-170; Chap. X, "Social Movement," pp. 171-188.
27. Spykman, N. J.: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Book II, Chap. II, "Opposition," pp. 112-127.
28. Sumner, W. G., and A. G. Keller: *The Science of Society*, Chap. XIV, "Antagonisms," pp. 353-414.
29. Tjalling, O.: "Landsmaal-Riksmaal: The Feud between the Dialects and the Official Language of Norway," *American Journal of Sociology*, 34(1929), 686-692.
30. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XX, "War," pp. 221-228.
31. Wirth, L.: "Culture Conflict and Misconduct," *Social Forces*, 9(1931), 484-492.

CHAPTER XIII

ACCOMMODATION

The discussion of conflict brought out its intermittent character and personal nature. As a process it is highly conscious and strongly emotional. In its more violent and spectacular forms it rouses the interest and enlists the sympathy of non-participants. In its overt forms, as in battle and personal combat, it is of brief duration. It may eventuate in peace through victory of one contestant over others or in some order of compromise among them, or it may continue indefinitely as a chronic state of mutual fear, hatred, and intermittent strife. Personal conflict, as far as physical combat is concerned, is of necessity brief, but a mutual hatred and fear may continue indefinitely as a state of potential conflict. Conflict within the person is always the subjective aspect of membership in different conflicting groups. It is resolved as one set of values prevails or, in the inability to deny either group, it becomes a chronic condition and the individual is to some degree at least psychopathic.

In the present chapter attention is given to certain aspects of accommodation. This is to be conceived both as a state and as a process. As a state it is the reciprocal recognition and acceptance of existing status. As a process it is a mode of transition from a prior condition, usually one of conflict. It may be considered as a process of adjustment among groups, as a process of fitting the person to his status within the group, and as a process of resolving conflict within the person. It is an intermediate stage between conflict and assimilation. In the general sequence conflicts give rise to some regulation of the hostile elements and the cessation of overt conflict. But conflict is still potential and with any change of situation the controls and adjustments may fail—that is, a new period of confusion, unrest, and possible conflict is precipitated, which in turn issues in new accommodations or a new social order involving changed status in relations among participants. The present chapter defines both the process of accommodation and the state of being accommodated.

It also defines the invariable pattern of accommodation—subordination and superordination—and gives some description and analysis of certain typical forms of personal and group accommodation.

A. THE NATURE OF ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation is both a condition and a process. Each may be treated from the point of view of persons and from the point of view of groups.

As a condition, accommodation is the recognition and acceptance of a set of relationships that defines the status of the person in the group or of the group in the more inclusive social organization. It is a state of relative mental and social peace, an equilibrium between or among contending forces that is more or less permanent and acceptable because of the existence of a supporting body of habits, sentiments, and institutional organization. It is one of the familiar and commonplace facts of everyday experience. Each person is born into a particular group and develops a set of habits, beliefs, and practices that are necessary in the situation. The situation into which a child is born is never one that satisfies the wishes of original nature. "The rights of property, vested interests of every sort, the family organization, slavery, castes and classes, the whole social organization, in fact, represents accommodations, that is to say, limitations on the natural wishes of the individual."¹ The person who grows up in the system takes for granted the whole complex body of customary procedure, the endless regulation of activity, the class order, the traditional division of labor between the sexes, the hierarchy of occupations, and the other major and minor arrangements that characterize the particular group and culture. These accommodations are a part of the social heritage; they are accepted without question by the persons born and reared in the society.

Accommodation is a condition that secures for all parties concerned a recognized status and a degree of security in the pursuit of their differentiated interests. It gives the patterns of behavior to which the group members habitually conform, defines the status and rôle of persons and of groups and so maintains

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 510.

working relations, prevents overt conflict, among the groups and persons that are potentially antagonistic.

Accommodation must not be assumed to represent a state of complete harmony. Complete harmony between groups or within a group involves a contradiction of ideas; on such a condition there would be neither living structure nor life processes. An absolute homogeneity would mean identity, with the consequent impossibility of interaction. Accommodation is rather the acceptance of conditions in order to avoid or terminate conflict and the subsequent maintenance of the status through personal adjustment and habituation.

Conflict, out of which accommodation directly or indirectly arises, does not entirely disappear in accommodation. It continues to exist as a kind of potential opposition keeping all persons in their defined relations one to another and continuously enforcing the arrangements. In some cases, as will be noted more concretely in the discussion to follow, conflict appears in a disguised or sublimated form. Indifference, cynicism, reticence, pride, "making a virtue of necessity," and rationalizations are or may be in each case milder forms of conflict within an area of accommodation. More marked manifestations are to be observed in extreme formality, ceremonial avoidance, other-worldiness, and compensatory activity in other realms. Among the castes of India, where status was rigidly fixed and invariably observed for generations, conflict between the castes while never overt was always present in the form of class pride, aversion and avoidance, and rationalization.

Accommodation may be viewed from the point of view of the social adjustments made rather than from that of the persons adjusted to them. Forms of etiquette and the social ritual generally define certain relationships as the "proper" ones and by so doing avoid clashes, impositions, and irritating invasions of personality. These may be treated as accommodations inasmuch as they are in a way a resolution of conflict among various possible and mutually incompatible ways of acting. In the same way the division of labor between the sexes, the rules of courtship, the form of marriage, the customs of the road, the rights of property and person, the rules of law and equity, and the various other concrete forms of consensus, in so far as they are forms of control in which friction and conflict are avoided or limited by habitual and customary procedures, may be treated as accom-

modations. In the economic sphere, conflict among powerful rival producers and distributors of similar goods is avoided by some sort of *modus vivendi*: by price agreement, division of territory, and the like they maintain amicable relations or at least avoid destructive competition. The transcontinental railroads, for example, maintain uniform passenger rates and the same running time: competition is restricted to such items as the degree of "service" and the type of luxury each offers.

As a process, accommodation is the sequence of steps by which persons are reconciled to changed conditions of life through the formation of habits and attitudes made necessary by the changed conditions themselves.

The accommodation of the person may come, as stated above, as a part of the heritage; the child is conditioned to fit the restrictions of a given social order as a part of his education. But not all individual accommodations are ready-made in the social heritage of the person. All through life, the process of accommodation goes on, fitting the changing person to the changing surroundings. The whole art of living may be viewed as a process of continuing accommodation. Not all the necessary accommodations are included within the heritage. Many are and must be worked out experimentally in the contact and interaction of persons in the home, the neighborhood, and elsewhere. The child learns methods of getting along with his parents and with other children in the family with a minimum of unpleasantness and discomfort. The husband and the wife commonly hit upon adjustments that enable each to realize personal wishes in a measure, and with a minimum of friction, and to carry on a tolerable common life. The person who goes into a new social situation, as the student to the university or the immigrant to a new culture, finds a strange welter of procedures and customs. In the typical case he is for a period homesick—that is, he misses and longs for the old familiar stimulations at the same time that he is overstimulated and tired by the new and unfamiliar, but presently habits are formed and interests developed in accord with the new situation and his accommodation to it is then underway.

The process of accommodation is not to be identified with that of adjustment. The latter is a process of consciously fitting oneself into the situation. It is more a first step in accommodation or a preceding state than the reality itself. Accommodation

is in large measure at least an unconscious process. Once a situation is accepted, an adjustment consciously made, there follows a new set of habits, interests, and companions that develop bonds that tend to keep the situation as it has come to be. The student in the university may at first deliberately and consciously and laboriously adjust himself to conditions that are contrary to his liking. After living in the conditions for a time he may prefer to continue in them rather than to return to the earlier ones. A group defeated in war accepts the terms of peace as a matter of necessity, accepts the inevitable. The person who does not accept the inevitable is psychopathic. The country adjusts its finances, its industries, and other machinery to the changed conditions—and new individual habits and sentiments are presently formed on the basis of the new conditions. At this stage the accommodations become hard to change; to make a change would upset established business arrangements and interfere with the newly formed habits. A labor group may strike in protest against new wage or work conditions. If the strike be lost, the workers presently accept the terms, adjust themselves to conditions they cannot control. This adjustment requires thought and effort. In time there is an accommodation to the new order; habits are formed in the process of living that make the new arrangement tolerable. The man adjusts his manner of life to a larger or a smaller salary; later he becomes habituated and reconciled to the new scale of living. The bride consciously adjusts herself to a new way of life; only with the passing of time does she form the new habits of thought and action and forget the earlier ways; only with the passing of time does she become accommodated to the new rôle. The person's acceptance of a new theory is a conscious intellectual process, but time is required before he is accommodated to it and to the change in his mental life that it makes necessary.

B. ACCOMMODATION AND ADAPTATION

Accommodation needs to be clearly and sharply distinguished from the analogous biological concept of adaptation. The former is an outcome of conflict, the latter the natural issue of competition.

Adaptation is an end result in the process of biological evolution. In the organic realm the individual members of a species differ more or less in size, color, cunning, and other physical and

psychological characters. Also, in the organic realm, the multiplication of organisms leads inevitably and universally to a bitter and continuous struggle for individual and group existence. In this struggle a few survive and reproduce; the overwhelming majority fail and are eliminated without opportunity to reproduce. There is thus a high degree of selection in each generation of those best fitted to survive in the conditions. In so far as the characters that enable the survivors to succeed in the struggle to live and reproduce are heritable traits, each generation will be better adapted than the preceding one to live in the given environmental conditions. That is to say, the species will change its nature through the survival of some and the elimination of others and come to be characterized in higher and higher degree by those traits that are advantageous, in the given conditions, in the struggle to survive.

The term adaptation, when used to designate a process, conceptualizes this biological process of selection which operates through a series of generations and tends to produce organic forms better and better fitted to their environing circumstances. It connotes organic selection—the preservation of certain favored variants and the elimination of the less favored ones. Used to define a condition, it refers to the biological state of a species that, as a result of the long and continuous operation of selective forces, is well fitted to its conditions of life.

Accommodation, on the other hand, is not a selective process and involves no change in the organic type. It is a learning process that fits the person to the environing social conditions by way of changes in habits, sentiments, and ideas. The adjustments thus worked out may come, in time, to be objectified in customs and social institutions and transmitted as parts of the social heritage.

The taming and domestication of animals, discussed in a previous connection, illustrate the two processes simply and clearly. Taming is a specific form of accommodation. The tamed animal has acquired a set of habits that makes it at once dependent upon and able and willing to live in association with man. But it undergoes no organic change in so doing and its offspring will differ in no respect from those of the untamed members of the species. Domestication, on the other hand, is a specific type of adaptation. It is a matter of selection, through generations, of variants and the gradual production of a new

biological form: the dog is not a tamed jackal or wolf but a new form gradually evolved by biological selection from some wolflike ancestor.

The distinction between accommodation and adaptation is illustrated in the difference between domestication and taming. Through domestication and breeding man has modified the original inheritable traits of plants and animals. He had changed the character of the species. Through taming, individuals of species naturally in conflict with man have become accommodated to him. Eugenics may be regarded as a program of biological adaptation of the human race in conscious realization of social ideals. Education, on the other hand, represents a program of accommodation or an organization, modification, and culture of original traits.¹

C. CONFLICT AND ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation has its origin, directly or indirectly, in a conflict situation; it is itself a radically different type of interaction. A statement of the relation of the two and of the transition from one to the other should make the distinction clear.

In a conflict situation there are always forces operating to its cessation. The forces making for peace, as those making for war, are continuously operative; the temporary dominance of one set of influences over the other determines the existing state of peace or war. In the recent war of the European states, forces for its cessation were operative before the actual destruction of life and property began; forces for its continuance were still active at its close and, at the present time, active for its revival. In a personal conflict, as a physical encounter between two men, there are perhaps always considerations on the part of one or both that operate to avoid or terminate the struggle. The actual conflict represents a period in which the passions and other belligerent tendencies are dominant over the forces that counsel peaceful relations. The cessation of the struggle marks the point at which the forces for conflict are definitely overcome by the opposing forces. An exact point, in a given historical instance, at which the one type of interaction, conflict, passes over into the other, accommodation, may not be definitely stated. The overt, initial steps may be dated, but the beginnings of accommodation are made while conflict is yet active and the forces for conflict

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 665. Reprinted by permission of the University of Chicago Press.

extend far into the subsequent accommodation period. Pugnacity as well as a love of peace are present as subjective elements whether the objective situation be one of peace or of war, and the objective factors of interest, greed, gain, and the like remain as permanent factors in group life.

The transition from a state of war to a condition of peace may come in numerous ways. Simmel distinguishes three main groups—victory, compromise, and conciliation.¹ One side to the conflict may be completely vanquished and utterly destroyed. In a historic struggle with the natives of the Philippines, an army drove an entire native tribe into the crater of an extinct volcano and from the points of vantage on its rim shot each man, woman, and child of the tribe. But victory may be less complete in various degrees. Peace may come before the complete exhaustion of either contestant. When the final outcome of continued struggle is evident, one contestant may acknowledge inferiority, concede the victory, and sue for peace. The end of the Civil War in America came when the final outcome was no longer in doubt but long before the complete exhaustion of the Southern armies and states. Each side to a conflict, for variable reasons, may desire to avoid the costs of continued struggle and so express a willingness to compromise. The more or less complete exhaustion of the contestants, without decisive gain on either side, may result in compromise and a period of peace through the intermediation of neutral powers or apart from such outside mediation.

In factional strife within a country, as internecine struggles between rival families or interest groups and in conflicts between individual members of a group, the outcome may be determined by the relative strength or endurance of the contestants. The conflict may be terminated by the intervention of a third party, either in the rôle of conciliator or through the exercise of superior force. Commonly such strife is suppressed by the exercise of the police power of the state. A change in the external circumstances of the more inclusive group, as the beginning of a foreign war or other great national calamity, may distract interest and enthusiasm and bring about at least a temporary reconciliation between the rival factions.

¹ N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 125-127. See R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 705-708; or A. W. Small, "The Sociology of Conflict," *American Journal of Sociology*, 9(1903-1904), 799-806, for Small's translation of Simmel.

At some stage of any overt conflict there is an abatement of actual hostilities on one or both sides accompanied by overtures toward peace. A temporary equilibrium is established. There is a kind of armistice, planned or unplanned, and a tentative agreement, tacit or expressed, is reached concerning a mode of adjustment. The form that this will take in a concrete case turns upon the issues at stake, upon the present character and strength of the antagonists, upon the general state of neutral opinion with reference to them, and upon the general circumstances in which each is involved. Each party to the struggle will act in a way designed to secure as tolerable a subsequent experience for itself as is possible in the conditions.

The terms of a peace treaty following the armistice and formally terminating actual strife define a framework within which future activity is to be confined. The termination of feuds and factional strife, of strikes and lawsuits, of personal fights, and of other conflicts within the group regardless of the manner in which the peace is brought about gives not an accommodation but the limits within which a future accommodation must be worked out.

The new social order or the new relationships within the social order are often, in the beginning, of an unstable and experimental character and, intentionally or not, subject to modification in application. The provisions of a treaty of peace nearly always vary from the terms of an armistice and they, in turn, undergo continual change as their enactment in practice progresses. In like manner, the compromise that terminates a personal conflict gradually changes and softens as the passions elicited by the struggle subside. As the terms of the peace and the new social order that they define come to be understood and accepted, the status of the several parties to the terminated conflict—and that of the neutrals as well—becomes more closely defined, the relations of each to the others become fixed, and each learns to keep within the newly determined spheres of activity.

This state of artificially established equilibrium gradually changes into a new social order. Types of behavior appropriate to it are learned and in time become habitual and customary. Sentiments and attitudes are brought into conformity with the new status and the behavior it determines and the whole arrangement becomes self-enforcing in many or all respects.

The general pattern of transition, in so far as it has a general pattern applicable to all concrete situations, may be stated sum-

marily as follows: a developed social situation involving acute and overt conflict necessitates certain types of behavior on the part of one or both parties in order to avoid the intolerable costs of continued struggle; there follows a tentative arrangement resolving conflict by redefining reciprocal relations and respective spheres of activity; this tentative arrangement gradually undergoes modification, as active hostility subsides, and hardens into a fixed and stable equilibrium; habits and sentiments are brought into correspondence and the new order comes to be embodied in and enforced by appropriate attitudes. In some cases the accommodation thus derived becomes traditional and is then transmitted to each initiate as a part of the social heritage; in some cases it is rationalized and a supporting philosophy is built around it.

Accommodation is complete when there is no longer need for an external control to enforce and maintain personal status and social order. The new relationships have ceased to be tentative and in need of external enforcement; they have become implicit in personal relations and group practice and are accepted and looked upon as natural if not as just and desirable. At this stage each new generation receives the set of relations as a part of the group tradition, incidentally through participation in the social order itself and explicitly through formal instruction. In many or most cases the process goes a step farther. The new order is rationalized: it becomes the object of reflective consideration and is explained in such way as to justify and perpetuate it: a mythological history is built about it, a philosophy is built upon it. In some cases a religious construct provides it with absolute supernatural sanctions in addition to the natural expedient ones.

In any case the process is not complete until personal status and social relations have achieved stability through the development of appropriate, supporting sentiments and attitudes. When accommodation exists, it does not require external pressure for its enforcement. In fact the need for arbitrary measures indicates that accommodation has broken down and conflict has again become overt. In a caste system members of the different castes become adjusted to their status; they take their position for granted and even develop a pride in it. Not only so; a person who violates the caste taboos offends the other members of his own caste and incurs their resentment as well as that of the higher and lower orders. It is a notorious fact that women are kept in

their place—that is, in subordination and compelled to act “as women should”—not so much by men as by other women. The common belief that slaves must be kept in the slave status by the whip of the overseer is of course generally contrary to fact. In so far as the slave and the master are accommodated to the arrangement which defines their relations to each other and their respective duties and obligations, the whip is unnecessary; with their respective rôles clearly recognized and respected so that each knows what to expect of the other, cooperation is possible and strong personal attachments often develop. In every case of accommodation, conformity to the norms arises out of habit, sentiment, and attitude.

In some cases conflict may be chronic. This is of course true always of a conflict of incompatible impersonal ideals. There is no possibility of a cessation of conflict between a natural and a supernatural interpretation of the universe; between realism and mysticism; between aristocracy and democracy; between capitalism and sovietism. The principles are impersonal and incompatible, and conflict ceases only with the complete eradication of one or the other of the opposing interpretations. Overt conflict between the adherents of opposing ideals may of course cease, but in the nature of the case conflict is always either overt or latent. And it is necessary to recognize that accommodation is possible and sometimes made to a conflict situation itself. Overt conflict, as between competing nations or factions involved in feuds, may be chronic or at least extend over decades, generations, or centuries, and persons and groups become habituated, accommodated, to it as one of the facts of the social order. The modern world is pretty well accommodated to war, actual or potential, between or among nations. The national organization, the submission to military drill, the unprotested payment of ruinous taxes to support standing armies, naval armaments, and the like could exist only in a population accommodated to actual or potential war. In the same way the American public in the present day is becoming habituated to continuous warfare between bootleggers and law-enforcement groups as a permanent fact.

Accommodation must always be seen as the internal adjustment of the person or the group that brings equilibrium in a changed social order. It must not be confused with the final stages of conflict or with the procedure and tentative adjustments

made in the period of change from a conflict to a peace basis between individuals or groups.

D. THE GENERAL PATTERN OF ACCOMMODATION

Accommodation involves reciprocal behavior and attitudes among the persons participating in the social order. The concept of social organization connotes the fact of difference among the elements that interact and assume position and relationship to establish the unity. And position or status, established and maintained through conflict, is an expression and a measure of relative superiority and inferiority among the various elements of the population. The fundamental pattern of accommodation is this fact of status, of reciprocal superiority and subordination. In the social organization it takes one or more of three general forms: the subordination of persons or groups to a person; of persons or groups to other groups; and of persons or groups to an impersonal principle, ideal, or arrangement.¹ It is also necessary to recognize that there is subordination of one attitude to another within the life organization of the person.

Among the persons whose relationships are stable and generally satisfactory a relationship of superiority and inferiority invariably obtains. In a political despotism, a patriarchal family, or a church hierarchy there is the assumption of superiority by one and its acceptance by others. But the same form of relationship exists wherever men associate: some assume the rôle of leadership which the others accept.

In general, the subordination of one person to another is not complete and all inclusive; it is an inferiority in certain ways and in certain relations rather than of the entire person. The whole web of relationships between two persons is commonly a complex series of subordinations in which one or the other is subordinated according to the character of the situation in which they are jointly involved. The father may be superior to the son in respect to medical skill or business experience but inferior to him at chess or tennis. In the drawing room or in conversation about current literature one man may dominate while in woodcraft or in

¹ G. Simmel, "Superiority and Subordination as Subject Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 2(1896-1897), 167-189, 392-415. An adaptation of Small's translation is given in R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 695-697.

conversation about astronomy dominance may shift to the other. In legal matters the physician is subordinate to the lawyer; in medical matters the lawyer automatically assumes the subordinate rôle.

In any society and at any time groups and classes are arranged in some sort of hierarchy within which the status of each is more or less clearly defined and recognized. In a slave or caste order the status of the different groups is definitely defined and universally understood. In every society women have a status always different and generally inferior to that of men. Laborers, servants, peasants, merchants, physicians, and the like form a more or less definite class hierarchy. Within the social order each group is subordinated to those higher in the social scale and superordinated to those below it, and the members of each class are accommodated to the status of the group as well as to their individual positions within it. The feudal order is a hierarchy of economic classes, a class order intermediate between freedom and bondage.

Whenever persons or groups meet at all peaceably, interaction is within norms defined in prior experience, accepted in practice, and fixed in habit and custom. In the family the relations of father, mother, children, and servants are governed by the ideal that people hold of family life. They are different, for example, in the Occident and the Orient, in the English and the American family, in the peasantry and the nobility of any country. In the market place the relations of customer and salesman are controlled by conventions existing prior to and apart from any particular transaction. And they are different in different types of markets: the higgling of the fish market, the "high-pressure" salesmanship of the insurance agent are violations of the norms of the market place. In the church and the confessional priest and parishioner alike are subordinate to the established rules of procedure that cover just such situations. In the play group, among personal friends, in the presence of strangers, in the court, in polite society, and elsewhere certain behavior is customary and recognized as appropriate. Persons are accommodated to the prevailing norms, that is, subordinated to the established definitions of what is the fitting and proper procedure in the situation.

Commonly, in stable social organizations, all the differentiated and somewhat opposed persons and groups are subordinated to a

system of rules and regulations, to a habitual or customary arrangement. Everyone knows, subconsciously at least, the kind of behavior that is expected of him; in cases of highly perfected accommodations this behavior seems absolutely natural and requires no conscious effort or direction. One turns to the right when meeting a vehicle on the highway, removes his hat when entering a home, and takes his grievance to the court instead of resorting to the use of fists or pistols. This does not represent any evident subordination to persons or classes but a recognition of and adherence to the customs of the groups. Even in those cases that apparently involve the subordination of a person or a group to an individual, as in the family, the company of soldiers, or the gang of workmen, there often is in reality a more fundamental subordination of both the leaders and the led, the rulers and the subjects, to a fixed and customary code. Citizens of a democratic state often yield to the expressed will of a majority against their own better judgment. This is not because they conceive themselves to be, or are in fact, subordinated to this majority but because they are subordinated, along with the present majority, to a method of deciding public questions. Likewise ministers, physicians, judges, policemen, teachers, parents, and others having authority in certain realms of experience or over certain aspects of the person are obeyed not because their clients or subjects are subordinated to them as individuals but because they are subordinated to them as symbols, as representatives or interpreters of the code which all accept and by which all live.

There is sometimes a tendency to think of the master of slaves as free to do as he will with them; they are property in much the same sense as his lands and houses are property. But there is a body of impersonal convention to which the master is very definitely subordinate. The "green" master, unaccustomed to a slave order, finds a very definite rôle carved out for him in the attitudes and sentiments of his people; he as well as the slaves is bound by arrangements developed in a master-slave relationship prior to the present master and his slaves. A corresponding condition exists in the relations between the master and his servants: the servants demand certain kinds of behavior from their masters quite as definitely as the masters expect other behavior from the servants. The division of labor and the treatment each expects of the other are necessary conditions to the

arrangement; if either party encroaches upon the other, accommodation dissolves into conflict.

The reciprocal subordination to impersonal principles or arrangements is the most perfect type of accommodation.

The resolution of conflicts between attitudes and ideas within the person involves the subordination of one tendency to another whenever the situation is such as to bring them into conflict. Two mutually exclusive tendencies to act cannot find overt expression contemporaneously; action is possible only as one of them is controlled in the interest of the other, or of activity in general, by permanent or temporary repression. The organization of the person for action requires the subordination of tendencies not in harmony with the line of action.

That the forms of accommodation are many is perhaps clear from the foregoing discussion. Some, as slavery and caste, are definite in character and more or less carefully described in the literature; others, like friendship and acquaintanceship, although frequently referred to in speech and writing, are of vague and ambiguous character and awaiting definitive analysis. Any attempt here to list, classify, and describe the various forms of accommodation as they appear in concrete human experience would be a futile and profitless procedure. But a brief definition of some familiar and typical forms will clarify the understanding of both the state and the process of accommodation.

E. ACCOMMODATION IN SLAVERY

In the initial stages of a slave *régime* the conquered and helpless group is compelled, by the exercise or show of superior brute force, to do the will of their conquerors. On the part of the conquerors are fear and distrust of the enslaved along with the determination to keep them in subjection and exploit their vital power. On the part of the conquered are hatred and bitterness, brooding over wrongs, the desire for revenge, the longing to escape. Control in the circumstances is of necessity physical and external: like animals and convicts, the slaves are controlled from the outside.

But other factors presently come into operation and modify the purely physical character of the relationship. The rebellious tendency subsides as the slaves become reconciled or resigned to their fate; they accept a situation that they cannot alter and adjust themselves to it. At the same time the masters become

less harsh as their fear of treachery and uprisings declines. As an established and going concern, slavery rests upon the habituation of the slaves to the servile status quite as much as upon any show of force by the master class. In a still later stage the servile group comes to be composed in whole or part of individuals born into it, and these slave children, having experienced no other system of human relations, accept their subordinate status as they do other parts of their social heritage. The caste order is all that they know and to them it is as natural as any other part of the institutional organization.

When slavery has become a fully established institution, the members of the servile group are subjectively as well as objectively in servitude. Their habits, sentiments, and beliefs are such as to fit them for the position they occupy. Inferior in fact, they accept the fact of their inferiority. When this stage is reached, the perpetuation of the status no longer rests upon external force; the forces that control are in large part subjective, within the slaves themselves. They accept the status and develop a certain pride in it. They look up to their masters and are proud of their superiority as the child is proud of the superiority of his parents. They are hurt by and resent any act that injures the master's prestige. They look upon themselves as inferior, as existing to serve. At this stage they are fully accommodated to a servile status.

The slave status is all the more easily accepted as just and natural by those long habituated to it because of the striking difference it makes between the servers and the served. The original differences between the conquerors and the conquered may have been negligible. But the difference in status quickly determines a difference in culture and in psychological attitudes. The slaves are poor, helpless, debased, ignorant, neglected, and despised; the masters are rich, powerful, educated, refined, and honored. The social and cultural differences are in general taken as reasons for the differential status rather than as results of it. They reinforce, therefore, the tendency to accept the arrangement as one in harmony with the facts of nature.

There is in a slave *régime*, as stated above, a reciprocal accommodation of the master and the slave. The behavior and the attitudes tend to be complementary. There can be no slave without a master. The master is habituated to the rôle of a leader as the slave is habituated to that of a follower; the one

commands, the other obeys. The slave owners develop a body of beliefs and attitudes appropriate to the position they occupy; they become accommodated to their status in the course of establishing the slave order. When slavery is a going concern, the white children of the slave-owning families acquire the attitudes and beliefs of the class as an integral part of their social heritage. They accept the fact of slavery and their place in it as they accept the other facts of their early environment. The slaves are obviously and conspicuously different from the members of their own class; the fact of their slavery is exactly as natural to the child as the fact of their difference. The slave-owning child is accommodated to this system of human relations in exactly the same way that the slave child comes to be accommodated to it.

The result of this reciprocal accommodation is the existence of harmony and friendly relations, an absence of strife and rebellion. The slaves accept their dependent condition and are content and happy in it. Between the classes there is often a high degree of social and personal sympathy and understanding. In the American situation the Negroes were so well accommodated to the servile status that, for the most part, they remained loyal to their owners throughout the war that was waged to free them. In very many cases, the ex-slaves remained loyal to their former masters throughout their lives—that is, they never became accommodated to a free status. In the case of the Southern whites much the same thing was true; so well were they conditioned to the old order that they were never able to accept the new. The accommodation of the Southern Negroes and whites to the free order, legally established some two generations ago, is still very far from complete.

F. CLASS AND CASTE

Every organized social group is divided into more or less clearly defined castes or classes. There is no society, primitive or modern, which is unstratified, that is, in which there is any real equality among the members. The criteria in terms of which classifications are made vary with time, place, and circumstance. The form and nature of the divisions, the degree of mobility of individual persons within the order, and the relationships among the classes and among the individual members of the various divisions vary with the particular historic group.

A concrete picture of the personal and class order in any organized group is very complex. But the fact of classification itself is a permanent and universal phenomenon.

In a composite group the original differentiation is commonly made on the basis of visible marks that characterize different elements of the population. In a biracial group the separation is automatic; where there are marked differences in skin color or other conspicuous physical trait, the initial division tends to endure and presently to be graded—through the organization of intermediate classes composed of racial hybrids. In the beginning of the state, political power rests with the conquering chief; the population is divided into rulers and ruled, that is, conquerors and conquered. But the practical business of control, exploitation, and administration necessitates the delegation of authority, hence the creation of a hierarchy within the ruling group and a gradation of authority and prestige. Difference in occupation is a third condition that initially determines more or less rigid and enduring class lines. The various occupations differ in economic return, in skill required to pursue them, in the degree in which the activity is stimulating, and in other ways and they come to be considered honorable in graded degrees. Within each group and division of the society are various degrees of authority and subordination: no group is without its bosses, by whatever name they may be called, and various subordinates in diminishing degrees of authority and prestige to the final submerged stratum.

In some cases the original separation is a voluntary withdrawal, a separation on the basis of sentiments or beliefs peculiar to some segment of a larger group, as when the members of a religious sect isolate themselves in order to avoid contamination through worldly contacts. In any case there comes to be a unity of sentiment and external signs: where the initial differentiating fact is some external condition, the members develop a corresponding body of sentiment; where the initial factor is a peculiar belief or interest, the members incidentally or deliberately assume some characteristic external peculiarity. The caste or class, whether its origin be in a voluntary withdrawal or in an enforced exclusion, comes to have peculiar external marks and a common body of sentiment, the former serving the purposes of recognition and identification while the latter unifies the group and justifies its existence. The status of the group determines the type of life

and the range of contact of its members, hence determines the habits and beliefs that develop and the customs and attitudes that come to prevail. This accommodation of persons is both effect and cause of the social stratification; personal accommodation and social stability are obverse and reverse sides of the same fact. Individuals become habituated to any mode of life that is imposed upon them and their habitual responses contribute to the fixity and stability of the arrangements.

The various divisions in a given social organization, as the racial, political, and occupational, come to be closely interrelated so that those in the upper, intermediate, and lower strata in one respect are also in the corresponding strata in other respects. The interrelations among the various forms of stratification are not always perfect, the various hierarchies do not always completely coincide. But in general those who are in the upper economic stratum are also the educated, the politically powerful, and the socially prominent; those in the lower economic strata are also the ignorant, the politically disfranchised, the racially divergent, and the followers of lowly occupations. The society as a whole, therefore, tends to assume a hierarchal form. At the top is the group that possesses power, that is, controls the value dominant in a given time and place. It is the standard from which the other classes depart more or less widely and by which their status is determined. The prevailing standard may be wealth, as in America; education, as among the Chinese; military power, as in Roman society; or any other value that readily lends itself to degrees of classifications and distinctions. Persons and groups of persons take a status in the class order as they possess or control more or less of the dominant value.

Once the class order is fixed and stable it tends to be self-perpetuating and the members of the different strata become more and more perfectly accommodated to it. An elaborate body of myth and philosophy develops to rationalize and defend it and to increase its stability. It is shown that the poor are poor because they are ignorant or shiftless or immoral and this, in turn, because they are stupid and incapable; the rich and powerful are so because they are good or pious or industrious or intelligent. The existing stratification, regardless of its origin or character, always appears in close harmony with the inevitable natural order. The church may lend a divine sanction to support the existing structure. In the situation a class and caste order

comes to general acceptance and approval. Accommodation reaches a point where the lower and exploited strata are as loyal to the system that exploits them as are the beneficiaries of the system.

G. THE ACCOMMODATION OF WOMEN

The social status and psychological attitudes of women furnish a familiar case of a well-nigh perfect accommodation to a subordinate social position. The position is not everywhere the same when viewed either comparatively or historically; but everywhere, and in all times, it appears to be different from and generally inferior to that of men.

There is without doubt some biological basis for the dominance of the male; the metabolic differences incident to the fact of sex predisposes men more than women to active and violent behavior. In an original, spontaneous division of labor the less active and stimulating pursuits would inevitably fall to women. Moreover, the special incapacities connected with motherhood determine a more sedentary life for most women and especially in the middle period. The handicap of the child places her at a disadvantage and makes her in a measure dependent upon man. This is particularly the case in war, nomadic life, and barbaric conditions generally; it is there that her special abilities and disabilities most directly and immediately determine her social rôle and status in the group life. But the subordinate status of woman is common to nearly all stages of social history and in nearly all places; the form of the subordination differs, the fact is all but universal.

The division of labor and the social status, arising in the first instance from the organic differences, come imperceptibly and inevitably to be matters of custom and usage as well. As such, they were perpetuated in changed as in unchanged conditions of life and extended in numerous ways and directions quite unrelated to the sex differences that gave rise to the original division of work. The subjection of women is not to be conceived as a conscious and deliberate invention of men but rather as an incidental by-product of group and social life. The order of life has been shaped to suit the tastes of the more aggressive male, and woman, in varying degrees of completeness at different times and places, has assumed the minor rôle. In some social situations man has been complete master and

exercised unlimited control over her conduct, her work, her place of residence, her children, and even her life—women were bought and sold as other property. In the modern Western world the subordination of women is marked and general. They are virtually excluded from the well-paid occupations, they have little part in the ownership or control of property, their legal rights are restricted, and they have little place or power in the political life. In various other ways, as in the use of stimulants and narcotics and in the double standard of sex morality, the behavior of women and girls is subject to restrictions that do not apply equally to men and boys.

In a position that was inferior in fact, woman acquired the traits of mind and behavior that the status required. She developed the character that men admired and demanded; men have everywhere shaped the ideals that girls are taught to realize. The duty of woman has been to obey; her purpose and mission in life have been to serve, please, and inspire men. She has learned and she is taught to avoid disagreement and contention, an assertive or aggressive manner; to conceal opposing opinions and desires; to develop a conciliatory and caressing manner; to stay within her "sphere"; and in all ways to subordinate herself to and sink her personal interests in those of man. It is merely incidental that in conforming herself to the man's desires she perfected an indirect method of control, a means for securing her own ends; she must get these separate ends by diplomacy, by dissimulation and indirection. In the modern Western society women are so thoroughly accommodated to their subordinate status that they are the most staunch supporters of the conventions that enforce it and give it objective expression.

H. IMMIGRANT ACCOMMODATION

The accommodation of the immigrant to the social order into which he goes in search of more tolerable conditions of life has been frequently described in naïve life-history documents and analyzed by scholarly writers.

The first reaction is one of amazement and utter confusion. The immigrant is bewildered by the strange customs and inexplicable behavior and by the language that he does not understand. As a provincial person of narrow experience and limited education, he is emotionally dependent upon the familiar.

Unlike the cosmopolitan person, he does not easily adjust himself to the strange ways and standards of the new environment. He is habituated to intimate personal relations and the abstract, secondary character of the new contacts he finds to be emotionally unsatisfying. He quickly tires of the new and the strange; that which was at first stimulating and exhilarating becomes exhausting and painful. He develops an intense loneliness, a longing for home and friends and for the familiar and satisfying scenes and contacts of his earlier experience.

There is a gradual adjustment to the new conditions and type of life. The changes may be easy and rapid or difficult and slow but they are inevitable. Change in the simple externals comes first: the immigrant alters his outward appearance as to clothes and habits of work and learns to conform in manner and outward behavior to the norms of the group. He acquires a working knowledge of the language and gradually becomes accommodated to the social rules and moral standards. He learns to live and prosper in the new environment and comes presently to participate more or less freely in the social and cultural life.

The accommodation of the immigrant puts him in a peculiarly advantageous economic position. He is in a sense a stranger in the social order. To the extent that he understands it he is able not only to adjust himself to its outward requirements and to participate in the life about him but he is also able to exploit it to his personal advantage. He understands the culture and the institutional organization as well as the sentiments, the prejudices and loyalties, the traditions and the taboos of the folk among whom he lives. But, while he understands the sentiments, they are foreign to him; he is not bound by them. He is thus in a position to use them to his personal and private advantage.

I. CONVERSION AND ACCOMMODATION

In the activities of certain religious sects great importance has been placed upon the phenomenon of conversion. Certain writers have confused the fact or process of conversion with that of accommodation. It is, in its essence, a change of allegiance, a denial and repudiation of former associations, doctrines, or ways of life and an acceptance of new companions, creeds, or practices. The change is frequently an abrupt and spectacular break from the old and an eager and enthusiastic adoption of the new.

Conversion is often followed by a period of acute discomfort. The new is stimulating but it is neither comfortable nor satisfying. The convert has publicly espoused the doctrines and accepted membership in a strange group, and he has committed himself to new or modified types of behavior. All of this runs more or less counter to his established habits and former ways of life. Inevitably, as the emotional excitement that preceded and accompanied the change of relations subsides, he misses and longs for the comfort, companionship, and emotional stimuli of the old and the familiar. He is beset by doubts and is apprehensive of the future; he is irritated and exhausted by the strange contacts and behavior standards. He feels himself a traitor to his former group.

The convert may presently "backslide," that is, give up the new affiliations and return to his former social, sentimental, and intellectual environment. If the requirements of the new status are not too exacting, and the convert is sufficiently stimulated by sympathetic contacts, the new status may become established. The period of homesickness passes. The convert finds new companions, forms new habits, becomes adjusted and comfortable in the new situation and resigned to the loss of the old. That is, he gradually becomes accommodated.

Conversion itself is not accommodation. It is merely the point at which decision is made or announced or the point at which the argument or appeal of a group overcomes the complex of forces that has determined the person's adherence to a contrary position or competing group. Accommodation is the process that follows the change of allegiance, the acquisition of habits of thought and action that are in harmony with the altered status.

J. RATIONALIZATION AS A FORM OF PERSONAL ACCOMMODATION

Rationalization is a form of personal accommodation. It is the finding of reasons that are convincing to oneself for customary behavior or for routine beliefs and sentiments. It is an attempt to defend the preferences and prejudices, or the preconceptions that underlie them, and thereby suppress knowledge that would precipitate conflict and necessitate change.

Most human beings find it necessary to offer good reasons for their actions. No matter what the actions, people profess the highest and noblest motives for them. Angry parents punish children and justify the action to themselves and others on the

ground that it is for the welfare of the children. Slavery is always defended in terms of the welfare of the slave rather than in terms of profit to the master. Nations justify the aggressive exploitation of their weaker neighbors on high and noble grounds. Even where the predatory motive is as obvious as in the Japanese war with China for Manchuria or the United States war with Mexico for Texas and the Southwest, good reasons are found to justify and sanction, or at least to extenuate and excuse, the predacious policy and practice. The appetites and impulses, the sentiments and prejudices, the lusts and passions, the greed and avarice that lead to the actions of men and groups are decently concealed by a mass of noble and fictitious motives.

The motives that men and groups profess are in some part for purposes of deliberate deception. The profession of honesty and virtue are useful lies by which men allay the suspicions and secure the confidence of those they wish to rob. But in general the process is not on an intellectual plane. It is more usual for persons to find a rational justification for their actions in order to avoid conflict within the person. An act that is performed on impulse, in anger or in fear, has no support beyond the impulse that motivated it. It leaves the person in conflict; his conscience—the subjective aspect of the group standards—disapproves of the behavior. If a good reason can be found to convince the group—that is, allay a guilty conscience—the person is at peace with himself and the act may be continued or repeated. In reason he gets a sanction for its performance and an additional incentive to its repetition. It comes to be a reflective act rather than one performed from ulterior motives. This is not necessarily duplicity; the person is himself often convinced. And to the extent that he is convinced he has reached an accommodation that resolves subjective conflict.

Another aspect of accommodation through rationalization appears in the tenacity with which persons hold to the logical convictions that underlie or seem to underlie various phases of the personal and social order. It is the function of beliefs and sentiments to resolve or to prevent the emergence of conflict. The origin of beliefs and sentiments, as of opinions and convictions, is in general non-rational and outside the conscious life of the person. But they are essential to his mode of life and give a semblance of reason for his activity. The more completely this is the case the greater the emotional certitude with which they

are held. The beliefs or opinions that are logically derived or held because of the weight of evidence, as the germ theory of disease or the truth of a given mathematical formula, are always tentative and subject to indefinite modification and correction. But those that exist as rationalizations, as a belief in the superiority of monogamic marriage or the immortality of the soul or the wisdom of the governmental prohibition of the sale of intoxicants, rouse violent emotional attitudes toward persons who seem to question their finality. To put them in question is to destroy the man's personal accommodation and precipitate within him a state of mental conflict.

K. ACCOMMODATION AND SOCIAL TYPES

The term type is in common use and its meaning generally clear. It connotes an ideal representative of a group, one that is a more or less perfect exemplification of the characters of the group. It does not represent a concrete division but is always in the nature of an abstraction, a pattern to which all are referable. Concretely, it always resolves itself into a question of averages; the individuals who exemplify most of the traits characteristic of a group are said to be typical members of that group. A typical American Indian would be an individual of broad face, high cheek bones, black hair, and with the other traits, whatever they be, that are characteristic of that racial subdivision. It is usual to speak of physical, temperamental, occupational, and various other types according as the attention is directed to one or another set of traits. The adjective "social" directs the attention to characters that are the result of contact and interaction.

The exigencies of life in any environment determine a degree of uniformity among the members of a group. Dress, food, character of shelter, and the like are in large measure accommodations to climatic conditions and are sufficiently uniform among the members of a given group that it is possible to speak of the type of dress of the Eskimos, the typical colonial house, and so on. In a similar way the beliefs, sentiments, attitudes, and traits of character, mind, and personality are conditioned or determined by the nature of the social life and heritage. Each group as a whole has a more or less marked character: the Jews, the Japanese, the Sicilians, and other national groups have each a characteristic organization of social values and attitudes that gives

homogeneity and personality. The classes within an inclusive group, as the military, peasant, priestly, noble, and others, are differentiated and at least roughly characterized by habits of thought and action appropriate to the function and status of the class. Each major and minor group has a more or less clearly defined status and rôle in the social order, and the individual members, at least in regard to the major and distinctive characteristics, are more or less perfect replicas of the group pattern.

It is, however, not possible to assume identity of personality and character in the members of a given concrete group. In spite of the great homogeneity that undoubtedly exists within certain groups—though this may be grossly exaggerated—the heritage and experience, as well as the original differences in intellectual traits and temperamental qualities, are in some degree unlike. Certain persons within a group are in important ways more like persons within another group than they are like the rank and file of their own group. An American artist or scientist, for example, is more akin to the artist or scientist of Germany or England than he is to the American farmer or business man.

In a complex modern society there is a somewhat minute differentiation of the population into classes and into vocational, convivial, and other groups. Each such division, representing as it does some distinctive purpose, work, or manner of life, comes to have more or less definite status in the society, that is, becomes an accommodation group and develops a distinctive character. To the extent that this is true it puts its characteristic mark upon its members: each learns the code, forms the habits, acquires the beliefs, repeats the formulas, practices the ritual, and in other ways conforms to type. In so far as the group has vitality and permanence there is a strong tendency toward uniformity. The fact gets recognition in the popular thought and literature of a period. The current caricatures—the society matron, the lumberjack, the hobo, the minister, the professor, the business executive, plumbers, gangsters, college students, political bosses, and so through a long list—represent a popular recognition and effort to characterize what is typical of the members of such groups. The intent being to abuse and ridicule rather than to analyze and understand, popular thought commonly seizes upon and emphasizes the superficial and obvious traits that are easy to caricature. The types thus defined may

represent either accommodation or lack of accommodation: the newly wed, the tenderfoot, the tourist, the newly rich, the country boy in the city or the city boy in the country are unaccommodated persons whose behavior is more or less according to pattern.

From a somewhat different angle and in a somewhat more abstract and fundamental way a social type is a personal exemplification of the complex of forces operating in a given life situation. Aside from the trivial and superficial marks of social rank and occupation, the individual character and personality, the habits of thought and action are determined by the contacts and the run of attention inevitable in the situation in which he is placed. The position makes the man.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this chapter to the chapter on conflict.
2. What is meant by accommodation (a) as a condition, (b) as a process?
3. "The term 'accommodation' applies to any acquired alteration of function resulting in better adjustment to environment and to the functional changes thus effected." Is this statement from the *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* in accord with the usage in the text?
4. "Conflict does not entirely disappear in accommodation." Explain.
5. Give illustrations of some common forms of accommodation that you have experienced or observed.
6. Define accommodation as a process.
7. In what way does a state of accommodation come through the social heritage?
8. Distinguish between adjustment and accommodation.
9. State and illustrate the difference between accommodation and adaptation.
10. "Accommodation is the natural issue of conflicts." Explain.
11. Explain how accommodation begins before conflict ceases.
12. "War may be described as a process of liquidation of animosities which grow up in time of peace." Explain and illustrate this statement.
13. What are the several ways in which the transition from war to peace may come?
14. What are the several ways in which factional strife may be brought to an end?
15. What is meant by saying that the terms of peace do not give accommodation but merely the framework within which accommodation will take place?
16. Outline the process of accommodation.
17. When is accommodation complete?
18. State the general pattern of accommodation.
19. State and give illustrations of the three forms of subordination.

20. "The relations of subordination and superordination are always reciprocal." What is the meaning of this statement? Do you agree with it?

21. "The natural affections are social bonds which not infrequently assume the form of bondage." Explain and illustrate.

22. What are the two characteristics of a caste form of accommodation?

23. "The Negro is all right in his place." What does this commonplace statement show with reference to the accommodation of Negroes and whites?

24. Explain the steps in the process by which a conquered group becomes accommodated to a slave status.

25. In what way is the master class accommodated to the slaves?

26. Differentiate between a caste system and a system of open classes.

27. Do you agree that society inevitably becomes stratified in some way?

28. Explain the fact that people have been willing to support institutions and social systems which kept them physically and mentally degraded.

29. Is woman accommodated to a position of inferiority in our society? Give reasons for your answer.

30. How are our present sex accommodations enforced? Who are more active in enforcing them, men or women? In what sense is "lady worship" a technique for keeping women in subordination?

31. "The modern woman is an unaccommodated person. She wishes to be treated as an inferior and as an equal at the same time." Comment upon this statement.

32. Enumerate various conventions and taboos that imply the inferiority of women.

33. What are some evidences of the changing status of women? Do you think that women will ever equal men in achievement?

34. Why do colleges regulate the hours of college girls and otherwise supervise their behavior in a manner different from the supervision they exercise over the college men? Why do the young women tolerate such interference with their personal freedom?

35. Give the steps in the accommodation of the immigrant to the American heritages.

36. To what extent does naturalization indicate that the immigrant has become accommodated?

37. What are the characteristics of conversion and its relation to accommodation? How do you account for "backsliding"?

38. Can you give an illustration from your reading of the achievement or disintegration of personal accommodation?

39. Explain personal accommodation through rationalization.

40. What is a social type? What determines the type?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Analyze and prepare to discuss concretely but logically and dispassionately the changing accommodation of women in American society.

3. Organize and describe some personal experience in accommodation.
 4. Make an analysis of some situation or character in polite literature in terms of conflict and accommodation.

5. Study some social type—the society leader, the political boss, the college student, or other—in terms of accommodation.

6. *Bloodsuckers three on earth there be,
 The bug, the Brahman, and the flea.*

From H. H. Risley, *The People of India*, or elsewhere bring together a series of popular adages that reveal antagonism existing in a status of class accommodation.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. The Relation of Conflict and Accommodation. F. N. House, "Conflict and Accommodation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 31 (1926), 624-627.

b. Adaptation. F. H. Hankins, "Adaptation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

c. Adjustment. K. Young, "Adjustment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

d. Accommodation. E. W. Burgess, "Accommodation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

e. The Reciprocal Character of Subordination and Superordination. N. J. Spykman, *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, pp. 95-111.

f. The Jewish Type. L. Wirth, *The Ghetto*, "The Social Type," pp. 71-74.

g. Accommodation through the Justification of Behavior. R. B. Perry, *The Present Conflict of Ideals*, pp. 16-20.

8. Topics for written themes:

a. Convention and Accommodation

b. Slavery as a Form of Accommodation

c. Caste Accommodation

d. The Accommodation of the Sexes

e. The Seclusion of Women in the Moslem World

f. Taboos on the Marriage of Widows

g. The Suttee

h. The Double Standard of Sex Morality

i. Sex Parity and Male Dominance

j. Immigrant Types

k. Adaptation and Accommodation

l. Conversion and Accommodation

m. Antagonism in Accommodation

n. The Rationalization of National Predatory Activities

o. The Disintegration of a Personal Accommodation

Supplementary Readings

1. Ames, E. S.: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chap. XIV, "Conversion," pp. 257-276.

2. Baldwin, J. M.: *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, Chap. XVI, "Summary: Final Statement of Habit and Accommodation," pp. 476-488.

3. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XVIII, "Accommodation," pp. 210-217.
4. Bushee, F. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. IV, "Adaptation," pp. 34-41.
5. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XXV, "Social Stratification," pp. 516-532.
6. Coe, G. A.: *The Psychology of Religion*, Chap. X, "Conversion," pp. 152-174.
7. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*, Chap. XXVII, "Hostile Feeling between Classes," pp. 301-309.
8. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XI, "Accommodation," pp. 437-495.
9. Groves, E. R.: *Personality and Social Adjustment*, Chap. XVI, "Phantasy and Social Rationalization," pp. 231-247.
10. Hankins, F. H.: "Adaptation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
11. Hart, H.: *The Science of Social Relation*, Chap. XV, "Solving Conflict by Accommodation," pp. 292-329.
12. Herskovits, M. J.: "Domestication," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
13. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. XIII, "Social Adjustment," pp. 386-437.
14. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. X, "Accommodation," pp. 198-218.
15. Park, R. E.: "Human Migration and the Marginal Man," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 881-893. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *Personality and the Social Group*, pp. 64-77.
16. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. X, "Accommodation," pp. 663-725.
17. Park, R. E., and H. A. Miller: *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Chap. V, "Immigrant Types," pp. 81-118.
18. Reinhardt, J. M., and G. R. Davies: *Principles and Methods of Sociology*, Chap. IX, "Avoiding Direct Conflict," pp. 250-264.
19. Reuter, E. B.: *The American Race Problem*, Chap. V, "The Accommodation and Assimilation of the Races," pp. 100-118.
20. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XX, "Adaptation," pp. 222-236.
21. Simmel, G.: "Superiority and Subordination as Subject Matter of Sociology," *American Journal of Sociology*, 2(1896-1897), 167-189; 392-415.
22. Spykman, N. J.: *The Social Theory of Georg Simmel*, Book II, Chap. I, "Submission," pp. 95-111.
23. Wirth, L.: *The Ghetto*, Chap. V, "The Jewish Type," pp. 63-74.
24. Young, K.: "Adjustment," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

CHAPTER XIV

ASSIMILATION

In the chapter on competition and social ecology attention was given to the fact that multiplication of living forms in a relatively closed universe sets the stage for a bitter and ceaseless struggle to secure the means of life. In conflict there is a clash of interest and values and of persons or groups concerned to make one set of values prevail over another. Its resolution, whether by victory or by compromise, establishes a new or changed social situation in which persons and groups must continue their life activities; a change of status of one or both persons results.

In an altered situation persons more or less immediately make such adjustments in their behavior practices as will enable them to live as tolerably as may be. The acceptance of the facts is the beginning of accommodation. As time goes on the adjustment of persons to the new modes of life and of persons to persons in the new relations becomes less irksome. The new life becomes more and more a matter of habit and routine. In time a body of tradition and sentiment develops that rationalizes the status and tends to its perpetuation. The accommodation of persons to their status in the social order is complete when they cease to struggle against its restrictions. The slave, the child, the peasant, the white woman are examples of fairly complete accommodation to an inferior status.

Assimilation is the next and final term in the process of interaction. It is the object of attention in the present chapter.

This term has a number of uses—all, however, with the common root meaning of incorporation and conversion into the substance of the assimilating body. It may signify either the process of transformation and incorporation, as of nutrient materials into the protoplasm and organic tissue of the plant or animal body, or the state of being so converted and appropriated. In the literature of social theory the term has general currency in two somewhat distinct but related senses. In the one usage it refers to the incorporation of a foreign body into the culture

complex; in the other, it refers to the change of sentiments and habitual reactions that follows alterations in social status. The chapter gives brief attention to the first of the two processes but is chiefly concerned to present the second.

A. THE FUSION OF CULTURES

Human culture is always to be understood as the product of human activity in the effort to satisfy human need. The needs of men being everywhere essentially the same, the cultures are much the same in their basic elements. But a human need may often be satisfied in a variety of ways. Moreover, the enviroing circumstances and the historic experiences differ from group to group. Consequently each culture, while basicly like every other, is unique in some or many respects. The vocabularies of languages reflect the unique character of other aspects of the cultures: the concepts and even the objects of one group may have no equivalent in the language of another.

The independence of cultures, however, is never absolute; each has many borrowed elements. When two peoples of divergent cultures come into contact, through migration, war, commerce, or other means, there is an exchange of influences; each takes from the other such artifacts as are immediately and obviously useful in the situation. It is of course the material elements of the cultures that are most easily and readily transferred. Tools and weapons, articles of food and clothing, ornaments and utensils may be taken over from a foreign source, even without contact of the peoples, and incorporated into the culture complex. Their superiority to those previously in use may be apparent, and their utilization may meet with no sentimental or other resistance. Many native peoples who have little or no regular contact with the Western peoples who produce them make use, for example, of firearms, intoxicating drinks, and other articles of foreign origin. The cloth and the trinkets and the metal tools and implements of the advanced culture peoples are objects of great value to the simpler peoples; the raw materials—lumber, minerals, furs, vegetable products, and the like—of the natives may be objects of desire to the men of other regions.

In some cases elements of a foreign culture are taken over in a physical sense only. In the culture into which they are introduced they may serve a purpose totally different from that served in the culture to which they are native. European muskets were

at one time in use by certain Negroes of the African interior as magical implements. This of course represents use without assimilation: the objects are given a use but they remain outside the essential culture of the group. In other cases the borrowed elements undergo change and modification in the process of their adoption and incorporation into the foreign complex. In much the same way, when divergent culture groups are in contact, there is an adoption of customs, manners, habits of dress, and like folk practices. Each group may learn from the others, or the culture complex of one group may prevail—in a modified form due to corruption by the other—and the other be displaced. The language of one group, for example, corrupted by words and phrases from the other, may become the common tongue, or both languages may be preserved, each in a corrupted form. In the long-continued contact of the once culturally divergent peoples, the religious practices, supernatural beliefs, and moral notions of one come presently to be accepted by the other.

An important difference is to be observed between the simple adoption and use of isolated elements of material culture and their fundamental assimilation. The latter is complete only when they have become an integral part of the machinery of life and the group has learned to produce them; they are assimilated only when they would persist in the culture and the area of their adoption should a knowledge of their use and fabrication disappear elsewhere. It is possible for a people to use and even to become dependent upon elements of a foreign culture without having truly assimilated them. Metal tools and implements, for example, may displace the types previously in use and yet remain foreign because the people have not learned the art of making them. The native may use a gun without his culture group's learning to make arms and ammunition. Whiskey and other alcoholic beverages are used and appreciated in cultures where their distillation is unknown. Matches, musical instruments, phonographs, radios, and a great variety of other utilities and mechanical devices are used by peoples whose cultures have not assimilated them.¹

The transfer and adoption of material and immaterial culture facts may go on in a formal way and without greatly influencing the basic structure of the culture. The incorporation of the foreign elements may corrupt or enrich the complex without

¹ W. D. Wallis, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 377-378.

change in the fundamental organization. The metal tools of the civilized traders may displace the less efficient stone or bone implements, for example, without immediately affecting the native manner of life. Words may be borrowed from a foreign tongue and become current without in any way producing change in the structure of the language.

The culture is fundamentally affected only when the adopted elements function to modify the preexisting organization. The introduction of firearms, for example, may result in a change in the method of warfare and thus indirectly change the military and political status of the group and so the whole moral order. Or the introduction of firearms may make easy the securing of game among a primitive folk and lead to an era of sudden prosperity. But the new weapon may lead in a short time to the destruction of the game on which the group depends for livelihood. The destruction of this source of food supply may make imperative a fundamental change in the whole economic mode of life.

The assimilation of foreign culture elements is always a matter of degree. The simple material facts are the most easily appreciated and the first to be assimilated; the language and body of myth and technology follow; and ultimately there is change in the fundamental social organization and mode of life.

Every modern culture is of course enormously enriched by the scientific, ethical, religious, and other immaterial as well as material facts borrowed from neighboring cultures. In the course of their assimilation there may be a protracted period of personal and cultural disorder. A polyglot culture, for example, may and often does become the mode at the borders of racial contact. Discussing the "slow and mysterious process" by which the immigrant ceases to be a foreigner and becomes an American, a recent commentator illustrates the language corruption resulting from contact:

Nowhere are the facts more apparent than in the process . . . which has resulted in the naturalization of some dozens of immigrant languages so that many of them now are neither fully intelligible to the folks in the homeland nor, of course, understandable outside the racial group in America. . . . Through sheer necessity they [the immigrants] are absorbing words and phrases from their English neighbors to express thoughts and ideas wholly new to the immigrant. The spoken language of the immigrant in America is not the language of literature but is

usually some peasant dialect or the "low" speech of a European city. It is mixed with literary phrases and some learned terms but always it is "Americanized." English words have been made to conform to the accent, pronunciation, and grammatical construction of each language. Frequently the results are astounding. The *literati* of the various language groups both here and abroad, of course, regard these strange jargons with nothing less than horror.

In the adoption of the immaterial elements of culture it is of course always the external and formal aspects that are first learned. The form and routine are copied long before the inner significance is grasped. The form always comes before the meaning: the child learns words—honor, virtue, loyalty, and the like—which are relatively meaningless to him and continue so until such time as a content comes through experience. In a similar way the group gets the forms of a new culture, and it may in time get a meaning for the forms that are copied and learned. The conversion of a people to a new religion is a case in point. At first it is little if anything more than a new form and technique for the practice of old beliefs: there are certain peoples today who practice voodooism according to the ritualistic ceremonials of Roman catholicism; there are others to whom the cross is not merely a symbol but an object to be worshiped. Educational institutions have flourished and do flourish without any clear idea as to the nature and function of education. The group of buildings and equipment exists and instruction is supplied but education is absent. Even in America in the present day legislatures in some cases have, in part, forbidden education in the schools they levy taxes to support.

B. RACE CONTACT AND CULTURE CHANGE

The contact of divergent peoples results in two distinct but related phenomena: the intermarriage and intermixture of the peoples and modification of the culture heritages. The two phenomena need to be clearly differentiated, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their mutual influences need to be understood. One is a biological process and involves the subtended biological phenomena, the other involves a sociological process with its dependent complex of social and cultural phenomena. The relation of the processes is a special case of the interrelation of biological and sociological processes that prevails generally; the relation of the phenomenal aspects of the processes

is to be seen on the observational level in the concrete social reality.

At all places where divergent peoples have come into contact for any period of time, they have produced hybrid offspring. If the association is long continued, the lines of demarcation disappear as one or the other of the originally divergent peoples is lost in the resulting mixed population. This mixture of races has been going on throughout the history of the world: many of the fossil remains of prehistoric men show them to have been descended from ancestors of different racial stock; in the world today only a few small and insignificant groups are in any sense racially pure; each of the European peoples is a complicated mixture of racial stocks. In the modern world, because of the cheap, easy, and rapid means of transportation, the unprecedented migration of peoples, and the growth of commerce, the contacts of peoples are more numerous and the amount of intermixture of diverse races is greater than at any previous time.

Where the stocks are somewhat closely related and not sharply contrasted in physical appearance or culture, as the various immigrant peoples and their descendants who make up the American population, the intermarriage phenomena attract little attention. But where there are marked differences in physical characters, particularly in skin color, the intermixture commonly arouses violent emotional condemnation. The intermixture continues, however, and the mixed-blood groups grow in size and importance.

Socially and culturally the mixed-blood people everywhere occupy positions intermediate between the two culture groups in contact. The mulattoes in America and elsewhere are intermediate between the Europeans and the Negroes; the *mestizos* of Latin America have a status superior to that of the Indian but inferior to the European stock, and the same intermediate social and cultural status of the hybrids prevails wherever such groups exist. The degree of personal achievement of the hybrid individuals is everywhere higher than that of individuals of one and lower than that of individuals of the other ancestral group.

The two facts, mixed-blood and culture status and achievement, exist together and the first is often assumed to be the cause of the second. The intermediate culture status, however, is not a direct result of the racial fact. Both the mixture of blood and the superior status and achievement of the mixed-bloods them-

lives are the result of social contacts; they arise from the same act, not one from the other. Contact is a condition essential to the advance in culture. It introduces new standards, definitions, beliefs, ideas, practices, and methods, thereby disorganizing the established order and freeing the individual man from the traditional controls. The social disorder incident to cultural contacts is a condition favorable to the violation of conventional sex taboos and the intermixture of races. This gross violation of the purity standards, on the other hand, contributes to the social disorder and the confusion of standards and thereby promotes personal freedom and culture change. The hybrid individuals and groups, because of their greater mobility and freedom of contact, are more easily and quickly assimilated to the dominant culture than are the more isolated and less mobile members of a native population.

C. AMALGAMATION AND ASSIMILATION

Assimilation is to be carefully differentiated from the analogous biological process of amalgamation. In the contact of peoples the two go on together and, consequently, are often confused in popular thought. Even in the social literature it is the exception rather than the rule to find them clearly differentiated and clearly understood, and there is frequent misunderstanding as to their relations in the general culture process.

Amalgamation is a biological phenomenon. It is a process of crossbreeding to the production of hybrid offspring and the blending of racial stocks. The intermarriage and intermating of races have taken place everywhere that different peoples have come into contact both in the ancient and in the modern world and apparently the intermixture of racial stocks in prehistoric and earlier times went on wherever there was contact of peoples. Assimilation is a cultural, social, and psychological phenomenon. It involves the fusion of culture heritages, on the one hand, and, on the other, the modification of sentiments and attitudes and the gradual incorporation of the strangers into the culture group. Acculturation—cultural assimilation—and the assimilation of persons to the culture complex go on where there are contact and communication between groups.

The two processes thus lie in different realms of reality: one is biological, the other sociological; one is a fusion of cultures, the other a blending of racial stocks. Either may go on without the

other: races may intercross and produce hybrid offspring without either being assimilated to the culture of the other, or they may become assimilated to the culture and social heritage without undergoing a loss of racial identity. The existence of either process, however, is favorable to the other. The greater the degree of assimilation—that is, the more alike the people become in language and in their manners, customs, and habits of life—the more frequent are the close personal contacts and attachments that lead to intermarriage. On the other hand, intermarriage and race crossing increase personal contacts and association, hence favor assimilation; they provide the primary contacts and sympathetic association most essential to appreciation and understanding. The hybrid offspring inherit the physical and temperamental traits of both parent races and they acquire something of the sentiments, attitudes, and loyalties of both parents.

D. THE ASSIMILATION OF PERSONS

From the point of view of the person, assimilation is the series of steps by means of which persons, previously unlike in culture heritage, come to share the same body of sentiments, traditions, and loyalties. It is a slow and gradual process of growth that typically goes on without the conscious awareness of the person who is in course of being changed. Bringing together the personal and group aspects of social reality, Park and Burgess state that “assimilation is a process of interpenetration and fusion in which persons and groups acquire the memories, sentiments, and attitudes of other persons or groups and, by sharing their experience and history, are incorporated with them in a common cultural life.”¹

Assimilation does not follow accommodation in the same serial fashion in which accommodation follows conflict. The two processes go on more or less simultaneously. Accommodation begins immediately upon the cessation of conflict, or on the introduction of the person into the new situation, and is of relatively brief duration: the situation is accepted, adjustments are made, and through the development of habit and routine the person is presently accommodated to the new order. Assimilation begins almost immediately as adjustments are made to the changed

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 735.

order of life, but it is a slow, gradual, and long process. The European immigrants to America often become so well accommodated to American conditions that they are conspicuously successful in business exploitation, but it is a second and generally a third generation before they are completely assimilated to the American social heritage. Accommodation often is abrupt and generally involves attention and deliberate effort on the part of the person; assimilation is always a gradual, unhurried matter of growth and seldom involves personal awareness.

Each individual is in general oriented in the culture of a particular group; he appreciates it, moves in it with ease, more or less understands it. There is a reciprocal relation between the person and the social heritage: the person is in the heritage and the heritage is a part of him. The group forms, customs, practices, and like elements of the culture heritage are objective and external; the person's sentiments, attitudes, and beliefs are subjective, they reside in the person. But the objective and the subjective facts are simply different aspects of the same body of reality.

The more or less complete and perfect orientation of the person in the group culture is of course a result of his life experience. The child is born into an organized group with a definite and comparatively stable and uniform set of attitudes and values. Through imitation and formal and informal instruction he is gradually initiated into the social heritage. He acquires the language, beliefs, attitudes, techniques, and other facts current in the situation; he comes to know his way about in the culture and is comfortable in it. In the course of this socializing process he comes to have a sentimental appreciation of the group values and an attitude of loyalty to them and to the group itself. His adjustment is for the most part in the realm of habit and his further experience with and participation in the group life tend to reinforce the early acquired patterns of mind and behavior. The whole body of formal and informal education tends to fit him mentally and emotionally to the particular set of culture facts and definitions. The cultural orientation of the person is an inevitable result of his life and participation in the culture group.

The very fact of the individual's adjustment to one culture complex makes impossible his similar adjustment to the culture of another group. He cannot be equally familiar with, sentimental about, and emotionally loyal to different groups and

culture values. An unpreferential emotional attachment to different groups implies an absence of complete assimilation in any. The more perfectly the person is incorporated in one social heritage the more difficult it is for him to make adjustments to and become an integral part of another. This complete assimilation to a given heritage and social group is of course a form of isolation. The provincial person is one habituated to the ways of a particular province and emotionally bound to them.

The cosmopolitan person, on the other hand, moves freely in different groups and cultures and is, in general, not sentimentally attached to any group or emotionally dependent upon any particular set of values. He is able to appreciate particular values and groups of values as they appear in different cultures; he may use different languages, appreciate the art and literature of different cultures, and otherwise understand and find good in the divergent manners and customs of many peoples. The cosmopolitan person is accommodated rather than assimilated; his interests and his appreciation and understanding are wider than those of a particular culture group. The Jew in American or European life is commonly accommodated to a culture and form of life to which he may be very imperfectly and incompletely assimilated.

The essence of the process of personal assimilation is the substitution of one set of group standards, ideals, and loyalties for another. It involves not only the acquisition of a new sentimental complex but the discarding and forgetting of the old. The child grows into the heritage without the necessity of giving up a fully formed complex of values, but his attachment to the group is nevertheless a continuous process of change from childish to increasingly mature understanding and appreciation. In the case of the immigrant in a culture group there is a dual process. The old ways to which he is habituated persist, while he is learning and coming to use and appreciate the new. Gradually and by degrees the new is built upon and replaces the old, and the sentiments and attitudes come slowly into line with the adopted situation and manner of life.

The process of assimilation involves the development in the immigrant and the native of similar apperception masses. To this end it is desirable that the immigrants should not only speak the language of the country but also know something of the history of the people among whom they have chosen to dwell. . . .

It is important also that every individual should share as fully as possible a fund of knowledge, experience, sentiments, and ideals common to the whole community and himself contribute to that fund. It is for that reason that we maintain and seek to maintain freedom of speech and free schools. The function of literature, including poetry, romance, and the newspaper, is to enable all to share vicariously the inner life of each. . . . Not merely the possession of a common language, but the widest extension of the opportunities for education, is a condition of Americanization.

For the immigrant to achieve an apperception mass in common with the American community involves the development of new attitudes on his part, and his old experiences are the only possible foundation for the new structure. . . .

A certain identity of experiences and memories between immigrants and Americans is of main importance for assimilation.¹

The earlier steps in the process of assimilation have to do with the purely external and relatively superficial culture facts. The immigrant to a new country adopts the prevailing form of dress, accepts the type of food, acquires the work techniques, and conforms to the established customs of the group. The whole body of material culture is accepted readily and usually without emotional resistance. Later and more slowly he learns the language and, through it, comes to appreciate somewhat the immaterial culture values of the group. He forms personal attachments, cooperates with others in the struggle for common interests, participates in the political life, and in other ways becomes bound by ties of interest and sentiment to the new group. He comes more and more to define the situation in terms of his associates and to develop a system of similar attitudes toward them. At the same time his memories of and sentimental attachments to the earlier culture and group decline.

E. THE RATE AND PERIOD OF ASSIMILATION

The course of personal assimilation to a foreign culture complex is of necessity gradual and slow. It is probably never possible for the adult during his lifetime to become completely assimilated to a strange culture. The habits of early life persist and the memories remain to give an outlook unlike that of the native who knows no other group. The European immigrant to

¹ R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, pp. 271-273. Quoted by permission of the Carnegie Corporation.

America, for example, if his transfer is after the period of early childhood, seldom learns to speak the language with the ease of a mother tongue or to become reconciled to the status of women and children or to the irreverence and religious indifference of the country of his adoption; he is never completely at home in the adopted country.

There are apparently very considerable native differences between individuals in the readiness with which they assimilate. The superficial, extrovert type of person changes his allegiances and loyalties with relative ease. He responds directly to the stimulation of the external environment and fits easily into a new situation. The old memories and loyalties are easily sloughed off and forgotten; he lives for the most part in the present and immediate situation. The more thoughtful, introverted person with his deeper sympathy, appreciation, and understanding gives up more slowly the old loyalties and memories and takes on the new more slowly. It is possible that there may also be differences in racial temperaments that make some groups easy and other groups difficult to assimilate.

Aside from the original or personal differences among individuals, there are differences in the assimilability of persons arising from the national status and code of the group from which they come. The relative status of groups in the family of nations determines in part the rate of assimilation. A strong sense of national unity and a pride of origin are powerful factors inhibiting personal assimilation in a foreign culture. In spite of the initial similarity of language and culture, the Canadian and the Englishman are not so quickly and readily assimilated to the American *mores* as are certain peoples more divergent in race and culture type.

The following analysis of personal name changes in the East-Friesian people in America gives a concrete and vivid picture of the assimilation of an immigrant group as that assimilation is objectively recorded in a single and simple aspect of culture:

In the family life of the Eastfriesian people in America the names given to the children clearly show a process of Americanization. In the old home in Europe and among the immigrant families in this country, and to a limited extent among the second generation, the custom prevails of naming the children after the grandparents. The first child receives the name of the paternal grandfather or grandmother, depending on the sex of the child; the second receives the name of the maternal

grandparent; and the names of additional children alternate from the father's family to the mother's. After the names of the four grandparents are used, the names of the parents' brothers and sisters are used, beginning with the name of the father's eldest brother or sister and turning next to the mother's brother or sister. A concrete example will make the system clear. Harm Meyer, the son of Peter and Aintje Meyer, marries Elske, the daughter of Behrend and Geeske Smit. The first child will preferably be a boy; he is named Peter and will be known to the world as Peter H. Meyer using his father's name as his middle name to distinguish him from other Peter Meyers, as Harm Meyer may have six brothers all of whom will have a boy named Peter.

The second child receives its name from its maternal grandparent; Behrend if a boy, Geeske if a girl. But fate may frown upon the union and the first children of the couple may all be girls. In that case the first-born is named Aintje and the second Geeske, after the two grandmothers. The third, not being a boy to take the grandfather's name, will be given the name of Peterke, a feminized form of Peter; the next child, if a girl, will be called Behrendje or Behrendina, feminized forms of Behrend. The following diagram of the Harm Meyer family shows the elements of the system. The numbers preceding the names are inserted for simplicity of reference; they have no other significance.

	5. Harm				
	6. Gepka				
	7. Elske				
1. Peter and	8. Jacob				
2. Aintje Meyer	9. Evert			21. Peter	after No. 1
	10. Janna			22. Geeske	after No. 4
	11. Trientja			23. Aintje	after No. 2
	12. Peter			24. Behrendje	after No. 3
		5. Harm Meyer		25. Gepka	after No. 6
		15. Elske Smit		26. Stientje	after No. 13
	13. Stientje			27. Jacob	after No. 8
	14. Geerd			28. Elske	after No. 15 (7)
	15. Elske			29. Janna	after No. 10
3. Behrend and	16. Kasper			30. Geertje	after No. 14
4. Geeske Smit	17. Weert				
	18. Amke				
	19. Hilke				
	20. Klass				

It will be noticed that Harm is the first-born of the eight children of Peter Meyer and his wife Aintje. His wife Elske is the third of the eight children of Behrend Smit and his wife Geeske. The union of Harm and Elske has produced ten children and it will be noticed that five of them have received their names from their father's family and the other five from their mother's. Numbers 24 and 30 are feminized forms of masculine names. This is the system as it works out in practice. And the older generation is insistent that it shall work. When a child is born in an Eastfriesian home its name comes automatically

as the result of the system and the grandparent after whom the child is named is obligated to provide the baptismal dress, perhaps a baby carriage, and, in the case of a boy, the first suit of clothes. If the rule be violated, the feelings of the grandparent are injured to such an extent that they find relief only in a codicil to the will unfavorable to the disrespectful son or daughter.

However, the system has slowly yielded to the inevitable; changes come in the customs of an immigrant group surrounded by other customs. It has now almost completely disappeared. An analysis of several thousand names reveals the fact that previous to 1900 the children received only Eastfriesian names. The grandmother's name, Geertje, was probably changed to Gertie, Elske to Elsie, and Hilke to Hilda. Sometimes, for the sake of familial peace, the child may actually be named Geertje, or Elske, or Hilke, but she will be known to the world only as Gertie, Elsie, or Hilda, thus giving the grandmother time slowly to adjust herself to the ways of a changing world.

This change in the form of personal names is symptomatic. The Eastfriesian name Dirk is in the next generation changed to Dick in popular usage and reappears in the third generation as Richard. Wessel becomes Wesley, Freerk becomes Fred, Wilhelm becomes William, Jan or Johann is changed to John, Jantje and Janna become Jennie or Jane, and thus the process goes on.

Not many of the surnames are changed. I have knowledge of only a few cases. Muller is readily changed to Miller; Hoogestrat becomes Highstreet, and Greenveld is known as Greenfield. In these cases the meaning has been retained in each case. Other names not subject to such ease of translation are retained in their original form.

In the case of personal names the tendency during the past decade has been toward the use of names quite far removed from those of the older generation. The appended lists of names, arranged by decades, are taken from the baptismal records of one particular church. They bring before us the names given to the children of that community during the past five decades:

1880-1890	1890-1900	1900-1910	1910-1918	1918-1928
Ulfert	Christian	Albrecht	Alma	Anton
Jan	Janna	Geert	Meta	Ivan
Engelke	Klaas	Bartel	Harvey	Inez
Trientje	Wessel	Friedrich	Harm	Eva
Altje	Bertha	Dina	Martha	Peter
Rindelina	Evert	Elizabeth	Frances	Viola
Andreas	Hilka	Rentsina	Stelva	Gertrude
Jacob	Heero	Nora	Raymond	Leona
Johann	Mareka	Leonard	Grace	Erves
Amke	Bina	Abbo	Anna	Luella
Albertus	Habbo	Hilkea	Beatrice	Phylis

1880-1890	1890-1900	1900-1910	1910-1918	1918-1928
Lumke	Sjamke	Folka	Lucile	Clifford
Gepke	Hinderk	Henrietta	Lucinda	Marvin
Wupke	Baukolena	Albert	Amos	Ivadel
Geerd	Hau	Sienus	Hannah	Virginia
Hermina	Grietje	Eildert	Evelyn	Florence
Geelkelima	Fantje	Wikelina	Pansy	Lorraine
Wilhelm	Eke	Wesley	Thomas	Berdell
Freerk	Lutjen	Enno	Nancy	Minnie
Reemt	Siefer	Taalko	Alice	Eunice
Frauke	Klaasina	Frieda	Evangeline	Phadoris
Christoffer	Berendina	Weert	Marie	Virgil
Christjahn	Jantje	Benjamin	Lillian	Arnold
Klaaske	Anneus	Kasper	Bernice	Allen
Dirk		Elsie	Vera	Matilda
		Dick	Lawrence	Jay
			Ruth	Marvis
			Fred	Delmer
			Helen	Gagle
			Tillie	John
			Caroline	Ivan
			Arthur	Marlys
			Richard	Merril
				Christine
				Jane
				Arlene
				Elmore
				Donna
				Charles
				Mary

The first stage is that of the older generation in which there is a strict adherence to the Eastfriesian naming system. This was followed by a period of formal acceptance of the system in which the child might be given the Eastfriesian name Geertje or Goeke in the baptismal service but be known to the world as Gertie or as Joe or Joseph. In the next stage the old names are no longer used even in the baptismal service, in their original form, but an attempt is made to Anglicize them. If a modern name having only a slight resemblance to the old is found, it is eagerly seized upon. Thus a grandmother whose name is Altje is happy to know that her children are still observing the ancient custom when they name their little daughter Alice. Conversely the young Americanized parents, realizing that they must at least recognize the existence of the custom, name their son Arthur rather than Arend after the grandfather. Sometimes the resemblance is so slight between the ancestral name and the name given to the child as to consist in the first letter only, as in the case of Arthur and Arend. In the final stage, which is the present, the old system is abandoned entirely and new

names as far removed as possible from those of traditional usage are chosen.¹

F. CONTACT AND ASSIMILATION

The ease, naturalness, and rapidity with which personal assimilation proceeds depend upon a number of different factors. Some of these conditions, as suggested above, inhere in the person, either as original or as acquired differences; others inhere in the social situation into which the person goes.

Other things equal, the rate of assimilation varies directly with the number and intimacy of contacts. It is possible for peoples to maintain commercial or other secondary types of contact without personal assimilation; persons or groups may for long periods live in the midst of a foreign group and yet retain their original culture complex more or less uncontaminated. But where the contacts are intimate and personal there is a rapid and profound change in sympathies and loyalties. For this reason intermarriage is everywhere conducive to assimilation. For the same reason slavery, especially of the domestic and patriarchical type, has been more effective than perhaps any other system for the rapid assimilation of foreign elements.

The factors making for a rapid assimilation of a foreign group are readily seen in the historic case of the Negro in early American life:

The assimilation of the Negroes by the European culture went on with remarkable ease and unusual rapidity. The individual Negroes were highly plastic and the external conditions were highly favorable. The process was, to be sure, extended over a long period and there were at all times many unassimilated Negroes in the slave population. But this was due to historic circumstances rather than to any retardation of the sociological process: the traffic in slaves continued for a long period after the earlier importations and their descendants had lost all trace of the African heritage and become culturally indistinguishable from white Americans of similar status.

Even in their native environment the Negroes were without a sense of nationality or of racial unity, so had no sentimental complex inhibiting their ready acceptance of alien culture facts. Moreover, the native African civilization in the regions over which the slave traders operated was thoroughly disorganized. The captives brought to America were separated from all the objective elements of their culture.

¹ Adapted from an unpublished manuscript of J. A. Saathoff on *The Assimilation of the Eastfriesians*.

Incidentally or intentionally the slave trade separated tribal members, and the Negroes came into the American situation as individuals. The slave *régime* completed the destruction of the tribal organization and social heritage of the captive people. As a consequence of the dispersion there was little opportunity to associate with fellow tribesmen: their more frequent contacts were with slaves of a different tribal origin, so of different language and social heritage. All the material facts of their tribal culture disappeared at once and completely; there was no opportunity to practice or perpetuate a native culture. There was no opportunity to reproduce the values in the new world and no possibility of retaining or transmitting the non-material values. Their time was occupied in tasks set by their masters, and the daily routine of their lives pretty effectually prevented attention being given to ancestral beliefs and practices. They were a broken people, realigned as individuals in a strange environment and subjected to a manner of living for which they had little inclination, without opportunity to practice their rites or transmit their culture tradition. They were completely stripped of their native social heritage and as completely as it is possible for any people to be at the mercy of a foreign culture.

The sentimental and other facts that characteristically retard assimilation were absent. And there were present some positive facts of a general nature that stimulated the process. . . .

In the American situation the Negroes were in the midst of an obviously superior type of culture. They were an unorganized minority in a strange environment. Even without the compulsion of their social situation and status, they would inevitably have taken over with great rapidity the material and technological facts of the white civilization. . . .

The slave status of the Negroes was thus an important, perhaps the most important, fact favoring their assimilation. The rapidity of the assimilation process is conditioned by the opportunity for association, and there is no form of social organization so well adapted to multiply the primary contacts of culturally divergent peoples as the patriarchal slave order. The Negroes, aside from those on the larger plantations and in the West Indies and in the Lower South, were in daily contact with the members of the master's family and with individuals of their own race who were already assimilated or partly assimilated to the white culture. So far as they were members of households owning a single slave or a few slave families—and such was the usual case—they worked side by side with their masters and mistresses. In the relationship of slave and master the disorganized and helpless Negroes found a new security; the friendly and intimate relations which prevailed between the races, once they became mutually accommodated, opened the avenues along which the assimilation of the white culture came easily and inevitably. . . .

The native languages were essentially useless to the transported captives. They could not be used as a means of communication with the whites and, because of the separation of tribal groups and the distribution of the slaves, individuals rarely came into contact in America with others who spoke the same dialect. In the situation the native tongues were forgotten and the slaves learned to understand and speak the language of their conquerors. The language substitution was so complete and one-sided that practically no words of African origin found their way into English. The acquisition of the language was rapid in the case of the fortunate individuals who lived in small households and were in consequence in close and intimate association with white persons. The Negro children born in America to these fortunate slaves learned English as their native tongue and knew no more of the African dialect than did the American white children. On the plantations, and elsewhere that the slaves were used in numbers, the contacts with the whites were infrequent and impersonal and the Negroes acquired the culture language more slowly and in a highly corrupted form. . . .

The religious and magical practices of the Africans were in large measure lost as a consequence of their dispersion. The sporadic appearances of tribal religious rites were generally suppressed. In the absence of observance the practices were forgotten and the beliefs lost. On the positive side they easily took on the white beliefs and practices. They were a primitive and superstitious people and fears aroused in the new form of life which they could in no way control made them ideal material for religious efforts. They readily accepted Christianity and found in it a philosophy admirably suited to their status.

In like manner the majority of their folk customs and practices were lost. In the absence of opportunity to associate with other persons of similar heritage the customs inevitably fell into disuse and were presently forgotten and lost. Little of either good or bad remained. Their moral ideas and tribal customs could not stand the shock of the slave traffic. . . . Their political ideas, never more than a somewhat vague sense of loyalty to the chief, were soon gone. The whole culture complex collapsed and was not and could not be transmitted to their children. In place of the destroyed values they quickly came into possession of the objective culture values of their conquerors. They learned the agricultural and household activities of the whites through systematic training; they acquired through imitation the superficial vices and mannerisms of their white associates.

As time went on the contact of the members of the two races came to involve a high degree of intimacy and mutual dependence, and the cultural modification of many members of the servile group proceeded beyond the simple appropriation of objective values: they came to a more or less adequate appreciation of the values. The native-born

Negroes shared in the common body of historic experience and had the same group of memories as did the native-born whites. The ethnic mixture of stocks, which is never absent when two culturally unequal groups occupy the same geographic region, increased the social contacts and promoted assimilation. In the Negro children of American birth and ancestry little or nothing distinctly African remained. They had no knowledge of the country nor of African ways and culture. They spoke the same language as their masters and shared the same tradition. They had the same political conceptions, held the same social beliefs, and had institutional and cultural loyalties identical with those that prevailed in their familiar environment. They differed from the pattern type more in degree of conformity than in the kind of culture facts. The process of assimilation—the fusion of culture heritages and the formation of a community of interests, sentiments, and historic memories through participation in a common life—was well advanced.¹

G. ISOLATION AND ASSIMILATION

Just as assimilation is promoted by contact, it is retarded by isolation. Any and every fact, whether in the personality of the cultural strangers or in the culture complex in which they are immersed, that hinders personal contact and free association operates to retard the assimilative process.

Reference has already been made to the fact that the pride of group ancestry is a condition that makes the individual persons slow to assimilate. Where persons from an advanced culture come into regions of backward or diverse cultures, as the Europeans in their various colonial possessions, there is a general loosening of personal standards but little tendency toward a fundamental assimilation into the native culture. Often there is a reverse process, as when both the Negroes and native whites of Texas came to speak the language and otherwise to be assimilated in the culture of the German immigrants. A superior culture and pride of ancestry isolate the persons from intimate association and operate to their own perpetuation.

A second major condition operating to isolate, hence to retard the assimilation of persons in a foreign culture, is the enforced or voluntary segregation of the strangers. The immigrant gravitates, naturally and inevitably, to those areas where others of his racial or cultural group congregate. The Negro in the city goes to the area of Negro settlement where he finds his friends

¹ Adapted from E. B. Reuter, *The American Race Problem*, pp. 108–115. Reprinted by permission of Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

and those with whom he may work and associate. The European immigrant goes to the area where his language is spoken and where the standards and practices of his homeland are understood and practiced. It is possible and not unusual for the Negro in New York or Chicago to have no contacts except with other Negroes, and it is not unusual for the European immigrant in America to live in an immigrant colony and be as insulated from direct contacts with the older American stock as he was in his native village.

For the complete assimilation of persons and groups, participation in the cultural life is essential. The degree to which a group may remain physically within a culture without becoming an integral part of it is illustrated by the American Indian people. In spite of four hundred years of contact with Western culture, they remain more or less completely unassimilated. One important element in the understanding of this fact—the inability to participate in the cultural life—is emphasized in the following statement:

The Indian race is fast reducing the purity of its blood, but the Indian blood predominates and holds the succeeding generations out of the national thought and out of Caucasian social control. No one is free until he shares in the thought which controls his social life. The mixed blood in custom and tradition is Indian, or raceless, which is worse. The Indian has no defined status. Taxed, he may or may not be a citizen. If taxed, or even if a citizen, he may have few or none of the privileges and immunities of a citizen; he may not—ordinarily he does not—have the control of his own property. If he is not a citizen, he is incompetent to sue or be sued, and is not even a competent witness in court. Even whole tribes of Indians, every individual of which may be nominally a citizen, have no standing in court and have no right to sue for their claims, even in the United States Court of Claims. And in the third place, though we spend on an average about one hundred dollars per year on every Indian child in the governmental schools and demand from them not less than twelve years, and sometimes hold them far beyond their majority, yet the limited few who get an advanced education do not by government policy go beyond the eighth grade of our public schools.

. . . The Indians are *not* assimilated. The assimilation of one race into another and surrounding race means bringing them into a full share in the life and thought of the latter. They must become constituent parts of the nation. They must be units of the new society. . . .

When a people is conquered and subject to another, it ceases to be a society, except in so far as it retains a spiritual life of its own apart from that of its conquerors. Yet it does not become an integral part of the victorious people's life until it is able to appropriate to itself the spirit of that life. So long as the citizens of the conquered state are merely in the condition of atoms externally fitted into a system to which they do not naturally belong, they cannot be regarded as parts of the society at all. They are slaves: they are instruments of a civilization of which they do not partake. Certainly no more melancholy fate can befall a nation than that it should be subjected to another whose life is not large enough to absorb its own. But such a subjection cannot be regarded as a form of social growth. It is only one of those catastrophes by which a society may be destroyed. In so far as there is growth in such a case, it is still a growth from within. The conquering society must be able to extend its own life outward, so as gradually to absorb the conquered one into itself; otherwise the latter cannot be regarded as forming a real part of it at all, but at most as an instrument of its life, like cattle and trees.

I maintain that the Indian has not been incorporated into our national life and cannot be until we radically change a number of fundamental things. We must give him a defined status, early citizenship and control of his property, adequate education, efficient government and schools, broad and deep religious training, and genuine social recognition. We must give him full rights in our society and demand from him complete responsibility. . . .

The Indians today, the great mass of them, are still a broken and beaten people, scattered and isolated, cowed and disheartened, confined and restricted, pauperized, and tending to degeneracy. They are a people without a country, strangers at home, and with no place to which to flee.¹

H. NATIONALITY AND THE RETARDATION OF ASSIMILATION

Assimilation is a slow process of growth and involves a fundamental cultural transformation. If the conditions are favorable, it goes on automatically, but it may not be hurried by artifice or device. It is of course possible to provide the conditions that are favorable to the ongoing of the process, but it is no more possible to condense the process into a few months or years than it is possible to shorten the time required in any other natural process of growth, as the period of development of the child from infancy to maturity.

¹ F. A. McKenzie, "The Assimilation of the American Indian," *American Journal of Sociology*, 19(1913-1914), 768-769. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of the *American Journal of Sociology*.

The various attempts by zealous but misinformed patriotic groups to force the assimilation of immigrants automatically defeat the ends desired; they put in operation forces that operate to opposed ends. Any direct attempt to speed the process by external pressure calls attention to the changes occurring and, by rousing sentimental opposition, invariably retards the process. The student in the course of his education gradually, and usually without conflict, outgrows the concepts of his fundamentalist training; they are replaced as his mind matures and his education progresses by more adequate conceptions. But to attempt to force the person to discard anthropomorphic beliefs and practices *in toto* and to accept mechanistic interpretations and rational practices is rarely successful. It calls his attention to the changes that are going on within him and revives his sentimental loyalties at the same time that it puts him on the defensive and thereby strengthens his resistance to change. Sentiments, beliefs, and loyalties of this order are not rational matters and may not be changed by argument no matter how convincing.

In the case of unassimilated groups residing within a culture area any arbitrary, tyrannous, or long-continued external pressure to bring about their assimilation tends to create irreconcilable antagonisms and to retard or entirely stop the natural process. Oppression makes the group self-conscious, organizes it in defense of its values, creates a militant spirit of nationality which is the most effective barrier that may be erected to retard or prevent the incorporation of a people into a foreign culture.

The disastrous effect of Bismarck's effort to speed the pace of Polish Prussianization is one of many historic examples of the retardation of the assimilative process by the ill-advised interference of politicians who wish to promote it:

Among these efforts to assimilate an incorporated group, I have found those of Prussia in connection with the Poles of its eastern provinces perhaps the most interesting, because the policy was formulated by the man who formed the German Empire and has been carried on with resourcefulness, system, and ferocity and because, on the other hand, it discloses in a more complete way than I have found elsewhere the varieties of reaction which the coerced group may develop under this external pressure. . . .

. . . It seems that the Polish population was at one time on the road to Germanization. In the period of serfdom the peasant had been so mercilessly exploited that he acquired a profound suspicion of the upper

classes, and this remains a prominent trait in his character today. . . . But in the back of the peasant's head there lingered a tradition that he fared badly because the emperor was deceived by the nobility and did not know how the peasant was treated. And under the German government he began to be loyal (for Germany understands how to care for her people) and for a long time—until after the war with France—she treated the Poles without discrimination—protected them and let them alone. And they in turn began to be patriotic, to speak German and drink beer, and to be proud of the Prussian uniform. A Polish nobleman has recently admitted that if you should put a Prussian Pole into a press, German culture would pour in streams from every opening and pore in his body. Prussian Poles are much sought in Russian Poland and Galicia as agricultural overseers, but they become homesick and long for the time when they may end their banishment and return to Posen. And the aristocratic Poles were coming even more under German influence and unconsciously imitating German institutions and speech. I do not know how far this process of assimilation would have progressed, for there was arising a noticeable nationalistic movement—a movement dating back to the thirties.

At any rate, so long as the peasant felt that the government was friendly to him he paid little attention to agitators. . . . At this point Bismarck took a hand and decided to force the process of Germanization. . . . He undertook the task with apparent confidence, but he was profoundly deceived in his judgment of the peasant. He said that the peasant who had shed his blood so generously for Germany was at heart a true German. The fact is, the peasant had been gradually losing sight of the fact that he was a Pole and the policy of Bismarck restored to him that consciousness.

It was a saying in Germany that the Prussian schoolmaster had won the battle of Sadowa, and it was Bismarck's policy to use the same schoolmaster in the Germanization of Posen. The German language was substituted for the Polish in the schools, and German teachers, preferably without a knowledge of Polish, were introduced into the schools. Now speech is one of the signs by which a people recognizes itself, and fear of the effacement of the signs of self-consciousness is somewhat like the fear of death. And this effacement of speech implied also the effacement of religion, for in the mind of the peasant speech and religion were identified. Ask a Pole his nationality and he will not improbably reply: "Catholic." He felt also, and the priest taught, that the good Lord did not understand German. At this point the peasant knew that the government was his enemy. He had heard it before from the priest and the nobility, but he did not believe it.

There is not the slightest doubt that the Prussian government at this point raised a devil which it has not been able to lay. This action, indeed, marked the beginning of what is now known as the Polish

Peasant Republic in Posen. The direct consequences of this school policy were riots and school strikes. At Wreschen a number of women who entered a schoolhouse and rescued their children from a teacher were tried for violation of domicile and sentenced to two, three, and five years' imprisonment. In 1906 there followed a systematically organized school strike involving about 150,000 children. The children, at the instigation of their parents, the priests, and the press, refused to answer in German. It seems that the behavior of the school officials was on the whole patient. But the strike had the effect of developing in the Polish children a hatred of the Germans. Indeed, this was probably the main object of the organizers of the strike. It may be that the Poles had planned precisely this and expected no further results.

The next important move of the Prussian government was the establishment of a colonization commission, with the object of purchasing Polish land and settling it with German peasants. This commission has been in operation for twenty-seven years, has expended about \$140,000,000 in the purchase of land, and the result is that the Poles have more land than they had at the beginning.

The next important move was a law prohibiting the construction of any buildings without a permit. This virtually meant that the Poles could not build on land newly acquired, nor build further on land already possessed; not even old buildings could be repaired nor chimneys renewed. It may be said at once that the Poles have almost completely nullified the force of this law by buying large estates and parceling them. The peasants then live in the manorial house, in the carriage house, the stable, the barns, the tenant houses, and by packing themselves in like sardines they have found that they save money.

And finally, in 1907, the government passed the expropriation act authorizing the legal seizure of any land which the colonization commission desired but could not purchase. This meant Polish land, and the action was forced by the fact that the Poles had developed so perfect a morale that practically no land was offered to the commission by Poles. This action aroused intense indignation and was condemned by many Germans, notably by Professor Delbrück, who took the ground that a modern state could not resort to such methods and remain a modern state. It was thought and hoped by many members of the government voting for this measure that it would never be enforced—that it was to be used as a threat—but in 1912 the government began to carry out the policy of expropriation.

These are the main steps taken by the Prussian government in its experiment with the assimilation of the Poles, and the Poles claim that the government is making war on 4,000,000 of its people.

Before outlining the results of this policy I wish to point out that the peasant has been the main factor in the struggle on the Polish side. He was aroused (1) by the Prussian state, (2) by a small middle class of

agitators and patriots, (3) by the press, (4) by the clergy, (5) by Polish business men, who developed in him an immense land hunger and ministered to it. It is noticeable also that the nobility and revolutionary agitators made no headway and secured no effective organization until the national consciousness of the peasant had been aroused. Indeed, I have the impression that, generally speaking, the nobility and the priest were, so to speak, shamed into cooperation with this aroused consciousness of the peasant.¹

I. MARGINAL MEN AND MARGINAL GROUPS

The complete substitution of the *mores* of one group for those of another is probably never accomplished in one generation. As a result of this fact, in the course of assimilation, individual persons and groups of persons come to occupy cultural positions more or less intermediate between the cultures in contact. They are not fully incorporated in either culture yet are on the margins of each: they are in the process of change from the one to the other.

The children of immigrants into a foreign culture are very frequently not fully assimilated in either the parental heritage or that of the parents' adopted country. They have grown up in partial contact with both but in complete contact with neither. In the home they may acquire something of the language, beliefs, and other elements of the parental culture heritage; on the street and in the schools they acquire something of the language, attitudes, and other elements of the heritage of the country in which they reside. The so-called disorganization so characteristic of the second generation of immigrant peoples, as, for example, the excessive rate of juvenile delinquency, arises, in part, from the lack of incorporation into and control by the standards of either group. In considerable part, however, it arises from the fact that the immigrant colonies, because of the low economic status of their members, are usually located in areas of demoralization in urban centers. These aspects of assimilation do not appear with nearly the same frequency in the cases of immigrant families or colonies having a more favorable economic status or located in

¹ W. I. Thomas, "The Prussian-Polish Situations: An Experiment in Assimilation," *Publication of The American Sociological Society*, 8(1913), 85-89. Reprinted by permission of the editorial staff of The American Sociological Society.

less disadvantageous areas, as in the rural districts of Minnesota, Iowa, and the Dakotas.

There may be a marginal stage in which one culture is repudiated without the other's having been acquired; to lose the one is not necessarily to acquire the other. The cultural stage where the youth has lost the standards and traditions of the elders and acquired only the more vulgar characteristics of the adopted group is stated concretely in an editorial in a Polish paper:

A young Pole reared in a Polish-American environment is certainly an unattractive type. He is neither a Pole nor an American in any genuine sense of either word, but a species of transitional being. . . . Having heard a great deal about liberty in America, he translates the notion into a license to do what he likes. He is impertinent and disagreeable to everybody (except to the policeman who carries a club and can put him in jail), and his behavior toward other people is such as to make a farmhand in the old country blush with shame. He thinks it perfectly proper to snub his parents, who are nothing but ignorant foreigners in his estimation, while he is a modern and progressive young person. He sneers with contempt at Poland, its language and civilization. All this makes him feel vastly superior to his elders, and he accompanies this display of his emancipation with oaths that would astonish a pirate and with a talent for long-distance spitting that would make a professional marksman gasp. Doubtless he believes that all this is American and calculated to win him the approbation of Americans. How should he know, poor soul, that decent Americans have a great deal more respect for a Pole who is genuinely and unaffectedly a Pole.¹

Groups as well as persons may occupy marginal positions in relation to cultures. As previously pointed out, migrants of the same race or nationality group to a strange country or city tend to congregate. In a strange environment persons feel keenly the need of others of like culture. The first arrivals form a colony, a kind of racial or cultural island, in the midst of the indigenous population. Later arrivals gravitate to these areas; it is there that they find their language spoken and their needs understood. Such a colony is a familiar society in a strange world. Many persons in foreign lands spend their entire lives within such segregated areas.

Such areas often have a high degree of homogeneity, they acquire a degree of unity and sometimes of community solidarity, and they have as well a considerable historic continuity. On the

¹ Editorial, *Kuryer Polski*, Milwaukee. Quoted from *The Interpreter*.

one hand, they attract the new arrivals from the homeland; on the other, they lose to the larger society and surrounding culture the persons who have become more or less assimilated to it. But the colonies themselves remain so long as immigration from the homeland continues; they persist as one culture world within another.

But the foreign colony within a culture never exactly reproduces the culture of the homeland. Change in dress, food, style of domicile, hours of labor, types of work, and other more or less external aspects of life and behavior requires necessary and inevitable adjustment. But change in the externals induces and accompanies change in the immaterial and more fundamental aspects of culture. Old forms lose much of their meaning and vitality in changed surroundings, and the new life and opportunities call for new methods of thought and action. And such ways as are retained are gradually and progressively corrupted by contact with the encompassing culture. The language, for example, may become corrupted into a dialect of the mother tongue that is not understood outside the colony itself. And it is so in regard to family life, religion, and other elements of the culture. The old forms are modified and lost at the same time that other ways are acquired. The heritage of the group is a strange mixture of culture elements, it is neither that of the home nor that of the adopted country but partly the one and partly the other as each is modified in retention or acceptance.

J. AMERICANIZATION AND THE PROCESS OF ASSIMILATION

Americanization is the process of assimilation to the American culture heritage. It differs in no respect from Germanization, Russianization, or Polanization except that, in the final outcome, the product is, of course, an American rather than a German, a Russian, or a Pole. It is a specific case of assimilation in general.

The assimilation of immigrants, throughout the national life of America, has gone on with ease and unusual rapidity. The external conditions were favorable and the attitudes both of the immigrants and of the older stock were conducive to an easy and natural change in sentiments and loyalties. The smooth and rapid pace of the process has also been due in large part to the general disposition to allow it to go on without formal or official interference. In the circumstances the incorporation of the immigrant into the American culture complex was rapid and

inevitable. In so far as conditions are kept favorable and the process not disturbed by official or patriotic impatience, it will continue as in the past.

Assimilation is thus as inevitable as it is desirable; it is impossible for the immigrants we receive to remain permanently in separate groups. Through point after point of contact, as they find situations in America intelligible to them in the light of old knowledge and experience, they identify themselves with us. We can delay or hasten this development. We cannot stop it. If we give the immigrants a favorable *milieu*, if we moderate their strangeness during their period of adjustment, if we give them freedom to make their own connections between old and new experiences, if we help them to find points of contact, then we hasten their assimilation. This is a process of growth as against the "ordering and forbidding" policy and the demand that the assimilation of the immigrant shall be "sudden, complete, and bitter." And this is the completely democratic process, for we cannot have a political democracy unless we have a social democracy also.¹

Various aspects and expressions of the assimilation process have been exhibited in the preceding pages; others are readily available for immediate study, since the process manifests itself everywhere that group life and culture change exist. It is the series of steps by which the person acquires the memories and sentiments, the ideals and aspirations, and comes to participate in the cultural and social life. The socialization of the child, his whole education from infancy to maturity, is a process of bringing him into the culture. The transformation of migrant peoples is a result of life and contact in new cultures, and their eventual incorporation into the culture and community life, is a familiar fact in the life experience of every historic group.

The details of the process may best be seen and understood, and perhaps may be fully appreciated only, in the concrete study of persons and groups who are passing or have passed through the process. The life-history documents of immigrants and of converts and of marginal and unadjusted men are essentially naïve reproductions of various expressions of the assimilative process. The mixed-blood and other culturally hybrid peoples and groups exemplify various stages in the transition from one to another form of culture.

¹ R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, p. 308. Quoted by permission of the Carnegie Corporation.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. State the relation of this chapter to those that immediately precede.
2. Give several common meanings of the term *assimilation*.
3. Account for the basic similarity of cultures and for their diversity in details.
4. In the contacts between divergent culture groups what type of culture elements is most readily adopted? Which elements change slowly? Explain.
5. What is meant by the assimilation of culture elements?
6. Distinguish between the use of an element and the assimilation of it.
7. Explain how the introduction of a simple culture element may bring fundamental changes in the social organization of a group. Give an example from history.
8. The Darwinian theory of evolution brought profound changes in the body of scientific thought. Explain.
9. The Darwinian theory of evolution has undergone a process of incorporation into the body of scientific theory. Explain.
10. Explain what is meant by saying that the external and formal aspects are learned before the meanings of the forms. Give examples not mentioned in the text.
11. State how the mixture of races and the fusion of cultures are related.
12. What historic evidence can you cite to show that intermixture of races is undesirable? Define race. What European groups can you speak of as races? What is the racial composition of the English? French? Spanish? Germans?
13. Do you understand from the text that social disorder and the confusion of standards are socially desirable phenomena?
14. Explain what is meant by a person being oriented in a culture. How does this orientation come about?
15. Distinguish between the provincial and the cosmopolitan person.
16. Describe the process of assimilation.
17. Distinguish assimilation and amalgamation.
18. How does the assimilation of the immigrant differ from his naturalization?
19. Indicate the psychological change that the European peasant must undergo before he is accommodated to an individualistic society.
20. Upon what does the rapidity of assimilation depend?
21. Why do educated and intellectual persons assimilate less readily than peasants? Why do the English assimilate more slowly than the Japanese?
22. What is the significance of the change in the naming custom of the Eastfriesians?
23. What factors in the early American situation aided in the process of assimilating the Negro?
24. What is the relation of isolation and assimilation?
25. What factors are likely to impede the assimilation of a group of immigrants into the resident culture?

26. "Assimilation of a person against his will is probably impossible." Do you agree? Give your reasons.

27. Is racial homogeneity essential to national unity?

28. Explain the American failure to assimilate the Indians to the Western culture.

29. How nearly parallel is the case of the boy who goes from a home in the country to live in the city with that of the European peasant who emigrates to America?

30. "The Americanization work of which so much is heard nowadays will hamper the process of Americanization." Discuss.

31. Explain the failure of Bismarck's efforts to Germanize the Poles.

32. What do you understand by a "marginal man"?

33. Give an example of a "marginal group."

34. Why does the foreign colony within a culture become progressively more unlike the homeland group?

35. Why is the assimilation of the immigrant in America inevitable?

36. "It appears that of all immigrants who come we are least prepared to receive the foreign intellectual, who is at the same time the type of immigrant best fitted to make a cultural contribution." Explain why this is true.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Take a page at random from an English dictionary and find the origin of the words defined and the changes in form that the words of foreign origin have undergone in being assimilated to English usage.

3. Make a list of all our culture elements that are of Indian origin.

4. Study the ways in which an immigrant colony facilitates the course of assimilation.

5. Study a foreign-language newspaper published in the United States to determine in what ways it attempts to promote and in what ways to prevent the Americanization of its readers.

6. Prepare a review with excerpts of some such immigrant document as:

Mary Antin, *The Promised Land*

H. J. Bridges, *On Becoming an American*

Rose Cohen, *Out of the Shadow*

E. Hasanovitch, *One of Them*

M. E. Ravage, *An American in the Making*

7. Study the attitudes and behavior of some nationalistic group in their relation to the oppressing group.

8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. Social Assimilation. R. E. Park, "Assimilation, Social," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.

b. Americanization, Assimilation, and Amalgamation. J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 853-855.

- c. The Development and Diffusion of Culture Traits. W. D. Wallis, *An Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 374-379.
- d. The Psychology of Assimilation. R. E. Park and H. A. Miller, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, pp. 270-280.
- e. Americanization. R. Lewis, "Americanization," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
- f. Contact and Assimilation. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 528-537.
- g. The Sociology of Assimilation. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 735-737.
- 9. Topics for written themes:
 - a. The Jew as a Culture Type
 - b. An Americanization Program
 - c. The Immigrant Community in Relation to Assimilation
 - d. Race Prejudice and the Process of Assimilation
 - e. The Assimilation of the Immigrant
 - f. The Molly Maguires
 - g. Amalgamation and Assimilation
 - h. Race Mixture and Native Assimilation
 - i. The Foreign-language Press as an Agency in Assimilation
 - j. A Historic Effort at Denationalization
 - k. Efforts to Assimilate the American Indians
 - l. The Second-generation Orientals in the United States

Supplementary Readings

- 1. Beach, W. G.: *Social Aims in a Changing World*, Chap. I, "Broken Loyalties, the Migratory Mind, and Community Integration," pp. 9-26; Chap. III, "Immigrant Assimilation and the Community," pp. 45-51.
- 2. Beach, W. G.: "Levels of Immigrant Assimilation and the Community," *Social Forces*, 4(1925), 373-375.
- 3. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XIX, "Assimilation," pp. 219-227.
- 4. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "Socialization of the Individual," pp. 429-447.
- 5. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chaps. XII, XIII, "Assimilation," pp. 498-526, 528-553.
- 6. Drachler, J.: *Democracy and Assimilation*, Chap. VII, "Americanization," pp. 191-210; Chap. VIII, "Democracy and Ethnic Fusion," pp. 211-223.
- 7. Duncan, H. G.: "A Study in the Process of Assimilation," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 23(1929), 184-187.
- 8. Ellwood, C. A.: *Psychology of Human Society*, "Social Assimilation," pp. 204-209.
- 9. Fishberg, M.: *The Jews*, Chap. V, "Types of Jews," pp. 90-120; Chap. VI, "Types of Jews in Various Countries," pp. 121-161; Chap. XXI, "Social Disabilities and Their Effects," pp. 438-465; Chap. XXII, "Assimilation versus Zionism," pp. 466-503.

10. Gosnell, H. F.: "Non-naturalization: A Study in Political Assimilation," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 930-939.
11. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XXII, "Contact and Assimilation," pp. 305-321.
12. Kallen, H. M.: "Democracy versus the Melting Pot, a Study of American Nationality," *Nation*, 100(1915), 190-194, 217-220.
13. Lewis, R.: "Americanization," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
14. McKenzie, R. D.: "The Assimilation of the American Indian," *American Journal of Sociology*, 19(1913-1914), 761-772.
15. Miller, H. A.: *Races, Nations, and Classes*, Chap. XV, "The Paradox of Americanization," pp. 168-180.
16. Park, R. E.: "Culture and Culture Trends," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 19(1925), 24-36.
17. Park, R. E.: "Social Assimilation," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
18. Park, R. E.: "Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups: With Particular Reference to the Negro," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 8(1913), 66-83; Also *American Journal of Sociology*, 19(1913-1914), 606-623.
19. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. XI, "Assimilation," pp. 734-775.
20. Park, R. E., and H. A. Miller: *Old World Traits Transplanted*, Chap. IX, "Reconciliation of the Heritages," pp. 259-308.
21. Reuter, E. B.: *Race Mixture*, Chap. I, "Civilization and the Mixture of Races," pp. 3-23.
22. Ross, E. A.: *The Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XVIII, "Adaptation," pp. 173-180; Chap. XXVIII, "Socialization," pp. 279-290.
23. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. VIII, "Preliminary Socialization," pp. 77-85; Chap. XX, "Adaptation," pp. 222-236.
24. Smith, W. C.: "Changing Personality Traits of Second-generation Orientals in America," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 922-929.
25. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XXXII, "The Development and Diffusion of Culture Traits," pp. 374-379.
26. Young, Pauline V.: "The Reorganization of Jewish Family Life in America: A Natural History of the Social Forces Governing the Assimilation of the Jewish Immigrant," *Social Forces*, 7(1928), 238-244.

CHAPTER XV

SOCIAL CONTROL

In the preceding chapters attention was centered upon competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation considered abstractly as the general forms of interaction. The nature of each of these forms was defined; the relation of each to the others was indicated; and each was exhibited as it appears in some of the more familiar situations of associated life.

Competition, the basic or elementary form of interaction among human beings, is not strictly social in character, since it involves individuals and groups within the human population as biological, rather than as social, units. It has its analogue in the ecology of a plant community and is best understood by use of this analogy. One species of plant in a given area holds others in check or supplants them not by any direct attack upon them or by any sort of conscious opposition to them but by drawing down the limited resources of soil, moisture, or light as it establishes itself in the community. Similarly within the human mass individuals and groups oppose, restrain, and supplant one another, in part, as their demands upon the environment—their economies—intersect. In opposition upon this elementary level relations between competitors are indirect and external and are determined by the fact that each is striving for values extraneous to, but desired by, both. No conscious struggle need be present, nor need contact and communication upon the level of language and ideas enter into the relationship; in fact, competition appears, in its pure form, just when opposition is not only indirect and external but impersonal and unconscious in character. Although it is thus not in itself social, it was shown to have effects that are of basic importance to an understanding of the human community. It results in the specialization of individuals, groups, and areas and establishes among them a condition of balance and interdependence, an ecological order somewhat analogous to the natural order resulting from the struggle for life among the various biological forms.

Within this competitive process and the impersonal order created and maintained by it, interaction rises to the social level. It takes first the form of conflict as competitors are identified and opposition between them becomes conscious and personal. The possibility of subordinating or eliminating rival claimants is then realized. Persons enter the situation as values, as potential enemies or allies, and such powerful sentiments as hatred, jealousy, pity, and affection give the struggle an added intensity and a new character. In so far as conflict expresses itself in physical terms, to be sure, it entails relationships that are no more social than are those of competition. But the significant fact is that among human beings it invariably does establish contact and communication and tends increasingly to substitute social for external methods of dealing with others. It initiates the social processes and marks the beginning of the development of a distinctly social order.

The social order is, however, a product of accommodation and assimilation, forms of interaction growing out of competition and conflict. Accommodation is a process of adjustment by means of which overt conflict is resolved and competition restrained within fixed limits. It evolves conscious and tentative forms of subordination and superordination and defines and organizes behavior in terms of them. The mutual subordination of opposed elements, differentiated in competition and conflict, to accepted social arrangements within which all opponents have a recognized status terminates the process.

These arrangements, defined and organized by accommodation, are reconciled, consolidated, and fixed in the process of assimilation. Assimilation takes place slowly and to a considerable extent without conscious effort or direction. In the subjective experience of persons it involves an interpenetration and fusion of memories and meanings through common and prolonged participation in the inclusive scheme of group activity; it thus establishes social arrangements in a body of common sentiments and loyalties, in habits of concurrent action, and in a consciousness of unity. In the objective experience of group life, assimilation involves a complete incorporation of new patterns of behavior with their supporting rules and rationalizations into the value system of the group. It establishes the social and the cultural organization.

This analysis of interaction into its four general forms provides a frame of reference in terms of which the fundamental structure of the human community may be understood. The basic ecological pattern of the community and the various segregated or stratified social groupings specialized within it, together with the structuralized oppositions and attachments holding them in a condition of reciprocal interdependence, are in a general sense products of competition, conflict, accommodation, and assimilation. But if sociological analysis stopped with the discovery of these general and abstract forms of interaction, it would be partial and incomplete.

At this point, therefore, interest is shifted to the more limited and specific processes of interaction as they appear in the behavior of social groups within the community. In this and the several succeeding chapters two types of inquiry are made, types that are differentiated in terms of two different points of view from which groups may be studied and described.

A. SOCIAL CONTROL AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

Group behavior, the present object of attention, may be viewed either collectively or distributively. Viewed collectively, a social group is a corporate body acting as a unit; it has a more or less stable form and a definite position and function in the economy of the community as in the life of the inclusive society. When examined in their collective aspects, social groups may be defined and classified, their characteristic forms of behavior described, and their interrelationships traced and generalized. Viewed distributively, a group breaks up into a number of active personal units: the separate men, women, or children comprising its membership. Each of these persons appears to be, and is, engaged in pursuits that are peculiarly his own; he has his own impulses, desires, and opinions and his own unique set of activities. To be sure, upon closer scrutiny, each person is seen to be related in many ways to those about him. What he does generally has some reference, directly or indirectly, to what others are doing. Throughout a wide range his behavior impinges upon the behavior of others, is stimulated, restrained, or otherwise modified by theirs, and supplements or is supplemented by theirs. Approached from this point of view, the group appears to be set up and organized in the experience of persons; it achieves unity

and is enabled to act in a corporate manner only as the behavior of its several members is integrated into a kind of matrix.

These two points of view differentiate the study of collective behavior and the study of social control. The former, viewing the group collectively, is concerned to define and classify groups, to describe the unitary aspects of their behavior as they establish and maintain relations with other groups, and to discover the processes through the operation of which changes are brought about both in their corporate form and in their folkways, *mores*, institutions, and philosophic systems. The study of social control, assuming the distributive viewpoint, aims to discover the means whereby unity is achieved among the discrete personal units within the group. It searches out the processes, agencies, and mechanisms by means of which people in associated life reciprocally restrain and direct one another as they achieve an orderly collective experience.

The present chapter and the one following are devoted to a consideration of social control. Immediately thereafter, in a group of three chapters, the forms and processes of collective behavior are analyzed and described.

B. THE MEANING OF CONTROL

The word *control* is so familiar as a term of popular speech that to raise any question of definition with reference to it may seem unnecessary. Yet two points must be called to attention if its meaning is to be properly understood, each of which has an important bearing upon the point of view essential to objective study in the field of sociology.

In the first place, although control always carries the idea of restraint or direction, it may refer to either of two types of thing. It may designate, on the one hand, an act of controlling: some person or thing relates itself, or is related, to some other person or thing in such way as to effect changes in the latter's behavior. On the other hand, it may designate not an act of controlling but the process, technique, or device by means of which changes in behavior are effected. The former usage centers attention upon control in a verbal sense—that is, upon acts of controlling viewed from the standpoint of the controller. The latter usage directs interest to controls in a substantive sense—that is, to all the pressures actually operating to determine behavior viewed from the standpoint of the controlled. As applied to human relation-

ships the term may carry either of these meanings. Parents control their children; there are also controls that operate to restrain and direct the behavior of children, with or without the knowledge of parents or of the children themselves. The former usage is commonplace; the latter is less frequent but, as will be indicated presently, more important for purposes of research.

In the second place, as a designation for acts of controlling, it may be thought, apart from inquiry into usage, that the reference of the term should be limited to effects that are intentionally produced, excluding those that are unintentionally or unknowingly occasioned. It is obviously true that in some contexts the term control is applied only to a purposive and effective use of technique in order to produce a desired effect. But it is also true that in other contexts a wider meaning is given the term. The astronomer speaks of the movement of a planet as being controlled by the related movements of the other heavenly bodies, although he does not think of the latter as intending this control. Similarly the botanist speaks of the growth of a plant as being controlled by factors, such as soil elements, moisture, and light, which are incapable of will or purpose. In fact, in all theoretical discussion outside the fields of the human sciences usage favors the broader definition. The former meaning appears in the discussions of practical social problems, which are necessarily concerned with the desire of the group to bring the facts of behavior into harmony with prevailing ideals. The latter meaning appears in research literature, which is directed toward discovery of the processes actually involved in the determination of social facts as they are.

The sociologist adheres to the broader definition of social control for two reasons. In the first place, he is not immediately interested in the practical problem of enabling groups to control their members more effectively in terms of present purposes and ideals. Rather, he is concerned to examine society as a totality of functional relationships and to consider, objectively and with as much detachment as he can achieve, the effects upon personal behavior of all these relationships. The distributive point of view stated above centers his attention upon the controlled persons rather than upon the controlling society and leads him to inquire into the manner in which persons are influenced either with or without intention by the pressures arising in association and interaction with other persons. He desires to know the

forms that these pressures take, the channels through which they are brought to bear, and their characteristic effects upon external behavior, sentiments, attitudes, and ideas. The sociologist is interested in the social controls rather than in their intentional use in attempts to control.

To be sure, the sociologist is not unmindful of the very real desire for effective techniques for purposive control upon the practical level. He hopes in the long run to make, indirectly, some considerable contribution to the satisfaction of this desire; in this hope lies the ultimate usefulness of his study. But he realizes that this ultimate contribution depends upon his present ability to divorce his study from practical considerations, to escape the prejudicial effects of prevailing idealisms, and to build up a body of theoretical generalizations concerning the operation of control factors. It is only as science provides such knowledge that efforts at intentional, purposive control may become more than mere trial and error or blind and often abortive reliance upon tradition. Just as purposive control by the horticulturist in the development of plant forms succeeds, except by accident, only as it is based upon descriptive knowledge of all the factors controlling the development of plants, so an effective and economical realization of purposes within the social realm may be facilitated only by knowledge of all the factors affecting personal behavior and the development of sentiment, attitude, and idea systems.

A second reason for adhering to the broader definition of control is implied in what has just been said. There is really no fixed line of demarcation between controls that are used intentionally and those that operate spontaneously and incidentally. Any act of control that is above the level of mere fumbling consists merely in the utilization for conscious reasons of controls that do or may operate at other times without such conscious direction. There is thus a continuous passage of controls into the realm of techniques available for purposive uses. In fact, a control process of the spontaneous type is scarcely discovered and its effects described before it is seized upon and made the basis of a conscious technique of manipulation by some control agency. Witness, for example, the extent to which the generalizations of psychology and social psychology have been incorporated into the techniques of the educator, the advertiser, and the propagandist. The field of intentional control thus expands with

every new bit of knowledge concerning controls. It comprises no stable body of social fact having a definite character of its own. In view of this fact it seems sensible as well as logical to turn attention to controls as such and to treat the presence or absence of intention in their use as a matter of incidental importance.

C. THE NATURE OF SOCIAL CONTROL

Not all social control is self-conscious and deliberate. Conversely, not all self-conscious and deliberate control is social. The term social implies that the modifications in behavior result from acts of communication and not from arbitrary applications of physical force.

The behavior of individuals is sometimes controlled in much the same way as is the behavior of physical objects. Babies who are too young to understand are confined in their movements by straps and pens and are picked up bodily and moved from place to place. Children and adults alike are not infrequently shoved about, beaten, imprisoned, or otherwise curbed or compelled by the use of physical force. But modifications in external behavior effected by such means do not represent social control; the relationship between controller and controlled is, in such cases, external and non-social in character. There must be a sharing of experience, a communication of meanings, making mental adjustment possible before control becomes social.

Dewey gives a hypothetical case of a child who is made to bow by pressure on his neck muscles every time he meets a certain person. Finally bowing becomes automatic. As the psychologists might put it, his responses have been conditioned so that the stimulus of meeting the other person causes him to bow even in the absence of pressure upon his neck. But so long as control remains upon this level, the act of bowing has no meaning for the child; it does not imply recognition or reverence. The control becomes social only when the child is made to understand what he is about by sharing in the meaning which the act carries to the one who controlled him and to the one toward whom he acts.¹

Every act of social control relies upon the controlled person ultimately to determine his own behavior; the prior acts of com-

¹ J. Dewey, *Democracy and Education*, pp. 35-36.

munication serve merely to provide a basis for such self-determination. In physical control immediate behavior is adjusted to a physical pressure as such, a push or pull, a blow, a noise, or an odor. This adjustment is a direct result of the pressure. Such internal changes as occur through the acquisition of new meanings and the redefinition of wishes and attitudes are consequents, or at most concomitants, of the response to the physical cause. At least, the internal changes do not occur first and lead to the adjustment in external behavior. In social control, on the other hand, the inward adjustment comes first; communication merely defines the situation for the individual by relating it to his wishes and to the expectations and demands of others; the modification in outward behavior is a result of this new alinement of subjective factors. When this freedom for self-determination is denied and behavior is compelled, control loses its social character. There is thus in all social control an element of self-control.

Of course, in a limited sense, a physical pressure may be in itself an act of communication in that it conveys a meaning to its recipient. Thus when one person strikes another in the face, he may make unmistakably clear the intensity of his feeling and the degree of his insistence. In this sense the blow is a kind of gesture, extreme to be sure, but serving the same social purpose as expressions of anger upon the face or in the voice. The forward stance of the body, the taut muscles, the clenched fists, and other gestural accompaniments of anger are, in reality, indications that conflict is likely to be transferred to the physical level. The blow is both an execution of these threats and a proof of their sincerity; in the latter sense it may be thought of as an act of communication. It is to be noted, however, that the meaning of the blow is not usually discoverable from the blow itself but only by interpretation in terms of other aspects of the situation. Whenever it is isolated from these, as when one is struck unexpectedly from behind, it cannot be understood; it is then not a gesture, for it communicates nothing on the social level. The illustration may suffice to show the limited extent to which a coercive physical pressure has social content. In any event, this social content and the responses that are occasioned by it are not to be confused with the physical effects of the pressure as such. Falling to the floor unconscious is one thing; adjusting one's conduct to the meaning of the other as a vicious person is another thing. A man who is handcuffed, confined in a strait-

jacket, or locked in a cell is restrained not by social but by physical means.

The frequency with which the group has recourse to physical force in some form in its attempts to secure conformity from its members makes it necessary in sociological study to give attention to coercive techniques. But this distinction between them and techniques of a social sort should be kept in mind, as it provides a necessary basis for understanding them.

The term social control, as here used, refers to the restraint and direction of personal or group behavior in so far, and only in so far, as such restraint and direction result from interaction upon the social level. It includes at one extreme the exchange of influences and consequent modifications in behavior arising from the mere fact that persons are aware of one another's presence and extends through the full range of types of interaction to include, at the other extreme, adjustments in behavior that follow from critical discussion upon the most objective and abstract level. It thus designates equally well pressures that are intentionally applied with the purpose of securing a foreseen result and those that are exerted unintentionally and in a quite incidental manner. It excludes, however, control that is exercised by the application of purely physical pressures even when these pressures are consciously brought to bear by other persons.

When the term is understood in this broad way, it becomes evident not only that control appears wherever there are contact and interaction but further that there is control on both sides of every relationship between persons. One cannot control without submitting to control by the other person. There must be accommodation to the point of view, level of intelligence, capabilities, and general situation of the other before communication with him is possible. The parent adapts himself thus to the child, using the child's vocabulary and appealing to interests and wishes upon the child's level. Moreover, the parent is bound by the child's dependence upon him as by his dependence upon the child. Similarly, the master in a master-slave relationship has to play the rôle expected of him—distasteful or inconvenient as it may be at times—if he is to derive from the slaves the benefits he desires. All social control partakes thus of the nature of accommodation and involves reciprocal modifications and adjustments in act and attitude.

D. THE GROUP AS A CONTROL ORGANIZATION

When society is considered in its contemporary rather than its evolutionary aspect, it is seen to be essentially a control organization. It secures and maintains orderly relationships among persons and groups that are interdependent but have, nevertheless, their own distinct and often conflicting interests and desires. Through the exercise of this function it not only enables the collective endeavor to proceed smoothly and effectively but also provides for its members a tolerable degree of security and freedom.

Order and continuity are possible in group life only because there exists and is observed regularly a body of definitions governing behavior in all those situations that recur at all frequently in the experience of the group. Within the family, for example, order implies a routine and a body of rules which each member observes: regular mealtimes; a division of labor in the performance of household tasks; acceptance of parental authority; and respect for the persons, property, and convenience of others. Mutual subordination of all members to these common arrangements and expectations brings order in the familial relationships. Similarly in the larger community, folkways, *mores*, conventions, and laws direct and channelize behavior in all the general types of situation in which persons must act together. They enable each member to know what kind of behavior may be expected from others and so to avoid unnecessary confusion and conflict; they introduce regularity. Without them there could be no order: traffic would be tied up at every intersection; every personal encounter would be problematical and hazardous; property rights could not exist; there could be no division of labor, with its implications of cooperation and interdependence; and life itself would be eternally in jeopardy.

The social heritage of every group carries a vast complex of such definitions of situations. Some of them are given explicit expression in public opinion, religious creeds, or formal codes; many of them are scarcely formulated in conceptual terms at all, except casually as in the informal commands of parents, but are implicit in folk practice and conventional behavior. In either case, however, they are transmitted from parent to child, from member to initiate, and established in the habits and attitudes of persons by means of interaction. Furthermore, they are con-

tinually reimpresed upon members by various sorts of control pressure as there is a recurrence of the situations to which they apply.

This conscious and unconscious activity of groups in the communication and administration of ready-made definitions of situations is a major aspect of group control. But these definitions must not be too narrowly conceived. Some of them, like traffic regulations and customary injunctions against lying, stealing, adultery, and murder, are unambiguous and apply immediately to experience. But multitudinous as they are, such definite rules do not in the highly complex modern society supply a pharisaical code covering all possible situations; they have to be supplemented by general standards admitting of wide interpretation and adaptation as they are applied to the unique circumstances of real life. These general standards, also contained in and transmitted as a part of the social heritage, exist in the form of sentiments, attitudes, and idea systems that underlie, supplement, and give meaning to the more specific definitions.

Loyalty and patriotism, which nearly every group celebrates in its folk tales and about which it has organized dramatic forms of approval, are illustrative; in the form of acts of heroism and self-sacrifice in the service of the group these virtues are commemorated in poem and song, in myth and legend, in statues and public monuments and are rewarded by accessions of power and prestige or even by elevation to sainthood; commemorative devices and tangible rewards become, in turn, effective devices for their inculcation in others. Conformity and cooperation are similarly prized group virtues. Or, again, if the group succeeds in establishing in its members attitudes of respect or reverence for the elders, the clergy, the teachers, and other officialdom, as well as for the accepted gods, these become, in turn, agencies of control. In time they may acquire an aura of sanctity and their utterances become wise and authoritative.

The fundamental moral training of the group consists in the inculcation of just such general criteria of goodness expressed in more or less abstract terms: loyalty, obedience, respect, reverence, kindness, justice, industry, reliability, unselfishness, doing unto others what you would have them do unto you—these are all essentially social virtues in that they orient the person with reference to the needs and wishes of others and make him amenable to group demands. Associated with them are the funda-

mental religious and magical ideas or other theories and beliefs that explain them in such way as to justify and perpetuate them, providing in many cases supernatural ordinance and sanctions for them. Thus a king rules "by divine right." Nobles are accepted as superior because of the belief in their "separate biological origin," and slaves bear their lot meekly because it is part of "the providential plan." These idea systems contained in legends, myths, and indoctrinated history give group rules plausibility and group agencies absolute and universal authority; they are among the most deep-seated and persistent products of group control.

The inculcation of this whole body of general attitudes with its supporting system of ideas and beliefs is an indispensable accompaniment of the control that operates to communicate the more specific rules and practices. It provides the person with means whereby definitions satisfactory to the group may be worked out by him as occasions arise.

E. TYPES OF GROUP CONTROL

Group control goes on largely within the norms defined in custom, convention, and law and serves to maintain orderly relationships in the conduct of group enterprises and to create for individual members some degree of security in the pursuit of private ends. It communicates or imposes approved rules and standards and supports and supplements them with the attitude and idea systems carried in group tradition.

In the exercise of this function, the group utilizes several different types of control which may be briefly indicated. Control is in part spontaneous and unconscious, an incidental accompaniment of human association; in considerable part, however, it is self-conscious and deliberate. In the latter case, again, it may be of either an informal or a formal type—that is, it may occur casually in the course of ordinary group contacts without the intervention of organized agencies and means, or it may be formally exercised by specialized institutions maintained for the purpose. Furthermore, it may utilize, both incidentally and deliberately, either social means or coercive physical pressures. This last distinction has already been clearly indicated in the discussion of the nature of social control and will not require further elaboration at this point; coercion as a means of compelling members against their own wish or inclination—always a

possibility and frequently a reality in group life—will be considered in order in the following chapter.

The transmission and inculcation of group definitions occur, to considerable extent, without conscious effort on the part of the group. The fact that definitions are acted upon by others and that the actions of these others comprise the individual's significant environment—the real conditions that stimulate, sustain, supplement, and give direction and meaning to his own acts—controls him. Folk practice defines the circumstances within which he must live and sets copies for him to follow. Whatever needs he has, as for food, clothing, recreation, rest, have to be satisfied in ways that are available to him, the ways of his group. The social structure of which he is a part and in which he is continuously immersed was organized and functioning before he was conceived; he is generally powerless to reshape it to fit his own predilections—if he has any. Group routines, demands, and expectations are brute facts that are scarcely more susceptible to change by him than are the facts of his geographic environment. Since he cannot control them, he soon finds that he can get along better by accommodating himself to them—that is, by submitting to their control. On the whole, his submission is secured with little conscious resistance on his part; he does not fight against such cultural facts any more than he fights against other external facts, as those of the physical world. He early becomes habituated to them. Furthermore, his concrete wishes have been defined for him, largely during infancy, within and with reference to this social structure; they incline him to conformity and make him want to do what others are doing wholly apart from compulsion or conscious suggestion from them. The group ways are natural to him.

By the time the individual comes to maturity, at any rate, he has acquired in this quite incidental way many, if not most, of the prevailing folkways and moral customs of his group.

But not all group control is incidental and automatic. The group functions as an active control agency in the administration of many of its definitions, particularly those of moral or ethical nature. The criminal code as well as many less formal codes of conduct is sufficient evidence that not all standards are self-enforcing. In fact, there is always in every group considerable conflict between the definitions of situations which individuals have worked out for themselves and the standards which the

group provides. The latter "are often too restrictive for the enterprising, too narrow for creative minds, too altruistic for the self-seeking."¹

The individual tends to a hedonistic selection of activity, pleasure first; and society to a utilitarian selection, safety first. Society wishes its members to be laborious, dependable, regular, sober, orderly, self-sacrificing; while the individual wishes less of this and more of new experience.²

Such conflicts the group attempts to resolve by the self-conscious and purposive use of control pressures.

Control of this intentional sort is accomplished by a wide variety of agencies and means, the more important of which will be studied in some detail in the following chapter. At this point it is to be noted, however, that they group into two general types, variously designated as informal and formal, unorganized and organized, non-institutional and institutional.

Certainly, to a considerable extent, purposive control is exercised more or less informally without the use of highly specialized and organized agencies and techniques. It takes the form of guidance and direction rather than of government. The infant experiences such intentional control first in the family situation as parents and older brothers and sisters consciously direct his attention toward approved types of behavior and tutor him in the practices, attitudes, and ideologies carried in group tradition. He is taught what is modest or polite and what is immodest or impolite, what is his and what is not, and so on. A little later his playmates outside the family, his friends and acquaintances, even his casual associates on the street and elsewhere give him further conscious but informal guidance in his initiation into the ways of the group. Such control is not formal and systematic. It occurs by way of ridicule, chaffing and chiding, ordering and forbidding, reprimands, rebukes, advice, criticism, spontaneous praise and blame, and other expressions of approval and disapproval. Not only is the person made the object of such control; he is frequently drawn in, also, upon the controlling side in the disciplining of others; he comes thus to feel some responsibility for the maintenance of group standards—an important means to his own control.

¹ R. M. MacIver, *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, p. 249.

² W. I. Thomas, *The Unadjusted Girl*, pp. 42-43.

These informal control pressures, together with the incidental and unconscious type of control discussed above, are the bulwarks of group unity and continuity. Without them the more highly organized type of control could not long retain its effectiveness. The formal agencies of government, for example, rest finally upon the informal support given them in gossip and other forms of private and public discussion. A substantial body of members who have vested interests to protect or who are sincerely convinced that the established ways are best is always interested and active in seeing that others, at least, conform to established practice and belief. The group can rely for the main burden of control upon such casual and personal types of authority and upon random but immediate control pressures; when they become ineffective over a general area or with reference to considerable numbers in the population, the group becomes disorganized.

Formal or organized control, as distinguished from control of this informal sort, involves the use of specialized agencies and standardized techniques. It begins with the formulation of the definitions to be imposed, not necessarily in writing or in legal codes but at least in explicit and communicable terms. In primitive societies rules are often exhibited in mimetic or symbolic acts, as in ritualistic performances; but as culture develops, the tendency is toward more abstract statement in language form, as in the creed of the church or in the body of common and statutory law. But formal control involves further, and especially, the clear location of responsible authority for the interpretation and application of the rules—judges and policemen, teachers, the clergy—and the regularization of the techniques by means of which these authorities are enabled to act. Usually, though not invariably, the penalties or rewards supporting the rules are also given exact and standard form as control becomes organized.

The group may create formal rules, agencies, and techniques as emergency measures for meeting a particular crisis, such as famine, plague, or war, and then demobilize them when the crisis has passed. But generally such organizations tend, as have the church, the school, and the court, to take on institutional form: they build up a history, accumulate a body of precedent, acquire material properties such as emblems, libraries, and buildings, and develop a professional personnel trained to their service. The major social institutions, which are primarily control organiza-

tions, were discussed in the chapter on social institutions and will not be given further attention in the present connection.

The development of modern secondary society has occasioned increasing formalization of control methods.

Under the fairly uniform and stable conditions of primary group life, control occurred generally in an informal way. Communities were small, compact, relatively isolated, and self-sufficient; the sense of group solidarity was strong and persistent; standards of conduct were fairly definite and homogeneous, and the situations of experience simple. Under such circumstances the weight of the *mores* and conventions bore upon everybody immediately and intimately by way of personal criticism and discipline.

But in modern life incidental and informal controls have lost much of their effectiveness: life moves at too swift a pace and is organized into units too large for intimate acquaintanceship; relations are too casual, indirect, and impersonal; there is too much heterogeneity of standard and too frequent opportunity for comparison and experiment; problems are too complex and too far removed from commonplace experience. Resort to formal control devices that were already familiar, but are now extended to new uses, has been one result. Enacted laws have multiplied at a tremendous rate and have attempted to bring a greater range and variety of acts under the jurisdiction of the courts and the police. In a similar way increasing responsibility has been shouldered on the public schools, oftentimes uncritically and without adequate provision of ways and means. Moreover, many new devices, like research bureaus, regulatory commissions, and propaganda, have come into use.

These attempts to preserve some sort of order and balance under the strenuously competitive conditions of modern life have been so largely ineffectual or abortive that many students conceive our major social problem to be the general one of subordinating the community to some sort of ordered, purposive existence. Change and progress dominated the minds of men during the generation that is passing; stabilization and control may of necessity concern them in this generation.

F. PERSONAL-SOCIAL CONTROL

The aspect of control described in the preceding sections runs in terms of the group's definitions of situations, its conceptions—

implied or expressed—of the kinds of activity expected of persons in the familiar situations of experience. It includes all interaction that supports the norms prevailing in the society: the folkways, *mores*, conventions, and formal codes, as well as the fundamental beliefs and ideas—magical, religious, or scientific—implicit in them. By inducting the individual into the culture and making him a unit in the collective enterprise, it creates and maintains order and coherence in group life and an area of security for the person.

But the control arising from associated life does not fall wholly within such a fixed body of stereotyped behavior patterns. Elsewhere than in isolated communities that are small and of relatively homogeneous culture the social environment of an individual comprises not one group but several or many groups, each of which has its own variant or conflicting definitions. This fact in its relation to the development of personality and the self was discussed in an earlier chapter, and what was said there is germane to the present consideration of control. As the individual belongs to more than one of these groups, he is subjected to many somewhat inconsistent or opposed control pressures which he must harmonize for himself.

Furthermore, within any one group there are areas of freedom unpatterned by fixed norms or patterned only in broad terms. Not all standards are considered obligatory, nor do all of them bear upon all persons. Some, such as the norms of sex conduct and the rules protecting the person and property of the individual—the *mores*—are obligatory, since they are considered indispensable to group welfare. These are supported by the most severe types of group pressure, even expulsion or death. Others, such as the codes of etiquette or the canons of respectability and taste—the conventions—are not so inviolable; they contribute orderliness to life in areas of experience where order is desirable but not indispensable, as in aesthetic and convivial pursuits. The sanctions supporting them are not so severe or so formal; anyone who is willing to risk ridicule or avoidance may be ill-mannered and depraved in taste and still remain within the group. Still others apply, only within certain sets, circles, classes, or strata which one may or may not enter, depending upon circumstances or his own free choice.

Moreover, within many norms provided by the group there is considerable latitude for the expression of individual idiosyncrasy

and variation. As was pointed out above, social definitions often indicate only the general form conduct must take and the general limits within which it must fall, but not the detailed pattern. To be in fashion, for example, one has only to accept the current mode which fashion prescribes; within this mode every person is permitted to individualize himself—is approved, in fact, for so doing. The same thing is true of many, although not all, group norms. Persons learn, often by painful experience, just to what extent and in what ways individual definition is permissible within the general framework of stereotyped and interlocking behavior characterizing the group as a whole.

These facts create areas in associated life within which behavior is not regimented by invariable group norms. In these areas control of another sort operates—control by forces which Young has aptly termed personal-social and which he differentiates from the cultural forces operative in group control.¹ Cultural forces inhere in the standardized culture patterns as these are manifest in actual behavior. Young illustrates them by the case of a mother who employs a wet-nurse for her baby because, in the upper-class European society to which she belongs, convention decrees that the natural mother shall not suckle her own child; should she do so, she would lose caste. Forces of the personal-social kind inhere in the spontaneous responses of other individuals “outside codified forms of behavior” as they create an extra-cultural environment to which one reacts. He illustrates them by the reciprocal interplay of stimulus and response between the nurse and the baby; perhaps the baby is fretful and, as there is no convention governing the time interval between feedings, the nurse lets him have the breast whenever his fussing becomes sufficiently annoying. Her yielding to the spontaneous demands of the infant instances control of a personal-social sort. There is always in all associated life, even within a homogeneous culture, a considerable margin of experience that is subject to such interpersonal interaction and control.

Group control in terms of the culture norms develops personalities conforming in general detail to the group type. Personal-social control differentiates each person within the basic and universal community pattern.

These differential effects are of importance in the development of the person. Traits of character, peculiarities of taste, dis-

¹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 4-8.

positional qualities, personal ambitions and ideals, conceptions of the self, and a variety of other facts, all bearing upon the individual's position and rôle in society, result in some part from personal-social control. From the moral standpoint of the group such effects may be either good or bad. Bad sex habits, dishonesty, excess or defect of sympathy, defensive sullenness, habits of dependence, timidity or conceit, for example, although developed by contacts and relationships within the group, may be considered undesirable by the group. Often these influences taken singly seem negligible; their significance appears only when they are fitted into the total situation, including of course the controlled person with his present wishes, feelings, and attitudes, or when their cumulative effects through a period of time are observed. Sometimes, however, a single pressure is sufficiently intense or shocking, as in the case of erotic or immoral experiences, to have drastic and far-reaching effects.

G. PERSONAL PRODUCTS OF CONTROL

An important aspect of the study of control is its effects upon the behavior and the personalities of the controlled individuals. That group control, to the extent that it is effective, establishes and maintains order and continuity and so enables the collective endeavor to proceed smoothly has already been called to attention. But the personal products of control or, more accurately, of control situations are certainly of equal importance. The problem of purposive control on the practical level might better be stated, in fact, as one of developing wholesome personalities, persons well adjusted to the requirements of associated life, than as one of maintaining group order. The former is the indispensable means to the latter.

The personal effects of control, whether intentional or unintentional and whether results of cultural or of personal-social forces, may be divided for convenience of study into two types, direct and indirect, and each of these types may, in turn, be broken into effects in immediate behavior, on the one hand, and effects in such subjective factors as sentiments, attitudes, and ideas, on the other.

The changes in present overt behavior that follow directly from any act of control are matters of present awareness, and their relation to the control pressure is evident. A child at table is told by his mother to manage his food with a fork instead of

picking it up in his fingers; if he heeds her advice at the time, the immediate purpose of the command is realized. From a limited point of view, these adjustments in present behavior may be thought of as the object matter of control; in cases of intentional guidance they are the direct, the planned, result and appear to terminate the control process.

But such immediate behavior changes are only one aspect, and in the long run a less important one, of the direct consequence of control. The mother who corrects her child's behavior at the table may be affecting his behavior in similar situations in the future as well as in the present. She is inculcating a standard for his guidance; she is determining in him a habit and an attitude. Every act of control may effect changes in the habits of the controlled person. The group definition of the situation is communicated and the child's attitudes and ideas are oriented with reference to it. He no longer has a disposition to eat with his fingers and disapproves others who do so. The behavior of the group has come to be incorporated into his life organization; social control has eventuated in self-control. These internal adjustments which conform the individual in his wishes and attitudes as well as in his external behavior are less obvious than the overt and temporary pressures, but they are of greater importance. They adjust the person to the requirements of group life and enable him to make his own way in the cultural situation in which he is placed; they are the necessary incidents in his cultural initiation. In some measure they determine the direction of his personal development.

The direct effects upon attitudes are paralleled by other changes within the person. The child, for example, may develop an attitude of hostility toward his mother because of her persistent and repressive discipline, or he may become obsessed with an acute sense of his own personal inadequacy. These are indirect effects of the control process. Some of the central, persistent tendencies in personal development appear to be determined within the very early years of life as indirect products of control. They may determine in the long run the person's attitude not only toward other persons but also toward the groups which these persons are taken to represent and toward social situations and social standards generally.

It is the present mode to find the explanation of a wide range of juvenile and adult behavior phenomena in the early control

techniques. Repressive discipline, for example, may be instrumental in developing in the child a sense of inferiority or a rebellious or secretive nature or other secondary condition. The tertiary expressions are stealing, bullying, running away from home, and so through the gamut of the so-called behavior problems. It is not necessary here to evaluate this trend in child psychology.

H. BASES OF SOCIAL CONTROL

The ultimate basis of social control is in the original nature of the individual, not in any specific equipment of reflexes and instincts that adjust him apart from learning to the requirements of his social environment but in his immaturity and in his plasticity. The facts concerning original nature were stated in detail in an earlier chapter; here it is necessary merely to recall them and to relate them to the processes of control.

As compared with other animals, man is born immature and helpless. His senses of sight and hearing are not fully developed; he cannot differentiate objects, persons, sounds, and other facts that make up the world of things and events about him. He cannot control his own movements; he has only the most rudimentary equipment of reflexes and instinctive tendencies. He has no habits, sentiments, or ideas. This physical and mental immaturity is associated with a relatively large capacity for learning, but learning is necessary to functioning even upon a purely physical level.

The immaturity of the child at birth coupled with the fact of plasticity—that is, learning capacity—leaves the individual helplessly dependent on his environment. He is not capable of participation in this environment on a social level, as the mechanisms making social interaction possible are not developed. However, the fairly stable configurations of stimuli provided by the environment condition his spontaneous and random responses into more or less definite forms of behavior consistent with the demands made upon him. But during this process of conditioning he is not a wholly passive being controlled and molded by an active environment. Very early the infant develops techniques whereby he controls others. As his physical and mental powers develop, he “goes out to meet his environment” in an increasingly explorative and experimental way. The rapidity with which he

gains control of certain immediate aspects of his environment has been repeatedly observed by students of infant behavior.

Although interaction in the very early infantile period is largely external, it develops certain indispensable bases for the further control of the person by his human environment. The sympathetic tendencies which cause the person to be affected vicariously by the actions of others, especially by their expressions of feeling and emotion, seem to have their origin here. The same is true of the person's consciousness of himself in relation to others which lies at the basis of his wish for response and recognition—his love of approbation and dread of ridicule. These tendencies, which Cooley identifies with human nature, orient the person with reference to his social world and make him psychologically dependent upon it. The importance for subsequent control of this early infantile conditioning is indicated by the cases of feral children, if they may be taken as at all authentic. When reintroduced into society, these children remain essentially non-human; they are unresponsive, unsympathetic, humorless, and generally disinterested in human ways. They are never successfully brought within the group. Its importance is indicated also by the fact that the tendency to self-display, to self-reliance, to persistence in a projected course of action, and many others, that are obviously and significantly related to personal control, are set up in the first instance by early conditioning. Many of the socially disadvantageous tendencies characterizing adult behavior have their roots in such infantile experience.

Many mothers are so emotionally conditioned to their babies that they produce in the latter a host of habits which determine the direction of life organization and point of view ever afterward. The sense of dependence on the mother, commencing with feeding and bodily care, spreads, as the child grows, to nearly every relationship which involves him and his social world. . . . These overdependent personalities never completely separate themselves from parental influences. . . . They always want their own way. And if it is not forthcoming they resort to whining, crying, temper tantrums, or other symptomatic actions to gain attention. Later their technique for securing attention may change, but the sense of dependence remains unaltered.¹

As the child's powers of self-control develop, his behavior comes more and more under the direction of his own conscious

¹ K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 241, 246. Quoted by permission of F. S. Crofts and Company.

processes. His efforts at control are less exclusively of an overt and random trial-and-error sort. He learns to think out his adjustments. Trials are made imaginatively rather than in overt action. This is the most distinctive characteristic of human behavior: it is self-consciously determined in imagination in advance of overt action. In a sense the person constructs his situations out of the data that experience brings him and then acts upon the constructs. The development of this distinctively human type of behavior depends upon the acquisition of a language. As the child comes to share in the communication system of his group, he develops the power to marshal his own experience and that of others and to bring this experience to bear reflectively upon his present situation; he can in consequence bring the situation under some rule. Language thus provides a basis for social control, that is, for control by means of communication. The person is able to share not merely in the present activities of others but in their memories and aspirations, their conceptions of right and wrong, their whole body of custom, tradition, and present ideas.

Language is a means of both storing and communicating the group definitions and of making manifest the approvals and disapprovals that are associated with them. Even primitive groups do not depend exclusively upon imitation, ceremony, and ritual to communicate and perpetuate the folkways and *mores*. The body of folklore is sometimes extensive and, especially in items relating to the moral order, often systematically inculcated. As the culture increases in complexity, the group becomes increasingly dependent upon language as a means of preserving facts, ideas, and methods. Without writing and printing the present complex social order could not have developed. But the present interest is in language as a control mechanism.

The mind of the child is first influenced by the folkways, *mores*, opinions, and beliefs of the group through the commands, injunctions, and reminders of parents and playmates. But he acquires also a vast mass of folk belief by means of nursery rhymes, fairy tales, folk legends, myths, and popular sayings. This body of folklore comes to him in more elaborate and effective formulation in tracts, stories, poetry, drama, history, and other forms of literature. It is otherwise generalized and enforced by the proverbs of common sense, the creeds of the church, and the formal enactments of law. The child may memorize a decalogue or a

catechism that is surrounded and made impressive by a mass of story and ceremonial. He listens to the gossip of his elders and learns from them the penalties of social deviations, particularly ostracism and loss of status. The book of etiquette instructs him in politeness and refinement; he is given much oral instruction and criticism in propriety and the evidences of good breeding. The folk literature provides him with hero types to emulate and traitor types to execrate. Language is the means by which this moral heritage comes to him and in terms of which it is remembered. Language, oral or written, is also the means by which he receives instruction in the customary vocational and avocational techniques of the group. All the meanings, requirements, and opportunities of social life tend to become embodied in language formulas and to be inculcated by means of language communication.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. Differentiate the four general forms of interaction, making clear the character of each form, and indicate also the interrelationships among these several forms. What is their bearing upon social order?

2. To what extent and in what ways do these general forms of interaction operate to control the behavior of persons and groups?

3. Is every process of control a specific instance of the more general processes of accommodation and assimilation? Explain.

4. Differentiate the aspect of group life studied in these chapters on social control from the aspect to be studied later as collective behavior. Are these aspects separate in reality or only in a conceptual sense? Explain.

5. Classify the following as problems of social control or as problems of collective behavior: (a) the relation of mechanical invention to institutional change, (b) the nature and types of psychological crowds, (c) the basis of respect for law, (d) leadership, (e) the relation of myth to ritual, (f) types of revolutionary social movements, (g) punishment, (h) the means whereby unity is achieved in a psychological crowd. Give your reasons in each case.

6. What is the difference between a practical problem in control and the theoretical problem in which the student of control is interested? What is the relation of the two types of problem?

7. Why cannot human heredity be controlled in terms of our desires?

8. Give illustrations of unintentional control in human society. Was the control exercised in these cases social?

9. Give illustrations of the physical control of individuals.

10. Which of the following forms of control are chiefly physical: (a) censorship, (b) cutting out the tongue, (c) persuasion, (d) imprisonment, (e) restraint by fear, (f) direction by deceit?

11. What are the requirements of social order? Can order be taken for granted? In what way is it dependent upon social control?

12. What is meant by "a definition of a situation"? To what extent are you guided in defining your own situations by the definitions provided by your group?

13. Give illustrations of each of the several types of control.

14. "The development in children of the attitudes and dispositions necessary to the continuous and progressive life of a society cannot take place to any considerable extent by direct oral conveyance of beliefs and knowledge. It takes place through the intermediary of the environment." Explain and illustrate.

15. How do you account for the conflict between individual and group definitions of situations?

16. "Without the support provided by incidental and informal control the more highly organized types of control, like government, could not long retain their effectiveness." Explain. Does this statement throw any light upon the "breakdown of control" in present-day society?

17. Review the chapter on the social institutions and discuss each of the major social institutions—religion, education, government, the economic organization—as an organization for control.

18. How do you account for the increasing formalization of control in modern secondary society?

19. Differentiate and illustrate personal-social and cultural forces. What, in general, is the difference in the effects of the two types of forces in the development of personality?

20. Describe the "areas of freedom" within which personal-social control operates.

21. What is the difference between the direct and the indirect effects of control? Of effects in immediate behavior and in subjective conditions? Illustrate each. Are the indirect subjective effects important?

22. What is the ultimate basis of social control?

23. What is meant by a conditioned response? What is its relation to social control?

24. In what sense is human nature the basis of social control?

25. Discuss the significance of language in the control of the person.

26. "All social control eventuates in self-control." Explain. Does all control in human society, then, eventuate in self-control?

27. "All social problems turn out finally to be problems in social control." Develop this statement.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Make a careful analysis of the types of control involved in some concrete social situation.

3. Show by careful analysis the ways in which some "social problem" is a problem in social control. Try to avoid a moral or ethical attitude toward the condition which is considered problematical from the point of view prevailing in the group; that is to say, try to see it objectively.

4. Prepare a personal document analyzing your own experiences in control, indicating the sources and the nature of the influences that seem to you to have been effective and their direct and indirect effects upon you.

5. Make an analysis of one of the following from the standpoint of control:

Samuel Butler, *The Way of All Flesh*

George Eliot, *Silas Marner*

Fedor M. Dostoevsky, *Crime and Punishment*

Dorothy Canfield Fisher, *The Bent Twig*

Sinclair Lewis, *Babbitt*

6. If you have ever been brought under the influence of an organized crowd or mob, as in an emotional religious revival or a riot, recount as accurately as you can just how you were controlled.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. Custom and Control. E. T. Krueger and W. C. Reckless, *Social Psychology*, pp. 159-165, 254-265.

b. Spontaneous Control in the Crowd. F. H. Allport, *Social Psychology*, Chap. XII, "Response to Social Stimulation in the Crowd," pp. 292-318.

c. Indirect Effects of Control in the Family. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XIV, "Personality and Family and Group Pressures," pp. 349-378.

d. Family Disorganization in Relation to Control. E. R. Mowrer, *Family Disorganization*, Chap. VII, "Social Forces in Family Disorganization," pp. 145-173.

e. The Gang as a Control Organization. F. M. Thrasher, *The Gang*, Chap. XIV, "Social Patterns and the Gang," pp. 252-271; Chap. XV, "Group Control in the Gang," pp. 272-308.

f. Control in a Rural Community. J. M. Williams, *Our Rural Heritage*, pp. 19-24; 46-49, 65-77, 201-209.

g. Impulse and Social Control. J. M. Williams, *Principles of Social Psychology*, Book VIII, "The Social Reactions of Suppressed Impulses," pp. 385-430.

h. Control in the Field of Race Relations. Chicago Commission on Race Relations, *The Negro in Chicago*, pp. 437-458.

8. Topics for written themes:

a. Accommodation as a Process of Control

b. Folkways, Mores, and Laws as Forms of Control

c. Physical Control in Human Society

d. The Unwritten Law

e. The Conditioned Response as a Mechanism of Control

f. The Four Fundamental Wishes (Thomas) as Bases of Control

g. Folk Literature and the Inculcation of the Moral Heritage

h. Personal Types as Products of Control

i. Play as a Means of Control

j. Control in the Political Party

k. The Church as an Organized Control Agency

l. The School as an Organized Control Agency

m. Control by the Police

Supplementary Readings

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2. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XXIX, "Group Control," pp. 339-347.
3. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XXVII, pp. 551-570.
4. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *An Introduction to Sociology*. Chap. XVII, "Social Control," pp. 652-702.
5. Dewey, J.: *Democracy and Education*, Chap. II, "Education as a Social Function," pp. 12-27; Chap. III, "Education as Direction," pp. 28-48.
6. Eldridge, S. (editor): "Processes of Group Control," J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 730-753.
7. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. XIII, "Social Order," pp. 391-417.
8. Everett, Helen: "Control, Social," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
9. Gillin, J. L., and F. W. Blackmar: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XXIII, "Social Control," pp. 429-449.
10. Ginsberg, M.: *The Psychology of Society*, Chap. VII, "Tradition," pp. 104-116.
11. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XVI, "Primitive Control and the Transmission of Culture," pp. 304-321.
12. Groves, E. R.: *Personality and Social Adjustment*, Chap. II, "Impulse and Social Control," pp. 21-33.
13. Krueger, E. T., and W. C. Reckless: *Social Psychology*, Chap. IV, "Social Objects and Social Definitions," pp. 87-116.
14. Lumley, F. E.: *Means of Social Control*, Chap. I, "Introduction," pp. 3-30.
15. Lumley, F. E.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXIII, "Social Control," pp. 486-504.
16. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*. Chap. XIII, "Social Codes and the Social Structure," pp. 248-265; Chap. XV, "Social Codes and the Individual Life," pp. 284-302.
17. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *An Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. XII, "Social Control," pp. 785-864.
18. Ross, E. A.: *Social Control*, Chap. I, "The Problem," pp. 1-6.
19. Ross, E. A.: *Principles of Sociology*, Chap. XXXIV, "Social Control," pp. 423-432; Chap. XXXV, "Super-Social Control," pp. 433-438.
20. Rynin, D.: "The Nature of Communication," *Journal of Philosophy*, 29(1932), 505-516.
21. Smith, T. V.: "Conduct," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
22. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XVII, "History, Tradition, and Opinion," pp. 183-194.
23. Young, E. F.: "The Relation of Personality to Communal Forces," *Social Forces*, 5(1927), 449-452.
24. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. V, "Group Control and Culture Standards," pp. 78-116; Chap. XVI, "Personality and the Mental Patterns of the Group," pp. 419-458.

CHAPTER XVI

FORMS OF CONTROL

Control, as that term was defined in the previous chapter, is a universal fact of associated life. It exists wherever the activity of one person exerts restraining or directive influence upon the behavior of another. Not all control in human society is social; it is physical in so far as the relation between persons is purely external; it is social to the extent that it involves communication. Even the purely physical means of restraint take on a social character in so far as inferences are made concerning their meaning or significance. Control, whether physical or social, may be either incidental and unplanned or planned and deliberate; in the latter case it may be either informal and unorganized or formal and organized.

To a considerable extent, control within areas of associated life is of personal-social type—that is, it arises out of the coalescence or opposition of individual impulse and act. Generally in primary groups, and to a less extent in secondary groups, control runs in terms of the group's practices and rules: the rules define and the practices exemplify the expected or required behavior.

The problem of control on the practical level is to bring individual behavior into conformity with the group norms. The means to this end are various formal and informal agencies to coerce or induce the individual to conform to the standards. Theoretically the problem is one of discovering the processes and mechanisms by means of which behavior is determined.

A. INCIDENTAL AND INFORMAL CONTROL

In the preceding chapter attention was called to the fact that society, to a considerable extent, communicates and continually reenforces its definitions in quite incidental ways, without conscious or formal efforts at control. This incidental control demands attention first in the present connection because of its priority in the life of the individual and because of the universality and continuity of its operation.

In the first place, control arises from the fact that for most persons and in most realms of experience the range of values and the patterns of behavior to which the person has access are restricted; the area of contacts is limited. During the first few years of a child's life he moves almost exclusively within his family circle. His contacts are confined within the family group and the neighborhood within which he lives by the protective supervision of his parents as well as by his own limited powers of observation and interpretation. His environment is, more or less inadvertently, kept simple and homogeneous. Approved patterns of behavior are emphasized merely by absence of situations involving divergent or conflicting ones. He has little or no opportunity for comparison, contrast, and selection; variant types of behavior, except those arising from the person's own impulses, do not suggest themselves, and conformity to existing practices results.

This sort of restriction is not, of course, limited to the period of infancy; it obtains in less degree throughout life. Each specialized group into which the person comes—the church or the occupational group, for example—has its relatively homogeneous and exclusive patterns, and as it draws the person into itself and absorbs his time and attention, it effectively prevents the acquisition of divergent ideas and behavior patterns. The social set performs a similar isolating and limiting function. This kind of control is well illustrated by the peasant who has dwelt continuously in a stable, primary community. His personality, which is stabilized at an early age, is simple and homogeneous; he is a stable and well-organized person because of the absence of incompatible patterns and stimulations in his social *milieu*.

The restriction of values to which the person is exposed is not always an accident of circumstances. Many groups attempt deliberately to keep their cultures homogeneous by excluding conflicting thought and behavior patterns. The censorship of plays or books or school curricula or companionships are cases in point. The moral customs of a group commonly get explicit formulation only in the presence of alien patterns of behavior which are thought to endanger the continuance of the traditional standards.

The incidental situational control described in the foregoing paragraphs is for the most part negative in character. There are also positive, directive, or compelling influences which arise

incidentally in social situations. The mere presence of other persons exercises a degree of control. It may occasion embarrassment or confusion, or it may evoke forms of self-display. But always it brings about both an increase in tension and concern as to the consistency and conventionality of behavior. The presence of another person establishes a connection with the group. Through him we are appraised of the whole body of custom and convention and of our relation to it. Through him people not present may know our behavior and be enabled to praise or blame, to applaud or ridicule. He stands in both a personal and a group relationship to us; our desire for response from him and our desire for recognition and status in the group are both aroused. But the reactions are, in minor degree only, intellectual; the presence of another merely serves to make active the body of previously acquired conventional controls.

The imagined presence of others may have somewhat the same effect as does actual presence. Much of the activity in which persons engage privately is directed toward the judgment that others will subsequently pass upon it. A belief in spiritual persons who are omnipresent and omniscient introduces an imagined presence which serves as a powerful control device. The all-seeing eyes of the gods are everywhere, and they observe from the viewpoint of the *mores*.

The spontaneous behavior of other people, which reveals continually their attitudes of approval or disapproval, operates also as a positive form of incidental control. The postures and movements of slight and subtle character—of the eyes, the face, the voice, the hands, the whole body—betray continually and spontaneously the inward state of impulse and attitude. Frowns, smiles, laughter, looks of anger, surprise, alarm, chagrin, and other signs of approval or disapproval keep persons in a situation informed as to the impression their behavior is making. Generally this impression is favorable or unfavorable as it accords or fails to accord with group custom and convention.

Words and phrases, as collective representations symbolizing the emotional attitudes of the group, operate as verbal suggestions controlling behavior in an immediate and spontaneous way. The epithet is a direct and powerful means of verbal control. The simple device of calling names mobilizes the sentiments of the group and standardizes behavior in accordance with the general pattern. The epithet serves at once to define a situation and to

express and elicit the most powerful emotional attitudes of the persons toward it. Sissy, coward, scab, traitor, and a rich variety of other epithets are in the vocabulary of every group ready for use whenever a situation calls for summary definition or when a definition needs support.

Epithets are cryptic means of calling to attention any variation, whether great or small, that violates popular prejudice, tolerance, or routine. They rebuke both the defect and the excess of any quality. They brand the dissenter, the non-conformist, the disliked, and the feared, whether within or without the group, by putting him unmistakably into a category and bringing to bear upon him all the sentiments associated with the category.

. . . They suggest not the rôle of a person but rather the rôle of a *character*. For example, when a man is called a spy, a particular aspect of his life is singled out and made to stand for the whole. The public gives no attention to the fact that he may be a good father, a skillful operator, an exemplary citizen of his own country, or a scholar. All these features are neglected and forgotten by the namers. To them he is not a *man* but a *spy*. . . Hence, all those who call him a spy organize their activities to deal with nothing but a spy. They will not permit him to be a whole man.¹

Watchwords and slogans are other means by which situations receive immediate, emotional definition. Their function is to unify and mobilize the group. They differ from epithets in that they apply to situations in the experience of the group rather than to the vagaries of individual conduct. These catch phrases, as collective representations generally, are heavily freighted with sentiment while more or less completely devoid of intellectual content. Democracy, public opinion, freedom of contract, providence, progress, the open shop, Wall Street, capitalism, and like terms are instruments of control, not concepts designed to convey thought. When so used, as in popular oratory and editorial writing, the terms are not defined; their power depends in large measure on the absence of critical definition. They call to the minds of men vague notions of personalized power, some sort of animistic force or energy that exercises compelling influence in human affairs. Like the rattle and drum of the primitive

¹ F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, p. 310. Reprinted by permission of the Century Company.

medicine man, the solemn and unctuous pronunciation of sonorous words and phrases has a powerful influence on the behavior of men.

Slogans are more imperative than watchwords and are more suggestive of a course of action. They are sentimental, never rational, in their appeal. "No taxation without representation," "Tippecanoe and Tyler too," "The full dinner pail," "Remember the *Maine*," "Bust the trusts," "Make the world safe for democracy" are a few among the many slogans that have influenced the course of American life. Slogans are rallying calls, sweeping intolerant affirmations that permit of no argument. They attach directly to emotionalized tendencies, especially to sentiments that have been organized in previous conflict situations. Some slogans, like those of commercial advertising, are of milder import: "Eventually, why not now?" or "Say it with flowers," for example. Back of these, however, is the strenuously competitive activity of modern salesmanship operating its apparatus of suggestion in its own interest in quite the same way as do the leaders of a party campaign or the patriotic leaders during a war.

Epithets, watchwords, and slogans are devices of suggestion by means of which the situations of experience are related to traditional or conventional attitudes. When such suggestive means are used in connection with a direct appeal to the sentiments or ostensibly to the reason in an effort to overcome inertia or resistance, the technique of control is referred to as persuasion. By emotional language in association with other instruments of suggestion, persuasion brings into play prejudices such as those of race, class, or nationality, fear of men or gods, sentiments of loyalty, the tender sentiments like mother love, the sympathetic tendencies, self-interest, rivalry, and a variety of other subjective factors; these are then related to the suggested belief or course of action. Persuasion involves the use of such attitudinal devices as cajolery, pleading, flattery, sarcasm, irony, coaxing, and histrionism. It employs symbols and shibboleths. By continual iteration and subtle insistence it often wears down resistance. Debate is avoided in emotional persuasion in order that the one to be influenced may not commit himself to a position from which he will not recede because of pride.

Persuasion that is addressed ostensibly to the reason, on the other hand, marshals evidence in support of its propositions and proceeds logically—or gives an impression of doing so—to the

conclusions it wishes to establish. Frequently, of course, it is highly partial and brings together facts that are selected and interpreted from a prejudiced viewpoint, consciously or unconsciously. Inapt, but effective, analogy, citation of precedent and authority, hasty and sweeping generalization are among its devices of deception. Critical discussion is not persuasion, for it is not aimed at winning adherents to a preconceived position; on the contrary, it is concerned to discover the correct position. Such control as it exercises upon the behavior of others is incidental.

B. RITUAL AND CEREMONY

A ceremony is the performance of a traditional sequence of solemn acts in recognition of the peculiar significance of an occasion. The drinking of a toast, the formal procedure of the court, the periodic review of the military forces, the installation of a president, the university convocation are familiar ceremonials in different departments of modern life. The ceremonial itself is a more or less complex behavior pattern involving various fractional elements in definite organization. It is to be understood as both an expression and a cause of group attitudes: it develops out of group experience, and the performance of the ceremonious acts, on the other hand, by rendering an occasion impressive, induces the appropriate attitudes. At the one extreme ceremony passes over into ritual, at the other it passes into manners.

For purposes of the present discussion ceremony may be divided into two types, the ceremony of occasions and the ceremony of social intercourse. The first type is represented by such behavior patterns as those followed in the birth and christening of children, initiation, graduation, betrothal, marriage, and burial in the life of the individual, by the performance of religious services, the inauguration of a leader, the dedication of a church or of a public building, the celebration of a historic event, or the conclusion of a treaty of peace in the life of a group. These, however, are merely illustrative. Among primitive peoples, and to a considerable extent in modern life, every occasion of importance is associated traditionally with ceremonial forms governing the behavior of group members.

The ceremony of social intercourse includes all forms regulating behavior in situations where any degree of respect is to be shown

in the intercourse of persons. The handshake and the bow may be ceremony just as truly as the making of sacrificial offerings and the coronation of a ruler, although they may decline in ceremonial content as by imperceptible degrees they pass into forms of etiquette, manners, and good breeding.

Among primitive peoples ceremony is supported by a belief in its magical potency. The formal act or series of acts will, if faithfully performed, control the natural or supernatural forces in a way favorable to the person or the group. This is the essence of ritual. To a primitive mind, natural forces are personal, spiritual entities capable of such psychic powers as the individual perceives in himself, except that these powers are tremendously augmented. These spiritual agencies are assumed to have purposes, wills, and feelings, and efforts at control must be, therefore, either propitiatory and persuasive or coercive. Propitiatory techniques and the ideas associated with them make up the religious practices and beliefs; coercive techniques and ideas are magical in character. Magic always has in it an idea of mechanism; if the rites are meticulously performed, the spirit world is powerless to resist and the desired results follow. But whether magical or religious, ceremonies are, in this primitive view, agencies for controlling the forces of the environment. Incidentally they are powerful instruments for transmitting tribal beliefs to the young.

Ceremonial practices are supported and perpetuated by the fact that an inward condition is frequently induced by the outward ceremonious acts; by assuming certain postures and making certain movements a coveted feeling may actually be experienced. In primitive thought this idea incorporated a belief in demon possession. Forces within the person, like those without, were conceived in animistic terms, and the succession of feeling states was thought of as the coming and going of spirits. The rapture of the choral dance and even the ecstasy of madness were caused by the entrance into the individual of dominating spiritual beings. Survivals of this notion of possession are discoverable at the present time. To many minds religious conversion, illness, and badness are thought of as "visitations" and appear wonderful. "He is literally possessed of the devil" is sometimes intended to be more than mere figure of speech. With the movement away from a mystical conception of forces that came with scientific understanding a different explanation of the emotional behavior

has been evolved. But, whatever its explanation, the fact is that ceremony, when uncritically indulged, does reinstate in the person and the group feelings that have been experienced with pleasure or profit under similar circumstances in the past. The act or series of acts becomes thus the symbol of, and the stimulus to, such feelings; it is a stereotyped form for the control of them. This psychological effect of ceremonial observance is what gives it its chief importance as an instrument of control. It occasions the persistence of the formal act even after the magical ideas supporting it have been discarded.

The ceremony of occasions controls in another way also. By focusing attention sharply upon an event and arousing strong feelings with reference to it, it impresses the event and the obligations which it entails upon the memories of all participants.

We find that the occasions most scrupulously accentuated by public formalities are just those which mark a change in the relations of the individual which involves the acceptance of new responsibilities. The recognition of a newborn child, the attainment of manhood or womanhood, the coming of age, the inheritance of family property, the succession of the headship, marriage, adoption, initiation, confirmation, naturalization, the promise of allegiance, enlistment, installation in office, ordination, compact, and treaty—these, though they are events of very different importance, have this in common, that they bind somebody to do for others, for his family, or for the group at large what hitherto has not been laid upon him.

Why should this be unless ceremony promotes the performance of these obligations? . . . It dwells on that which would be overlooked, reminds of that which would be forgotten, and so reveals the full significance of what is being done. Thus in marriage the carrying away of the bride, the pretended payment for her, the "giving" her away, her whipping by the groom, etc., are ways of signifying that the girl's allegiance to her family has ceased. The *confarreatio*, the drinking together of *sake*, the joining of hands, the exchange of bracelets, the tying together of garments symbolize the intimacy of the new relation. The service of ceremony, therefore, consists in so stimulating the imagination by appropriate gestures, actions, and words as to call up the conception of something vaster in power, life, or numbers than the here and now—God, society, the dead, or the unborn.¹

In personal encounters and social intercourse generally, it is the supposedly expressive character of ceremonious behavior

¹ E. A. Ross, *Social Control*, pp. 253-255. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

that gives it its power to control others. It makes manifest the conventional attitude and intention of one with respect to the other and so provides an assured basis for reciprocal relations. To be sure, observance of social ritual may be, and often is, purely formal, a series of somewhat empty gestures. Politeness is sometimes a mask for positively contradictory sentiments and inclinations; behind the polite bow or the ceremonious phrase there may be profound dislike, jealousy, or ill will. But the significance of ceremony as an instrument of control is best illustrated in just such cases, since without it conflicting interests and attitudes would make most encounters overtly hostile and costly.

Observance of social ritual thus introduces a degree of order into the ordinary intercourse of people. It avoids the necessity of having to define each situation as it arises and keeps encounters among persons from being eternally problematical and critical. When people know what to do and what to expect from others, intercourse proceeds with relative smoothness and with a certain graciousness, based upon reciprocal expressions of recognition and respect.

Ceremony plays a less important rôle in modern society than in the communities of an earlier day. A number of factors have weakened its effectiveness. The magical ideas supporting it have been largely dissipated by the development of science; rational attitudes toward events and persons have tended to supplant the sentimental attitudes prevalent in stable communities having a lively sense of their own pasts. People have become less bound by custom, more individualistic, more direct. Class lines have become less rigid; and society has become more complex, democratic, and competitive, less military and more industrial. Moreover, the general increase in literacy and the perfection of devices for extended communication have provided better means for recording and storing experience and for transmitting tradition. Ceremony has always been a conservative element in society and is still strongest in those realms of experience, like religion, in which social development has been slowest. Otherwise it survives largely because of its aesthetic value or because it serves a useful function.

C. FASHION

Ritual and ceremony are conservative control factors in human society. They imply strict adherence to traditional social forms,

if not to the beliefs supporting the forms, and derive their force in large part from the memories and sentiments that they keep alive in the minds of men. They provide an assured and stable basis for contacts and relationships. But they are exacting and repressive. They deprive life of freshness and spontaneity. Attempts to introduce changes in the institutional forms of society commonly find a locus of attack in the ceremonial usages of the age.

These facts put ceremony in contrast to fashion but also relate the two. Fashion has been referred to as "the caprice of custom." It is a kind of legitimized, egoistic rebellion against the monotony and uniformity of custom without, however, involving a complete break with custom. The mode which it prescribes is a contemporary variation of a customary practice which derives its compelling power not from tradition and accepted usage but from the fact of its present acceptance.

The motive underlying conformity to fashion is not simple. Conformity is not based on rational grounds or on considerations of utility or of private or public welfare, although such matters enter into its rationalization. A woman need not think the present style of hat becoming to her or beautiful in the abstract; she may know that furs in August and silk hose in January detract from her comfort; but notwithstanding these facts she capitulates to the dictates of fashion. The socially ambitious persons conform because of their desire to be identified with those individuals or groups who have prestige. The more conservative people are compelled by the illusion of universality and the fear of being conspicuous or queer. But novelty itself has some appeal; the variations of fashion provide an opportunity for new experience without the risk, which most people are unwilling to take, of being unconventional. Certainly there is not uncommonly a sense of adventure in taking up the new mode—a kind of capricious rebellion against the restrictions of customary morality. Nearly everyone can testify to the exhilaration and trepidation accompanying a first venture with some new mode—bobbed hair, rouged lips, a derby hat, a backless gown, or an abbreviated bathing suit. This element of adventure is particularly important in understanding the greater sway of fashion among sophisticated people: leisure creates boredom, and fashion innovation is an effort at escape.

In the employment of the fashion, as in the attempt at personal differentiation within it, there is always a "costuming of the ego"—a garbing of the mind or the body in the habiliments that have current approval from the smart or socially favored classes. The desire is to make the self more attractive as a means to prestige. The sway of fashion is most marked in just those realms that are obviously and closely identified with the person: dress and ornament, domestic architecture, interior decoration, and amusements. Persons who have no other means of securing distinction are the most slavish followers of fashion; men and women who have more serious claims to public recognition, reputations that are built on genuine achievement, are generally more or less unconcerned about the vagaries of the current mode.

The prestige of the innovator is often a powerful factor in determining the spread of fashion. This prestige may be an accompaniment of class membership, but it derives also from conspicuous and popular success. In a feudal society, the landed nobility are likely to be the prestige bearers; in an industrial society, the people of wealth. The source of influence may have a rather definite geographical location, too; Paris was certainly looked upon as the fashion center of the Western world during the last century, and Hollywood plays an effective rôle in the determination of feminine fashions in America at the present time.

As fashions spread, they are rationalized. The rationalizations are, of course, afterthoughts, not guides to the real forces underlying the origin and spread of the fashion. For a generation before 1910, women wore their skirts long. In those days long skirts were "modest" or at least "decent"; about them clustered a whole code of feminine modesty. But as skirts became shorter and shorter, until by 1927 they were knee length or less, short skirts became "sensible" and "hygienic"; to "wipe up the streets" with long skirts was "idiotic" and "filthy." The old code of modesty was asserted to be "a mask for pruriency." With the rhythmic swing to longer skirts the knee-length skirt has become "ugly"; it deprives the feminine form of its "natural symmetry and grace." To resist the rationalizations which the group builds up about its fashions is to brand one's self as queer. To refuse to conform to the mode of the group is to forfeit one's sense of belonging. Fashion controls because of the fear of ridicule and isolation.

Fashion invades all realms of experience—language, music, literature, art, politics, and even philosophy and science. During the nineteenth century “democracy” was a fashionable shibboleth; now it is becoming fashionable to question democracy. In many northern communities of the United States an argument that has been used by members of the Republican party, informally but widely and effectively, is that voting the Republican ticket identifies one with the “respectable people”—a fashion appeal. A few years ago instinctivism was the vogue in psychology, as was psychoanalysis at a somewhat later date. For competent students, of course, both were serious theoretical movements; but they were accepted and talked about glibly by many people simply because they were the current modes of thought. Clothing one’s mind in these conventional ideas is just as truly an external manifestation of a desire to be identified with the prestige bearers of the group as is the wearing of the present style of hat.

Although fashion control appears in the stable, custom-bound, primitive group, it is more markedly a phenomenon of the secondary society of today. The tempo of fashion change has been tremendously accelerated, and an ever increasing body of social fact has been brought under its influence as the barriers of isolation—both geographical and cultural—have been broken down. The newspaper, the magazine, the motion picture, wider travel, and extended markets are among the more important factors that have speeded up the circulation of modish artifacts and ideas. Modern industrial society shows much greater tolerance for new modes of behavior: change is in the *mores*; progress is the ruling idea. Moreover, “the emancipation of the individual man,” his greater freedom of movement, and the increase in the number and externality of his contacts have created a social *milieu* in which judgments are determined generally by the superficial aspects of the personality—by “front.” Fashion has greater compelling power under such circumstances.

D. LEGENDS AND MYTHS

Legends and myths are complex, insidious, and pervasive formulations supporting traditional and conventional group practices. They are concrete embodiments of traditional beliefs and of present needs and aspirations. Every definition of a situation that is provided by the group combines both beliefs

concerning the nature of the things involved in the situation and present needs and wishes of group members with reference to it. But the bare verbal expression of the rule of behavior does not express these other facts that give the rule its significance and sanction. Legend and myth perform this function.

The legend is a more or less fictitious narrative of a great man or a significant event that is accepted as authentic and that exemplifies or gives reality to common beliefs, ideals, longings, or fears. Legendary heroes embody group virtues; legendary traitors embody group hatreds and fears; legendary events explain and justify group beliefs and aspirations. Legends always contain a fictional element, usually in the form of exaggeration. Persons and events that are somewhat removed in time or space but that are, nevertheless, of some significance to us are always subject to the legendizing process. George Washington is pictured in story and poem and even in school histories as a paragon of all those virtues contained in our Puritan code: he never told a lie; he was always gentle, kind, humble, and self-sacrificing; he was just and honest in his dealings with men; he was courageous, persistent, industrious, and thrifty; and he was both patriotic and pious. He illustrates clearly the rôle of the legendary hero. His importance is not chiefly historical but moral. Narratives of him are conduct stories carrying in concrete form the beliefs, the pious hopes, the idealized rules of conduct, and the approvals and aversions that are in our *mores*.

In a similar way contemporary people and events become distorted in terms of our current beliefs and wishes. The atrocity stories widely circulated and believed in every country during the World War are cases in point. These narratives, relayed by word of mouth, printed in newspapers and books, and collected and published for propagandist purposes by the belligerent governments, recounted the crucifixion of Red Cross nurses, the brutal killing of prisoners and wounded soldiers, the rape of women in public, the mutilation of both civilians and prisoners, and many other atrocities. Stories about Germans and Austrians were believed by the people of the Allied countries, and stories about the Allies were believed by the Germans and Austrians. They fitted in with prevailing hatreds and fears of the enemy and aroused group members to even more frenzied prosecution of the war. Strikes, political uprisings, factional disputes, slavery, and all other types of conflict situation are subject to

the same sort of legendizing. Whether spontaneously or deliberately created and circulated, they are effective means of control in terms of accepted beliefs and practices.

The origin and development of legends are related to critical situations in group experience, when the hopes and fears and the wishes and longings of the group are aroused and organized with reference to some emergency. Persons and events are observed not calmly and dispassionately but from the standpoint of prejudice and interest. Emotional attitudes act selectively upon the details of reality, determining what will be seen and how it will be judged. The biased observations are further distorted by selection and interpretation as the observer recounts them to others. And each active imagination that acts upon them makes still other alterations and amendments that, in turn, become part of the current version. All of this enlargement and distortion may go on without any consciousness of falsification. Gradually, however, the legend acquires a more or less stable and standard form, especially as it gets into the printed records.

The legends are so perfectly consonant with the wishes of a people, in reality dramatic projections of the wishes, that they are accepted without any evidence of credibility other than that which they themselves contain. They give the impression of being accurate historical accounts. Not infrequently reference is made to a source, as to the account of an eyewitness; but the source is of such character or is indicated in such a way that its trustworthiness or even its reality cannot be ascertained. Publication in printed form gives legends additional authority; when they are incorporated in the sacred or historical books, they are virtually beyond dispute. Here they are adapted and related to the whole body of oral and written tradition in a more or less systematic and organized way.

The history of any group, whether oral or written, is, in its dynamic aspect, a mass of such legends. The popular, tradition-bearing history that controls the behavior of men is always a dramatization of group prejudices and group standards. The school histories in general use in states that were involved in the Civil War embody one group of legends about the personages and events of that war if they lie north of Mason and Dixon's line; a different group, if they lie south of that line. A comparison of the treatment accorded the American Revolution or any other international conflict in the school histories of the several inter-

ested nations will reveal the same tendency to patriotic legendizing on all sides.

Myth is not a clearly defined term. It is sometimes used to distinguish those legendary narratives that provide supernatural origin and sanction for the *mores* of the group. These sacred tales have a much larger infusion of magical and religious conceptions than have ordinary legends, and they relate more frequently to recurrent phenomena, such as disease, death, planting, harvest, and the weather. At other times the term refers to a happening, past, future, or recurrent, or to a person or thing that exists only in the imagination or that, since it is not verifiable, is accepted on faith. Thus Sorel speaks of the general strike that is part of the dogma of revolutionary socialism as a myth. In the same sense, the hero—human or divine—who, in the belief of many suppressed peoples, will appear at some indeterminate time in the future to deliver them from their misery and woe is a myth. So is the separate origin of the white and colored races which many ethnocentric people accept as a fact. That Calvin Coolidge was a silent man was a myth.

A common fourfold classification of myths according to their nature or function is into the etiological, the hero, the conflict, and the Utopian. The etiological myths are those that seek to explain, as the creation myths universal among primitive men. The hero myths are those that grow up about folk leaders, as Washington or Lincoln, and convert them into glorified and fictitious personalities. The conflict myths are those that grow up as emotional expressions of the hopes and fears of conflict groups, such as the atrocity stories in war time. The Utopian myths are those, like the Messianic hope and syndicalist general strike, by means of which a distant goal is given present reality.

The existence and function of myth are clearly seen in the study of primitive peoples, because in viewing another culture than our own we are able to achieve greater objectivity. We are generally unaware of our own myths and of our own tendency to mythologize. However, our religious heritage is in large part a body of sacred story in which our ritual, our morality, and our beliefs about life, death, and the future life are made real and are given supernatural authority. Similarly in economics and politics we have our Utopian and other myths. In spite of a developing scientific point of view, we still tend to personalize the forces operative in our own lives and in the natural events of

our physical and social world and to project our wishes and purposes upon the whole universe of which we are merely part.

Malinowski's penetrating analysis of the function of myth in the control of primitive peoples is applicable to modern society.

Myth fulfills in primitive culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked, active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom. . . .

Myth is, therefore, an indispensable ingredient of all culture. It is . . . constantly regenerated; every historical change creates its mythology, which is, however, but indirectly related to historical fact. Myth is a constant by-product of living faith, which is in need of miracles; of sociological status, which demands precedent; of moral rule, which requires sanction.¹

The desire for effective instruments to control mass behavior in modern secondary society has led to the deliberate creation of legends and myths. The technique of myth creation is an essential part of the equipment of the professional propagandist. Politicians and others who must secure and retain wide public favor frequently have their "public relations counsels," the "shirt stuffers" in the journalistic lingo, whose business it is to present their employers as concrete embodiments of the popular stereotypes, as "self-made men" and as men of integrity and keen insight.

E. AUTHORITY AND LEADERSHIP

In the enforcement of group rules, whether by oral commands, by ritual and ceremony, by the use of force, or by other means, there is always some specialization of responsibility in certain functionaries. Even when the group acts as a mob, certain members serve as nuclear points for the whole mass; they speak the will of the group, or they lead and direct in the execution of that will.

Authority is the right or the capacity to command or to exercise power over others. Continuity in the location and consistency

¹ B. Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, pp. 19, 92. Reprinted by permission of W. W. Norton & Company, Inc.

in the exercise of authority are essential to the stability and orderliness of group life. Confusion and anarchy follow the breaking down of authority, a condition which groups universally seek to avoid by various devices, such as hereditary succession, assuring the continuity of officialdom.

Established authority, institutionalized leadership, always resides in an office or a class and not in an individual as such. The individual derives his authority from his occupation of the office or from his membership in the class. Thus a king has authority which passes from individual to individual as each new successor is inducted into office. In a similar way priesthood in a church, headship of a family, foremanship in a factory, or captaincy of a company of soldiers as offices of authority have prerogatives that are delimited by tradition or codal enactments and are independent of the personalities of the individual occupants. Class lines in a society mark gradations in status and authority. The members of a superior class, as the nobility of medieval Europe or the master class of the old South, possess powers and privileges, with reference to classes below them in the social pyramid, that are unrelated to their qualities as individuals.

The nature and extent of established authority are defined in custom and tradition. Tradition declares the source of authority. Although the exercise of authority is always an act of an individual, the right or capacity of the individual always derives from a principle that is known and accepted, such as divine right, the "call" to the ministry, inherent superiority, or popular election. In the old South, the idea of white superiority was supported by the story of Cain and Abel and by other Biblical allusions and was commonly believed by both Negroes and whites. Tradition likewise defines the extent of authority and the forms appropriate to its exercise; violation of these accepted definitions may deprive the individual incumbent of his power. Myths and legends are important vehicles for the transmission and continual regeneration of these notions. They carry beliefs concerning the origin of the office or the class, its sacred character, its inviolability, its sanctions, and its relation to group welfare.

These facts are given explicit and dramatic expression in ceremonial. Induction into office is by means of elaborate and impressive rites. It is an "investiture" whereby the incumbent is endowed, in the minds of the people at least, with the qualities

and powers that inhere in the official personality which he is assuming.

Authority rests thus upon tradition reproduced in the habits, attitudes, and ideas of those subject to it. But it demands a degree of social distance for its proper maintenance. This it secures also by ritual and ceremony. The officialdom is set apart by symbolic dress, by manner and bearing, by exclusiveness, and by ceremonious forms of address, such as "your majesty," "your honor," or "most holy and reverend." Material symbols, like the scepter, the mace, vestments, insignia, coats of arms, and the gavel, serve the same purpose. These may extend even to properties and environments: the throne room, the confessional, and the retinue of guards and attendants. In the modern situation these trappings have their counterpart, in both form and function, in the private office and the corps of formidable secretaries.

Attitudes of submission have in them an element of fear. As long as the mythology supporting established authority is unquestioned, all the qualities which supposedly accrete to an individual by virtue of his office or social position are accepted as real. But they are not understood. They are conceived in magical terms and make their possessor an object of awe. Most persons are conscious of such spontaneous feelings in the presence of a priest, a banker, or an officer of the state. Also the impression that authority is universally accepted and supported by others reinforces each individual's submissive tendency.

Respect for authority is largely a matter of fear, although there may be in it, also, a positive appreciation of the superior qualities attributed to the one entitled to its exercise. There is a feeling that this person has the right to command because he is fitted by nature and superior training to command. Mixed with fear is, then, an element of admiration. Respect arises in part, also, from a belief in the beneficent character of the offices performed; persons feel secure under an authority which guarantees the continuity of established practice. There may be, as Simmel has suggested, a more subtle factor involved, a more or less subconscious recognition by the group that its functional unity is organized about or contained in its leaders and that its unity dissolves as their leadership disintegrates.

But the power of an officialdom always rests, in the final analysis, upon its command of physical means of compulsion.

Whatever police forces the group possesses are subject to the persons or class in authority. As long as these forces remain loyal, individual resistance or rebellion is futile, and group rebellion carries such risk to individual participants that it can be organized only under exceptional circumstances. It is doubtful if any political revolt has succeeded when the military remained loyal to the existing government. Moreover, the individual's means of subsistence are often dependent upon his submission to established authority. His job may be taken from him and he and his dependents made to suffer privation and want. Secrecy surrounds the act of voting to prevent just such persecution in democratic countries. Generally, too, the entrenched officialdom has command of psychological and social means of exerting pressure upon group members. It has a superior command of language. It is more skilled in the use of suggestive devices, such as manner and bearing, dramatic representation, and the use of emotional stereotypes and symbolic devices. Because of its superior material resources it can ingratiate or retain the press and the school and even the spontaneous leadership that appears within the group—the artist, the literarian, or the reformer. It often develops vast systems of patronage.

F. SANCTIONS

Generally, knowledge of group expectations, supported by the fear of incurring popular disfavor and criticism or by the desire to secure confidence and respect, keeps the individual member of a society under adequate restraint and gives him adequate direction. For most people in most situations conformity brings its own rewards in the approvals of other people, in the absence of irksome conflict, and in the orderliness which conformity introduces into one's own life and into social relations. Nonconformity, likewise, carries sufficient penalties in its own natural consequences—dislike and avoidance or opposition and possible frustration. But for the control of occasional individuals not at times amenable to these means, specific sanctions are provided.

A sanction is a value, positive or negative, that is more or less arbitrarily imported into a situation as an additional inducement or restraint. It is a reward or a penalty annexed to a rule as a means of enforcing it upon persons who otherwise would be unwilling or unable to observe it.

Rewards are explicit and definite expressions of group approval. The thing given may be wholly immaterial, as an award of honor, or it may have some material value, as do money prizes; but in either case the reward derives its value as a control partly from the emphatic public approval which it manifests. Usually the ceremonious manner in which a reward is conferred signalizes to others the achievement of the recipient and makes him a special object of public favor. The stimulus that the reward provides often depends upon just this fact. The appeal it makes is to the desire for recognition and status; pride, vanity, or other egoistic motive is brought into play. But when the conferring of awards is reduced to a system so that persons may have them in prospect and definitely strive for them, other motives are evoked. Group rivalry is accentuated, and the behavior of other persons than those who ultimately share in the distribution of honors may be affected; the existence of an honorary scholarship society on a college campus is supposed to have such an effect on scholarly activity. Material awards, as grants of money, fellowships, and other useful things, appeal also to the self-interest of the individual, to his cupidity or his desire for new experience.

A well-conceived and carefully administered system of rewards may have several control effects. It may serve as a stimulus to a desired kind of behavior until interest in the behavior itself or a set of conforming habits is built up in the individual to sustain the activity. To secure this effect rewards must be well adapted to both the person and the occasion. With certain types of individuals in whom the wish for recognition is not strongly developed, rewards may serve as a corrective, making the person more desirous of approval from others and more sensitive to social criticism. In individuals who lack self-confidence they may, as do praise and flattery, tend to build up self-respect and develop a somewhat more aggressive attitude.

Each of these effects may be offset, when rewards are unwisely used, by perversion or excess. The giving of rewards may transfer interest from the activity rewarded to the reward itself, and the thing given be looked upon as an object of value in itself. Emphasis upon the system of rewards used in schools—grades, credits, honors, and degrees—often has this effect. Interest is not in the subject matter of courses, except in so far as knowledge of it is necessary to classroom use or to satisfactory marks on examinations. Similarly a diploma or a degree, rather than

scholarly attainment, becomes the end sought. The negative effect of reward giving is even more likely when the rewards are of material value. Or persons may be led to place an excessive valuation upon social approval or to become excessively sensitive to it. In this case interest is transferred to and fixed upon recognition instead of the approved activity. The person then becomes a seeker after notoriety, more concerned about his reputation than his character. Finally, as a result of rewards for achievement or conformity, a person may develop vanity rather than self-respect. He may get a grossly exaggerated notion of his abilities and achievements.

Penalties are always coercive; that is, they involve the use of force upon an unwilling subject. They take many forms: avoidance, ostracism, imprisonment, deprivation of some sort, the infliction of pain, or mutilation. They may be formally and exactly defined and enforced by organized agencies, like the government; or they may be rather indefinite or conjectural in character, as in the family, and invoked in a less formal way.

Coercion is commonly justified on the ground that the individual's wishes, if exercised, would be harmful to himself, to the group, or to both or on the ground that the group interest must be conserved even at the expense of individual interest or well-being. Frequently, however, it is either a short cut to an end that might be realized more satisfactorily and permanently by other means or an expression of irritation and impatience. In the latter case it is largely vindictive; infliction of some penalty of severe sort by a parent, for example, may be an expression of the parent's anger and feelings of frustration rather than a correction of the child's tendencies.

The provision of penalties in support of the group rules or the edicts of authority may be preventive, although this effect is easily overestimated. When actively invoked, they are supposed to have a corrective effect. Sometimes, when used in conjunction with such social means as verbal explanation, they do act as mnemonic devices and so prevent the recurrence of the undesired conduct or secure the repetition of the approved behavior until supporting habits are formed. Sometimes, also, when the consequences of an act are its sufficient justification, performance even under duress may lead to an appreciation of its value and so to voluntary repetition. Commonly, however, coercion compels an external conformity that is not based upon corresponding

habits and attitudes, and such conformity lasts only until such time as the pressure is removed.

From the standpoint of the one upon whom it bears, coercion is likely to seem brutal and unfair. It is an additional complicating factor in his situation, making satisfactory adjustment more difficult. It may set up resistance within him to the authority enforcing the rules or to the entire group. This effect is produced on a large scale by the traditional methods of legal punishment. A condition of stubborn conflict between society and the criminal is created. Frequently the individual isolated from society by its coercive treatment of him identifies himself with other criminals among whom he finds some response and recognition. This group, built up outside the political and moral order of the community, develops an *esprit de corps* and a code of its own. It represents an inversion of loyalties and a complete severance of purposes which is likely to defeat all attempts at correction and to make necessary continued arbitrary protection of society against its encroachments.

G. GROUP OPINION

The means of social control that are of first importance in any group are the opinions which the members of the group formulate and express with reference to problematical situations that attract their common attention. An opinion is simply an interpretation placed upon a fact or a set of facts concerning which there are doubt and discussion.

An event that is at all extraordinary, or that appears to affect either favorably or unfavorably the interests of any considerable portion of the group, becomes an object of inquiry and comment. News of it is carried in popular rumor and report from person to person along with current, and usually variant, interpretations of it. In the interplay of discussion these interpretations are compared; some of them are discredited and discarded, others are amended and combined. This whole body of views as it exists at any one time comprises the group opinion. It is often a complex, confused, and heterogeneous thing, not the definite and unitary thing it is sometimes assumed to be. There may be a preponderant opinion, and in simple groups, or in complex groups involved in major emotional crises, there may be a consensus. But when there are divergent and conflicting views, there is no consensus. Minority groups, although lacking in numerical

strength, may hold opinions with such conviction and advocate them with such vigor that they may prevail even when the majority views are enacted into law and have, theoretically at least, the backing of the government.

Group discussion and the views determined by it involve ordinarily a modicum of rationality and a vast infusion of self-interest and conventional prejudice. Facts are acted upon selectively by traditional attitudes and stereotyped thought forms. If the community is complex, each interest group tends inevitably to emphasize aspects of a critical situation that appear significant to it because of the way they affect its integrity or status. Most of the decisions arrived at are merely "repetitions of old formulas." They are expressions of biases and beliefs that have been mobilized and adapted, or perhaps merely intensified, by the verbal interchange.

The factors entering into the formation of group decision and its rôle in the control of group behavior vary with the type of group. In the isolated, primary-group type of village community, with a relatively stable body of citizens who are personally and intimately known to one another and with a simple, homogeneous culture that is firmly rooted in tradition, the internal problems that arise are usually simple, and knowledge of them is first hand and subject to easy verification. In such a community group judgments are formed through conversation and discussion in face-to-face groups. All persons are alert observers of events within their limited environment and are interested and active participants in community affairs. Moreover, common tradition provides a uniform basis for discussion and interpretation; people are mutually intelligible to one another and can be sure of their common interests. The group is likely, therefore, to arrive at a consensus with reference to any event that comes to its attention. Persons who are objects of its social criticism experience pressure of an immediate, intense, and universal kind.

It is here that gossip is most effective as an instrument of control; all matters of personal behavior are subject to its constant supervision. Gossip is one means of defining a situation, but it does so by bringing the situation under a traditional, accepted definition. The *mores* are never at issue; they are taken for granted; they are the basis on which gossip operates. The behavior which departs from them is the thing criticized. Of course, gossip may be treated as symptomatic of the hold of

traditional rules. When it is general with respect to a certain type of behavior, and particularly when it brings members of respectable families in considerable numbers within its orbit, it may indicate and advertise a change in common attitudes. Usually gossip operates in support of the traditional standards; in the primary group the fear of being talked about acts as a very real check upon the nonconformist tendencies of members.

But the stable, solidary, and intimate community is fast disappearing as a result of industrialization and urbanization. The local unit is increasingly absorbed into the larger economic and political society. Individuals no longer live wholly or even largely within the primary group but are oriented with reference to the larger social world outside. Individual interests, transcending the locality, are integrated on a national or international scale. The approvals that matter are not those of immediate communal association but of persons of similar interests wherever they may dwell. As contacts have become more varied and extensive, they have become also more formal and external. The person is fractionalized, participating in each of his several or many groupings with only a limited aspect of his total self, commonly in terms of some one interest or function. As a concrete, total personality, he is commanded by no one group, not even by his family. Few if any groups are interested in aspects of his life other than those germane to their own peculiar activities. Intimacy has given way to acquaintanceship or to anonymity.

Both the problem of controlling personal conduct and that of integrating the group for effective collective enterprise have been materially affected by this transition to a secondary, urban type of community life. Personal conduct escapes immediate, detailed supervision. Moreover, in the urban community, there is little homogeneity of sentiment and attitude in terms of which the known facts of personal behavior are judged. The city is such a congeries of divergent and conflicting traditions that any moral consensus is highly improbable. The censure of one group may be escaped by a relatively easy shift to another, where tolerant attitudes exist toward the previously disapproved behavior. What is true of the city is true, in lesser degree, of the larger social world which is organized about, and enjoys an easy interchange with, the city. The ineffectiveness of informal means of control of personal behavior in the modern secondary

society accounts for the increasing resort to such formal means as law. But law is bound by a body of norms and precedents built up in the simpler society of other days that make it relatively ineffective. Moreover, its effectiveness is further nullified by the absence of the support formerly provided in the essentially homogeneous attitudes of the community and the strong currents of popular opinion expressive of these attitudes.

It is this situation which has given rise to the practical need for techniques whereby the community may be organized and enabled to act collectively with reference to such matters as the control of industry or the prosecution of a war. The development of the art of propaganda is one result. Propaganda is an organized effort by covert means to create an uncritical emotional and ideational consensus favorable to some interest or mode of action defined by the propagandist. The increasing emphasis upon education as a means of moral control, with the incidental development in connection with the school of such specialized agencies as the visiting teacher, and the modification and enlargement of the organization for social work and of agencies for child guidance represent other efforts in the direction of control.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. In what way do restrictions upon the range of values in the environment of the person control him? Give illustrations of some of the less obvious ways in which situations are restricted. Relate this kind of control to isolation and social contact.

2. Are there any other ways in which situations are modified so that behavior and attitudes are controlled?

3. "All control is exercised indirectly by way of changes in situations." Explain.

4. In what ways does the presence of other people in a situation control behavior? Is this, in your judgment, an important aspect of control?

5. Does presence as such control or does presence merely serve to bring other values into the situation?

6. State as accurately as you can the ways, and the extent, of control by spontaneous interaction.

7. What is the relation of such control to the emotional level at which persons operate? To the phenomena of moods?

8. "A prepossession for communication on the level of language blinds us to the fact that our behavior is to a very considerable extent controlled by spontaneous responses to spontaneous stimulation." Comment.

9. Explain the control that is exercised by epithets.

10. "Epithets put contacts on a categoric basis." Explain.

11. "Watchwords call to the mind vague notions of personalized power." What is meant by this statement?

12. In what sense are epithets, watchwords, and slogans collective representations?

13. What are the techniques of persuasion?

14. What is the difference between persuasion and critical discussion? To what extent does the latter operate as a control?

15. What is meant by ceremony? Indicate its relation to (a) ritual, (b) manners. What is social ritual?

16. What are the two types of ceremony discussed in the text? Relate each type to control.

17. What are the psychological effects of ceremonial? Its social effects?

18. "Ceremony is a means of reinstating in the group the collective excitements that have been found pleasurable or useful in the past." Explain.

19. How do you account for the decreasing importance of ceremony in society?

20. How is fashion related to tradition? To ceremony?

21. What are the motives that lead to adoption of the fashion mode?

22. To what extent are aesthetic considerations involved? Considerations of utility?

23. "There is no rebellion against fashion." Discuss.

24. Can fashion change be brought under control?

25. Give other illustrations of fashion control outside the realm of personal adornment.

26. Outline the steps in the growth of a legend.

27. How do you explain the fact that historic personages are almost invariably legendized? What control value do such legends have?

28. Give illustrations of myths from your own experience.

29. "The myth frames a future." "It provides a basis in the present for acting on the future." Explain.

30. "Myth is not an idle tale but a hard-worked, active force." In what way?

31. What is the relation of established authority to the order and continuity of group experience?

32. Why do groups always have an established method of succession to positions of authority?

33. Differentiate the "office" and the "person" holding office.

34. What is the relation of ceremony, ritual, myth, and legend to control by authority?

35. How do you explain the submissive attitude?

36. How does established authority differ from the authority exercised by spontaneous leadership?

37. Discuss rewards as means of control.

38. Are sanctions always coercive?

39. What are the justifications and the limitations of punishment?

40. What would be an adequate substitute for punishment in dealing with such problems as delinquency? Is such a method available?

41. What is meant by group opinion? What is its relation to preponderant opinion? To minority opinion?

42. How is group opinion formed? Is it rational? Under what circumstances is consensus possible?

43. Are the *mores* at issue in gossip? As long as they remain *mores*, are they ever at issue?

44. How do you account for the increasing emphasis on the study and control of group opinion?

45. What are some of the organs or agencies of group opinion in modern society?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Enumerate with brief discussion as many instances of ceremonial control as you can think of by reviewing your own group relationships. Can you discover the symbolic content in each of them? How do you explain its survival and its effectiveness?

3. Study some myth, religious or otherwise, as a control device.

4. Analyze one of our American hero legends, discovering as far as possible the elements of truth in it and displaying the group virtues and ideals—or aspirations—involved in it.

5. Study some political campaign, at first hand if possible, and prepare an analysis with exhibits of the various types of control used.

6. Make an analysis of one issue of a metropolitan daily newspaper to discover the type of news matter contained in it, the attitudes or interests to which it appeals, the emotional language that it uses in headlines and elsewhere. What tentative inferences can you make concerning the newspaper as an organ of opinion?

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. Laughter as a Means of Control. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 370-375. Also F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, pp. 266-284.
- b. The Making of Myths and Legends. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XVII, "Myths and Legends as Part of Subjective Environment," pp. 461-479.
- c. Social Control through Leadership. K. Young, *Social Psychology*, Chap. XV, "Leadership, Authority, and Prestige," pp. 361-394.
- d. Punishment. E. H. Sutherland, *Criminology*, pp. 314; 339-359.
- e. Gossip as a Means of Control. F. E. Lumley, *Means of Social Control*, Chap. IX, "Gossip," pp. 211-236.
- f. The Newspaper as an Organ of Group Opinion. K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 599-625.
- g. Propaganda as a Means of Control. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XXVII, "Propaganda: The Manufacture of Opinion," pp. 782-826.
- h. The Child-guidance Clinic as a Control Agency. W. C. Reckless and M. Smith, *Juvenile Delinquency*, Chap. X, "Readjustments by Clinics and Placements," pp. 285-301.

8. Topics for written themes:

- a. Incidental Control and the Differentiation of Sex Types
- b. The Techniques of Advertising
- c. Religious Ceremonial
- d. The Etiological Myth
- e. War Myths
- f. Myth and Legend in American History
- g. Prestige and Leadership
- h. Punishment in the Home
- i. War Propaganda
- j. Control in Modern Urban Society
- k. The Requirements of a Rational Technique of Control

Supplementary Readings

1. Ames, E. S.: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chap. IV, "Custom and Taboo," pp. 51-70; Chap. V, "Ceremonials and Magic," pp. 71-94.
2. Beard, C. A.: "Government by Technologists," *New Republic*, 63(1930), 115-120.
3. Bernays, E. L.: "Manipulating Public Opinion: The Why and the How," *American Journal of Sociology*, 33(1927-1928), 958-971.
4. Boas, F.: "Development of Folktales and Myths," *Scientific Monthly*, 3(1916), 335-343.
5. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*. Part IV, "Leadership and Interstimulation," pp. 371-471.
6. Burns, C. D.: "Ceremony," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
7. Catlin, G. E. G.: "Expert," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
8. Chaffee, Grace E.: "Control in an Integrated Social Group," *Social Forces*, 8(1929), 91-95.
9. Cooley, C. H.: *Human Nature and the Social Order*, Chap. IX, "Leadership or Personal Ascendancy," pp. 317-357.
10. Dickinson, J.: "Social Order and Political Authority," *American Political Science Review*, 23(1929), 293-328.
11. Gillin, J. L., and F. W. Blackmar: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XXVI, "Control by Force," pp. 474-479.
12. Grattan, C. H.: "The Walter Hines Page Legend," *American Mercury*, 6(1925), 39-51.
13. Groves, E. R.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, "Magic as a Means of Control," pp. 289-298.
14. Hart, A. B.: "American Historical Liars," *Harper's*, 131(1915), 726-735.
15. Hocart, A. M.: "Etiquette," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
16. Hodder, A. V.: "Propaganda as a Source of American History," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 9(1922), 3-18.
17. Jenks, L. H.: "The John Brown Myth," *American Mercury*, 1(1924), 267-273.
18. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, "Societal Mechanisms of Control," pp. 126-132.
19. Laski, H. J.: "Limitations of the Expert," *Harper's*, 162(1930), 101-110.

20. Lasswell, H. D.: *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, Chap. I, "The Matter in Hand," pp. 1-13.
21. LeBon, G.: *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, Book II, Chap. III, "The Leaders of Crowds and Their Means of Persuasion," pp. 133-159.
22. Lloyd, A. H.: "Newspaper Conscience: A Study in Half Truths," *American Journal of Sociology*, 27(1921-1922), 197-210.
23. Lowie, R. H.: "Ceremonialism in North America," *American Anthropologist*, 16(1914), 602-631.
24. Lowie, R. H.: "Ceremony," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
25. Lumley, F. E.: *Means of Social Control*, Chap. II, "Rewards," pp. 31-55; Chap. V, "Persuasion," pp. 109-133; Chap. VIII, "Propaganda," pp. 185-210; Chap. XV, "Punishment," pp. 363-394.
26. Lumley, F. E.: "Essential Aspects of Propaganda," *Sociology and Social Research*, 16(1932), 517-526.
27. Lundberg, G. A.: "The Newspaper and Public Opinion," *Social Forces*, 4(1926), 709-715.
28. MacIver, R. M.: *Society: Its Structure and Changes*, Chap. XIV, "Religion, Custom, Fashion, Morality, and Law," pp. 266-283.
29. Mead, G. H.: "The Psychology of Punitive Justice," *American Journal of Sociology*, 23(1917-1918), 577-602.
30. Michels, R.: "Authority," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
31. Park, R. E.: "The Natural History of the Newspaper," *American Journal of Sociology*, 19(1913-1914), 273-289.
32. Sapir, E.: "Fashion," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
33. Sutherland, E. H.: "Public Opinion as a Cause of Crime," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9(1924), 51-56.
34. Thrasher, F. M.: *The Gang*, Chap. XV, "Group Control of the Gang," pp. 277-308.
35. Whipple, G. M.: "The Obtaining of Information: Psychology of Observation and Report," *Psychological Bulletin*, 15(1918), 233-247.
36. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. XXVI, "Censorship: The Negative Control of Opinion," pp. 632-652.
37. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XXVI, "The Organs of Public Opinion," pp. 756-778; Chap. XXVII, "Propaganda: The Manufacture of Opinion," pp. 782-826.

CHAPTER XVII

COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR

In the chapters on social control immediately preceding, attention was given to the means by which social behavior is established and maintained among the discrete population units. The interest was in the processes that bring unity and make possible collective and concerted action rather than in description of group behavior itself.

There is in every group a general disposition to make the overt and formal behavior of others conform to the recognized group norms. The social rules are in part explicitly stated, in part they are implicit in the social arrangements but nevertheless generally understood. In every effectively organized group there are formal procedures designed to supplement spontaneous mechanisms leading to the indirect control of behavior in terms of customary and conventional norms. By inculcating the beliefs, defining the sentiments, and fixing the attitudes that will, in turn, produce the conventional and desired behavior responses, these procedures provide the mechanisms whereby the person is controlled from within. But the mechanisms of this control are established, in large measure, from without.

In these chapters on social control, society was viewed more or less consistently from the point of view of the control of behavior by others. But the whole elaborate mechanism of group control is a product of activity; it is created and evolved in and through group action. It remains to give attention to these processes, and, in the present chapter and those that immediately follow, attention is directed to the collective aspects of controlled behavior. In so far as the behavior of persons is mutually controlled by the presence of others, the behavior is collective; in so far as persons act in accordance with conventions they share together, their behavior is collective as well as controlled. It is inevitable, but not undesirable, that there should be frequent repetition and overlapping with the preceding chapters. Group behavior which was there discussed from the point of view of the

mechanisms of control is here discussed from the point of view of its collective aspects. The discussion has to do with the phenomena arising out of institutional change and the breakdown of the traditional controls.

As in the chapters on social control, note is here first taken of the general aspects of collective behavior. This general view is followed by a somewhat more detailed presentation of the natural process, from the initial state of social unrest through crowd behavior and mass movements to the establishment of a new social order.

A. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR DEFINED

The term collective behavior is very commonly used in a generic sense to include all the facts and phenomena of associated life; all classes of group and social reality are brought within its orbit. In this general and inclusive usage the concept is virtually synonymous with social behavior, since nearly the whole of human activity is directly or indirectly social. The term is made to include practically the whole content of sociological science and the major economic, political, and other processes of human reality as well as much of the behavior of the lower organisms. When so defined, collective behavior is simply a point of view from which to examine the whole range of phenomena of associated life.

In the present chapter the term is used in a somewhat restricted sense. It is limited to those mass and concerted phenomena that imply and express a unity or solidarity that is the result of interaction among the discrete units; that is contributed to and shared in by each individual; and that modifies, conditions, or controls the behavior of each member of the unity. Collective behavior, in the sense in which the term is here used, has been defined as the "behavior of individuals under the influence of an impulse that is common and collective, an impulse, in other words, that is the result of social interaction."¹ The discussion is designed to show the group in action and to present the major steps in which societies are produced and changed. Attention is limited to certain phenomena that show most simply and clearly the nature of social disorganization and the steps in

¹ R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, p. 865.

subsequent reorganization. The chief concern is with the process by means of which social organizations disintegrate and are replaced by new organizations of the constituent elements. Basically the problem is one of institutional evolution. Viewed as a general social process, collective behavior includes the various stages in the transition from one type of social organization to another. The chapters set out the stages of the process.

The possibility of collective behavior depends upon the fact of interaction among the discrete units of a collectivity or of a population. Without interaction there might conceivably be a certain type of mass action, as in the displacement and movement of a collection of physical objects, but there could be no collective behavior. The particular type of collective behavior possible and actual depends upon the nature and type of the interaction among the units acting together. The kinds of interaction give, therefore, the basis for classifying the forms of group and collective activity.

The various levels of interaction—elementary, traditional, and critical—were discussed in an earlier connection. Here it is necessary only to relate them to group and collective behavior.

B. BEHAVIOR ON THE ELEMENTARY LEVELS

There is a type of interaction important in certain forms of collective behavior that is essentially physiological: stimulation is unintentional and response automatic; there is an absence of imagery as there is of purpose and foresight; reason, sentiment, tradition, or other social patterns have no part in its direction and control. In its final and most simple and elementary form collective behavior depends upon this sort of spontaneous or organic reaction of individual forms to others of their kind.

The social ants carry on an elaborate collective economy through mutual stimulation and response on the level of reflex and instinct operating by means of odor and the sense of smell. The bees carry on their collective life through the instinctive reaction of individuals to the pitch variation in sounds unwittingly produced by the fellow members of the hive. The mechanistic basis of the collective life of the other animal forms appears to be chiefly if not entirely on the physiological level of the reflexes and instincts. They react immediately and directly to the presence of their fellows on a purely sense basis. The behavior,

whether individual or collective, is always on an emotional and instinctive level.

The flock is a natural assemblage of gregarious animals or birds—sheep, goats, geese, ducks, seals—and is characterized by more or less definite formations and behavior patterns. The organization is typically loose and fluctuating but always about leaders—the older, larger, and more active individuals. In a flock of sheep, under the artificial conditions of life on the range, a few goats are commonly included in the flock and, because of their greater activity and perhaps superior intelligence, assume the leadership. The behavior of the flock is always with reference to and generally a reproduction of that of the leader: automatically the members of the flock follow the patterns of activity set for them. The loss of leaders throws the flock into immediate disorder and the condition continues until new leadership is established. In the natural state a flock of birds, as wild geese, fly in formation in relation to the leader. If the flock is thrown into panic by sudden danger and loses its leader, it quickly reassumes the flock pattern with another individual in the position of leadership. The interaction of the members, resulting in the unity of the flock, appears to run wholly in terms of immediate stimulation and instinctive response: there are no rational communication, no definition of purpose, no foresight of ends, and apparently no control by tradition or experience.

The beasts of prey are typically non-social and non-gregarious in their habits and manners of life, but certain of these animals form temporary groups and act collectively in certain conditions. The pack of wolves is such a temporary group of non-social animals. They are brought together as a result of individual activity directed toward a common end and render each other assistance without doing so with intention. The hunting cry of the wolf is stimulated by the sight or scent of game, and the cry stimulates all others, within hearing of the cry, to the chase. All may follow the same trail, the cry of each stimulating the others, but there is no organization, in the sense of a division of labor to a common end, and there is no enduring unity. There are interstimulation and a collective pursuit, but the group is purposive only in the sense of common activity and it dissolves as soon as the immediate objective is accomplished. They work together but the behavior is not concerted. As soon as the object that brought them together is accomplished, they scatter.

The herd behavior and unity of cattle and of the larger animals are equally on the organic level. They respond to the immediate presence of their fellows and to cries and other behavior of immediate biological and survival import. The interaction among them is wholly on the basis of instinct; they have no conventions or acquired behavior patterns; there are no critical interaction, no division of labor, and no foresight of ends. The group unity and collective action and behavior are on the level of organic responses to immediate stimuli. The herd finding its ordinary routine disturbed becomes restless, the unaccustomed behavior of members stimulates others, and the unrest is intensified. The restless, milling herd is in a condition such that any sudden event, however insignificant, may precipitate a stampede.

This same order of interaction, sense stimulation, and emotional response plays a more or less important rôle in the organization and behavior of human groups. Individuals are responsive to the presence of others; they do not feel or act when in the presence of others as they do when alone. Whenever individuals come into contact and association, no matter how incidentally or remotely and no matter what the race, class, intellectual, or other differences that separate them, there are a spontaneous interchange of influences, mutual stimulations and responses, and an adjustment of each to the presence of others. These spontaneous organic responses precede and accompany the interactions on a verbal plane. This sympathetic organic reaction with its consequent feeling state and modified behavior is, presumably, the sum and totality of the interaction of the non-speaking animals; they influence each other immediately and directly only and only when in face-to-face relations. In the world of human beings this type of interaction is in some cases obvious. In the mother-child relationship, for example, the satisfying nature of the association quite obviously comes, in some part at least, from stimulation and response of a physiological and emotional sort. But the spontaneous elementary responses are often subtle and generally unobtrusive and in nearly all cases are accompanied by responses on the more distinctly human levels. Hence, more frequently than not, they lie outside the conscious awareness of the participating persons. But such interaction is always present when individuals are in close association. It is known, however, only or chiefly when other types of interaction tend to break down, as in crowd excitement, when the mutual

responses on the more elementary level stand out as determining factors in group organization and behavior.

This body of original responses to immediate sense stimulation seems to be the same in all men and seems to be of essentially the same character in men as in the other highly developed animal forms. On this elementary level of interaction it is possible for groups to form and act. Inarticulate cries of terror, rage, pain, and the like are a sort of universal language, as are, also, the bodily gestures and attitudes that accompany the mental states. They give a certain degree of understanding and make possible a certain order of collective behavior. They provide the major mechanisms for the collective behavior of the higher animals. In so far as human groups form and act on this emotional basis, their behavior bears a striking resemblance to the mass behavior of other animal forms.

C. INTERACTION ON THE BASIS OF THE SENTIMENTS

A second, and exclusively human, order of interaction is that on the level of tradition and sentiment. The interaction and communication of persons are of necessity in terms of a common body of apperceptions, in terms of what they have in common. They can converse only in so far as they have a common language and, in this language, only in so far as experience has given a common definition to the words and concepts. The things that men have in common, in addition to the sense and emotional responses which they share with the lower animals, is the body of convention, custom, tradition, sentiment, and belief that results from the associated life and is held more or less in common by all members of the social group. The general run of social behavior and interaction in human groups is in terms of these norms. Speech, as other behavior, is on the level of the habitual, customary, and traditional. Persons communicate in large measure in terms of formulae; language is used not so much to convey ideas as to create pleasing emotional tones; conversation is an end rather than a means.

The individual behavior of human beings is further modified and controlled by the prevailing body of habit, convention, and social definition. In the presence of others, in any defined situation, convention dictates appropriate behavior, directs it in accordance with established norms. Thus individuals not only influence each other immediately and directly but the behavior

of each is controlled by the traditional ideas of behavior appropriate to the situation. In any congregation of individuals—a classroom, a picnic, a funeral, a formal dinner, a social dance, a faculty committee—the presence of others brings an organic response from each, and the traditional definition of the function tends to bring out the sentiments appropriate to the occasion; the behavior of each individual is in accordance with the mood evoked by the occasion and by the presence of others in the same mood. Custom and tradition set a pattern for appropriate behavior and the behavior itself reinforces and perpetuates the appropriate pattern.

This sentimental type of interaction—that is, association on the levels of common sentiments and conventions—is the basis of most human groupings and of most collective behavior. It is the basis of all ceremonial and ritualistic procedures as well as the organizing principle in a great variety of more or less permanent concrete groups. Sororities, fraternities, service clubs, congregations, sectarian groups, racial organizations, and numerous others periodically come together in order to reinstate traditional and sentimental relationships among the members. Temporary groups form and carry on collective activity on the basis of any body of sentiment common to the members. Each performance renews and reinforces the body of sentiment and so makes easier subsequent groupings and activities.

Any concrete social grouping is on the basis of accepted and traditional definitions that are not examined or, indeed, subject to examination. They lie for the most part in the *mores* of the society.

It sometimes happens, of course, that habit and convention have provided no patterns of activity or channels of expression adequate to the contact situation or the group mood. There may be in the group situation no common body of definition, the congregated individuals may be of a different social heritage and hold conflicting conceptions of the behavior appropriate in the circumstances, the situation may be an unprecedented one and convention may provide no machinery for its mediation, or the intensity of mood or feeling may be such that the traditional machinery is inadequate to its channelization. In any such circumstance the behavior will be impulsive, erratic, and lacking in uniformity. Out of chaos and disorder may develop, spontaneously, approximately adequate means to express the mood or

purpose of the group. The existence of crowds, gangs, orgies, revivals, spontaneous celebrations, and the like is at once an evidence of the inadequacy of the traditional social and institutional organization and an expression of the moods and needs of the time.

D. CRITICAL INTERACTION

The third type of interaction is on a critical level: the person responds to ideas rather than to presence or to sentiments. In communication on this level each person responds to statement and proposal on the basis of fact, in terms of logic and evidence. There are no sentimental reservations and no assumptions that may not be questioned. On the contrary, critical behavior commonly puts in question the validity of the very tradition whose common acceptance is the basis of sentimental interaction. The reaction of one mathematician to the demonstration of a problem worked out by another is presumably purely intellectual. The relation of the two men is secondary and impersonal. The attitude toward the solution is cautious and critical but not antagonistic. The only thing involved is the accuracy and the adequacy of the demonstration in question, a purely intellectual matter. Communication among the members of every scientific group, as long as the members function as scientists, is on an intellectual and critical level. The objective is the determination of general truth. The interaction among the members of a committee, a cabinet, a congress, a jury, and other such groups is assumed to be on an intellectual and critical level.

The types of interaction just defined are theoretically distinct and separable; they must be conceptually isolated in order to be understood. But in concrete social reality they act simultaneously and the behavior of the person is determined by a confusion of physiological responses, sentimental and traditional reactions, and a modicum of instrumental intelligence. Moreover, each form of response conditions the other forms: the mere presence of other persons impedes the higher thought processes, the immediate responses on the organic level are more or less conventionalized, and the conventional responses are in a degree modified by critical intelligence. In the concrete social reality no one type of interaction is ever found to exist wholly uncontaminated by others; in so far as we confine the discussion to the behavior of

concrete human groups it is always a question of the relative influence of the physiological, sentimental, and critical.

In the critical group there is always more or less of sentiment, prejudice, and personal reaction. The members of a jury, selected to decide in regard to the facts in a given case, are isolated from outside influences and instructed and sworn to allow nothing but the evidence to influence the decision they reach. But it is the rare exception when the final decision is even in major part so determined. The immediate presence of the other jurors and their opinions, the emotional responses to the appeals of opposing counsel, and irrelevant considerations and personal interests and cultural preconceptions enter to determine what the juror may honestly believe to be a decision in regard to the facts. The deliberations of a committee, a cabinet, or other presumptively critical group are seldom uninfluenced by the irrelevant prejudices and personal ambitions as well as by the verbal exhibitionism of the different members. The purest form of critical interaction is apart from personal presence; thought, apart from personal and sentimental contamination, is not possible in the group.

In the sentimental group there is never a complete absence of either intellectual and critical response or of response on the purely spontaneous level. The church congregation is a group whose members interact chiefly on the level of sentiment, belief, ritual, and ceremony but they also react to the immediate presence of other believers and some degree of intellectual interaction is also present. In political gatherings the interaction is chiefly in terms of slogans and catchwords which make active the prejudices and other sentimental attitudes, but exhilaration and emotional stimulation of the other listeners and participants are also present, and also some interchange on the level of thought and idea. In the human groupings where the more elementary types of stimulation and response are important there is also always present more or less of interaction on the other level.

All human groups are concrete common-sense phenomena. In each there is interaction on different levels. The presence of different types of interaction in the concrete groupings makes impossible any logical and mutually exclusive classification of concrete groups. What we have on the concrete level are groupings in which one or another type of interaction predominates but in which no one is the exclusive mode of contact.

E. SOCIAL ORGANIZATION AND PERSONAL ACCOMMODATION

In long periods of quietude and institutional stability the pattern forms of behavior become defined into comparatively uniform systems that comprehend all, or at least all the major, types of response to the problems of life. In those parts of the animal world where the environing conditions are uniform and unchanging, as in the case of sea animals, the behavior patterns are organically defined in the form of instincts which provide automatically for all responses the animals are called upon to make. In the small and long-undisturbed human group the customs tend to take on something of the character of the animal instincts; they are fixed, uniform, and invariable and they cover all the contingencies of life in the circumstances.

The ways of the group parallel the animal instincts in the sense, also, that they are satisfying to the individuals within the system. Any system that has reached an equilibrium and a comparative stability must of necessity make provision for an approximate satisfaction of the basic appetites and human wishes; otherwise there would be neither equilibrium nor stability. The individually satisfying nature of any set of social patterns depends of course on a dual base: as just stated, the social order must provide approximately adequate ways for meeting the basic needs of the individual members and also for meeting the variety of concrete wishes and desires of social origin, those created in the members by the character of the social life itself; on the other hand, the satisfying character of the life depends upon the habitual organization of persons, on the degree to which they are accommodated to the group definitions and manner of life. The basic trend of social organization is toward an equilibrium and stability analogous, at least, to that which rests upon animal instinct; the basic trend is toward an ever more perfect system of definitions and activity patterns that answer all questions with definiteness and finality, that cover all situations that arise, and to which the individual members are accommodated and within which the individual life may proceed automatically, that is, on the basis of habit.

The primitive society is, in general, characterized by a high degree of stability and a relative inflexibility of social structure. The life conditions are simple and relatively uniform. Ideas are few. All of the essential activities of life have been fixed in

practice into standardized and customary ways of doing things. Habituation has given to these ways the appearance of right ways. The practices have defined custom and tradition which in turn enforce rigid adherence to the precedent, and a whole body of beliefs and emotions, incidental products of the practices themselves, reinforce and enforce the practices. The system of ideas parallels the established practices. There is therefore no criticism of the validity of the practices or of their rationalization in the idea system. In all the ordinary contingencies of isolated life the established patterns are adequate to group and personal need.

F. SOCIAL CHANGE AND DISORGANIZATION

No group reaches, or for long maintains, so perfect an adjustment. The human environment is nowhere completely stable and entirely uniform, and the habits of men never reach the degree of perfection attained by the organically transmitted instincts—the inculcation of traditional beliefs and customary behavior patterns is never perfect. Social organizations are imperfect in varying degrees and they become progressively inadequate with changes in the environment and culture heritage. There is always a degree of cultural and, therefore, of social change. Any change, whether it be in the purely physical environment, such as results from climatic variations or changes of habitat, or in the cultural and technological environment by which men surround themselves, such as results from discovery or borrowing in either the material or the immaterial realm, produces a degree of cultural maladjustment and so disturbs the social equilibrium.

If the group comes into contact with another of a somewhat different culture content, through a change in habitat, invasion of its territory, infiltration of foreigners, or in other way, an inevitable conflict of culture forms and a disintegration of old practices and standards occur. In the process of incorporating the new elements, or modifying the old elements to a changed environment, there is some inevitable disorder within the structural system itself. The disorganization gives rise to an acute emotional distress on the part of the accommodated members of the group; it is looked upon as a public calamity and may in reality give rise to great personal loss and social disorder. The cultural and institutional change and disorder bring into the habitual organization of persons a degree of maladjustment

and disorder. The customary ways no longer work or they work badly, the traditional definitions no longer fit the situations that arise; the individual needs and wishes can no longer be satisfied within the old framework: for one reason or another the old system is inadequate to the human needs.

The discomfort of individuals in the situation gives rise to divergent behavior, that is, to efforts to satisfy their felt needs in other than the conventional ways. The breakdown of the old and stable is always felt as a public calamity and a personal loss. But such unusual behavior, and the disorder it engenders, rouse emotional opposition and the whole control system of the society is brought into action to suppress the disorder and enforce conformity. Effort is made to suppress the divergent and to reinstate the traditional behavior. The taboos are made more explicit and the penalties for their violation more severe. The old definitions are made to cover the new situations. If the control system be well established and the means employed to suppress divergent behavior be sufficiently ferocious, and if the factors that induced the maladjustments are not of fundamental character, the old order may be maintained. But if the culture fact be an important one—as the invention of the bow and arrow, the steam engine, the theory of organic evolution, the germ theory of disease, or other basic fact—all efforts to control in the interests of the established system are futile; they simply contribute to the disorder.

But the release of individuals from the set forms makes new adjustments necessary and out of the old elements, through confusion and disorder, there gradually emerge a new organization, a redefinition of situations, and a new set of practices which gradually come to have an emotional content and acquire a moral sanction. The behavior that was new and scandalous comes to be the expected, then the customary, then the moral, and finally the legal and sacred.

Human and culture changes follow, in general, the pattern thus roughly sketched. The group patterns of behavior, once they are established, tend to harden and to become inflexible; with every change in group life and culture they become increasingly inadequate to group and human need. Their breakdown releases individuals from the authority of established ways and permits a new organization of the old elements to serve the new needs. But the new system, in turn, acquires a structure and with it an

inflexibility, an emotional content, and a group of functionaries interested to maintain and perpetuate the order as just, normal, and right. This in turn is followed in time, usually in periods of group crises, by disorganization, disintegration, and reorganization.

The period of transition from one state of equilibrium to another represents, on the whole, a more or less blind milling to a new formation. The outcome is distant and obscure, the forces operating are not generally understood, and the processes of change are concealed by the complicated complex of superficial and secondary phenomena. Only in the perspective of history, if at all, can the ordinary man visualize a major social change.

G. SOCIAL UNREST

Social unrest is the initial and most elementary form of collective behavior. It is the activity which results from the mutual and circular stimulation of persons, some or many of whose needs have failed of satisfaction in the environment. It is a symptom of maladjustment and a product of social interaction. Just as fever and nausea are phenomenal expressions of a profound disturbance of the organism's adjustment to its environment, unrest is an indication of unsatisfactory adjustment between the social organization and the social-psychological equipment of the persons who are subject to it.

The immediate cause of unrest in the person is a lack of adjustment to the conditions of life. The behavior of an organism is in response to needs and normally leads to a biological adjustment to the enviroing circumstances. If some present need be balked in its satisfaction, there are added discomfort and increased and random activity. The needs may be organic or social, vague or clearly defined, but the means to their realization are not under control. On the conscious level unrest arises out of the failure of the existing social organization to satisfy the needs and wishes of the members of the group or to make possible their satisfaction.

The failure of adaptation that gives rise to unrest may be on a purely physical level. The discomforts that arise from unsatisfied animal appetites—hunger, thirst, cold, physical discomfort, sickness, fear, confinement, and the like—result in activity, often random and misdirected, to appease the appetites and end the

discomfort. The physical and organic needs of men and animals may in general be satisfied individually and the restlessness subsides with the satisfaction. If the needs be not satisfied, restlessness is recurrent or chronic and expresses itself in varied activities. Hunger may get a secondary expression in dreams, the fretful crying of the child, the prowling of the animal, and other familiar ways. The fretful and peevish behavior of the tired and sleepy child is unrest activity derived directly from the unsatisfied organic need. The antics of Harold Teen, and indeed the romantic comedy generally, are overt, sometimes sublimated, expressions of unsatisfied appetites.

On the strictly human plane persons seek satisfaction for a great variety of conscious wishes. The nature and variety of these wishes depend upon the character of the culture complex to which the individual has been habituated. They may be relatively simple and elementary and closely connected with the bodily needs. In the simple society food, shelter, sex, and other animal appetites and needs comprehend almost the whole range of desires. In a more complex society the concrete wishes may be almost indefinitely great; they include beauty, education, leisure, recreation, sanitary surroundings, intellectual activity, the opportunity for creative activity, and many other values that do not, in general, fall within the range of interest of the simpler peoples. Within the same society the wishes are often widely different in the different social classes; the upper and educated strata have a great variety of wishes not found in the lower strata and, sometimes, not even comprehensible to the members of the lower strata. Even in modern American society the interests and values of the artist and the scholar are in general incomprehensible to the man on the street.

Unlike the simple brute appetites, the human wishes may find satisfaction only within the social organization. The social institutions are in essence a machinery which functions to satisfy the needs that led to their creation. A perfect social order would make it possible for every member to satisfy each of his wishes: it would create no wishes that it could not satisfy and would provide adequate satisfaction for all the wishes created. The failure of the social organization to provide means whereby the wishes may reach approximately adequate satisfaction results in personal unrest. The social order creates wants that it does not provide the means to satisfy; in consequence, persons are left

with a helpless feeling of something wished for that cannot be achieved.

Not all of unrest is social. In every society there are some or many unaccommodated persons, persons who for one reason or another are out of adjustment with the existing social organization. The condition may be temporary or chronic: an accommodation may presently be reached, or the person may remain permanently unaccommodated to the conditions of his life. In any case the discomfort incident to unrealized wishes and unsatisfied appetites expresses itself in activity, often in random and futile behavior, activity that does not bring an adjustment and accommodation. Perhaps every person in some degree and at some times is unable to realize his needs and the suppressed or inhibited impulses find secondary and random expression. Change in the organism itself or in the conditions of life disorganizes the established habit patterns and necessitates a more or less complete reorganization. Other persons apparently are never accommodated to the social organization in which they must live; they never succeed in perfecting a tolerable working adjustment with the social order and spend their lives in a succession of futile and time-consuming activities.

This dissatisfied state, with its consequences in the type of activity described as unrest, may be characteristic of only a few persons in the group; the social framework may be such as to permit a reasonably adequate realization of the wishes of all save the divergent and exceptional persons. This may be true either because of the relative perfection of the social organization or because of its success in disciplining the vagrant human impulses and in regimenting its members. In either case there is no general loss of control by the group. In a slave order there may be little or no discontent: adequate provision may be made to satisfy the physical appetites and bodily needs of the servile group and the members of the slave caste may be habituated to the life and accommodated to the status. The peasant and primitive societies have, in general, evolved a system of activities adequate to the wishes of the disciplined members of the groups. However, they provide, in general, no means for the realization of the vagrant and divergent needs of the exceptional members.

In another society there may be many persons unable to live a tolerable life. The paucity of resources of the area in which they live may be so great that it is not possible to satisfy the physical

needs of the members of the group, or the distribution of property and power in a region of abundant resources may be such as to keep many individuals in chronic distress; America in the present decade is surfeited with goods and resources, while millions of the population are in dire distress and misery. Aside from the necessities of a comfortable physical existence, the social organization may provide no adequate means whereby persons may realize the wishes which life in the society creates. Whatever the specific reason, discontent, dissatisfaction, and restless activity may be more or less general; a great percentage of the individual members of the group may be unaccommodated to their rôle in the situation and unresigned to their status. Such personal discontent and unrest may be widespread yet remain an individual and personal rather than a social or group phenomenon: unrest may be widespread without being social. General unrest differs from personal unrest only in the number of persons involved.

The fact that many persons share a condition does not make it social; it is communication, not general incidence, that defines the social. But when discontented persons come into contact and association they become aware that their discontent is shared by others. The discontent of individuals is heightened by contact and communication with other similarly repressed persons and tends to become general. Discontent is intensified, vocalized, defined, and communicated and its expression in overt behavior becomes more intensive and more general; the activity of one influences the activity of others. When and to the extent that unrest is communicated it is social.

Discontent within a group may not become vocal, may not even be definitely conscious. It may exist as a vague sense of unfulfillment and appear only in the symptoms of ill adaptation—in crime, drink, insanity, suicide, in bizarre, compensatory, and rationalized behavior. Unrest may be local or general, continuous or intermittent. It may characterize one or many aspects of the social life. Economic unrest, for example, may be general and acute, while there are few indications of religious, educational, or political unrest.

H. UNREST IN THE MODERN WORLD

The belief is general that social unrest is a phenomenon of the modern world or, if not of recent origin, is at least more general

and widespread than at any previous time. But social unrest is in no sense restricted to recent times. Every change in culture life disturbs the existing habit patterns, increases wants, creates new desires and means of satisfying them. Everywhere among men discomfort and dissatisfaction exist and have perhaps always and everywhere existed. The traditions of every primitive group are founded on the idea of a migration, and migration is an obvious and indisputable evidence of dissatisfaction; it is, in fact, itself a form of unrest. The literature of every age is shot through with the protests of reformers and the activities of dreamers. Unrest as a social phenomenon has probably existed since man's first association with his fellow men.

Nevertheless it is probably true that the phenomenon is more widespread and deep-seated than at most earlier times. Certainly it was never before so fully made known and so easily and freely communicated. The complexity of modern life and social organization creates endless maladjustments; the complexity is so great and the pace of life so rapid that there are frequent, persistent, and profound maladjustments between the social structures and the human wishes they are created to satisfy. The individual cannot control the organization and is more or less helpless within it. The modern unrest also differs in kind from that characteristic of earlier and simpler forms of society. It is in the lives of the great multitude of people, not, as earlier, confined to exceptional individuals and localized groups. There are an almost universal irritation and maladjustment in every major sphere of activity.

In the simple and primitive society any injustice, as murder or robbery, is concrete, localized, and understandable; moreover, the appropriate actions, for revenge or recovery, are definite and available and the actions themselves are satisfying. In the case of floods, disease epidemics, and other major calamities, the group philosophy, by defining them as acts of the gods, puts them definitely outside the human order; they are understood to be uncontrollable, hence are accepted stoically. But in the modern world the steps intervening between cause and effect are beyond the simple mind as well as beyond individual control. The loss of property in investment or bank failure, for example, leaves the individual helpless; he is unable to identify the thief, and when this can be done he is unable to act.

The past two centuries have seen profound changes in many aspects of Western life and culture, particularly in the economic and industrial basis of life and security. The basic fact in the changing order is the development of physical science which made possible a series of mechanical inventions giving control of steam and electricity and making possible the development and utilization of power-driven machinery. The resulting increase in production and the rapid growth in the material aspects of Western culture molded society into a new pattern. Power and power-driven machinery took industry from the home and the shop to the factory; it changed economic production from a handicraft to a machine basis; it shifted ownership and control from the craftsman to the capitalist.

The coincident growth and improvement in transportation facilities and in means of communication made possible worldwide trade and commercial relations which have broken down the cultural isolation of an earlier time. The various peoples of the earth have been brought into a close economic interdependence. This has operated, in one way, to destroy in some part the integrity of the primary groups, to weaken family, local, and national ties, and in some part to free individuals from their control. There have been equally important changes in the nature of agriculture and in the traditional relations of men to the soil. The requirements of machine industry brought about a migration to industrial areas and put men in a new location in respect to others. The majority of the people of the civilized world are of recent migratory origin; they or their immediate ancestors have moved from one land to another or from a rural to an urban area; city and urban life have been taking the place of rural and village existence. The growth of the present industrial order has brought the greatest changes in human life and relations that have occurred in the history of peoples; no event in the history of man is comparable with it except possibly the ice ages.

Social change in general operates to the same end; it brings maladjustments between men and the social order. The social order is in reality an intricate mass of institutional forms growing out of the cultural order and having their dynamic reality in the habit patterns and reciprocal accommodations of men. Every invention and discovery, every cultural innovation, necessitate change in every part of the complicated existing structure in order that it may incorporate the new elements and be itself

adjusted to them. Even in the most stable and static of human groups there is some degree of change; the conditions of today are not those of yesterday, and the habits of today will not, in their entirety, be adjusted to the conditions of tomorrow. Groups have continually to adjust themselves to changing conditions, and the relations of persons within the groups must undergo corresponding change. A change in any part of the social structure disturbs more or less every other part; hence it disturbs the habitual relations of persons, makes necessary a whole new set of reciprocal adjustments among persons and between persons and the social organization. To this fact of change in the social heritage, which makes some degree of maladjustment a more or less chronic condition in the modern world, must be added the fact that the complexity of the material culture and the mobility of modern man give rise to a rich variety of concrete wishes that cannot achieve satisfaction. Modern life creates desires that it has no capacity to satisfy. Unrest, then, is caused by maladjustment between the needs of the person and the social organization in which the needs must find their satisfaction. Where there is inflexibility of attitudes or interests that prevents or impedes change or makes difficult or impossible adjustment to a changed order, or of the changed individual to the old order, unrest exists in proportion to the importance of the unsatisfied need.

But scientific development has been responsible for a yet more basic and profound disturbance of the old order: the intellectual development and the religious decadence of the modern Western world. In the life of stable groups there is always developed a philosophy adequate to the needs. It answers in a definite, hence satisfying, way all the questions that arise as to the aim and end of existence and concerning the true and the good. The system of philosophic and religious thought in a stable society tends to be absolutistic. In the settled society education fits the person to the society, it is a technique to insure the stability of the group by bringing about the accommodation and assimilation of new members. But in the complex modern society it sometimes fails of these ends; it gives the person ambitions, wishes, and aspirations that he may not realize within the existing order. Moreover, the advancing intelligence may make men impatient with the slow advance of social standards and practices. They come to see, as well as to feel, both the pressure and the repression of the conservative institutions which enforce by formal and

informal means the various outmoded social rules and thereby repress the very activity that the education and the social life make inevitable. In a sense unrest is an unconscious protest against the conditions that brought it forth; it is a challenge to the existing social conditions.

But modern science and intellectual development destroyed absolutism and substituted doubt and uncertainty for previous certainty. The earlier Christianity finds no response in the minds of men: it is essentially patriarchal, pastoral, militaristic, feudal, and despotic. It does not appeal to the citizens of an industrial society: it is neither practical nor vital. "All the paraphernalia of thrones, diadems, armor, and blood-red banners arouse no response in mind or heart of the day laborer, the clerk, or the mechanic. They are symbols without significance." In the modern world truth is relative; science is hesitating and uncertain. The ancient dogmas are gone, the individual's philosophy of life lacks the feeling of certainty and safety, it lacks the definiteness and finality that the mentally untrained person demands. Freedom is external and formal; in historic sentiment and emotional nature man rebels against the abstract and impersonal relations that the secondary type of social order implies. He is still bound to and dependent upon the primary and communal type of relations, while social and culture changes are making such relations increasingly difficult. This is a basic fact in the Western unrest; the individual is not adjusted to the universe of science. He lives on a plane of uncertainty. There has been enough in literacy and education to destroy the old but not enough to bring any fundamental acceptance of the new. Most men have developed intellectually beyond the plane of the simple anthropomorphism of the primitive and childish thought. But they are still influenced by the early instilled fears and superstitions; they are unable to reach stability on the basis of a definition of the universe as presented by thought and science. They crave the definiteness, certainty, and finality of the dogmas they no longer accept. They are anxious, fearful, groping souls in process of transition from a universe of fiat to a universe of impersonal law.

I. THE IMPLICATION OF SOCIAL UNREST

Social unrest is, in general, an accompaniment and result of social change. Its existence implies a social order in process of

transition from one period of relative equilibrium to another. It expresses and focalizes the inarticulate discontent of maladjusted persons. By doing so it makes leadership possible; it makes possible the appearance of spokesmen who voice more or less adequately the inarticulate discontent. Issues are thus defined, organization perfected, ends projected, and means to the achievement of objectives formulated. Social unrest thus passes into mass movements which may result in time in new or modified institutional arrangements and thus in a new social equilibrium. It is, therefore, an initial stage in the transition from one state of social balance to another.

No social organization remains indefinitely static. Any change in the enviroing circumstances, as increase or decline in numbers, abundant harvests, exhaustion of the supporting resources, emergence of notably competent or incompetent leadership, changes the character of the society. Even the most stable of organizations undergo modifications: some elements are added to the culture and others become modified or are lost. If the isolation be broken by contact with other cultures or if invention and discovery bring new elements into the culture, a more or less profound and prolonged disturbance of the cultural balance results. The new elements are gradually incorporated into the practices of the group. In the process they are modified to fit the new complex while in turn the whole organization is modified by the act of incorporating them.

The process involves personal maladjustment and disorganization in proportion to the importance and rapidity of the underlying cultural modifications. In the early, small, and simple societies cultural changes were infrequent and relatively small; when they were not so profound as to destroy the group, adjustments were gradually worked out in the *mores* and the institutions were by gradual, unplanned, and imperceptible degrees adjusted to the needs of men in the group.

In any period of rapid social change there is a loss of control. Old habits no longer function or they work but imperfectly. Standards and practices conflict, choices must be made, people do not know how to act, or, acting efficiently, they violate the traditional and emotionally entrenched standards of the group. The behavior situation tends to be characterized by random activity, unregulated behavior, and a generally heightened emotional tone. The whole procedure is not unlike the behavior

of a rat in a maze. It is in reality a trial-and-error method of reaching a new group definition of the situation on the basis of which new habit adjustments may be made. The requirements of a tolerable existence demand new adjustments and organization in conformity with the external facts. The old social-control groups—the state, church, moral codes, and the like as well as the individual habits and sentiments—operate to inhibit or suppress divergent behavior and to maintain the old and emotionally satisfying. Restless behavior continues to such time as a workable redefinition of the situation is reached and becomes habitual to individuals and traditional in the group.

This is the meaning of the modern unrest so strikingly evident in the countries of Western civilization. It represents an intellectually unformulated folk movement from accommodation to a set of institutional norms and social definitions, adapted to an agricultural, handicraft, and rural economy and mode of life, that has become progressively unworkable with the growth of science, communication, and machine industry, toward some new and as yet undefined set of institutional and social norms, that will permit of humanely satisfying activities and relations among men. Europe and America are still in the early stages of disorganization resulting from scientific discoveries and mechanical invention. But in the East, particularly in Asia, the contacts with Western science and the machine methods of economic exploitation have begun to undermine and disorganize the old communal order. The whole world is in the beginnings of a transition from an agricultural and handicraft basis of life to a social order in harmony with machine production. This seems to demand a mechanistic view of the universe and an acceptance of individual freedom totally foreign to the thought of the East and, indeed, only in part accepted in the West.

Inevitably, the scientific development and the growth of material culture must be accompanied and followed by extensive readjustment and modification in other aspects of life. There is of course no possibility of status until such time as an internal harmony has been achieved among the culture elements included in the social organization and no possibility of a return to "normalcy," that is, a reinstatement of the norms of an earlier generation. There is no possibility of continuing the present or of returning to an earlier type of organization. The old human relations no longer work; new ones are necessary and inevitable

and mankind is in process of evolving them. The modifications and adjustments going on are a blind, undirected, and largely unconscious evolution of a new order. An intelligent and competent social leadership might direct and control the process and so mediate the transition as to reduce personal disorganization to a minimum. Eventually all the institutions and social arrangements will be modified as they are integrated into a harmonious culture system. The family, for example, cannot persist in its traditional form in an urbanized and industrialized society. Its present state of disorganization is an evidence both of present disharmony and of a movement toward a future organization of its essential elements and values in harmony with human needs in a new culture situation. Before a new social equilibrium is reached, before there is integrated harmony among the elements of the culture, there must be as much modification in institutions, laws, and social rules, in customs, creeds, and modes of thought as there has been in tools and vehicles and modes of communication and transportation.

The apparent goal of the present world movement is a social order as different from the present and immediate past as the historic was different from the relations and culture complex of primitive savagery.

The sudden breakdown of an old order and status reduces a society more or less completely to an atomistic basis. The unrest of the day is an evidence of human confusion in a rapidly changing order. In a new situation, the old ideas and definitions are inadequate, the old practices no longer suffice, the old forms and groupings have lost purpose and effectiveness, the old controls no longer work. But the old is supported by the individual habit patterns and sentiments and have the sanction of law and tradition. There is ever an attempt on the part of organized society and its beneficiaries to preserve and enforce the old patterns, and this is supported by the sentiments and thought patterns of the social membership. At the same time individuals are released from the traditional associations and controls. But the average person, when free, is both unhappy and irresponsible; the average man is not prepared to lead an independent life; he seeks security and status in organizations and membership. A new set of practices and definitions grows up and a new set of controls develops. Freed from the primary controls of primitive, primary, organization, he is ready to enter new associations. In

the confusion incident to institutional disorganization and social disorder a multiplicity of new, strange, and bizarre associations is formed and group movements initiated. They represent the blind gropings of men, unhappy as free, for new controls and associations that are efficient and emotionally satisfying. This random behavior, in the large, should be viewed as an inchoate movement toward a new social order. It is a milling of the human herd to a new formation.

J. FORMS OF UNREST

Unrest is a symptom, not a primary condition. Its presence in a society shows an imperfect adjustment or a lack of adjustment between the social organization and the social psychological equipment of the men who are subject to it. The lack of adjustment expresses itself in various ways, the forms depending in part upon the nature of the maladjustments, in part upon the courses of activity open to the members of the group, and in part upon the intelligence and discipline of the group members. Unrest records itself in election returns and other political phenomena, in the migratory movements of men and groups, in crowds and crowdish behavior, and in other ways according to time and circumstance. It has been a major fact in the great spectacular events of human history.

Perhaps the most simple and universal form of unrest is that which seems everywhere and at all times to characterize the so-called younger generation. Much of the behavior of youth is a form of unrest activity the basis of which they only vaguely or not at all perceive. And this behavior has apparently been a cause of more or less acute distress to the older members of every society that has left an articulate record of its life. The forms of expression are numerous and they vary with the culture situation and the fashion of the time. The drinking of modern youth, for example, is in one sense a juvenile conception of the smart thing to do, an easy means to distinction. More basically, however, it is a symptom of dissatisfaction, it expresses the absence of satisfying and absorbing interests, an inarticulate protest against exclusion from the mature if prosaic business of life. The unrest of youth is negligible in those forms of social organization where marriage and family responsibilities come at an early age and where the youth participates from childhood in the work and interests of the elders. It is greatest in the social situations where the period

of immaturity is most prolonged and the opportunity for full participation in the serious activities of the mature generation most delayed. In the modern world, as elsewhere, the restlessness of youth disappears as the young are incorporated and allowed to participate in the social world of the mature.

In the modern world much of the striving for wealth is an expression of unrest rather than the behavior of rational men. Economic activities are basically associated with the wish for security, but a relatively small, secure income completely satisfies the need. Beyond this point wealth and its accumulation become means for securing unrelated values, or wealth becomes an end in itself unrelated to any basic social or human value. The communication and extension of this type of activity have given rise to a competitive attitude that has become more or less general and characteristic of the present stage of social organization. The run of social attention is upon the accumulation of wealth, and accomplishment in this line has become a popular standard for evaluating activities in unrelated fields of endeavor. The basically unsatisfying nature of the activity is evident in the fact that it is made the means to other ends. An ostentatious display of wealth, for example, represents a striving for recognition, an effort of the person to get distinction in terms of what he has rather than in terms of what he is or has contributed to the fund of social values.

Various sorts of spectacular activities are of the same order of activity as the race for wealth. The public interest in dancing marathons, tree-sitting contests, airplane distance and endurance flights, and the like reflects a widespread lack of accommodation to the actual conditions of life. The folk heroes of the day—motion-picture actors and actresses, prize fighters, athletic champions, racketeers, the criminal rich, stunt performers—are in no case individuals who make substantial contributions to the culture of the society. The popularity of the moving pictures and the type of moving pictures that make the popular appeal reflect the general maladjustment and the disposition to get, by vicarious means, satisfaction for wishes that are denied an adequate normal satisfaction.

The widespread use of the automobile in the present-day Western world is in large measure a substitute for satisfying activity. The same thing is true of course of most travel: it is a form of restless activity arising from wishes unsatisfied in the routine of daily life.

There are automobiles, railway cars, steamships, airplanes—serving little other purpose, really, than the gratification of wander tendencies. Usually we do not say it so openly of course; we make a good reason for traveling, for not “staying put.” Many a business man has developed a perfect technique for escaping from his rut; many a laborer has invented a physical inability to work steadily that lets him out into the drifting current when monotony sets in on the job. Life is full of these moral side doors; but we do not need to view man’s rationalizing power cynically, merely understandingly. The escapes he contrives are a damaging critique of the modern mode of life. We may infer from them the superior adjustments we strive so blindly toward.¹

In a given social order unrest may be evident in a single or a few departments of the social life. The maladjustments may be of limited scope, confined to one or a few institutions, or a more general condition may be limited for the time to a single or few avenues of overt expression. On the other hand, maladjustment of limited scope may give rise to erratic behavior in remote departments of the social life or in diffused and general restlessness. The migratory disposition of the Americans is in some measure a rational effort on the part of individuals to better their economic condition, but it also represents a search for novelty and new experience that may be related remotely only or not at all to economic status. The political unrest of the modern era, as evidenced by the overthrow of governments, non-voting, new party movements, and the like, is in large measure economic in origin. Religious unrest expresses itself in reform and sectarian movements both within and without the church.

The presence of unrest in a group reveals itself in the violation of the traditional social norms and in various types of extravagant behavior, in individual protests against injustice, criticism of institutions and functionaries, advocacy of reforms, subversive proposals and movements, and numerous other concrete expressions of dissatisfaction. The presence of disorder, divergent behavior, and open criticism in a society outrages the dignity and rouses the fears of the timid and the conservative elements. There is a spontaneous demand by the scandalized members of the group for a suppression of the offensive conditions, and an effort on the part of the constituted authorities to suppress the symptoms. The society through some or all of the organized instruments of control and suppression—the state, the church,

¹ R. Tugwell, “The Gypsy Strain,” *Pacific Review*, 2(1921), 178.

the school, etc.—undertakes to maintain or restore the traditional norms and compel an observance of them. Legislation is multiplied and penalties for violation and nonconformity increased. The advocacy and the practice of severity and suppression are a well-nigh infallible index of an unrest sufficiently general and deep-seated to menace the existing order or to threaten the tenure of its functionaries.

K. SOCIAL CONTAGION

Since men interact and carry on collective activities in terms of what they have in common, the forms and patterns of collective behavior reveal the general sentiments, interests, and tensions that characterize the group life. This is true whether the behavior be that of crowds and other close aggregations or of dispersed units within an area of communication. In either case communication and participation in common exercises define group objectives and common characteristics and intensify a common mood whether it be one of emulation, hope, and enthusiasm or one of suspicion, fear, or terror.

All mass phenomena involve social contagion—that is, the rapid transfer and intensification of emotional states. The mechanism of social contagion, suggestion, has been previously described as the expression in overt activity of pattern responses that have been fixed in the previous experience of the person; it is here necessary only to show its relation to group and collective phenomena. It has played a heavy rôle in the history of peoples and is a decisive factor in much of the behavior of daily life. It is the dominant force in the collective unity of the animal group and a major factor in the concerted action of the primitive and, indeed, in all social groups. Men and animals everywhere respond to the presence and excitement of their fellows and all groups, in consequence, tend to run amuck. Mobs, manias, crazes, and epidemics of all kinds are normal behavior in the sense of being the uninhibited consequence of group stimulation. To treat them, as is often done, as antisocial is completely to misunderstand their nature and significance. The whole development of institutions, laws, and formal social organizations generally may, from one point of view, be looked upon as means of stabilization and ways of inhibiting and devices for controlling the effects of social stimulation and social contagion.

The human being is so constituted that, in the absence of inhibiting facts, any idea brought to the attention is accepted as truth. The child and the uninformed and untrained person do not in general question the accuracy of report. Moreover, in the absence of contradictory ideas, physical impediments, or habit patterns the idea before the mind tends to express itself in overt acts. Any condition, as fear, anger, and emotional excitement generally, as any circumstance seeming to demand immediate decision and overt action, clouds the memories and prevents reflection—hence leaves the person more or less prone to act on the basis of the ancient, simple, and deep-seated impulses.

The degree of suggestibility varies from person to person and, in the same person, from time to time. The least suggestible of persons is the mature, self-reliant, well-informed man who is trained to bring all available data to bear upon any proposition before endorsing it and who is not unduly impressed by the source from which report may come. Suggestibility increases as the amount of systematically organized knowledge and scientific habits of thought decreases so that the uneducated and untrained man is more suggestible than is the informed and mentally disciplined person. It increases, too, as the capacity to reason logically declines. The highest degree of suggestibility is in emotionally disorganized, psychopathic persons and those of a low order of intelligence. In the same person the degree of suggestibility varies with the condition of the organism and the amount of information in hand. It is least when the person is mentally alert and attentive, on his guard as it were, and in regard to subjects on which he has the most systematically organized information. It is greatest in the fields where he has the least information and organized knowledge and is least competent to hold an opinion and in times of emotional excitement when a condition of mental isolation is established that suspends the inhibiting influence of information and habit.

In simple and familiar form contagion is a basic factor in epidemics of giggling, laughing, fainting, and like hysterical and semi-hysterical phenomena. The emotional excitement, the centering of attention, and the rapidly recurring stimuli isolate the person from other contradictory and inhibiting suggestions. Epidemic phenomena of both trivial and serious character are possibilities to be anticipated and guarded against in correctional and other institutions.

. . . A French medical writer relates that in a convent of nuns where the sisterhood was unusually numerous one of these secluded fair ones was seized with a strange impulse to mew like a cat; that several others of the nuns in a short time followed her example; and that at length this unaccountable propensity became general throughout the convent—the whole sisterhood joining, at stated periods, in the practice of mewing, and continued it for several hours. But of all the extraordinary fancies . . . none can exceed that which Gordan relates to have happened in one of the convents of Germany during the fifteenth century. One of the nuns . . . was seized with the strange propensity to bite all her companions; and, extraordinary as it may seem, this disposition spread until the whole house was infected with the same fury. The account, indeed, states, that this mania extended even beyond the walls of the convent and that the disease was conveyed to such a degree from cloister to cloister, throughout Germany, Holland and Italy, that the practice at length prevailed in every female convent in Europe.¹

Social contagion is an important element in the determination of crowd behavior, and it is a basic element in the whole range of enthusiasms and fears by which groups or whole peoples are from time to time possessed. In the conditions of close association and activity, response to stimulation is immediate, direct, and circular—hypnotic in character and compelling in effect. There is no critical interaction in crowd conditions, no reflection and no possibility of rational thought. Some indication of the extraordinarily irrational behavior to which human groups are prone is given in the following excerpts. It should be emphasized, however, that this behavior appears extravagant chiefly because it is distant and unfamiliar; it differs in no essential respect from a large percentage of historic and current behavior.

The months of July and August may be called the months of the "great fear." Men were afraid, both in town and country, of they knew not what. How this universal feeling of terror arose cannot be proved, but it was actually deemed necessary in some districts for a distinct denial to be published to the report that the king had paid brigands to rob the people. . . . This "great fear" was generally expressed in the words, "The brigands are coming." Who the brigands were, whence they came, or whither they were going, nobody knew; but that the brigands were coming, nobody doubted. . . . It was in the towns that this strange terror was most keenly felt. In the town of Guéret July 29, 1789, was known for years after as the day of the "great fear." Suddenly, at about five in the afternoon of that day, a rumor arose that the

¹ J. G. Zimmerman, *Solitude*, Vol. II, pp. 163-164.

brigands were coming. The women rushed out of the town and hid themselves in the thickets and ditches; while the men assembled at the Hôtel de Ville, and hastily formed themselves into an armed force to assist the town militia. Several notables of the town took their seats with the municipal officers, and formed a committee, which sent dispatches to all the neighboring towns and villages for aid. . . . These allies, to the number of 8,000 to 10,000, flocked into the town, and were regaled at its expense; and when it was found that the brigands did not come, they all went home again. At Château-Thierry news arrived, on July 28, that 2,500 "carabots," or brigands, were marching along the Soissons road; the tocsin rang, and the bourgeois marched out to meet them. On their way a miller told them that the brigands had just sacked Bouresches, which was in flames; but when the partisans of order arrived there, the flames were found to be only the reflection of the sun upon the roofs of the houses. Then the brigands were described in the act of crossing the Marne at Essommes; but when the tired pursuers came up, they found that these new brigands were the women of Essommes, who had been scared at their appearance, and who believed them to be the real brigands.¹

Between epidemics of concerted giggling and other such trivial behavior at the one extreme and the ferocious behavior of an angry mob at the other social contagion plays a less conspicuous but not less important rôle in all the collective phenomena of animal and human life. It is a conspicuous factor in fads and fashions, in economic and financial activities, in moral and social crusades, in political behavior, and in most other collective human activity. Examples of concrete phenomena in which social contagion plays a part are presented in the following section and in the following chapters.

L. SOCIAL EPIDEMICS

The term social epidemic is used to designate those extreme and spectacular forms of unrest that appear from time to time in human groups and especially those in which social contagion plays a prominent part. Against a background of widespread maladjustment and general discontent restless activity is readily communicated and generally intensified in the process of communication. The fears or other emotions of one are intensified by a recognition of similar emotions in others. The activity gives a quick release of the repressions and the sudden appearance

¹ H. M. Stephens, *A History of the French Revolution*, Vol. I, pp. 178-179. Reprinted by permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

of extreme and violent behavior phenomena. Some attention is given to this order of behavior in the discussion of the crowd. The immediate interest is in the social situation of which such behavior is an evidence and expression. Social epidemics, as other forms of unrest, may be understood only in the light of their social and cultural setting, the group situation, and the type of interaction.

The animal analogue of the social epidemic is the stampede. Herds of cattle, and certain other animals, become restless because of hunger, thirst, strange surroundings, or other cause, and the unrest may take the form of sudden movement of the entire herd. Like the panic runs of armies, animal stampedes appear against a background of physical or mental fear and discomfort.

Fads and such related phenomena as crazes, booms, and fashions illustrate other forms of social unrest. Fads are variations from and protests against the conventional, customary, and standardized folkways of the group. They generally have to do with the ornamental and superficial gewgaws of life but they appear also in literature, education, architecture, medicine, and other fields. They consist essentially in placing emphasis on the trivial, glamorous, and superficial rather than upon enduring values. A condition of maladjustment is the medium in which they flourish. They are often the result of a random search for satisfying activity. There is an inarticulate protest against status and a consequent disposition to seize upon new and novel things. The old is treated lightly or disrespectfully; honor goes to the new and prestige is enjoyed by the freakish.

A second group of spectacular phenomena, including such items as real estate and financial booms and spectacular manias, centers about those economic activities of the group that seem to promise large and sudden wealth. Social contagion and enthusiasm are essential elements. Fads and fashions affect particularly the members of the idle and well-fed groups; the financial manias spread ordinarily in a different stratum of society. They go back, too, to a different basis; fads are in general a matter of distinction and new experience; speculative manias are initiated by the desire for economic gain.

The concrete cases where sudden bursts of speculative enthusiasm have inflated prices of goods far beyond their value are numerous in the modern era. In recent years speculation in

stocks raised the prices until a sudden collapse destroyed the fictitious values. A recent boom in Florida real estate inflated land values grossly in excess of economic return. During the World War period farm lands in several midwestern states were bought and sold at four or five or more times their value as capitalized on the basis of any possible productive return. Almost every American town has passed through a boom, a period of inflated land values. Canal and reclamation projects, oil booms, and gold rushes are among the numerous popular demonstrations of this order. A single concrete illustration will suffice.

In 1825 the report of a congressional committee on the feasibility of producing silk in America showed the imports of silk to lead all others and to exceed in value the American food exports to Europe. This report was the initial step in the silkworm boom. The vision of fabulous sums to be made in silk production seduced the popular imagination: knowledge of silk production was absent and imagination was wholly uninhibited by correcting facts. No statement of prospective profits, however incredible, seemed exaggerated.

The delusion was shared and increased by the government and the public press. Four years after the congressional report the legislature of Delaware undertook the official encouragement of the silk industry. All lands employed in growing the white mulberry trees—the food supply of the silkworms—were exempted from taxation and prizes were offered for the growing of mulberry trees. The mania spread throughout the eastern tier of states and as far west as Indiana, Kentucky, and Tennessee. Fifteen other states passed acts similar to those of Delaware. Advertisements increased in number and size and the newspapers in their news columns gave much space to praise of the mulberry. Men posing as experts in the raising of silkworms lectured to crowded audiences at high admission fees. Books on the subject were written and found a ready sale; a magazine devoted to silk culture appeared and gained a wide circulation.

The belief became general that every farm would be a mulberry grove and a nursery for young trees. A single acre planted to the mulberry would yield a profit of from \$200 to \$500; the Richmond papers gravely discussed profits of \$1,000 per acre. An ounce of eggs would produce 40,000 cocoons. One cocoon would yield from 300 to 600 yards of silk thread. Twelve pounds of cocoons would reel a pound of silk which would make 16 yards of cloth

worth \$4.50 a yard. One hundred fifty-two pounds of mulberry leaves would feed enough worms to produce the pound of silk.

Homes were mortgaged to buy trees. In the beginning of the boom the shoots sold for \$2 a hundred; at the height of the boom they found a ready market at \$500 a hundred. Choice trees brought \$25 or more each. The bare hills were presently covered with the young mulberry trees. There was not enough space about Baltimore for all the trees purchased. The town council of Baltimore gravely considered the planting of mulberry trees in the cemeteries.

Raising the trees is the least difficult part of the silk industry. The hatching of the eggs and the care of the cocoons proved difficult; the care of the cocoons and the reeling of silk were wholly beyond the capacity of the Americans. When it was presently discovered that there was no easy money to be made, the fever died down, the price of mulberry trees and of silkworm eggs dropped to their former levels, and the people returned to sanity and business.

In the presence of fear, hardship, and uncertainty epidemic phenomena spread easily and rapidly. Political oppression, economic suffering, or other condition that renders the life of many persons intolerable may lead to migration and mass wandering that appear to be more or less spontaneous. The Negro exodus from the South in 1879 was a mass though not a concerted movement. The hard life coupled with the vague rumors of easier conditions elsewhere and the example of others started thousands in migration to they knew not where. The numerous rushes to newly discovered gold fields, diamond mines, and other regions that hold the lure of sudden wealth are in major part individual rather than concerted movements, but the stimulus is in some part the action of others. Volunteers in times of war are for the most part emotionally disturbed individuals responding to the suggestion of example. The major or many of the major phenomena in human as in animal behavior appear against a background of fear and uncertainty.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. What is the relation of collective behavior to social control?
2. State your own conception of collective behavior.
3. Describe the process of collective behavior.
4. How is the term used in the text? What is its relation to social disorganization?

5. What is the most elementary basis of collective behavior?
6. Explain what is meant by saying that in any familiar situation convention dictates the appropriate response. Give illustrations other than those mentioned in the text.
7. Give examples of situations known to your experience in which no ready-made convention was socially provided. How was the situation mediated?
8. Why are the established patterns of behavior more nearly adequate to the needs of a primitive than of a modern society?
9. Is it true that in times of cultural disorganization there are always attempts to restore and enforce traditional ways?
10. What are the three general types of interaction?
11. Classify some ten or a dozen familiar types of groupings according to the type of interaction that is dominant.
12. We speak of the congregation in relation to its pastor or of the group of children in a family in relation to the one in charge as a flock. What are the common and what the differentiating features of the human and other flocks?
13. Distinguish between the pack and the herd. Which, in your opinion, has more the characteristics of human groups?
14. How important among human beings are sense stimulation and emotional response?
15. Define and give additional illustrations of interaction on the basis of common sentiments and traditions.
16. How much of interaction among people you know is on a predominantly intellectual and critical level? To what extent is the discussion in this class on a critical level?
17. Give examples of your own relations to others on the different levels of interaction.
18. "Man is only a little bit reasonable and to a very great extent very unintelligently moved in quite unreasonable ways." Discuss and illustrate concretely.
19. In what ways do group ways parallel the animal instincts?
20. Describe the place of custom in primitive society.
21. Trace the general pattern of culture changes.
22. Define unrest and state the conditions under which individual unrest becomes social unrest.
23. What are the causes of unrest?
24. What is the relation of social unrest to social organization?
25. What are the facts that make for social unrest in the modern world?
26. How does education contribute to the increase of social unrest?
27. How has modern science contributed to unrest in the modern world?
28. State the relation of social unrest to the social organization.
29. Give various examples of forms of unrest not mentioned in the text.
30. Define social contagion.
31. Give illustrations from your experience of phenomena that you would class as social epidemics.
32. How do you account for such behavior as the mewing epidemic in the French convent?

33. In what fundamental sense if at all does the behavior of "the great fear" differ from that of the mewling nuns?
34. Show how social contagion plays an important rôle in political behavior.
35. State your understanding of the idea that discontent becomes articulate. At what point does it become articulate?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.
2. Make a study of a "congenial" group from the point of view of the types of social interaction between the members.
3. Study the fraternity, sorority, or other group to which you belong from the viewpoint of group unity and its basis. Is it a unity? In what sense? Are there factions within the group?
4. Make a classification of an extensive list of specific concrete groups according to the dominant types of interaction.
5. Study some collective behavior phenomena in the student body from the point of view of social contagion.
6. Record faithfully the conversation you have during some interval of time and afterward analyze it into that which is conventional and that which is intellectual.
7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:
 - a. Collective Behavior. R. E. Park, "Collective Behavior," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
 - b. The In-group and the Primary Group. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 59-61; 63-65.
 - c. Levels of Interaction. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 342-343.
 - d. Types of Social Groups. J. L. Gillin and F. W. Blackmar, *Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 397-407.
 - e. The Classification Groups. E. Sapir, "Group," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
8. Topics for written themes:
 - a. Mass and Collective Behavior
 - b. The Classification of Groups
 - c. A Social Epidemic
 - d. The Group as an Automatic Control Device
 - e. Collective and Concerned Action
 - f. Diverse Conceptions of Collective Behavior
 - g. Collective Behavior and Social Change
 - h. The Content of Daily Conversation
 - i. Suggestibility and Its Control
 - j. Historic Social Epidemics
 - k. The Agitator as a Type of Restless Person
 - l. The Tulip Mania
 - m. The Mississippi Bubble

Supplementary Readings

1. Bernard, L. L.: *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. XXXII, "The Influence of Contacts upon Individual and Collective Behavior," pp. 496-516.
2. Bernard, L. L.: "Collective Behavior of Men," J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 415-416.
3. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XXI, "Social Groups," pp. 241-252.
4. Bowman, L. E.: "Population Mobility and Community Organization," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 20(1926), 133-137. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *The Urban Community*, pp. 155-160.
5. Brooks, L. M.: "The New Mobility and the Coastal Island," *Social Forces*, 9(1930), 99-103.
6. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*, Chap. XIV, "Democracy and Crowd Excitement," pp. 149-156.
7. Dewey, J.: *Individualism, Old and New*, Chap. IV, "The Lost Individual," pp. 50-70.
8. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, "Social Change and Disorganization," pp. 711-713.
9. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. III, "Group Life and Mental Evolution," pp. 82-105.
10. Gault, R. H.: *Social Psychology*, "Psychic Instability and Unrest," pp. 255-261.
11. Gillin, J. L., and F. W. Blackmar: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "Collective Behavior," pp. 396-412.
12. House, F. N.: "Social Change and Social Science," *Social Forces*, 7(1928), 11-17.
13. Odum, H. W.: *Man's Quest for Social Guidance*, Chap. VII, "Social Change and Social Problems," pp. 100-115.
14. Park, R. E.: "Human Nature and Collective Behavior," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32(1926-1927), 733-741.
15. Park, R. E.: "Collective Behavior," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
16. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Collective Behavior," pp. 865-934.
17. Sidis, B.: *The Psychology of Suggestion*, Chap. XXVIII, "Society and Epidemics," pp. 309-313; Chap. XXIX, "Stampede," pp. 314-318; Chap. XXX, "Medieval Mental Epidemics," pp. 319-330.
18. Thompson, J. W.: "The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War," *American Journal of Sociology*, 26(1920-1921), 565-572.
19. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XXXIII, "Widening Horizons," pp. 380-386.
20. Wallis, W. D., and M. M. Willey: *Readings in Sociology*, Chap. XVII, "The Diffusion of Culture," pp. 576-595.
21. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XXIV, "Mental Epidemics," pp. 693-720.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE CROWD

An unsatisfied appetite or other individual or personal need of the organism produces a state of tension and leads to activity to satisfy the need and relieve the tension. When the need is a recurrent one, there is periodic tension; and, if the means for satisfying the need are under control, prompt and pleasurable satisfaction results in habit patterns and folk practices. Where it is not possible to satisfy the need, either because the need itself is not understood or because the means to relief are not under control, tension is more or less chronic and often leads to random activity that ends in exhaustion rather than in satisfaction and relief. There exists a state of unrest, of aimless and random and misdirected activity in response to needs that the activity does not satisfy.

Unrest becomes social when it is communicated, when the activity of one leads to similar activity on the part of others, and especially when there is a heightened emotional condition resulting from the mutual and circular stimulation and response. In the preceding chapter social unrest was treated as a first stage in institutional reorganization. It arises and flourishes in a social situation where the social organization has failed to satisfy or to permit the satisfaction of certain fundamental human wishes. It expresses a deep-lying but generally undefined and often unrecognized revolt against the existing social arrangements. In such a time the existing social order is more or less unstable and there is a general administrative disposition to maintain its integrity by an increased use of pomp, ceremonial, and external force. By these or other means the institutional organization may be perpetuated, in spite of its inadequacy, and the condition of social unrest continue as a more or less permanent characteristic of the social order.

A condition of social and general unrest is an environmental setting favorable to the appearance of emotional groups and spectacular group behavior. In the present chapter crowds and

crowd activity are treated as characteristic of unrest and as representing a second stage of the collective behavior process.

A. THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF CROWDS

In popular language the term crowd designates any aggregation of persons. The usage is characteristically loose and non-discriminating. In the social literature the use of the term is almost equally loose and confusing. Ross employs it without definition or consistency. In Le Bon's writing it refers to the masses, the lower or unemancipated classes, particularly in times of disorder. Lee, Nietzsche, and Trotter also use the word more or less as an epithet in reference to the peasantry and industrial proletariat. Martin further abuses the term by confusing the group with certain bonds of group unity. To him the crowd is not so much an aggregation of persons as it is a mental condition of wide incidence. "The word crowd must be understood to mean the peculiar mental condition which sometimes occurs when people think and act together, either immediately, where the members of the groups are present and in close contact, or remotely, as when they affect one another in a certain way through the medium of an organization, a party or sect, the press, etc."¹

In the common-sense conception a crowd is any collection of persons. It includes any and all chance and ephemeral aggregations as well as groups that are more or less permanent and highly organized. It is applied to any congestion of persons on the street, to the spectators at an athletic game, to an academic procession, to a church congregation, and to any other massing of persons regardless of nature or purpose. A crowd in the popular usage is a number of persons in close formation. The common-sense use of the word always stresses one essential characteristic: the crowd is always an aggregated group.

But a mere chance grouping of people, no matter how closely massed or disorderly, is not a crowd in the sociological sense. A massed aggregation of individuals becomes a crowd only when and to the extent that it acquires a unity and comes to possess a distinguishing set of behavior characteristics. It is sharply differentiated from the mere chance aggregation of people on the one hand and from the public assembly on the other.

¹ E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, p. 6.

The crowd is an elementary, spontaneous, and temporary group. It has no past, hence no sentiments or traditions, and no future. Every crowd, however, has a definite life history: it has a beginning, a period of development and organization, and a stage of decline and dissolution. And this life history, in its essential elements, is the same in every true crowd; crowd organization is a fairly definite and uniform process.

Any unusual chance happening—an accident, a band, an orator, a fire, a police raid—attracts the attention of many or all persons in the immediate locality to the same thing or in the same direction. The general focusing of attention may be but momentary: curiosity satisfied, the persons may redirect attention to their several ends. If the event be one of a spectacular nature, say an atrocious crime or one that has deep and general significance, as a public disaster or gross social injustice, many persons will be emotionally disturbed and attention will continue to dwell upon the event. Other persons, attracted by the group itself or excited by the reports that spread, hasten to the scene. This congregation of people and the focusing of attention are the initial steps in crowd formation.

In the conditions—close aggregation and focused attention—the individuals in a group become highly suggestible. The very presence of a great number of persons in close proximity is in itself stimulating; it increases the emotional strain and nervous excitement, hence the suggestibility. Each person is conscious of the presence and mood of others and this in some measure modifies his mental processes; his feeling, thinking, and overt behavior are different from what they are when he is alone. His bearing and action, modified by the presence of others, influence those in his presence. The excited words and gestures heighten the effect. The excitement spreads. There is thus initiated a series of reciprocal influences, interactions on the level of immediate responses to stimuli, among the assembled persons. The appearance and gestures of *A* stimulate *B*, whose response serves in turn further to stimulate *A*. But both *A* and *B* stimulate, and are further stimulated by, *C*, *D*, and the other individuals in the aggregation. A circular reaction is set up and maintained among the assembled persons that is comparable to the milling of the herd. It continues as long as they remain assembled.

The milling process establishes a condition of *rapport* among the members of the group. A common mood is built up, intensi-

fied, and maintained; the members develop a high degree of emotional like-mindedness in which stimulation and responses are in the main on the organic level; they are immediate, direct, and sympathetic. The emotional state may be one of fear or rage or enthusiasm according to the nature of the circumstances; but all feel alike, each tends to respond in the same way.

The centering of attention on one object or idea shuts out for the time being all consideration of other things. In the excited, milling group one idea or thing is supreme; a condition of mental isolation prevails; all elements foreign to the situation are removed, all distracting factors are excluded. The multiplicity of memories and considerations that ordinarily control personal behavior are for the time being shut out. The attention is focused and the range and center of consciousness narrowed to a single consideration. This mental isolation is the most characteristic and important feature of crowd organization when viewed from the point of view of behavior. In it is an absence of all social restraint. The excitement and fixation of attention inhibit the working of the habits, ideas, and standards which normally guide the individual in ordinary social life. The conventional inhibitions are forgotten; they have for the time being ceased to exist. In these conditions the impulses commonly repressed or sublimated may find expression in criminal, savage, and bestial behavior so often asserted to be characteristic of crowds.

The final element in the fully organized crowd is some form of collective representation, something to focus the attention, symbolize the sentiment or passion, and embody the objective of the group. A shibboleth, a banner, a war cry, or other device is essential to a complete organization.

In the fully organized crowd, then, a condition of mental isolation and *rapprochement* is established and the attention of the members is focused on some collective representation. Obviously, there are all degrees of crowd organization, from that of the momentary centering of attention of a passing throng to the isolated solidarity of the orgy and the mob.

B. THE BEHAVIOR OF CROWDS

It is perhaps emphasizing a truism to point out that the members of a group can communicate and become organized only on the basis of what they have in common. In a group composed of

a lawyer, a farmer, a merchant, a section hand, and a stenographer, for example, the possible conversation, in so far as it is general, will be limited to the weather, automobiles, and the like—to the very few things concerning which each member of the group has experience or information. When the number of persons is much increased, the possibility of interaction is farther reduced; it must be on the level of elements common to all men in the group regardless of class or education. The things common to all men and comprehensible to all are such fundamental emotions as fear, anger, and rage and, within any local group, a common body of enthusiasms, prejudices, hatreds, and other sentimental complexes. In terms of these common elements crowds form and feel and act.

In the aggregation of animals, whether a herd, a flock, a pack, or other formation, there is an absence of any common and conscious purpose and the behavior is conditioned by this fact. In the flock of sheep each behaves like every other, the leaders set the pattern to which each individually conforms. In the hunting pack each dog is stimulated by the cry of the others to continue the chase, but there are no cooperation and no division of labor; each follows independently the trail of the quarry. In a stampede of cattle the action is collective but it is not concerted. Different animal groups act in ways that are distinctive and characteristic—in ways that are predetermined in the animal organism—but there is no concerted action and no possibility of concerted action except on the basis of instinct.

In the human crowd there are always some degree of organization and some division of labor. There is always a more or less clearly defined purpose and the crowd members are controlled by it as an objective; they cooperate to the achievement of the common end. The members of a human crowd do not imitate as do the members of a flock; they carry out the suggestions of the leader but each member acts individually as well as cooperatively to promote the common objective. Like the members of the pack, they are stimulated and encouraged by the presence, gestures, and general behavior of other members of the group; but there is an additional source of unity and stimulation in the fact that the human crowd members respond to symbols that objectify and seem to justify the immediate activity. Moreover, each individual of the human crowd acts more or less in his own way to promote the common end.

The behavior of the crowd is always emotionally determined. Men differ much in intellect and experience and information but little in the primal emotions. These provide a common bond and a basis for interaction in all conditions. In the crowd the emotional tone is heightened by the concentration of attention, the suggestions of leaders, the use of verbal and other symbols, the excited gestures of the crowd members, and other circumstances of the occasion. The centering of attention and the excitement arising in the milling of the crowd give a state of expectancy that plays a large part in determining the group's behavior. The fact that people expect something to happen is in itself an important factor in determining the appearance of the thing expected. In reassembled crowds, where the members have a memory of the behavior of previous occasions, there is commonly an easy reinstatement of the emotional tone and behavior in accordance with the earlier pattern.

It follows from the facts stated that the crowd is easily led. The critical faculties are in abeyance: individuals accept as true the most improbable of statements, and any suggestion in line with the mood of the crowd gets an immediate response and may become an objective of group activity. The successful crowd leader is the orator who is capable of arousing fanatical enthusiasm and who is prolific in suggestions for immediate activity.

C. THE CLASSIFICATION OF CROWDS

As mentioned incidentally, crowds differ one from another in numerous ways. They differ in size and duration, in objective and behavior, in mode of origin, in degree of organization, and in other major and minor ways. Each concrete crowd is a historic phenomenon; no two are identical.

Any thoroughgoing classification of crowds, as of other similar groupings, must result from concrete study of the groups and their behavior. It must follow study that will reveal the modes of interaction and the bonds of unity. No such study has been made; there has been very little scientifically reputable work done along this line. The various writers on the crowd have been content, for the most part, with common-sense groupings.

A division adequate to the present purpose is into the political or active crowds, those that act; and the mystic or orgiastic crowds, those that simply mill to an emotional frenzy.

The simple presence of other persons even under ordinary circumstances is mildly stimulating. In times of expectancy and tension the excitement is heightened by the mutually sympathetic stimulations and the common mood is intensified. With the unity of feeling and attention and the development of *rapport*, the conventional inhibitions on behavior are broken down and the crowd mills in moral abandon. Crowds do not always act; they are often content simply to feel. The behavior of most crowds does not go beyond the state of isolation and emotional expression.

To such crowds we apply the term *orgiastic* or *mystic*. They are purely feeling groups, passive and expressive rather than active. Their behavior is ecstatic, they have no end beyond the pleasure inherent in the emotional debauch. Through mutual and circular stimulation the members may work themselves into a pleasurable emotional warmth or even into a hysterical frenzy. In a relatively brief period, commonly through fatigue, attention is dissipated, the emotional excitement subsides, and the group disintegrates.

Other crowds that have achieved isolation and emotional unity are not content merely to mill; an objective is defined and the mass surges to its achievement. These are political or active crowds of which the mob is a familiar type. Their behavior is spontaneous and often spectacular; their duration is necessarily brief.

Some concrete indication of the nature and behavior of different types of *orgiastic* and political crowds is given in the following sections.

D. THE ORGIASTIC DANCE

The dance is the simplest and most elementary type of *orgiastic* crowd. Dancing is an immediate and spontaneous expression of emotional excitement and the activity intensifies and communicates the excitement. The dance is expressive, a spontaneous method of celebration.

Muscular movement is the most elementary and typical expression of feeling whether of elation or of grief. The exaggerated physical behavior of the child in emotional moments, or of the dog, is generally familiar. Movement gives a release of tension, it provides a vent for emotional energy in individuals with no other means of expression. It follows spontaneously and directly

from mental or emotional excitement and externalizes the emotional state. But these spontaneous, impulsive, random movements tend to be rhythmic; behavior under stress of intense emotion assumes form and pattern, it is repetitive and tends to be measured and symmetrical. But rhythmic movements are highly contagious; they arouse an organic sympathy, establish a relationship among the participating individuals. The explanation and social function of the dance lie in this fact: it is unifying; through stimulating the emotions it brings about corporate unity.

Not only does the dance serve as a vent for excitement but it stimulates excitement; because of its rhythmic nature it produces a form of autointoxication. The dancing dervishes of the East, as the priests and prophets among many peoples, dance themselves into a delirium in which state they deliver themselves of oracular and "inspired" utterances. A similar state of emotional frenzy may be induced in large numbers of individuals participating in the collective dance. The power of the dance to stimulate the participants to exaggerated forms of irrational behavior appears concretely in the following accounts of Mooney and that of Hecker as well as in that of the Indian ghost dance quoted in a later connection.

In 1374 an epidemic of maniacal religious dancing broke out on the lower Rhine and spread rapidly over Germany, the Netherlands, and into France. The victims of the mania claimed to dance in honor of Saint John. Men and women went about dancing hand in hand, in pairs, or in a circle, on the streets, in the churches, at their homes, or wherever they might be, hour after hour without rest until they fell into convulsions. While dancing they sang doggerel verses in honor of Saint John and uttered unintelligible cries. Of course they saw visions. At last whole companies of these crazy fanatics, men, women, and children, went dancing through the country, along the public roads, and into the cities, until the clergy felt compelled to interfere, and cured the dancers by exorcising the evil spirits that moved them. In the fifteenth century the epidemic broke out again. The dancers were now formed into divisions by the clergy and sent to the church of Saint Vitus at Rotestein, where prayers were said for them, and they were led in procession around the altar and dismissed cured. Hence the name of Saint Vitus' dance given to one variety of abnormal muscular tremor.¹

¹ J. Mooney, *Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 14(1892-1893), Part II, 935.

About the same time another strange religious extravagance spread over western Europe. Under the name of Flagellants, thousands of enthusiasts banded together with crosses, banners, hymns, and all the paraphernalia of religion, and went about in procession, publicly scourging one another as an atonement for their sins and the sins of mankind in general. They received their first impetus from the preaching of Saint Anthony of Padua in the thirteenth century. About the year 1260 the movement broke out nearly simultaneously in Italy, France, Germany, Austria, and Poland, and afterward spread into Denmark and England. It was at its height in the fourteenth century. In Germany in 1261 the devotees, preceded by banner and crosses, marched with faces veiled and bodies bared above the waist, and scourged themselves twice a day for thirty-three successive days in memory of the thirty-three years of Christ's life. The strokes of the whip were timed to the music of hymns. Men and women together took part in the scourging. The mania finally wore itself out, but reappeared in 1349 with more systematic organization. According to Schaff, "When they came to towns, the bands marched in regular military order and singing hymns. At the time of flagellation they selected a square or churchyard or field. Taking off their shoes and stockings and forming a circle, they girded themselves with aprons and lay down flat on the ground. . . . The leader then stepped over each one, touched them with the whip, and bade them rise. As each was touched he followed after the leader and imitated him. Once all on their feet the flagellation began. The brethren went two by two around the whole circle, striking their backs till the blood trickled down from the wounds. The whip consisted of three thongs, each with four iron teeth. During the flagellation a hymn was sung. After all had gone around the circle the whole body again fell on the ground, beating upon their breasts. On arising they flagellated themselves a second time. While the brethren were putting on their clothes a collection was taken up among the audience. The scene was concluded by the reading of a letter from Christ, which an angel had brought to earth and which commended the pilgrimages of the Flagellants."¹

So early as the year 1374, assemblages of men and women were seen at Aix-la-Chapelle who had come out of Germany, and who, united by one common delusion, exhibited to the public both in the streets and in the churches the following strange spectacle: They formed circles hand in hand, and appearing to have lost all control over their senses, continued dancing, regardless of the bystanders, for hours together, in wild delirium, until at length they fell to the ground in a state of exhaustion.

¹ J. Mooney, *Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 14(1892-1893), Part II, 935-936.

They then complained of extreme oppression, and groaned as if in the agonies of death, until they were swathed in clothes bound tightly round their waists, on which they again recovered, and remained free from complaint until the next attack. This practice of swathing was resorted to on account of the tympany which followed these spasmodic ravings, but patients were frequently relieved in a less artificial manner, by thumping and trampling upon the parts affected. While dancing they neither saw nor heard, being insensible to external impressions through the senses, but were haunted by visions, their fancies conjuring up spirits whose names they shrieked out; and some of them afterwards asserted that they felt as if they had been immersed in a stream of blood, which obliged them to leap so high. Others during the paroxysm saw the heavens open and the Savior enthroned with the Virgin Mary, as indeed the religious notions of the age were strangely and variously reflected in their imaginations.

Where the disease was completely developed, the attack commenced with epileptic convulsions. Those affected fell to the ground senseless, panting and laboring for breath. They foamed at the mouth, and suddenly springing up began their dance amidst strange contortions. Yet the malady doubtless made its appearance very variously, and was modified by temporary or local circumstances, whereof non-medical contemporaries but imperfectly noted the essential particulars, accustomed as they were to confound their observation of natural events with their notions of the world of spirits.

It was but a few months ere this demoniacal disease had spread over the neighboring Netherlands.¹

The power of the dance to inspire individuals and groups has been generally recognized and the exercise from time to time repeated in order to reinstate the emotional experience. When thus repeated it takes on a somewhat different character: it loses something of its expressive spontaneity, as it is deliberately manipulated to get an effect. In this form it is a means to an end, an aid in producing a desired emotional experience. It serves frequently as a technique for arousing the members of the group and stimulating them to deeds of valor. The war dance of the American Indians served to stimulate excitement and thus overcome fears through group frenzy. It is a widely used means to group unity and solidarity. The effects of rhythmic participation in the physical exercises are heightened and intensified by music and song. The dance is also a common device for creating religious frenzy.

¹ J. F. C. Hecker, *The Epidemics of the Middle Ages*, No. II, pp. 15-16.

The effects of the dance are sometimes spectacular and terrifying. They are not understood, therefore, especially where the dance has some religious significance; they are interpreted as a manifestation of divine presence. This explanation in turn gives renewed faith in the deities. In the ghost dance of the Sioux Indians we see the dance used consciously and deliberately as a technique for inducing trance and vision.

As the crowd gathered about the tree the high priest, or master of ceremonies, began his address, giving them directions as to the chant and other matters. After he had spoken for about fifteen minutes they arose and formed in a circle. As nearly as I could count, there were between three and four hundred persons. One stood directly behind another, each with his hands on his neighbor's shoulders. After walking about a few times, chanting, "Father, I come," they stopped marching, but remained in the circle, and set up the most fearful, heart-piercing wails I ever heard—crying, moaning, groaning, and shrieking out their grief, and naming over their departed friends and relatives, at the same time taking up handfuls of dust at their feet, washing their hands in it, and throwing it over their heads. Finally, they raised their eyes to heaven, their hands clasped high above their heads, and stood straight and perfectly still, invoking the power of the Great Spirit to allow them to see and talk with their people who had died. This ceremony lasted about fifteen minutes, when they all sat down where they were and listened to another address, which I did not understand, but which I afterwards learned were words of encouragement and assurance of the coming messiah.

When they arose again, they enlarged the circle by facing toward the center, taking hold of hands, and moving around in the manner of school children in their play of "needle's eye." And now the most intense excitement began. They would go as fast as they could, their hands moving from side to side, their bodies swaying, their arms, with hands gripped tightly in their neighbors', swinging back and forth with all their might. If one, more weak and frail, came near falling, he would be jerked up and into position until tired nature gave way. The ground had been worked and worn by many feet, until the fine, flourlike dust lay light and loose to the depth of two or three inches. The wind, which had increased, would sometimes take it up, enveloping the dancers and hiding them from view. In the ring were men, women, and children; the strong and the robust, the weak consumptive, and those near to death's door. They believed those who were sick would be cured by joining in the dance and losing consciousness. From the beginning they chanted, to a monotonous tune, the words

Father, I come;
Mother, I come;
Brother, I come;
Father, give us back our arrows.

All of which they would repeat over and over again until first one and then another would break from the ring and stagger away and fall down. One woman fell a few feet from me. She came toward us, her hair flying over her face, which was purple, looking as if the blood would burst through; her hands and arms moving wildly; every breath a pant and a groan; and she fell on her back, and went down like a log. I stepped up to her as she lay there motionless, but with every muscle twitching and quivering. She seemed to be perfectly unconscious. Some of the men and a few of the women would run, stepping high and pawing the air in a frightful manner. Some told me afterwards that they had a sensation as if the ground were rising toward them and would strike them in the face. Others would drop where they stood. One woman fell directly into the ring, and her husband stepped out and stood over her to prevent them from trampling upon her. No one ever disturbed those who fell or took any notice of them except to keep the crowd away.

They kept up dancing until fully 100 persons were lying unconscious. Then they stopped and seated themselves in a circle, and as each one recovered from his trance he was brought to the center of the ring to relate his experience. Each told his story to the medicine man and he shouted it to the crowd. Not one in ten claimed that he saw anything. I asked one Indian—a tall, strong fellow, straight as an arrow—what his experience was. He said he saw an eagle coming toward him. It flew round and round, drawing nearer and nearer until he put out his hand to take it, when it was gone. I asked him what he thought of it. "Big lie," he replied. I found by talking to them that not one in twenty believed it. After resting for a time they would go through the same performance, perhaps three times a day. They practiced fasting, and every morning those who joined in the dance were obliged to immerse themselves in the creek.¹

In the forms in which it receives the sanction of the modern *mores* the dance has of course lost much of its original character and most of its social significance. In its modern form it functions chiefly as an exhilarating exercise that lifts the inhibitions and reduces social distance. The stage dances of the sophisticated world, like the solo dances of primitive peoples, are exhibitions of a different order and with a different purpose.

¹ J. Mooney, *Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 14(1892-1893), Part II, 916-917.

E. EMOTIONAL STIMULATION AND ORGIASTIC RESPONSE

The mechanisms of crowd behavior are particularly apparent in certain types of religious activity. Religion is everywhere a social and group product and in its primitive and unsophisticated forms is largely or exclusively a crowd phenomenon—a body of emotional enthusiasm resulting from milling in close formation.

In origin and development and in many details of later practice religious exercises are closely related to the communal and orgiastic dance. In some primitive groups the two are indistinguishable; crowd frenzy aroused by the dance is directed toward religious interests. In many later cases the dance remains as the chief technique for producing religious frenzy. In the Western religious groups growing out of the Protestant Reformation the dance has generally been discontinued as a formal religious device, though remnants of the former connection or identity are retained in modified form, as in processions. The bishop of the church, for example, is literally "the leader of the dance," and in certain Protestant sects, as the Holy Rollers, the dance is retained in its entirety and functions to produce a condition of *rapport*, emotional frenzy, and mental isolation.

Religious exercises that come within the modern *mores* are not in most cases crowd phenomena in a pure sense. The crowd is a spontaneous and temporary grouping, without past or future; religious congregations are in all or nearly all cases groups that have met before and reassemble to repeat an experience that gave pleasurable, inspired feelings at previous times. They are in general an extension and organization of originally spontaneous forms, repetitions rather than initial performances. The activity is guided by a body of memories and behavior patterns and commonly lacks somewhat the spontaneity of the true crowd. Religious congregations are, in general, controlled, manipulated groups. From this point of view the church is an agency that has been developed, and itself has developed machinery, for reinstating the pleasurable emotional feeling of inspiration that comes from participation in crowd activity. In some cases it functions to stimulate, in some cases to restrain, exaggerated expressions of emotional frenzy. In some cases Western church congregations are virtually only sympathetic audiences and the church exercises routine and non-stimulating performances.

But the genuinely emotional religious group exemplifies each step in orgiastic crowd organization. Religious exercises commonly involve the congregation and close association of numerous persons. In general, the members of the congregations are prepared and expectant, ready to repeat a familiar exercise and experience a desired sensation. The physical conditions and surroundings—the dark church, the hollow music, the familiar ritual, the solemn ceremonial—are designed to induce the desired mental attitude and emotional mood. Mental isolation is further developed through devices for securing rapt attention to emotionally charged symbols. Participation in common and emotionally disturbing performances—that is, milling exercises—stimulates enthusiasm and a high degree of *rapprochement* among the members of the group. Because of the skillful technique and the psychological selection and preparation of the membership, the church congregations sometimes achieve a stage of protracted frenzy seldom reached by spontaneous and unconditioned groups.

It was at the principal of the Presbyterian churches that I was twice witness to scenes that made me shudder; in describing one, I describe both, and every one; the same thing is constantly repeated.

It was in the middle of the summer, but the service we were recommended to attend did not begin until it was dark. The church was well lighted, and crowded almost to suffocation. On entering we found three priests standing side by side. . . . We took our places in a pew close to the rail which surrounded it.

The priest who stood in the middle was praying; the prayer was extravagantly vehement, and offensively familiar in expression; when this was ended, a hymn was sung, and then another priest took the center place, and preached. The sermon had considerable eloquence, but of a frightful kind. The preacher described, with ghastly minuteness, the last feeble, fainting moments of human life, and then the gradual progress of decay after death, which he followed through every process up to the last loathsome stage of decomposition. Suddenly changing his tone, which had been that of sober, accurate description, into the shrill voice of horror, he bent forward his head, as if to gaze on some object beneath the pulpit. And as Rebecca made known to *Ivanhoe* what she saw through the window, so the preacher made known to us what he saw in the pit that seemed to open before him. The device was certainly a happy one for giving effect to his description of hell. No image that fire, flame, brimstone, molten lead, or red-hot pinchers could supply, with flesh, nerves, and sinews quivering under them, was omitted. The perspiration ran in streams from the face of

the preacher; his eyes rolled, his lips were covered with foam, and every feature had the deep expression of horror it would have borne, had he, in truth, been gazing at the scene he described. The acting was excellent. . . .

The other two priests arose, and began to sing a hymn. It was some seconds before the congregation could join as usual; every upturned face looked pale and horror-struck. . . .

And now in every part of the church a movement was perceptible, slight at first, but by degrees becoming more decided. Young girls rose, and sat down, and rose again; and then the pews opened, and several came tottering out, their hands clasped, their heads hanging on their bosoms, and every limb trembling, and still the hymn went on; but as the poor creatures approached the rail their sobs and groans became audible. They seated themselves on the "anxious benches"; the hymn ceased, and two of the three priests walked down from the tribune, and going, one to the right, the other to the left, began whispering to the poor tremblers seated there. These whispers were inaudible to us, but the sobs and groans increased to a frightful excess. Young creatures, with features pale and distorted, fell on their knees on the pavement, and soon sunk forward on their faces; the most violent cries and shrieks followed, while from time to time a voice was heard in convulsive accents, exclaiming, "Oh Lord!" "Oh Lord Jesus!" "Help me, Jesus!" and the like. . . .

Violent hysterics and convulsions seized many of them, and when the tumult was at its highest, the priest who remained above gave out a hymn as if to drown it.

It was a frightful sight to behold innocent young creatures, in the gay morning of existence, thus seized upon, horror-struck, and rendered feeble and enervated forever. One young girl, apparently not more than fourteen, was supported in the arms of another some years older; her face was pale as death; her eyes wide open, and perfectly devoid of meaning; her chin and bosom wet with slaver; she had every appearance of idiotism. I saw a priest approach her, he took her delicate hand, "Jesus is with her! Bless the Lord!" he said and passed on.¹

The technique developed by the various religious groups to arouse the appropriate and desired mental and emotional responses is, in major outlines, identical in the various formal denominational groups. In minor details it is sometimes radically different. The aim is everywhere the same: to produce a religious frame of mind and the appropriate overt behavior. In all cases there is congregation, a massing of people that inhibits freedom of movement and thought and conditions mental and

¹ Mrs. Trollope, *Domestic Manners of the Americans*, Vol. I, pp. 107-113.

physical behavior and emotional tone. The various groups are alike, too, in that the members congregate in an attitude favorable to the response. They come with a body of previous experience, a knowledge of the appropriate behavior, an expectation and foresight of the results to be achieved, and a sympathetic attitude toward the whole performance. All groups employ a technique to get crowd unity and enthusiasm; the differences are in the details. The building and the surroundings are designed to induce a reverent mood: in some cases reliance is placed on great, silent, ornate cathedrals in semi-darkness and on the grotesque and luxurious ornamentation of priests to produce a sense of awe and fear and reverence in impressionable believers; in other cases the buildings are intentionally rude, plain, and austere with nothing to cater to the physical comfort or the aesthetic sense. Music is in most cases a feature of the church technique. The slow, ponderous, hollow tones of the organ have a depressing and hypnotic effect; the group singing is mournful, monotonous, and repetitious. Prayer is universally used as an isolating technique. Some groups depend upon ritualistic ceremonial, others upon participation in group singing and other exercises to get physical and mental isolation and *rapport*. The Holy Rollers, the Shakers, and other gymnastic sects employ the dance in more or less primitive fashion to develop *rapport* and emotional unity.

The revival meeting exemplifies an extreme type of orgiastic crowd behavior. In performances of this nature there is an aggregation of selected persons in a state of expectancy. Emotional unity and mental isolation are secured through prayer, preaching, and group singing. The techniques are sometimes naively used, as by the backwoods preacher, or they may be deliberate and conscious, as with the stage managers of such performers as Mrs. Aimée Semple McPherson or the Reverend Billy Sunday. The object of the revival is to secure conversion by bringing crowd conditions to bear with such force as to break down rationally controlled individual behavior.

F. BEHAVIOR IN THE ORGIASTIC CROWD

The milling of the orgiastic crowd, especially in its religious forms, produces a great variety of concrete behavior phenomena of an irrational character. One type of response was shown above in the account given by Mrs. Trollope of a revival service.

Under the tense emotional strain, incident to crowd excitement and to vivid and impassioned presentation, certain persons break and manifest peculiar but characteristic physical and mental contortions. Individuals, unable to repress the violence of their emotions, give vent to them in sobs, cries, groans, shrieks, hysterical laughter, solemn weeping, shouts of ecstasy, and other muscular and nervous manifestations. The form in which the hysteria manifests itself in one becomes the pattern to which many conform. The "holy laugh," individually or in chorus, at certain times and places has been a recognized feature of religious worship. The "jerks" was a familiar phenomenon in the early American religious exercises and is still an occasional phenomenon in the religious exercises of some sects and regions. The person afflicted loses muscular control of one or more parts of the body. "The unhappy victim shook in every joint. Sometimes the head was thrown from side to side with great rapidity. Again the feet were affected, and the subject would hop like a frog. Often the body would be thrown violently to the ground, where it would continue to bound from one place to another." "Barking" is another expression of religious frenzy. The persons afflicted "gathered in groups, on all fours, like dogs, growling and snapping the teeth at the foot of a tree as the minister preached . . . a practice which they designated as 'treeing the devil.'"

The "falling exercise," described in the Indian ghost dance, was also a common result of religious activity among the pioneer whites in America. This seizure was a kind of swoon in which the individual lost muscular control with or without becoming unconscious. "Some lay quiet, unable to move or speak. Some talked, but could not move. Some beat the floor with their heels. Some, shrieking in agony, bounded about like live fish out of water. Many lay down and rolled over and over for hours at a time. Others rushed wildly over the stumps and benches, and then plunged, shouting 'Lost! Lost!' into the forest."¹

It is at this stage of tension, however produced, that trance and vision frequently appear. The afflicted individuals sometimes lie insensible for hours or days at a time and awaken to relate visions and experiences in the other worlds to which they have been transported. Every extraordinary and terrifying

¹ See E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 50-54.

nervous or physical contortion of the possessed is ascribed by the persons themselves and by others equally uninformed to some mysterious divine power. Such afflicted persons commonly enjoy a certain prestige. They frequently claim divine inspiration and are often accepted as spiritual leaders.

The whole group of miraculous phenomena—trance, vision, prophecy, the gift of tongues, healing the sick, and the like—common to orgiastic group exercises are of course easily subject to scientific explanation; they are more or less commonplace and well-understood things. But by the ignorant the physical manifestations are not understood and they are often interpreted as supernatural phenomena. As such they become the basis of sectarian groups.

About the year 1800 an epidemic of religious frenzy, known as the Kentucky revival, broke out in Kentucky and Tennessee, chiefly among the Methodists and Baptists, with accompaniments that far surpassed the wildest excesses of the ghost dance. Fanatic preachers taught their deluded followers that the spiritual advent of the kingdom was near at hand, when Christ would reign on earth and there would be an end of all sin. The date generally fixed for the consummation was the summer of 1805, and the excitement continued and grew in violence for several years until the time came and passed without extraordinary event, when the frenzy gradually subsided, leaving the ignorant believers in a state of utter collapse. The performances at the meetings of these enthusiasts were of the most exaggerated camp-meeting order, such as may be witnessed in many parts of the south, especially among the colored people. . . .

From another authority, endowed perhaps with less of fervor but with more of common sense, we get a description of these "exercises" which has a familiar ring that seems to bring it very near home. "The people remained on the ground day and night, listening to the most exciting sermons and engaging in a mode of worship which consisted in alternate crying, laughing, singing, and shouting, accompanied with gesticulations of a most extraordinary character. Often there would be an unusual outcry; some bursting forth into loud ejaculations of thanksgiving; others exhorting their careless friends to 'turn to the Lord'; some struck with terror, and hastening to escape; others trembling, weeping, and swooning away, till every appearance of life was gone, and the extremities of the body assumed the coldness of a corpse. At one meeting not less than a thousand persons fell to the ground, apparently without sense or motion. It was common to see them shed tears plentifully about an hour before they fell. They were then seized with a general tremor, and sometimes they uttered one or two piercing

shrieks in the moment of falling. This latter phenomenon was common to both sexes, to all ages, and to all sorts of characters."

After a time these crazy performances in the sacred name of religion became so much a matter of course that they were regularly classified in categories as the rolls, the jerks, the barks, etc. "The rolling exercise was effected by doubling themselves up, then rolling from one side to the other like a hoop, or in extending the body horizontally and rolling over and over in the filth like so many swine. The jerk consisted in violent spasms and twistings of every part of the body. Sometimes the head was twisted round so that the head was turned to the back, and the countenance so much distorted that not one of its features was to be recognized. When attacked by the jerks, they sometimes hopped like frogs, and the face and limbs underwent the most hideous contortions. The bark consisted in throwing themselves on all fours, growling, showing their teeth, and barking like dogs. Sometimes a number of people crouching down in front of the minister continued to bark as long as he preached. These last were supposed to be more especially endowed with the gifts of prophecy, dreams, rhapsodies, and visions of angels."¹

The political rally, the college mass meeting, the drunken revel, and other such popular demonstrations of group enthusiasm, like the dance and the religious revival, commonly lack something of the spontaneity and natural character of the true crowd. Almost invariably they are manipulated to produce the mood or demonstration desired. Often there is an elaborate technique and body of machinery, as in the case of the church, to induce the mood and behavior proper to the occasion. Where a group comes together periodically and develops a ceremonial or other technique as an aid in the reinstatement of previously expressed emotional excitement, it tends to take on organization, develop institutional characters, and establish habit responses in the membership. In the case of the political rally the demonstration is carefully planned and an elaborate machinery arranged. The demonstration may be wholly lacking in spontaneity and be carried through as a part of the routine procedure.

G. THE POLITICAL CROWD

The crowd that achieves an emotional unity and mental isolation may continue to mill about a mystic symbol until such time as physical exhaustion or other condition intrudes itself to dis-

¹J. Mooney, *Publications of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 14(1892-1893), Part II, 942-943.

turb the organization and disperse the aggregation. It has no purpose other than to produce in the participating members the type of physical pleasure that arises from the emotional excitement and uninhibited behavior on a non-intellectual plane. It is a feeling group content to shout and sing and enjoy the intoxication of exhilaration and the sense of mystic unity. The communal dance, the drunken revel, and other orgiastic and semi-orgiastic exercises of the simpler peoples seem to answer a cathartic need, as do also the pep meetings, public ovations, and other such functions among more sophisticated peoples.

But not all crowds are content merely to mill. The emotional condition may be one that demands action. If such be the case, a purpose is defined and the crowd seeks to realize it.

The character of the behavior of the political crowd is not difficult to understand. The true crowd is a spontaneous group organized on the simpler and more nearly universal levels of interaction. It is a unity that has never existed before; it is a new and unique historic event. It has no memories, no traditions, no formulae to guide its action. When it acts, it must of necessity act impulsively, that is, on the basis of immediate stimulations that make active previously established individual mechanisms. The crowd is, therefore, erratic in behavior and relatively easy to manipulate.

Under the influence of crowd excitement ordinarily intelligent and responsible persons often act in a manner radically unlike their usual behavior. The sense of responsibility and regard for consequences is in large measure lost. The behavior is always away from the customary standards and decencies of social life. Men of intelligence and apparent refinement participate in mob atrocities that seem foreign to their social nature. Nevertheless, behavior in crowds bears a very close relation to the ordinary behavior of daily life. The nature of the man is the same in and out of the crowd.

To understand the behavior of the mob it is necessary to remember that human beings are fundamentally emotional and sentimental both by original nature and by training. The native emotions of fear, anger, and the like are common to all men in about the same degree. Blended with and developed from this original equipment is a highly complex body of sentiments and attitudes that the primary groups have consciously or unwittingly inculcated. The emotion of fear normally aroused by the strange

and unknown may be supplemented and reinforced by the incidental or systematic teaching of patriotism—the love of one's own group and the reciprocal hatred of rival and enemy groups. The primary group or formal teaching may inculcate a racial prejudice against Negroes that supplements the more or less natural fear reactions incidental to contact with strange-appearing persons.

But fears, prejudices, and chauvinistic attitudes are not a possible basis of group relations. Hence the complex body of fears, prejudices, and hatreds is commonly overlaid by a more or less elaborate body of social ritual. In normal times prejudices and hatreds are more or less successfully concealed; diplomacy mediates the relations of the groups. Customs, conventions, ceremonial, moral codes, and the like are mechanisms by means of which peaceful and orderly working relations are maintained within the group and among groups in spite of personal and group fears, hatreds, and prejudices. Harmonious relations and cooperative activity among men are possible only when the fears, hatreds, aversions, and prejudices that exist among them are systematically controlled and their overt expressions inhibited. These attitudes underlie and condition the conventional behavior of the group and in the long run dictate the class and race order. But in the normal course of events they get expression, if at all, in a disguised, sublimated, and socially approved way. A racial hatred or class prejudice may get expression as a belief in the mental inequality of races or classes, for example, but not in more direct personal abuse of the hated object. Society sets the pattern of behavior from which individuals, in normal times, deviate but little. A set of working relations is maintained on the basis of habit, custom, and group definition of decent behavior.

But in times of passion, crowd excitement, and group crises the conventional controls break down; the diplomatic relations fail and behavior reverts to the basic patterns: racial prejudices and hatreds express themselves in the brutal acts of the lynching mob; the early inculcated patriotic attitudes get expression in war and violence. In the ordinary daily life of the individual the course of action is guided by a body of memories, considerations of personal and social consequences, and a great variety of external stimulations. But the effect of the crowd is to focus attention, shut out conflicting stimuli, produce mental isolation,

and thus inhibit the critical thought processes. Discussion is not possible in a miscellaneous group without a common body of knowledge and experience. There is no basis for rational group action. If men are to interact at all, it must be on the basis of what they have in common. The only things common to the members of a crowd are the universal emotions of fear and anger and the body of communal attitudes. The group responds as a group only to such stimuli as impinge upon the emotions and attitudes common to the mob members. These give a basis for understanding, for mutual response, and for concerted action. The expression of the emotions is a universally intelligible language.

The behavior of the mob is an overt expression of the underlying and normally inhibited emotional attitudes. The suppressed hatreds get direct expression when crowd excitement lifts the inhibitions and breaks down the conventional control. Passions are expressed directly, not under the disguise of socially approved behavior patterns. Mob behavior expresses the social heritage of the group, the body of attitudes held by men but under ordinary circumstances denied expression. The crowd lifts the inhibitions at the same time that it inflames the emotions.

The specific form that crowd and mob activity assumes is determined by time, place, and circumstance. It tends, however, to conform to local pattern. Every southern American lynching mob, except for details, is like every other: it expresses the fundamental racial attitudes of the white South. The Jewish pogroms in the Russian villages conform to pattern; the periodic attacks by Pacific Coast mobs on Oriental laborers are monotonously uniform. The specific mob is a unique historic incident but in any such group there are individuals who know by memory or report the behavior of similar groups and give the cue to behavior fitting the present crisis. On the American frontier, mobs in general killed their victims by hanging instead of shooting, burning, drowning, or other methods. The legalized form of capital punishment was doubtless the pattern originally copied, and subsequent mobs followed the previously used technique.

H. THE DISORGANIZATION OF THE CROWD

The duration of the crowd, in either its passive or active form, is of necessity brief. The tense emotional excitement quickly subsides. The strained attention leads to fatigue, consequently

to dissipation of attention except as the exciting stimuli become progressively more intense. The persistence of other stimuli—cold, hunger, rain, physical exhaustion, other sources of excitement—functions to divert attention from the crowd objective to personal needs. Every effective method of dispersing crowds involves some technique for distracting attention.

It was previously pointed out that any disturbance of the routine life of an animal herd, as hunger or thirst or a change of pasture, leads to a state of general uneasiness. If the disturbance be prolonged, the tension may be increased through milling in close formation. In this tense condition any sudden or unusual circumstance, as the fall of a horse, the scent or cry of a wild animal, thunder, lightning, or any sudden noise, may result in a stampede. Against a background of tension and discomfort the frightened behavior of one or a few may throw all into a panic. There is a sudden and wild run and dispersion of the herd. They act together, as by common impulse, but the behavior is unconcerted.

Certain phenomena among human groups have many elements in common with the animal stampede. The so-called rushes, as to newly discovered gold fields, involves a sudden moving together of a considerable number of persons but it is quite unconcerted. The course of events sometimes brings a deliberative or semi-deliberative body to an impasse from which it emerges, as by a common impulse of the members, in a new and divergent but unified course of action. The manipulation of such pseudo-deliberative or semi-deliberative groups as political conventions often results in a sudden and apparently spontaneous and enthusiastic unity and course of action quite at odds with the previous intentions of a majority of the membership.

The panic represents behavior following the sudden breakdown of an organization or of group or concerted behavior. It resembles the animal stampede in that it is collective and without organization or common end. In the panic the basic emotion is fear and the activity is an attempt to escape impending danger. Seized by a sudden overpowering fright, individuals make frantic and unreasoning efforts to reach safety. The emotional condition of each is heightened by the exaggerated behavior of others but the behavior of each is directed to achieve his own individual ends. The behavior of the union army at the battle of Bull Run was typical panic behavior.

Behavior similar to that characteristic of the panic is common apart from the actual physical proximity of persons. It appears as an incident of business affairs, in political and international relations, and elsewhere where there are easy means of rapid communication. If people are apprehensive of the safety of a financial institution, for example, any rumor may precipitate a rush to withdraw deposits. Similar violent measures to escape loss are familiar in the disposition of men to unload their securities on a falling market. The financial panic is the convulsive effort of individuals to escape loss after a period of excitement, over-trading, and inflated prices.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. What is the relation of the crowd to the phenomena discussed in the previous chapter?

2. Define the crowd. In what other ways is the word used?

3. On the basis of his definition of the crowd, how could Martin distinguish crowd behavior from other forms of collective behavior?

4. In what sense is the crowd a unity? What is the bond or basis of the unity?

5. Give the characteristics of the fully organized crowd and explain each.

6. Is it accurate to speak of animal aggregations as crowds? Justify your answer.

7. In terms of what can the members of a heterogeneous group interact? Does this explain the irrational behavior of crowds?

8. How does behavior within the crowd differ from the animal behavior in a herd and in a pack of animals?

9. Explain why the crowd is easily led.

10. What is the relation of the leader to the crowd?

11. Distinguish clearly and sharply between orgiastic and political crowds.

12. Explain the importance of the dance and its relation to the orgiastic crowd.

13. How do you understand the Dance of St. John described in the text?

14. What is your interpretation of the Flagellants?

15. What was the "one common delusion" that united the dancing groups described by Hecker?

16. Does this behavior strike you as more irrational than that of groups in your own community?

17. How is the dance related to the phenomenon of inspiration?

18. What remnants of the dance, other than those mentioned in the text, are found in the modern religious exercises?

19. In what sense does the church stimulate and in what sense repress the emotional behavior of the congregation?

20. Explain the effect of the performance described by Mrs. Trollope.

21. How do you explain such physical accompaniments of religious excitement as the jerks? What similar expressions of religious excitement have you seen?

22. How are trance, vision, prophecy, and healing the sick related to crowd excitement?

23. When you are studying a foreign language, you often dream in that language, even though you cannot speak it. Relate this to the phenomenon of "speaking with tongues."

24. In what sense is a college mass meeting a spontaneous crowd phenomenon? In what sense is it a technique for developing crowd enthusiasm?

25. What is the purpose of such demonstrations as are staged at political conventions?

26. How does the crowd situation permit the expression of repressed emotions and attitudes?

27. "The individual in the crowd behaves just as he would behave alone, *only more so*." Is this true? Explain.

28. What controls are absent in the crowd?

29. Le Bon speaks of the behavior of the mob as primitive. What is his conception of human nature? Account for the behavior that he calls "primitive."

30. Why has the panic no leader?

31. Comment, from the standpoint of crowd psychology, on Decatur's sentiment, "My country . . . right or wrong."

32. Is there social control in the crowd? If so, describe its nature.

33. "The crowd is always intellectually inferior to the isolated individual." "The crowd may be better or worse than the individual." What element of truth is there in each of these statements? Do they contradict?

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Collect, classify, and discuss the various definitions of the crowd.

3. Attend a church service and study the various techniques employed in the emotional manipulation of the crowd.

4. Attend a popular lecture and study the introduction of the speaker and the means used by the lecturer himself to get *en rapport* with the audience.

5. Bring together the various classifications of crowds and examine them for the principles used in the classifications. Attempt a logical classification of your own.

6. Describe and discuss the behavior of a college football crowd from the point of view of its spontaneity and manipulation.

7. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

a. The Crowd Defined. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 893-895.

b. Crowd Contagion. C. M. Case, *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, pp. 595-597.

- c. Oratory as a Crowd Control. L. L. Bernard, *An Introduction to Social Psychology*, pp. 460-463.
- d. Crowds and the Mob Spirit. J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 575-576.
- e. Control in the Crowd. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *An Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 655-659.
- f. Crowd Formation. K. Young, *Social Psychology*, pp. 518-521.
- 8. Topics for written themes:
 - a. Interaction in Crowds
 - b. The Manipulation of Crowds
 - c. Police Methods of Crowd Control
 - d. The May Day Festival
 - e. The Armistice Day Orgy
 - f. A Religious Revival
 - g. Religious Hallucinations
 - h. Physical Manifestations in Crowd Excitement
 - i. Crowd Leaders
 - j. Inspiration as a Crowd Phenomenon
 - k. Speaking with Tongues
 - l. Faith Healing
 - m. A Lynching
 - n. A Race Riot
 - o. A Bank Run
 - p. The Red Terror of 1920
 - q. Panics
 - r. The Sinking of the *Eastland*
 - s. The Non-aggregate Crowd

Supplementary Readings

1. Allport, F. H.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. XII, "Response to Social Stimulation in the Crowd," pp. 292-318.
2. Ames, E. S.: *The Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chap. XX, "The Psychology of Religious Sects," pp. 377-395.
3. Bernard, L. L.: "Crowd," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
4. Binkley, R. C.: "The Concept of Public Opinion in the Social Sciences," *Social Forces*, 6(1928), 389-396.
5. Bogardus, E. S.: *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, Chap. XXII, "Crowds and Mobs," pp. 254-265; Chap. XXIII, "Assemblies and Publics," pp. 268-276.
6. Conway, W. M.: *The Crowd in Peace and War*, Chap. I, "Kinds of Crowds," pp. 3-24; Chap. II, "The Nature of Crowds," pp. 25-38.
7. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Organization*, Chap. XII, "The Theory of Public Opinion," pp. 121-134.
8. Davenport, F. M.: *Primary Traits in Religious Revivals*, Chap. III, "Mental Traits of a Psychological 'Crowd,'" pp. 25-31.
9. Ellwood, C. A.: *Psychology of Human Society*, "The Behavior of Crowds," pp. 356-358.
10. Faris, E.: "The Sect and the Sectarian," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 22(1928), 144-158. Also E. W. Burgess (editor), *Personality and the Social Group*, pp. 134-150.

11. Gault, R. H.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. VII, "The Crowd and Allied Phenomena," pp. 155-178.
12. Gillin, J. L., and F. W. Blackmar: *Outlines of Sociology*, Chap. XXI, "Collective Behavior," pp. 396-412.
13. Hayes, E. C.: *Sociology*, Chap. XX, "Personal Groups and Crowds," pp. 478-487.
14. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XVI, "The Sociology of Crowds," pp. 200-211.
15. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Crowds and Social Movements," pp. 296-314; Chap. XIV, "Public Opinions, Propagandas, Democracy," pp. 316-358.
16. LeBon, G.: *The Crowd*, Book I, Chap. I, "General Characteristics of Crowds," pp. 25-38; Book III, Chap. I, "The Classification of Crowds," pp. 177-182.
17. Lorden, Doris M.: "Mob Behavior and Social Attitudes," *Sociology and Social Research*, 14(1930), 324-331.
18. Martin, E. D.: *The Behavior of Crowds*, Chap. II, "How Crowds Are Formed," pp. 14-50.
19. Martin, E. D.: "Some Mechanisms Which Distinguish the Crowd from Other Forms of Social Behavior," *Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, 18(1923), 187-203. Also J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Readings in Sociology*, pp. 576-578.
20. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Collective Behavior," pp. 865-934.
21. Pratt, J. B.: *The Religious Consciousness*, Chap. IX, "Crowd Psychology and Revivals," pp. 165-194.
22. Ross, E. A.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. III, "The Crowd," pp. 43-61; Chap. IV, "Mob Mind," pp. 63-82.
23. Thompson, J. W.: "The Aftermath of the Black Death and the Aftermath of the Great War," *American Journal of Sociology*, 26(1920-1921), 565-572.
24. Thrasher, F. M.: *The Gang*, Chap. III, "What Is a Gang?" pp. 45-57; Chap. IV, "Types of Gangs," pp. 58-76.
25. Waller, W.: *The Sociology of Teaching*, Chap. XII, "Crowd and Mob Psychology in the School," pp. 160-174.
26. Wallis, W. D.: *An Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XV, "Crowd Psychology," pp. 163-170.
27. Wallis, W. D., and M. M. Willey: *Readings in Sociology*, Chap. VII, "The Crowd," pp. 299-313.
28. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. XX, "The Behavior of Crowds," pp. 505-521; Chap. XXI, "Crowd Behavior and Personality," pp. 522-535.
29. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XXII, "Characteristics of Crowd Behavior," pp. 627-664; Chap. XXV, "The Nature of Public Opinion," pp. 722-753.

CHAPTER XIX

PUBLIC BEHAVIOR AND MASS MOVEMENTS

The previous chapter had to do with groups of people in close proximity and keenly aware of the presence of others. The discussion was restricted to such congregate groups as derive their unity from mutually sympathetic responses on the emotional level. Each crowd is a unique phenomenon of brief duration that is without a past or a future. It forms spontaneously, organizes emotionally, and acts impulsively.

But crowds are not the only form of congregate groups. There are types of human gatherings that lack every characteristic of the crowd except the close proximity of persons; there are many human groupings that lack one or more of the characteristics essential to a crowd. A public meeting is to a large extent a chance collection of persons who have not previously come together and may never assemble again. Its duration is brief. In other respects, however, it is commonly different from, rather than similar to, a crowd. An audience, as at the theater, assembles for a certain end and each member knows what to expect from the experience. Church congregations, political conventions, legislative assemblies, university convocations, congressional sessions, cabinet meetings, army mobilizations, and many other aggregations of persons are unlike crowds in some one or many essential respects.

The present chapter has to do with publics and public behavior and with mass movements that imply a more or less distinct internal unity without of necessity involving the physical assembly of persons within sight and hearing of one another. The number of such unassembled unities is almost indefinitely large. In races, as such, there is a degree of internal unity and of sentimental solidarity that gives them a life more or less separate and apart from others. Nations are the largest politically organized groups and they have a sentimental unity and solidarity apart from any political structure; patriotism is the individual expression of the emotional bonds that underlie and make possible the

governmental machinery. Political parties, social factions, economic classes, labor unions, professional bodies, and college alumni are among a great number of groups whose members are dispersed but more or less keenly group conscious and capable of mass behavior.

A. THE CROWD AND THE PUBLIC

Attention must again be directed to the levels of interaction and the forms of group unity. In certain types of groups unity is established and maintained for the most part on the levels of organic sympathy and social sentiment. In the swarm of insects, the school of fishes, the flock of birds, the herd of cattle, and other animal groupings there is no body of custom or convention to give behavior patterns and there is no foresight, no visualization of ends, in terms of which appropriate behavior may be defined. The unity of these aggregations is on the basis of instinct, or other inherited mechanism, and the mass and collective activity appear to be wholly on the plane of physiological response and organic sympathy. In certain forms of unity and behavior in human groups, notably in the orgy and the mob, interaction appears to be largely on the basis of immediate response to stimuli and almost or quite devoid of either conventional or intellectual considerations.

In the behavior of other human aggregations the interaction is primarily sentimental, that is, on the basis of accepted and unquestioned sentiments, conventions, and *mores*. The things common to the members of the group, and in terms of which communication runs and unity is maintained, are the conventional definitions. The members of a sect, class, congregation, or other similar organization are possessed of a body of doctrine that determines unity and dictates behavior. In the concrete behavior phenomena of such groups there is always some considerable interaction on the animal plane of immediate response to the physical presence and mood of other persons. There is also some interaction on the critical plane, some modicum of intelligence and rationality. But in human groups generally, the interaction is on a sentimental plane and the behavior in accord with conventional definition and traditional pattern.

In the third form of collective activity the intellectual processes are dominant and critical interaction prevails. Unity is estab-

lished and maintained on the basis of secondary relations and instrumental considerations.

Such groups are publics. The public is any group, aggregate or non-aggregate, that achieves corporate unity through critical interaction. In it there is an absence of sympathetic stimulation and response on the organic level and an absence of interaction in terms of the conventional and traditional definitions. The discussion of members is on the basis of relevant facts, free from sentiment and bias and passion, and it eventuates in a consensus that controls and guides the subsequent activity of the group.

The concept is not to be confused with the various common-sense usages of the term. It is often used in popular and journalistic writing and discussion as an antonym of private. It is usual, for example, to speak of making certain matters public, meaning that they are made open and accessible to anyone who cares to inquire into them. In this sense the deliberations of the town council, the legislative assembly, or the federal congress are public: anyone may attend the sessions and listen to the proceedings who desires to do so. The term is also in general use to designate all the people who are not immediately concerned in the acts or affairs of a specific group. It is usual, for example, to speak of certain occurrences within the individual family as private matters, matters that are of no proper concern to anyone except the members of the particular family group. The world outside is the public. In the private wars between employers and employees there are frequent references and appeals to the public, that is, to those parts of the population that are spectators rather than active participants in the dispute. These usages of the term, as well as others that might be mentioned, have more or less general currency and are of course entirely legitimate; so far as the usage is consistent and understood there is no confusion of thought. The meaning of the term as used in the present discussion was defined in the preceding paragraph.

The essential nature of the public is most clearly grasped when it is thrown into contrast to the crowd. In the crowd there are expectancy, enthusiasm, and excitement; in the public there is an absence of excitement and tension, it is a critical, not an emotional group. In the crowd there is an absence of discussion, hence of reflection, and action is on the basis of impulse. In the public discussion is free and unimpassioned; all relevant facts are received for consideration, divergent and conflicting opinions are

expressed and evaluated, all impulses to and proposals for action are criticized in terms of past experience and probable future consequences, a judgment is formulated in advance of action which is always deliberate and reasoned. The crowd generates and expresses emotion and mills to a dominating collective impulse; the public deliberates in regard to issues on the basis of fact and evidence. The crowd reaches unanimity through the development of *rapport*; the public arrives at a consensus through the clash and modification of opinion. The crowd is an ecstatic, the public a rational, group.

The public in this sense is, of course, an abstraction. In the consideration of publics in the sense of concrete groups it must be kept in mind that they conform in part only, approach more or less closely, to the purely deliberative and critical. The foregoing definition in conceptual terms fits with exactness no concrete group actually experienced. The nearest concrete approach to an ideal public is perhaps the body of scholars who constitute a scientific society. A group of mathematicians or physicists, for example, may discuss problems of their respective disciplines in a wholly unimpassioned way. No matter of sentiment is involved, the sole aim is to arrive at impersonal truth, and any effect of animal or personal response may be avoided by an absence of congregation. It is, or may be, a purely critical and deliberative procedure, a matter of intellectual stimulus and response in a rational method of carrying on a community enterprise and arriving at a group judgment. As a matter of fact a meeting of scientists is very commonly tinged with other forms of interaction. The exhilarating effect of the presence of others cannot be wholly canceled, and the inhibitions of convention generally prevent complete, free, and direct presentation. Moreover, in an assembled group, the idiosyncrasies of personalities and the accidents of circumstance obtrude obstacles in the way of free discussion. The prestige of reputation, the aggression of the narcissistic and inconsiderate, the volubility of the verbalist, the timidity of genius, and numerous other factors lower the tone of scientific gatherings and prevent an absolutely free discussion. A scientific meeting is perhaps dominated by intellectual interest and critical unity but always more or less contaminated by the convivial, conventional, banal, and trivial. But the scientific process, in the long run and aside from the assembly of scholars, is an exclusively critical procedure.

The legislative assembly, the jury, and other similar groups, designed to function wholly on the basis of fact and evidence and with all the carefully framed rules of procedure and evidence designed to conserve individual judgment and insure deliberation, in some respects and at certain times behave as crowds rather than as publics. Interaction is sentimental and emotional rather than critical, it goes on the basis of tradition rather than on the basis of relevant fact. Sometimes the immediate and undisciplined impulses are allowed to dictate acts. As a result such groups sometimes formulate and express sentiments rather than judgments.

The size of a public is determined by the available means of discussion. Until recently there were no means of communication that made possible a public of very considerable size. Prior to the development of communication by means of newspapers and other printed matter, publics were chiefly or exclusively aggregate groups, as the jury, the town meeting, the legislative assembly, and the council. They were limited to groups in which discussion and argument could be carried on by oral means.

In the present day publics are not always, or usually, congregate groups. The development of printing and other means of distance communication has created a public or a series of publics in the distributive sense. The new means of communication enable persons to participate in the discussion of an issue without being in direct face-to-face contact with each other, and they have enormously increased the size of publics. In the present era great numbers of widely distributed people may follow the course of happenings and promptly register their reactions. The new means of communication have made possible various "newspaper publics," radio audiences, trade associations, labor organizations, professional societies, and like public or semipublic groups, many of them international in scope. Most of the recent semipopular interest in public opinion is directed toward the behavior of these non-aggregate special publics.

Discussion eventuates in the formation and registration of a consensus on the matters at issue. This consensus is what is meant by public opinion. It is in the nature of a reasoned judgment and commonly embodies an objective to future activity. The validity of any opinion depends upon the competence of the person who holds it to arrive at an intellectual judgment in the premises; his opinion may be invalid either because the facts

necessary to a judgment are not known to him or because he lacks the native wit to arrive at a valid judgment even though the facts are available to him. The validity of a public opinion depends, in a similar manner, upon the adequacy of the discussion preceding and accompanying its formation. The adequacy of the discussion is a matter of time, competence, and a knowledge of the relevant facts. A scientific opinion, for example, is based upon a long and detailed examination of all the known relevant facts supplemented by a knowledge of the judgments of other workers in the same field. A scientific consensus—that is, a public opinion—is based on years and sometimes centuries of discussion among those who know the facts and are competent to understand them.

In regard to political questions and social matters generally, the complex that passes as public opinion and determines group policy is commonly something quite different. Most often it is a highly complex mass of prejudice, sentiment, and special interest masquerading under a pretense of rationality. It is more often general sentiment than public opinion; its derivation is in the emotions rather than in the intellect, and it is rarely based upon open discussion and an adequate knowledge of the pertinent facts. In regard to any national policy, for example, as the protective tariff, the prohibition amendment, or the cancellation of foreign debts, each individual has some conviction but it may not in general be accurately called an opinion. It is not the result of reflection on the basis of the pertinent facts; the ordinary individual does not know the facts and he is not competent to evaluate them. What passes as public opinion on such questions is conviction rather than judgment. The pertinent facts are not generally discussed and, where they are discussed, cannot be comprehended by the general population. On most questions of economic and social character voting men, as their elected representatives, can no more form valid judgments than they can form them on mathematical and scientific questions.

B. THE NATURE OF MASS MOVEMENTS

The crowd is always a congregate group. But the same type of influence that creates crowds, where men are in close proximity to one another, may spread among large numbers distributed over wide areas and give rise to similar types of emotional excitement and activity. A mass movement differs from crowd behav-

ior in that it does not of necessity involve the physical presence of the numbers in a limited area. The mass is typically a dispersed group. Its behavior is often much the same as that of the crowd and the two are in most respects closely related. Certain types of mass movement have their origin in crowd excitement and, in the course of mass movements, crowds and crowd behavior are typical incidents.

But in spite of their similarities and relationships the two are distinct types of social phenomena. Their frequent confusion in the literature of crowd psychology arises from a failure to recognize that the emotional exaltation resulting from the circular stimulation of large numbers of excited men, and the extreme and bizarre behavior that may accompany a lifting of the inhibitions, may not exist in the absence of the direct sense stimulation of the aggregate group. A frequent identification of "the crowd" and "the masses," as in Le Bon and others, assumes that the same feeling of emotional exaltation may be reached in the members of a dispersed population as is reached in the mob and the orgy. It is true that something of the same feelings of fear, anger, or enthusiasm is aroused in occasional individuals by means of newspaper and other sensational presentation, but the degree of emotion is less, and the feeling that comes from close contact with large groups of excited men is almost wholly absent.

Mass and public movements ordinarily involve a larger number of persons than can participate in any particular crowd or group of crowd activities. The crowd proper is limited by the range of the human voice and facial gesture; public phenomena and mass movements may involve a whole people. The number of persons even in the largest crowd is trivial in comparison with the population of a city or a nation. But the existence of mass movements, as of crowds, implies and expresses a more or less widespread state of social unrest as well as a community of sentiments, attitudes, beliefs, and habits of thought and action. In contrast to the crowd, mass movements form slowly, develop organization on a more formal and enduring basis, and center attention on more abstract symbols. They are, in consequence, more irresistible in trend and significant in result. The crowd is spectacular but ephemeral; the mass movement may or may not be spectacular but it is menacing, formidable, and fatalistic.

Mass movements are formed in much the same way as are crowds and, in the beginning, have many of the same character-

istics. There are a focusing of attention and an initial stage of excitement and emotional tension. Out of this, through the circular stimulation and restimulation of the disturbed persons, either in congregate groups or in a dispersed but communicating population, develops an emotional unity. Leaders arise and articulate the sentiments and feelings common to the group and themselves become centers of stimulation and organization. A collective purpose emerges and gets symbolic expression. The focused attention; by narrowing the range of critical response, increases credulity and mystical emotion at the same time that it releases impulses normally inhibited. The beliefs and behavior that characterize groups in times of war or during national elections are examples of mass phenomena.

Mass migrations are perhaps the most elementary form of mass movements. They are earliest in point of time and they are simplest in organization. They resemble in more or less detail the migratory behavior of certain animal groups acting in response to stimuli that are general and imperative. The swarming of bees and ants, the migration of birds and fishes, and other mass movements among animal forms are in response to an inner restlessness induced by the external conditions. The mass migration of peoples is of much the same order. They grow directly from a condition of general unrest in a population. For many people, for whatever reason, the conditions of life become intolerable, and individuals, moving in the search for better opportunities and for more satisfying conditions, stimulate other similarly circumstanced persons to like behavior.

Some animals seem to come together in an almost haphazard fashion, simply because they are all blindly following the same instinct at the same time. When food grows scarce many rodents, such as rats, gather together in enormous numbers, and migrate in company.

The lemmings of the Siberian tundras migrate in this way at the end of a season, when they have been more than usually abundant, and have exhausted the food available. They march northwards in closely pressed ranks, but it is not an organized march after a leader; they simply pour straight onwards like a living stream, turning aside for no obstacle.

If a mountain stands in their way, they go up one side and down the other, never attempting to go round. If a river crosses their path, they plunge in and swim to the other side—those who can.

Many are carried away, many more become exhausted and die on the march, many more are snapped up by the birds and beasts of prey that

continually harass the rearguard of the lemmings. But those that are left plod steadily onwards, resting by day, and marching by night, eating every blade of grass and every growing plant as they go, just as the migrating young locusts do in southern lands.

Eventually, in many cases, they reach the shores of the sea, but even that does not stop them. They plunge boldly in, and the waves sweep over them.

The lemmings' march cannot be called intelligent combination, but we can find very good examples of this, even among the rodents or gnawing animals, the order to which the stupid lemmings belong.¹

In certain circumstances there may be mass migration of a segment of a human population or even of a whole people. A tribe or part of a tribe may move to an unoccupied territory or invade the area of settlement of another people. The dispersion of men over the surface of the earth from the original home was probably the movement of considerable tribal groups. Many such movements of peoples fall within the period of historic records. The movement of the Israelites from Canaan into Egypt and their return after several generations was a movement *en masse* involving the whole or a large proportion of the tribes acting as a unit. Among the numerous instances in the period of West European history may be mentioned the invasion of the Goths from the middle of the third century to the end of the fifth, that of the Huns in the fourth, and that of the Magyars at the close of the ninth century. The mass migrations of smaller groups, as the Mormon sect from Iowa to a new home in Utah, with all their material possessions and immaterial baggage, are numerous and familiar.

In some cases these movements are regularly recurring phenomena. Some primitive tribes make semiannual or seasonal migrations from one area to another, and sometimes distant, area. Each year the Haida Indians of British Columbia make a voyage of some five hundred miles to Puget Sound to secure clams and oysters.² Other tribes change their base of operations with the maturing of a particular food supply. Many nomadic tribes change their location to follow the pasture on which their herds depend. The mountain tribes of Persia, numbering perhaps a million tribesmen, with the vast herds upon which they depend—

¹ M. R. Thomson and J. A. Thomson, *Threads in the Web of Life*, pp. 162-164. Quoted by permission of The Macmillan Company.

² O. T. Mason, "Migration and the Food Quest," *American Anthropologist*, 7(1894), 279.

perhaps ten million head—cross the roadless mountain ranges twice each year. The herds are dependent upon grass and no part of the tribal country produces grass throughout the year. In moving from one grazing ground to another, all start at approximately the same time, with their families and household goods, and live on what they can carry. It is a movement of an entire people acting as a unit.

A different type of mass migration is that in which a large number of persons, each acting in large measure independently and without awareness of the others, embark more or less simultaneously on the same journey. Such movements have their origin in a state of crowd excitement or general enthusiasm initiated by rumors or reports of great opportunities to acquire sudden wealth at some distant place. The discovery of gold in California and Alaska precipitated spectacular mass migrations, as did also the discovery of diamond deposits in South Africa and the opening of Oklahoma to white settlement.

The accidental discovery of gold deposits in California in the Spring of 1848 created an intense local excitement and, as soon as the rumor had received some degree of verification, a movement to the mines. "The excitement produced [by the specimens of gold brought from the region] was intense; and many were soon busy in their hasty preparations for a departure for the mines. . . . The family who had kept house for me caught the moving infection. Husband and wife were both packing up." The excitement spread to all classes of the population. "The blacksmith dropped his hammer, the carpenter his plane, the mason his trowel, the farmer his sickle, the baker his loaf, and the tapster his bottle. All were off to the mines." Every sort of conveyance was pressed into service. Some went "on horses, some in carts, and some on crutches, and one went in a litter. An American woman, who had recently established a boarding house here, pulled up stakes and went off before her lodgers had even time to pay their bills." The village of Monterey was deserted by all who were free to go. "Debtors ran, of course. I have only a community of women left and a gang of prisoners here and there and a few soldiers who will give their captain the slip at the first chance."

The movement was not limited to the people of California and the neighboring territory. Before the close of the year the whole American population was affected by the gold excitement and

thousands were on the march or preparing for the march to California confident that great fortune was almost within their grasp. "Men were selling their businesses, families were breaking up their homes, officials were resigning their positions, and professional men were getting rid of their practice. Literally scores of companies were formed by persons planning to make the trip to California." The movement of individuals to the gold fields during the following year stands among the great world movements of population. The usual conveyance was the animal-drawn covered wagon, though many other means of travel were used. The failure and suffering on the long trek across the country was of course very great. The trails across the desert were bordered by abandoned property and the bleaching skeletons of horses, mules, and cattle. "I counted in a distance of fifteen miles 350 dead horses, 280 oxen, and 120 mules; and hundreds of others are left behind unable to keep up." Vast amounts of property—leather trunks, clothing, and other personal belongings—were abandoned on the way "to the value of at least one hundred thousand dollars, in about twenty miles. . . . I have counted in the last ten miles three hundred sixty-two wagons, which in the States cost about one hundred twenty dollars each."¹

C. THE GANG AND POLITICAL MOVEMENTS

Another type of mass behavior is that represented by gang organization and political movements. These have been the most discussed of all the forces of social organization, comprising at times the chief or only concern of historical students. They continue today to play a major rôle in the life of peoples.

The crowd by definition is a temporary group. Its dissolution may come through the fatigue or discomfort of the members which destroys the mental isolation and unity; the objective of its activity may be achieved and the members disperse; or it may go to pieces in the face of opposition. In any case the members may reassemble at another point or at a later date and continue the interrupted activities or engage in others. The easy formation of crowds that act, disband, and reform is characteristic of periods of social unrest and general disorder. Such periods are often marked by sudden formation of crowds that strike—murder, rob, plunder, burn—and scatter in the face of the first formidable opposition. This character of behavior has been

¹ See K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 712-714.

common if not the typical behavior in the various race riots and labor wars in America.

The mob that disbands and reforms at a later date has undergone essential changes in character; it has ceased to be a crowd in the true sense. At the second and subsequent meetings the group has a past and there is a memory of previous behavior; the group has the beginnings of a tradition and the nucleus of permanent organization. In taking on a recurring form it has changed in character from a mob to a gang.

The gang may also come into existence in a less spectacular way as a more gradual development out of the play group of children. Adolescent boys have a more or less universal tendency to form loosely integrated play groups. These spontaneous groups satisfy certain needs of childhood and youth not met by the present recognized social institutions. The family, the church, and the school are essentially repressive; they operate in the interests of social order and adult convenience. The desire of the child is for activity and for new and stimulating experience. The formation of primary groups outside the social framework is a spontaneous effort of boys to create a society for themselves because the existing social organization is defective and inadequate to their needs. From such associations boys get an experience not possible under the conditions that adult society imposes. Such groups offer an escape from the monotony and repression of the home and the school. They occupy leisure time and provide interesting contacts and experiences. They give an opportunity for adventure—for smoking, drinking, card playing, and other forbidden activities. From these groups the boy gets the thrill of participation in common group activity, more especially in corporate action—in hunting, capture, conflict, flight, and escape. Conflict with other similar groups or with parents, school officials, the police, and the world about them is or easily becomes a form of sport and furnishes the occasion for many exciting group activities. In these conflict activities the group may become integrated, develop a tradition and an unreflective internal structure.

The gang, whether developed out of lawless crowd behavior of adults or from the neighborhood play groups of children, is always a conflict group. It is at war with other groups or with the forces of organized society. In either case it develops distinctive characteristics: as a conflict group it must have internal

unity and solidarity; effective action requires group control and the subordination and discipline of the group members. It requires loyalty, self-sacrifice, and mutual aid. It acquires a high degree of organization, develops and enforces a rigorous code, defines the situation for its members.

The behavior and social significance of gang organization, like every minor social structure, vary with the nature of the larger social order. In certain early and rude societies gangs were often composed of outlaws and brigands organized into predatory bands to prey upon the more peaceful and defenseless elements of society. In some cases they were military castes that exploited the civilian populations and defended the groups they exploited from the attacks of other predatory bands. From the activities of such gangs the military state developed. The Ku-Klux Klan was a notorious American gang of wide incidence. It was the outgrowth of Southern mob activity and operated to intimidate and terrorize the Negroes. Gangs as they exist in the modern cities are, in general, politically protected groups. As the youth gangs approach maturity they are taken under the protection of a ward politician, organized in a conventional way, given immunity and police protection in exchange for votes and other political activity, and continue activities of an extralegal nature. In this form they are essentially political factions or units in the political machine.

The gang may, with the maturity and change of interest of its members, individual shifts in family residence, changes in the character of the neighborhood, or other circumstances, disintegrate and the members be incorporated into other gang organizations or into the general community life. The gang may achieve historic continuity by somewhat formal organization under police protection and by provision for the initiation of new members and for graduation of the older. In this form it is a more or less intermediate stage from a gang to a political faction. Its conflicts with other gangs give way to negotiations and compromises. In the circumstances it may be more advantageous to combine forces to carry on conflict with or prey upon the general social group, or agreements may be reached through a division of territory or of function. But agreements however reached imply status and tend to define a definite rôle in the social order—that is, they have passed into the class of political organizations. In the form of a political party or faction, it is a permanent, oppor-

tunistic group that is characterized by the absence of principles and convictions and that functions in the interests of its members.

D. SECTS AND SECTARIAN MOVEMENTS

The active crowd, when it reassembles and takes on organization and a degree of permanence, becomes a political gang, that is, an organized conflict group preying upon society and at war with the established social order. This gang, in turn, develops by a relatively uniform and orderly process into a political faction or party, that is, an opportunistic group striving to secure control of the governmental machinery and patronage.

The orgiastic crowd when it reassembles and takes on organization and permanence becomes a sect, that is, an organized conflict group at war with the existing moral order. This, in turn, develops and is gradually transformed into some order of denominational or nationalistic group according to the external situation in which the sect is placed.

The orgiastic crowd by means of the dance or similar gymnastic exercises, by prayer and exhortation, by music and group singing, or by other techniques may achieve a high degree of *rappport* and mental isolation. The tense emotional state is conducive to a wide variety of abnormal physical and mental phenomena. Many of these things, especially trance and vision, make a deep impression on the unsophisticated. The afflicted persons themselves often claim to be inspired, and they are thought by others to be supernatural characters or to be persons possessed of occult and mysterious powers guided directly by supernatural beings. The dreams, visions, and other phenomena are interpreted as revelations and manifestations of the supernatural.

The fact that these phenomena are well understood and readily explained in purely naturalistic terms, that they are a regular accompaniment of epilepsy and other diseases, and that they can be induced by the use of various drugs as well as by starvation, exhaustion, and other means is not a matter of consequence. The afflicted persons do not know these facts. Moreover, the state of emotional excitement known as inspiration, however it be induced, is an immediate experience and, as such, has a unique value to the "inspired" person. In the absence of information and a critical attitude observers are awed by the trance and other ecstatic behavior. As the experiences are told and interpreted a group of believers and followers forms about the inspired person

and the movement begins to take form. Every sectarian group is an inspired group or the followers of an inspired person. It is, therefore, a highly selected group in that it includes only such persons as accept the divine character of the beliefs or exercises. The relation of certain of the religious groups to their origin in the phenomena of orgiastic crowd excitement is fixed in their names. Quakers, Shakers, Holy Rollers, Methodists, and others were once terms of derision that were at the same time descriptive of the ecstatic crowd behavior that characterized the groups in their primitive forms.

In the formation of the sect, and before it can develop beyond the initial stages of orgy and inspiration, two types of leadership must be present. In the beginning there must be a crowd orator, a verbalist able to arouse crowd enthusiasm and to articulate the feelings and aspirations of the group. This type of crowd leader is an emotionally unstable and easily inspired person, that is, one who comes readily under the emotional influence of the crowd. Without the appearance of such a person the sect does not gain converts. But if the sect is to be anything more than an ephemeral and local disturbance of the social order, a Jesuitic type of leadership must also appear, a person unmoved by the crowd excitement but with ability to take advantage of it and organize it. The organization gives stability and permanence; visible structure and interested functionaries are essential to continuity. In the origin of Methodism the two types of leadership were present in the persons of Wesley and Whitefield. The two types, the orator and the statesman, may of course be combined in the same person.

With the enthusiastic propagation of the idea, sentiment, aspiration, or what not that is the unique possession of the inspired group, converts are made. Policies are defined and dogmas and doctrines are formulated. As an administrative machinery is developed the group takes definite form, and the sect is then a going concern.

The sect is of course a conflict group. It is concerned to establish a code of morals and a set of practices different from those which prevail in the group of which the sect is an offshoot. For these new definitions it claims a divine authority arising from the inspirational nature of its origin and leadership. Possessed of divine inspirational revelations it is obligated to convert the world to the true ways of life. It is thus in its very nature at

war with the existing practices, and conflict between the group and the established order is inevitable.

The next step in sectarian development is the achievement of isolation. The sect sets itself off from the world that it seeks to convert. This is in part accidental and undesigned; in part it is deliberate and intentional. Some method of identifying fellow members is essential when the membership of the group increases beyond the bounds of personal acquaintanceship. The simple, obvious, and effective means to this end is some distinctive external peculiarity. The group adopts, therefore, an external mark by which members may be readily identified. It may be a peculiar and characteristic form of dress, a distinctive form of speech, an unusual cut of the beard, or any other obvious external sign that identifies. These marks are of course always rationalized.

But peculiarities of dress or manner make the person an object of ridicule and subject to other forms of persecution. This changes the psychological and sociological character of the external marks: from being indifferent signs of recognition they become objects heavily freighted with emotional content. Persecution dignifies and sanctifies the signs which were at first artificial and ludicrous and it becomes a cardinal principle of the sect to maintain them. To discard the marks is an act of disloyalty; heresy in one form is the giving up, under attack, of the external symbols of membership in the sect.

If the teachings or practices of the sect are such as to constitute a menace to the established institutional and moral order, or if their activities make them a public nuisance, more or less serious effort is generally made to destroy the group or to suppress the more offensive of its practices. Unless such repressive measures are ruthless and efficient they serve merely to solidify the group; the sect thrives on persecution. In the effort to escape persecution, or to prevent corruption of their members by contacts with the worldly, or to avoid losing their members to other groups, the sect may become territorially isolated. They may, as did the Mormons, establish a colony on the frontier.

If the group achieves a territorial isolation it begins a new stage in its evolution. As the dominant power in the region it controls the government, the schools, the press, and other institutional forms and can propagate its characteristics unmolested. In this situation the peculiarities of custom, practice, and belief are

impressed upon and characterize the area of dominance. But in escaping the external pressure of persecution the internal bonds of fanatical loyalty loosen and the problems change. The group is transformed into a nationality.

Failing to achieve a territorial isolation and forced to live in the midst of an indifferent or hostile environment, the sect gradually dies out or gradually takes on the character of an accommodation group. In order to gain converts the fanatically rigid discipline is relaxed, or the more offensive features of creed and practice are modified. On the other hand, the larger the group becomes, through securing new converts, the more variation there is within it; it grows in tolerance as it increases in members. As it becomes more tolerant persecution declines and the group is accepted or tolerated on the same basis as other rival organizations. At this stage the sect has evolved into a denomination. It has changed from a conflict to an accommodation group.

E. NATIONALISTIC MOVEMENTS

The nationalistic group, as suggested above, is one that has achieved a degree of territorial isolation sufficient to give an effective control over the instruments of culture and is, therefore, able to control individual enlightenment and thereby perpetuate the practices, beliefs, and state of mind characteristic of the group. To the extent that it is able to reach this stage of development it becomes a state. Something approaching this was reached by the Mormons in Utah. Ulster is another historic example of a sect developing into something approaching the position of a nation within the British Empire.

In the struggle for power and status most groups fail to achieve national status. In order to do so there must be a degree of territorial isolation, else the distinctive body of beliefs and behavior patterns cannot be maintained and perpetuated. The isolation may, in its origin, be incidental and voluntary or it may arise as a result of persecution or of an enforced segregation. The group may achieve isolation or it may have isolation thrust upon it.

Any number of persons possessed of ideas, beliefs, and sentiments that diverge in any radical way from those common to the group are drawn together by their common interests and by the

absence of sympathy between themselves and the group as a whole. The two facts are coincident. The common divergent interests may be so numerous, or seem to the individuals so important, as to lead to a more or less complete separation. The isolation is voluntary and, in the beginning, may be an incident of the divergent interests rather than a major objective.

Any group in a complex population may be excluded, more or less completely, from participation in the culture life because of peculiarities offensive to the group as a whole. Differences of race, religion, language, culture traits, or other facts may result in a deliberate, formal, and intentional exclusion of the divergent persons. The segregation of the Negroes in the American South has been general from the beginning of the Negroes in the American population. The religious practices of the Mormons made them so offensive to their non-Mormon neighbors as to lead to their being not only segregated but driven out of the regions in which they undertook to settle. Any incident resulting from culture diversity, as language or unusual food practices, leads to the avoidance or exclusion of the persons.

If the group be excluded by act of the dominant element of the society, it develops a characteristic state of mind, one in harmony with the position that it is compelled to occupy in the culture area. In the situation either one of two courses is open. To avoid exclusion, neglect, and ridicule, individuals may strive to remove the traits that lead to their exclusion and attempt to conform to the patterns acceptable to the society. They may conceal or eradicate marks of divergence and conform to the patterns of the culture. The immigrant in America learns the language, adopts the clothes, and otherwise attempts to conform to the American standards and in doing so discards the practices of his foreign group. In case the traits that lead to the exclusion are ineradicable, as skin color or other racial marks, or in case they have great emotional content, as religious beliefs and practices, the individuals may develop a body of defense doctrine instead of attempting to eradicate the peculiarities. In the effort to maintain self-respect the characteristics that lead to group exclusion are emphasized and take on an added emotional content; they acquire a culture significance that they would otherwise not have. If the segregation of the group be voluntary in its origin, the members will develop external marks as a matter of convenience in the effort to maintain their identity. A dis-

tinctive form of dress, speech, or other external marks makes it easy to recognize fellow believers and to identify the outsiders.

Regardless, therefore, of whether the original isolation of the group was voluntary or was brought about by the action of the larger society, the isolated group will, in its developed form, be characterized by a group of external marks and by a set of characteristic mental attitudes. If the beliefs and practices are the cause of the exclusion, the group will evolve a psychology to justify the status in order to maintain self-respect; if it is their beliefs that lead to the separation or exclusion, the group will develop external marks to help in the perpetuation of the group and in the propagation of its beliefs.

The term nationalism, as distinct from the political concept of nationality, refers to the body of sentiments and attitudes that hold the members of physically or culturally divergent groups together and keep them apart from the major and dominating population elements. It is, as explained above, one characteristic stage in sectarian evolution. The group so marked has not achieved a territorial isolation and political autonomy but is definitely oriented in that direction. The body of nationalistic sentiment is invariably an expression of a conflict situation.

The chief and most intense expressions of nationalism have come within the past half century. They have resulted from conflicts of the various underprivileged groups with others that are more powerful and therefore politically dominant. In recognition of the claims of such minority groups certain more or less vague references to the "self-determination of peoples" were incorporated into the terms of settlement at the close of the World War. A survey of the contemporary expressions of the nationalistic sentiment would include groups from all parts of the globe. The Irish and the Poles have been particularly conspicuous. But the Lithuanians, Letts, Ukrainians, Finns, Esths, and Albanians furnish additional instances from Europe, and there are similar movements in Egypt, Africa, India, Turkey, Korea, and China and in some of the dependencies of the United States. Nationalism is to be regarded as a world movement, however, only in the sense that similar situations in various parts of the world have given rise to relatively independent manifestations of the same sort of phenomena; it is a movement making for world division, through the erection of sentimental barriers to the free intercourse of peoples. As mentioned in a previous chapter,

it is the most powerful hindrance to cultural assimilation. Its genesis is in the struggle of racial and cultural minorities for recognition and status in the inclusive society or for recognition as independent political units. In the course of such struggles, and as an incident and consequence of them, the participating individuals develop intense group consciousness and the appropriate sentiments of loyalty. These emotional attitudes become organized about whatever distinctive characteristics the isolated group may possess; the racial traits, religious beliefs, language differences, and the like are simply focal points about which the sentiment is organized, but as symbols of the collective ideal they become invested with peculiar sanctity. The nationalistic complex rests in all cases upon a sentimental rather than upon a rational basis, though, in all cases, the emotional complex is rationalized to appear as intellectual rather than as emotional. Nationalism is thus a constellation of sentiments aroused in culture conflict and resulting in characteristic types of group behavior. It thus becomes a form of religion; loyalty and devotion to the symbols are obligatory upon each member of the group.

The effect of the development of a nationalistic group and body of sentiments is always and of necessity a cultural retardation of the group. Separate schools, churches, literature, and the like isolate the members of the group from contacts with the chief culture stream. The cultural retardation that results from exclusion and absence of participation in the general social life has the effect of intensifying the sentiment against the dominating group and thus results in a yet more complete exclusion. But the more complete the exclusion and the more backward the group the less able they are to realize their backwardness, and the less they are concerned to measure up to the current standards of the world at large. The very peculiarities of the backwardness appear to the sectarian as values of superior worth.

F. REFORM MOVEMENTS

Other forms of collective behavior are manifested in fashion, reform, and revolution. Each of these may and, in any full understanding, must be analyzed in its mass- and social-movement aspects. Fashion was discussed in an earlier chapter as a mechanism of control and may be dismissed with mere passing mention at this point. As a form of social movement it is in the nature of unrest expressing an unanalyzed protest against the

loss of freedom and the submergence of personality in custom. In its cruder expressions it is an effort to differentiate oneself, to get distinction and prestige by alinement with persons and classes that stand in superior place in the social hierarchy, or to avoid such alinement with persons of inferior rank. Fashion is apparently one of the fundamental means of social change.

A reform is a mass movement designed to bring the behavior of persons or groups more nearly into harmony with the traditional or ideal definitions and standards. It is an attempt to change behavior or conditions that are believed to be evil—that is, not in accord with the *mores* of the group—or it may be directed toward the administrative or institutional conditions believed to be responsible for the evils. It calls for a more or less important change in social policy and administration but is at the same time concerned to preserve and maintain the fundamental institutions intact.

The reform, like epidemics, mobs, migrations, and other collective and mass movements, has its roots in maladjustment and lack of accommodation to the existing social structure. The dissatisfaction and discomfort give rise to restless activity and more or less intelligent efforts to relieve the strain. There may or may not be an active revolt against the conditions; it may or may not be possible to identify the institutional arrangements that prevent the satisfactions of the needs and wishes. Where there is revolt it is commonly directed toward some tangible aspect of the system rather than against the system as a whole. Among the American farmers of the present decade, for example, the incipient revolt tends to be against such obvious abuses as high taxes rather than against the tax system basic to the abuses or against the financial structure as a whole. Such has been the nature of every major movement among the American farmers. The Grange, the Antimonopoly Party, the Reform Party, the National Reform, the Independent Reform, and others of the past as well as the Farmers' Union, the Non-partisan League, the Movement for Agricultural Credit, the Agricultural Bloc, and various other recent and contemporary movements have been or are in each case efforts to satisfy wishes and interests while preserving the system itself. The aim has been not to change the social order but to realize satisfactions within it.

When dissatisfaction is general, the inarticulate unrest may spread and become organized. Agitators may rouse the emo-

tions and reformers direct the behavior toward specific and more or less relevant objectives. Social unrest arising out of maladjustment to the economic system in America has been so widespread and long continued in America that it has developed a type of professional reformer, a regular and standardized technique of reform procedure, and a major journal devoted exclusively to the advocacy and procedures of reform. The objective of the reform movement as of the reformers and the reform journals is always regenerative, never fundamental change.

Crusades are one type of spectacular reform movement. They are concerted and mass movements toward a specific objective of major or minor character. They are generally conducted in a spirit of emotional fervor, often with sectarian enthusiasm and violence. Their successful organization lies in the appeal they make to a basic human interest or experience understood by the common people and to the fact that the opportunity for direct action appeals to the masses of a people.

Reform movements may be examined with profit as a form of unrest. Oriented as they are toward bringing about changes in social administration or policy or in the behavior of various persons, they present no menace to the social order or its major institutions but tend rather to reinforce and strengthen them. In this sense they are, in their essential nature, random activity in that they occupy the time and exhaust the energies of the participants without bringing results that satisfy the wishes that brought them into being.

G. REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENTS

As distinct from reform movements, revolution is a mass movement directed toward the destruction of the traditional order, or some considerable portion of it, as a means to the ends sought by the revolutionary contingent. It represents a demand by a whole social class or segment of society for changes in the fundamental institutions and *mores*, a demand for new values. In the revolutionary procedure each person acts in the name, if not always in the interests, of all.

The important changes in the conditions of human life have everywhere gone on, and go on everywhere at present, without any full awareness or understanding of the people. Such

changes are commonly slow, they are commonly not recognized as important by the majority of people at the time, and they are not directly sought by any organized mass. What may be called scientific revolutions, in the sense that they are fundamental changes produced by scientific discoveries, are the most important. In a fundamental sense they are the only real revolutions. But the consequences of scientific discovery, especially the remote and indirect consequences, attract little attention and less understanding. The change from an anthropomorphic to a mechanistic astronomy is among the greatest of all revolutions. Any great invention, as the bow and arrow, the domestication of animals, or the means of written communication, has revolutionary effects in that it overturns the whole or a major part of the social order. Of even more importance in producing fundamental alterations in the life of man are such discoveries as the theory of evolution, which overthrew the whole of biological science and changed the outlook of man; or the discoveries of Pasteur, which revolutionized medicine and contributed to a rational outlook on life. Such discoveries lie in the realm of ideas and are followed by radical and world-wide alterations in the life of man and in the relations of men; they destroy old institutions and systems and erect others in their place. In a real sense these are the only revolutions but, since they are not the product of disorder, they are commonly not so treated. Change is not usually recognized as revolution unless it is accompanied by violence and disorder.

The literature of revolution deals chiefly with the historical changes in the political constitution of society that have been realized or accompanied by violence and disorder, and the interest has commonly been in the spectacular features. The political revolution is an apparently sudden overturning of the seat of political power and a relocation of control in the political unit. The conflict of political factions and the substitution of one for another, even when accompanied by great violence and bloodshed, is in no real sense revolutionary; it is merely the substitution of one faction of the ruling group for another and represents no real change in the location of political sovereignty; it is simply an accident in the political game. In such activity the institutions and the social structure are not under attack; the question is merely which faction is to administer them. An uprising of the peasantry, on the other hand, that succeeded in destroying the form of government and transferring the seat of power from

the aristocrat to the peasant class would be a revolutionary political upheaval.

Revolutionary changes may occur equally well in any other considerable portion of the social order. Such movements are simply attempts to overturn and destroy existing structures because their presence is in the way of the realization of other values. In the realm of religious values, for example, the church may stand or be thought to stand in the way of what is conceived to be a truly religious life and it may be destroyed in order that the new way may prevail. Historically the religious revolutions, while not the most important, have been the ones most generally successful. An economic revolution is a mass attack upon the existing control of the sustenance system. In the present world the economic revolutionary movement, in so far as it has taken definite form, is directed toward the destruction of the distribution system. The substitution of some other than the present system, as a system of production for use in place of the present system of production for profit, would be an economic revolution.

Revolutionary attempts may be directed toward any considerable aspect of the social order. They have most often been directed toward an overthrow of government because this institution tends to be a conspicuous feature of the social order and tends to come to the support of any minor institutional form that is under attack and, also, because an aroused people are prone to strike at the most obvious aspect of the system that oppresses them.

It can hardly be said, however, that revolution is an attempt to reach objectives by "destroying social order in its entirety," unless the state or other institution under attack is conceived to be the whole order or unless the institutions are so interrelated that the destruction of one is tantamount to the destruction of all. This is not, in general, the case in modern secondary organization. A religious revolution in America of the present day might change the organization, control, and teaching of the church in its entirety without fundamentally disturbing the political, economic, family, and other important aspects of the social order. In the same way a new economic order might replace the present capitalistic system without destroying other parts of the social order. Indeed, such a change might be made in order to preserve the democratic form of government or other highly prized value.

Revolutions are not directed toward the social order in its entirety except in so far as that order is an undifferentiated unit.

The revolutionary process, in so far as it has been defined, involves several more or less distinct steps or stages. A state of relative equilibrium, characterized by a high degree of personal accommodation and institutional stability, is disturbed by invention or other culture fact that upsets the balance. The resulting maladjustments, the physical and mental discomfort and discontent, get expression in increased mobility, aimless activity, and general unorganized restlessness. In the circumstances individual unrest easily becomes social and exaggerated through social contagion. There is epidemic and crowd behavior but no concerted activity toward a common end. Such overt manifestations of discontent and maladjustment as become menacing to a major aspect of the social order, as the economic system, are suppressed by the military and police power of the state.

Such condition may exist and continue as a more or less chronic state; it may even come to be accepted as the normal state of social relations.

The next step in organization of the general movement, though it is more or less coincident in point of time to that just mentioned, is the appearance of intellectuals who voice the accumulated, suppressed, and inarticulate discontent of the masses and point the way to a new order, together with the development of leaders who organize groups and direct the manifestations of unrest. The leaders center the previously distracted attention upon abuses and maladjustments and thereby make possible a degree of concerted action. In pointing the abuses they define a new order and arouse a hope to realize it. This vision of a new order gives strength and unity and objective; the destruction of the old will usher in the new. It is only when the disinherited get the vision of a new order and believe it possible of realization that a revolution is actually underway. Discontent and revolt against intolerable abuses do not produce revolutionary movements; there must also be an ardent belief in the order to be achieved. When this goal has been defined and projected, the attack upon the present order and its destruction are merely among the things necessary to the achievement of the goal.

The state of violence and disorder—the period of crowds, mobs, riots, and bloodshed, the abrupt and violent overthrow of institutions—is in general the end of a long period of change, the

culmination of a long revolutionary process rather than the process itself.

H. COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOR AND SOCIAL CHANGE

The process of social change in its relation to collective behavior phenomena has been touched upon at various points in this and the chapters immediately preceding. A brief general summary at this point will show the relation of the parts to the whole and give the typical sequence of events characteristic of any complete social movement.

The social order is always to be conceived as an unstable equilibrium, as a state of relative balance among the various contending and cooperating factors. Broadly speaking these forces are, on the one hand, the ever changing conditions of life and, on the other, the accommodation patterns of persons. The equilibrium is among the various attitudes and behavior patterns of persons and between these and the parts external to the personality organization itself. The balance of forces is always a moving equilibrium. Every invention and discovery, every advance in science and knowledge, changes the external aspect of life and thereby disturbs the balance, and every reaccommodation of men to the changed universe tends to restore it; every new want or wish of men, arising in consequence of the changed conditions of life and seeking satisfaction, disturbs the balance which is restored by new inventions and adjustments to them.

In any particular time the existing body of culture and social organization—the complex body of culture facts, the definitions and customs in their totality and interrelations—is always more or less imperfect; as a mechanism to satisfy human need it is inadequate in varying degrees. The result of unsatisfied need is tension and tension gets relief in activity. If the nature of the tension is not understood or the social order provides no means for its relief, its manifestations take the form of unrest, that is, activity that leads to exhaustion without relieving the tension.

Such activity, if the inability to satisfy the wishes be general in the society, is easily communicated and gives rise to epidemic, crowd, and other mass phenomena of a more or less spontaneous and irrational character. These phenomena may take on an institutional form. In the one set of conditions the mystic and orgiastic practices may produce vision, trance, or other striking

results and thus define a new way of life, become the basis of a sect and a sectarian movement that ultimately ends, through its own activities, by being transformed into a different institutional pattern, some form of denominational or nationalistic group. In another set of circumstances crowds define immediate objectives and seek to achieve them by direct action; the exhilarating and pleasurable aspects of rioting and mob action as well as the effectiveness of this sort of activity lead to repetition and presently to organization, and the gang thus formed becomes in time, through a series of internal modifications, a political group of some order.

This whole body of phenomena is comparable at least to the milling of the animal herd. It is essentially irrational activity when viewed from any comprehensive point of view; it is often, perhaps generally, as ineffective as a means of changing the fundamental cultural facts and trends that brought it forth as is the milling of the animal herd in changing the natural conditions that produced their discomfort. And the fundamental changes in process in the cultural and social order are scarcely more understood by the milling groups of humanity than the natural facts are understood by the milling herd.

In periods of rapid change and disorder the milling groups may define general ends of activity. In so far as this is done the subsequent behavior takes on definite order and rationality in view of the ends defined. These ends are in all cases projections into the future of ideas, ideals, and aspirations that arise as a consequence of the existing conditions and cannot be realized in the present existing social order. They are essentially visions of a more perfect or satisfactory social order; they represent idealizations of the existing order—the present system with the objects and conditions of discomfort omitted. These are the myths by means of which people live, the myths that give order and direction to mass behavior.

Experience shows that the framing of a future, in some indeterminate time, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have very few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths, which inclose within them all the strongest inclinations of a people, of a party, or of a class, inclinations which recur to the mind with the insistence of instincts in all the circumstances of life; and which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which, more easily than by any other

method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. We know, moreover, that these social myths in no way prevent a man profiting by the observations which he makes in the course of his life, and form no obstacle to the pursuit of his normal occupations.¹

At this stage social unrest passes over into social movements. There is a common and collective definition of the situation in terms of the experienced discomfort and in relation to the ends visualized. When these visions of a better world in the future capture the imagination of those involved, they enter upon a defined and concerted course of action corresponding to the total situation, that is, the present, the ideal, and the means of transition from the one to the other. This course of action is a social movement. In the actual procedure many tentative movements are often entered upon before an effective means is fully defined. There is a rallying about this or that collective representation—socialism, communism, normalcy, planned economy, technocracy—and the substitution of one for another until one is hit upon that pictures an acceptable future. With the end visualized and the means defined, the movement proceeds until it restores an equilibrium or exhausts the participants or until the course of culture change outmodes it.

Questions for Class Discussion

1. Distinguish between the crowd and the mass.
2. Distinguish between the public and the crowd.
3. Define and illustrate the three levels of interaction.
4. Enumerate some of the smaller public groups to which you belong or of which you have some first-hand knowledge.
5. State some of the different uses of the term public.
6. Distinguish between the public and the private life of some man of national reputation. In what sense is public used in such distinction?
7. Why is the public always an abstraction?
8. What groups of those known to you approach most nearly to the ideal public?
9. How large may a public become? Discuss this in relation to the means of communication.
10. How is public opinion related to the opinions of the individual members of the group?
11. Distinguish between group opinion and public opinion.
12. To what extent is public opinion a compromise? To what extent is it a consensus?

¹ G. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence* (T. E. Hulme translation), pp. 133-134. Quoted by permission of the Viking Press, Inc.

13. In what sense does a compromise represent opinion in regard to expedient measures? In what sense does it represent opinion in regard to fundamentals?

14. Upon what does the validity of public opinion rest?

15. Enumerate some questions on which you would say that there is public opinion, as distinct from public sentiment, in your community.

16. Discuss the relation of crisis in the behavior of public sentiment.

17. "All losing sides dread discussion." Discuss this proposition in relation to some public question.

18. What is the relation of public opinion to the *mores*?

19. To what extent do the non-aggregate publics develop substitutes for the rules of parliamentary order that help to conserve deliberation and rational behavior in the aggregate public?

20. Distinguish between a crowd and a mass movement.

21. In what sense are mass movements organizing and in what sense disorganizing factors in society?

22. How are mass movements related to crowd excitement?

23. Under what conditions will a mass movement become organized? Under what conditions will it become institutionalized?

24. What is the essential difference between a migration and a gold run?

25. What is the significance of slogans, catchwords, stereotypes, and abstract ideas in mass movements?

26. How is the gang related to the active crowd? How is it related to the political faction?

27. Give the steps in the sectarian process from the orgiastic crowd to the denomination.

28. What is inspiration and what is its place in the life of the sect?

29. Distinguish the two types of leadership and give examples of group leaders belonging in each class.

30. Define by giving the steps in a nationalistic movement.

31. What is the fundamental distinction between a reform movement and a revolution?

32. State the steps in the process of revolution.

Exercises and Problems

1. Make an analytical outline of the chapter. Append a statement of points you may want to bring up for discussion in class: (a) any points that remain obscure or unrelated to the text after careful reading, (b) any points upon which you would like more evidence.

2. Outline in some detail the life history of some sectarian group.

3. Study a strike as a form of mass movement.

4. Compare or contrast sectarian and revolutionary movements.

5. Study some group of which you are a member to determine the amount of interaction on the different levels.

6. Study some reform from the point of view of a mass movement.

7. Contrast "men of action" and "men of thought" as leaders of men, defining carefully the type of situation as well as what you mean by "leadership."

8. Prepare a class report on one of the following topics:

- a. The Florida Land Boom. K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, pp. 714-718.
- b. Types of Mass Movements. R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, pp. 877-878.
- c. Revolution and Reform. E. A. Ross, *The Outlines of Sociology*, pp. 370-374.
- d. Revolution as a Political Movement. C. A. Dawson and W. E. Gettys, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 786-787.
- e. Psychology of Revolution. C. A. Ellwood, *The Psychology of Human Society*, pp. 253-257.
- f. The Oppression Psychosis. H. A. Miller, *Races, Nations, and Classes*, pp. 32-38.
- g. Contacts in Publics. J. Davis, H. E. Barnes, and others, *Introduction to Sociology*, pp. 456-459.
- h. Public Opinion. C. H. Cooley, *Social Process*, pp. 378-381.
9. Topics for written themes:
 - a. The Mass Migration of a Sect
 - b. Millerism
 - c. A Language Revival
 - d. Popular Heroes
 - e. The Leader as an Inspired Person
 - f. Prophecy in Relation to Mass Behavior
 - g. The Characteristics of the Crowd Leader
 - h. The Statesman—a Jesuitic Leader
 - i. The Criminal Gang
 - j. The Jury as a Public
 - k. The Audience
 - l. Creative Discussion

Supplementary Readings

1. Barnes, H. E.: "Social Reform Programs and Movements: Their Historical Development," *Encyclopaedia Americana*.
2. Bogardus, E. S.: "Analyzing Changes in Public Opinion," *Journal of Applied Sociology*, 9(1925), 372-381.
3. Burgess, J. S.: "Cultural Change in China," *Sociology and Social Research*, 15(1931), 373-380.
4. Case, C. M.: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology*, Chap. XXIX, "Group Behavior," pp. 594-607.
5. Cooley, C. H.: *Social Process*, Chap. XXXI, "Public Opinion as Process," pp. 378-381.
6. Dawson, C. A., and W. E. Gettys: *Introduction to Sociology*, Chap. XX, "Social Reorganization through Social Movements," pp. 763-804.
7. Edwards, L. P.: "Manufacturing 'Reds,'" *Atlantic Monthly*, 126 (1920), 119-121.
8. Ellwood, C. A.: *Introduction to Social Psychology*, Chap. VIII, "Social Change under Abnormal Conditions," pp. 170-187.
9. Ellwood, C. A.: *Cultural Evolution*, Chap. I, "Social Evolution and Cultural Evolution," pp. 3-16.

10. Ellwood, C. A.: *The Psychology of Human Society*, Chap. VIII, "Changes within the Group: Abnormal," pp. 250-274.
11. House, F. N.: *The Range of Social Theory*, Chap. XVII, "Social Movements," pp. 212-219; Chap. XXXII, "Revolution and Reform," pp. 472-491.
12. Johnson, G. G.: "Feminism and the Economic Independence of Woman," *Social Forces*, 3(1925), 612-616.
13. Kallen, H. M.: "Conformity," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
14. Kulp, D. H., II: *Educational Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Crowds and Social Movements," pp. 296-314.
15. Lasker, B.: "What Has Become of Social Reform?" *American Journal of Sociology*, 28(1922-1923), 129-159.
16. Park, R. E.: "Culture and Culture Trends," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 19(1925), 24-36.
17. Park, R. E., and E. W. Burgess: *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chap. XIII, "Collective Behavior," pp. 865-934.
18. Rice, S. A.: "Differential Changes of Political Preference under Campaign Stimulation," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 21(1926), 297-303.
19. Sidis, B.: *The Psychology of Suggestion*, Chap. XXXII, "Financial Crazes," pp. 343-349.
20. Sumner, W. G.: *Folkways*, Chap. II, "Characteristics of the Mores," pp. 86-95.
21. Thrasher, F. M.: *The Gang*, Part I, "The Natural History of the Gang," pp. 3-76.
22. Thrasher, F. M.: "Gangs," *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*.
23. Yoder, D.: "Current Definitions of Revolution," *American Journal of Sociology*, 32(1926-1927), 433-441.
24. Young, K.: *Social Psychology*, Chap. XXII, "The Psychology of the Audience," pp. 537-550; Chap. XXIII, "Fashion as Collective Behavior," pp. 552-568.
25. Young, K.: *Source Book for Social Psychology*, Chap. XXI, "Types of Leadership and Prestige," pp. 582-621; Chap. XXIII, "The Audience," pp. 668-690.

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